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“Do we need a theory of power? Since a theory assumes a prior objectification, it cannot be
asserted as a basis for analytical work. But this analytical work cannot proceed without an
ongoing conceptualization. And this conceptualization implies critical thought—a constant
checking.”
— Foucault

To my daughter Ariana, and the young generation of students in the Middle East
in search of freedom.
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ABSTRACT
Shadieh Emami Mirmobiny

PHILOSOPHY OF POWER AND THE MEDIATION OF ART:
THE LASTING IMPRESSIONS OF ARTISTIC INTERMEDIALITY,
FROM SEVENTEENTH CENTURY PERSIA TO PRESENT
This is a phenomenological study of patriarchy through the examination of its
genealogy as it relates to/parallels with the creative process. I argue patriarchy, while itself a
product of human creativity, has artificially elevated itself to prominence, and as such, has
dominated and shaped subjectivities to its own end. It has done so by undermining
individuality necessary for establishing the foundation of a more democratic form of
government in the region of the Middle East. In this democracy, a dynamic balance and
equity is envisioned between the subject and community.
Therefore, this study is concerned with the power of imagination, in the broad sense,
encompassing all creative endeavors that shape the subject. It focuses on the relationship
between subjecthood, freedom and the infusion of Neoplatonic ideas with iterations of
Islamic principles manifested in art and philosophy serving patriarchy. This study is
predicated on the idea that the exploration of art and subjectivity can uncover the hidden,
implicit power relations between humans and the creative process, and it relies upon the
philosophy of power to establish a theory that aims to reach beyond what Foucault
developed.
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Further, it intends to highlight the issue of “gap” in general, and the gap in particular
that existed between the major Islamic text/principles—a variation of the Platonic “gap”—
and the ideas/actions that have unfolded to this day but have never been questioned. The
objective of this study is to create a space in which the Middle East and the West, each
through its “other,” can recognize the importance of the process of the formation and
preservation of the individual within a collective subjectivity. Finally, this research through a
new theory aims to make more visible the current movements underscoring the individual
subjectivity in the Middle East and to work toward protecting and preserving individual
rights.
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PREFACE

We are convinced, we know, that in a culture everything speaks: the structures of
language impose their form on the order of things. This is merely another version
(a fruitful one, to be sure) of the axiom of the sovereignty of discourse, which
classical iconography already took for granted.1
— Michel Foucault

This study is concerned with the power of art and subject formation. It focuses on the
relationship between subjectivity, freedom and the infusion of Neoplatonic ideas with
iterations of Islamic principles manifested in art and philosophy serving patriarchy. Similar
to what Edward Said accomplished in his Orientalism—bringing to our attention the outercolonial element and its impact on the collective subjectivity of the Middle Easterners—I
suggest, although from within the Middle Eastern culture, Neoplatonism has colonized
subjective consciousness, negating the independent state of the subject in favor of the
collective consciousness. I argue, therefore, the West is not the antithesis to the Middle East,
but that one should look within to locate the antithesis. I am conscious that, because this
thesis focuses on philosophical theories, it may be seen as “idealistic.” Nonetheless,
philosophy more often than not, particularly when involving power, is translated into
formulas that shape real life experiences. Such is the incorporation of Neoplatonism, into art,
philosophy, religion, and culture of the Middle East that has had concrete and tangible
products; however, it has always been seen positively and hence never been critically
investigated. In this project, I have developed a critical discourse that centers on the power
and knowledge that is constructed through art, in its broadest sense (which encompasses
patriarchy/Neoplatonism), in a process that impacts social practices, influential in shaping
subjectivities and defining the interrelationship between the subjects.
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To accomplish this task, I was compelled to highlight the “gap” that existed between
the major Islamic text/principles—a variation of the Platonic “gap”—and the ideas/actions
that have unfolded to this day, but has never been questioned. When Plato crafted the
republic as a system (Book 9), he established a rule predicated on a “gap” between the “real”
and “illusion,” or the “pure” and “impure,” centered on his interpretation of the “divine.” I
suggest, contrary to what Plato argues, this “illusion,” is not in the realm of experience
/senses, rather it must be sought in what humans create, including in Plato’s own work.
Within his system, consequently, Plato engendered an alterity in the artists (Republic,
Book 10). Aristotle, in response to Plato, argues for the usefulness of the arts in the republic
(Poetics 3). Therein he believes the arts provide an appropriate space for the purgation of
emotions (i.e. impurities) such as “fear” and “pity” through “rhythm” and “song,” a process
he calls catharsis (Poetics xxxviii). Therefore, Aristotle deems a purpose for art in the
republic. As a result, art becomes part of the instruments of political power. According to
Michel Foucault “techniques of power” (1990 [1978]: 11) impose themselves on the
formation of the subject and result in subjugation (92). Julia Kristeva, argues that through
this purification the abject is taken back to the pre-language stage. She deems the
“repetition” (i.e. “rhythm” and “song”) in the poetics as “an external rule” that aims to fill the
Platonic “gap . . . between the body and soul […] [and] arranges, defers, differentiates and
organizes . . . [but] no longer is meaning” (Kristeva 28). Plotinus conceals the Platonic “gap”
by unifying both the “intellect” and “matter” with the “One” in his philosophy (Fourth
Ennead, eighth treatise); consequently, it results in the collapse of the space between subject
and object, a precondition to abjection (Kristeva 17-18). Keeping in view the role of art in
subject formation and philosophy inspired by Neoplatonic thoughts infused with
interpretations of Islam, the question I ask is: why has it been nearly impossible for
2

democratic movements to take root in the Middle East and to foster individual rights and
freedoms?
This investigation, therefore, is predicated on the premise that there is a common
thread between the major Western philosophical thought—particularly as manifested in the
German Idealists—and the philosophy infused with iterations of Islam, both derived from the
art and philosophy of Platonism and Neoplatonism. On this assertion, the arts served
patriarchal powers by rendering subjects submissive and unifying them into collective
subjectivities such that they acquiesce to those powers.
Whereas they may appear as mere opposites, the West and the Middle East have
much in common in their foundation, not the least of which are the patriarchal paradigms that
developed and consolidated over time through art and philosophy. I am aware of the fact that
the utilization of the binary terms “West” and the Middle East” is problematic and that they
imply a binary and arbitrary division, subject to continuous criticism. Nonetheless, the very
point I have stressed here is that they overlap, both in art, culture and philosophy.2 However,
the process of subject-formation in them took place differently, therefore bringing each
patriarchy out of sync with the other. Whereas many philosophers, such as Kant, Schiller,
Hegel and Heidegger (i.e. German Idealists) have viewed art as a path toward “freedom,” the
impact of art as a ‘power’ influencing subjects to submit to patriarchal might lay beyond their
concerns. It is Foucault who addresses power and its entanglement with subjectivity;
however, he does not show that power is implemented through works of art by transforming
individual subjectivity into a compliant, collective subjectivity or into a cultural ego.3
Therefore, contrary to the views of philosophers like Hegel, who saw “the source of
works of art . . . more free than nature” (Lectures on Aesthetics 5), art has not paved the way
3

toward freedom for the people of the Middle East. In that region, art works have been viewed
as a source of pride, a sign of civilization—in other words, as the “light of centuries”
(Agamben 2009 [2006]: 45); yet, my interest lies in the “shadows” cast from that light, which
is to say how such art alters subjectivities toward capitulation to dominant powers. Finally, I
assert that it is only by the exposure of the intermedial “gap”—the gap between the text and
image, or between the text and actions—that the dominant power structure, with a single
interpretation, can be disrupted and allow art to prompt questions, promote divergent
thinking, and initiate creative ventures toward change.
The intertwining of art and power has a lengthy history, and the region of the Middle
East in particular is exemplary in this respect. There are numerous illustrations that, for
instance, depict the ruler with symbols signaling his divine connections. 4 A prominent and
popular subject of painting from the Middle East, instrumental in forming collective
subjectivity and coinciding with the time period of interest here, is that of the figure of the
Prophet in the story of Mi'raj (Ascension of the Prophet). In this image Prophet Mohammad
is depicted as veiled, traveling through the layers of heaven, and through it the Safavid sufiking could claim Divine connection without ostensible transgression beyond the boundaries
of the faith understood by consensus.5 Constructing such an image was facilitated through
employing the authoritarian iterations of Islamic thoughts offered by mystics such as Ibn
Arabi. The unifying power of the image, however, concealed the gap that existed between the
original Koranic text on the Prophet’s ascension and the embellished version created by Ibn
Arabi, thus externalizing the legitimacy of the ruler’s position in the eyes of his subjects.
I argue that such art and philosophy did not lead to individual freedom, but rather to
group or “herd mentality,” (Nietzsche 2002, 86) easily constrained and controlled by
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patriarchal states. Expounded through Jacques Derrida’s “Truth in Painting,” the
“supplemental” and “parergon” produced the “interest” on which the agents of patriarchy
capitalized to solidify the subjects collectively under the rule of the king. Comparatively,
what occurs in contemporary Europe (contemporary to the Safavids) brings out the “gap”
between the texts and the artistic interpretations of them, underscoring its significance in the
development of individuality resulting in the European Renaissance. Conversely, the power
of the art that developed in Persia, concealed such a gap (the cost of unity sought by
patriarchy) that did exist between the text and images produced, and it never materialized
into a question that would foster individual responses.
The power of art in subject formation and manipulation is not restricted to the
production of works of art; indeed, image making often begins with the destruction of
symbols of the preceding powers alongside the elimination of adversaries. Early in October
2015, the military group ISIS “pulverized” the Arch of Triumph in the ancient city of
Palmyra in Syria.6 In fact, this was not their first attempt at the destruction of art and
architecture from antiquity; earlier, their invasion of the museum of antiquity and the
destruction of its statues made the headlines to much expressed sadness and disbelief of not
only the experts in the field, but of many around the world. Still, there are other examples.
Another radical group, the Taliban, in March 2001 used dynamite to demolish the centuriesold standing statue of Buddha in Bamiyan, Afghanistan that had already been defaced in
earlier times.7 Given the fact that art in the region has been held as a source of glorification
and identity, such acts of erasure that have always taken place across history raise the
question of: how does art help bring power and majesty to one group, while its appropriation
or obliteration create an image for another?8 What role does art play in shaping who we are
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and in determining what we (as humans) become a subject to? What links art to social justice
(or lack thereof) on the one hand, and to individual or collective subjectivity on the other?
Despite living amidst centuries’ worth of art and architectural works in most cases, a
great number of people in the world suffer from injustice and tyranny. This study is
concerned with how creation, appropriation and destruction of works of art, which in my
view includes philosophical ideas, figure in the process of forming an acquiescent or a
radical subject. There have been, and still are, many great obstacles in the path toward what
every free-thinking individual seeks in a society that offers equal opportunities to its
members. Arguably, the greatest agency and hindrance in forming such a society has been
patriarchy.9 Its power techniques, particularly through art, while enabling patriarchy to forge
civilizations, have hindered sustainable equity in society at the cost of unity in favor of
maintaining its grip on power (whether political, religious, ideological, etc.).
“Power techniques,” to quote Foucault, in their complex structures and network of
relations, have been instrumental in promoting inequality and injustice, conflicts, mass
elimination of the “other,” wars, colonialism, violence, but always implied, taken for granted,
and their presence is almost never visible. Foucault argues that since the formation of the
political structure, called “state, . . . [m]ost of the time . . .[it] is envisioned as a kind of
political power that ignores individuals, looking only at the interests of the totality or, I
should say, of a class or a group among the citizens.” However, it is the integration of the
older systems (i.e. Christian institutions in the West), into a new political form that produces
new , more complex “power techniques.” I submit that this task cannot be done without the
creative endeavors, Thus, the critical study of the art can reveal such techniques, or any other
cultural product, patriarchy espouses. Similar to Foucault, who writes persuasively on
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“submission of subjectivities” within Western culture, I am interested in “creating a history
of the different modes by which . . . human beings are made subjects” (1994 [1982]: 332,
327). Nonetheless, my interest rests within the Middle East and subject formation by way of
art.
I propose that the inability to establish a genuine democratic rule in the Middle East is
rooted in the lack (or absence of a recognition) of individuality, and free consciousness10 due
to a long tradition of patriarchy (religious, political, colonial, etc.); consequently, the issue of
what and where the “subject” is never comes up. The tradition of patriarchy in the region has
maintained its authority by appropriating and building on dominant iterations of a range of
artistic endeavors and philosophical thoughts—from antiquity, through the Middle Ages, to
present time—that support and justify the “rule of One” as the rule of the “experts.” The
objective of the art produced to support such justification, then, has been to unify a diverse
population into a collective subjectivity and to undermine/eradicate any attempts at divergent
or unorthodox thinking.
Patriarchy, while striving to unify, thrives in conflicts, and competition is an effective
tool in its powerful hands to simultaneously eliminate its rivals and to arrive at its goal of
domination and tyranny. The dark evidence to these conflicts is all around us: from the
“Islamic State” conflicts in Iraq and Syria, to “Boko Haram” in Nigeria, and others. These
crises demand our attention now (Agamben [2006] 2009: 39-54). I define such fusion, which
relies upon conflict and competition, as an artificial union that pulls the acting subject away
from its own genuine humanity-focused center and toward superficially imposed, false and
fabricated unifying ideas wrapped and concealed as philosophy, or better said, as works of
art.11 Therefore, whether in their construction, appropriation or destruction, works of art—as
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objects or as ideas—are equally vital in this study that investigates art, power, and their
relations to subject manipulation. Nonetheless, one cannot avoid but to view the art against
the backdrop of current events and power struggles.
As the violence in the Middle East escalates, and the harrowing details about the
rapidly unfolding events dominate the airwaves, our first reaction might be expressed in how
we distinguish ourselves from the cultures of the Middle East as a way to put distance
between ourselves and the atrocities committed in that part of the world (Orientalism 91).
Today, the tendency has been to sum up our differences in our religious disagreements; 12 we
blame “their religion” as the source of violence that is taking place “over there.” Having
stated this, the clues reaching us from the region, for example, in the self-claimed titles, like
“Islamic State” or the “Islamic Republic of Iran,” do not help the matter either. This is
evidence that even from within the Middle East, the adjective of "Islamic" is not perceived
monolithically; therefore, to reduce the problem to one factor is to overlook a much bigger
issue. I maintain the problem goes well beyond differences in religions or even a clash
between civilizations rooted in the question of identity, as once was proposed by Samuel
Huntington (Clash of Civilizations 20). Indeed, it is due to the competing ascendant iterations
of common ideas, which can be seen in the manifested artistic productions (or destruction)
that aim to artificially unify each side against the other: whether between the West and the
Middle East, or even within the Middle East itself.
Now that severe enough damages have taken place by the radical groups, it is time to
look closely at the complex nature of the conflicts and what lies beneath them, whether
among Muslims themselves, or between Muslims and the West. This suggests a perspective
that cuts through religious, political and economic issues to focus on deeper “relational
events” behind what comes into view on the surface (Semblance and Event, 23-24). For that
8

reason, criticizing what appears as the symptoms (e.g. radicalized gestures and action as well
as the violence) will not be adequate in either the understanding of what is taking place or
finding a possible solution.
While I believe conflicts arise because of the economy of competition, as evident in
numerous historical examples, and that they occur because powers aim to consolidate and
establish their own domination over one another, albeit to the detriment of those subjected to
it, I deem the issue of rivalry meriting a separate study. Therefore, the boundaries of this
project are confined to the investigation of the development of subjectivity toward freedom
as opposed to the domination of a collective subjectivity informed by a uniting idea—most
likely represented through some form of artistic efforts —under patriarchal struggles.
Nonetheless, it must be noted, the groups involved in the current conflicts in the Middle East
represent subjectivities that were shaped by the old modes of patriarchy and subsequent
colonialism, and they are now feeling threatened and struggling for their survival. In the face
of the great Western adversaries, therefore, they are acting upon the old strategies and tactics
of terror and destruction to show they are in control.
The striving to establish hegemonic status is a problem that engenders inequity,
alterity, self-alienation and radicalization for those subjected to it by means of technologies
of power (e.g., art and culture), and it feeds the never ending cycles of violence and injustice
in the afflicted subjects and regions, ultimately, to the advantage of the hegemonic rule.
Unless the subjects affected by the “polymorphous techniques of power” (Foucault 1990
[1978]: 11) are thoroughly examined and the inner workings of such techniques exposed, the
influential Hegelian Master-Slave dialectic (Phenomenology of Spirit 111) leads us into a
binary loop, each side entangled in a never-ending cycle of struggle with the other, promising
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only the unequal relationship. In other words, the dialectic promotes competition between
two predetermined and preset entities, with a finality waiting at the end. The result suggests
two possible reactionary gestures as applied to the crisis at hand: one emerging from selfalienation that accepts and submits to the power in place, no matter how pernicious it is, and
the other leading to the formation of the radical who moves/revolts to eliminate all those
standing in its path to arrive at the position of power itself. These two mirror the afflicted
subject by way of the production (in the former) versus the destruction (in the latter) of works
of art, respectively. Further, they map well onto Aristotle’s concern with “fear” and “pity”
threatening the republic, for which he prescribed art as a cathartic channel (Poetics xxxviii),
and about which Kristeva wrote “of purifying the abject . . . that catharsis par excellence
called art” (17). In either case, the damage done under such dynamisms to the subject and
subjectivity deserves a closer investigation. Lastly, subjectivity is affected by abjection that
first becomes ingrained into the subject, and then, in becoming displaced, it manifests itself
in horrific reactions when threatened (Kristeva 1). We have witnessed these reactions in
seemingly random acts of violence against the “other.”13 Kristeva notes the return of the
subject to the point of unity in abjection when the “I” is threatened or when the space
between subject and object collapses.
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INTRODUCTION
There is contemporary significance to the philosophical thoughts from antiquity, as
the search for “justice and happiness” remains an ongoing objective for all to this day. Plato’s
argument that holds the “philosopher-king” as the only one capable of uniting the political
authority with the knowledge of what lies beyond—in other words, the realm of the “real”—
constructs a governing formula and a system of socialization and education for the republic
(Republic, Book 9). To address Heraclitus’ flux, Plato had maintained a space between the
“real” and the “illusion” (Republic 202-207), with the “real” as “form” being above any
changes. In Poetics, Aristotle uses that space to purge the destructive emotions through
catharsis (Poetics xxxviii). This space collapses altogether when Plotinus argues for the
derivation of everything—from intellect to matter—from the “One” (IV.8), but unlike Plato,
he does not “express contempt for all that is of sense” (ibid). In Plotinus’ view there is unity
between all creation and the “One,” which makes the return to the “One” possible (VI.9).
From here, there is a short distance to Neoplatonism in Christianity and Islam—religious
institutions already immersed in Greco-Roman heritage and patriarchy—to which realizing
that unity becomes the principle objective.14 The transcendental “Truth,” the higher state of
being, or “pure self-consciousness” and unifying with it sets the path toward Idealist
philosophy, exemplary in the works of German philosophers. A remarkable clue leading to
what facilitates the re-emergence of the idea of unity, transcendence, and the configuration of
power in nineteenth century Europe lies in G. W. F. Hegel’s work, particularly as articulated
in his Master-Slave dialectic.
In the Phenomenology of Spirit ([1807] Oxford 1977), Hegel’s Master-Slave dialectic
is predicated on the elevated idea of “self-consciousness.” Hegel lays out his argument by
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first pointing to a “supersensible world” and how consciousness supersedes the senses (e.g.
seeing or hearing) in order to achieve, through a dialectic process, that self-consciousness
(79). “A self-consciousness,” Hegel argues, “ exists for a self-consciousness . . . for only in
this way does the unity of itself in its otherness becomes explicit for it […] [w]hat still lies
ahead for consciousness is the experience of what Spirit is” (110). In other words,
consciousness, striving to “experience the Spirit,” is compelled to progress toward growth,
unity, and pure self-consciousness (ibid).
Hegel, himself being conscious of history (v), develops the Master-Slave model to
articulate the power relationship that is projected to make the transcendence happen in time.
However, he presupposes the elevated status of the “pure self-consciousness,” in line with his
Christian belief, and does not reveal what makes the “master” what he is. He states: “[s]elfconsciousness, is . . . simple being-for-self, self-equal through the exclusion of itself from
everything else” (113). What is its essence and important to it is the “I,” and that which is
“other” to it becomes “unessential.” What defines the position of the master, I argue, is a
constructed illusion (not unlike what Hegel himself has done), an idea, predicated on
Plotinus’s idea of the “One.” To the unity (of the pure self-consciousness) and the diversity
issued through Plotinus’s hierarchic theory of Hypostasis, and in response to the ever present
issue of power (evident in history), Hegel replies by condensing it into the master-slave
formula with a dialectic, yet predetermined relationship. A “consciousness” either struggles
for the highest status, or submits and serves by working through its attachments (Hegel), i.e.
purifies itself (Plotinus). As a result, Hegel’s theory has not only explained well the conflicts
between the rising and falling powers in history, but also has projected a plan for aspiring
contemporary and future powers (i.e. colonialism, capitalism, etc.). Within this dialectic, he
explicates a conflict in terms of encountering another “self consciousness.
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If the “other” is another self-consciousness, there rises the problem of “recognition.”
Hegel notes: “[e]ach [self-consciousness] is indeed certain of its own self, but not of the
other, and therefore its own self-certainty still has no truth” (113). Here, Hegel brings up the
issue of recognition (i.e. unity or submission) and what it entails: “the relationship of the two
self-consciousness individuals is such that they prove themselves and each other through a
life and death struggle. […] And it is only through staking one’s life that freedom is won”
(114). It is the demonstration of a “pure being-for-itself” that reveals absolutism and
independence, and he who has not done so, even though he may be deemed as a “person, . . .
he has not attained to the truth of this recognition as an independent self-consciousness”
(ibid). According to Hegel, in the process, the former maintains its multiplicity, yet remains
independent and “for-itself,” and the latter, becomes dependent and “not purely for itself but
for another . . . consciousness in the form of thinghood” (115). Therefore, this unequal
relationship translates into master and slave, respectively (ibid). In order for the dialectic
progression to work, this relationship must be maintained. Hegel distinguishes the slave as
the being that is “fearful[,] . . . for it has experienced the fear of death.” This is a
consciousness that is dependent upon the master, and at the same time exists with
attachments in the material world (117). However, through “obedience,” and “work” he “rids
himself of his attachment to natural existence in every single detail, and gets rid of it by
working on it” (117-119). It is worth noting that, in this “work,” the slave is associated with
technology and craft. While this may be seen as “aesthetics” under analysis in this study, I
argue, the slave takes the idea (i.e. form) from, and produces for, the master. The formula
convinces the subject (slave) that his freedom is through this work. Through the fear of the
master, the slave obtains “wisdom;” nonetheless, his “consciousness is not . . . aware that it is
a being-for itself.” It is through the work that the slave becomes aware of his true self (118).
13

Thus, the point in linking art and freedom becomes the counter argument in this study.
Although, Hegel continues by elaborating on how eventually the slave becomes conscious of
his self-worth, this formula is problematic, if Hegel’s discourse is viewed as power
technique.
Viewed through the lens of Foucauldian “power techniques” and “discourse,” the
topic of power and its distribution/relation is key in the development and formation of
subjectivity. Foucault states: “[i]t soon appeared to me that, while the human subject is
placed in relations of productions and of signification, he is equally placed in power relations
that are very complex” (Power 327). However, the study of power relations without the
deconstruction of what Foucault calls the “apparatuses”15—specifically those relying on the
production of the arts, seems incomplete. After all, how can one address gender, racial and
religious inequities without full disclosure of the implications of power mechanisms?
Mindful, then, of power relations grounded in history, this study concentrates on a
particularly significant historical period in a specific location within the Middle East. A case
study of the founding of the Safavid dynasty in early sixteenth century Persia will serve to
demonstrate how an emerging patriarchal power moves to validate itself upon new iterations
of established and innovative artistic, religious and philosophical products. To legitimize and
solidify its existence, such a power organizes and implements apparatuses, with
repercussions well into the future of that region. I particularly selected this era, because it is a
formative instance in the history of the country we call Iran today. Moreover, it is exemplary
in instigating systematic shifts while unifying an empire, all patriarchal characteristics with
which this project is concerned. The models the Safavids employed are not unlike what Louis
Althusser calls “Ideological State Apparatuses” (Lenin and Philosophy 96) that become the
active agents to maintaining their political domination. According to Althusser:
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If the ISAs ‘function’ massively and predominantly by ideology, what unifies their
diversity is precisely this functioning, insofar as the ideology by which they function
is always in fact unified, despite its diversity and its contradictions, beneath the ruling
ideology, which is the ideology of the ruling class (98).
These shifts, just as they might be manifested in traditional battles, struggles or even
revolutions that challenge the power bases on the surface, are likely also to appear in new
artistic movements that unify subjects collectively under a new banner.16 Such
manifestations, I assert, are in reality unavoidable to patriarchy's survival as an ideology, 17
but are fortuitous for our purpose, as they lay bare the inner workings of patriarchal
structures and strategies. This helps us not only to understand better present conflicts, but
also to foresee future strategies implemented by later forms of patriarchy, for just as with
‘discourses,’ patriarchy, too, changes with time.
The emergence of the Safavids serves as a marker, because in addition to being a
critical point in the history of Iran as an independent state, it is directly linked on the one
side, with the Neoplatonic philosophy from antiquity, and on the other with the present form
of government currently in power in that country. In this study, whereas I believe the
emergence of the Safavids and the compulsory conversion of the population to Shi'ism
played a key role in retaining the political sovereignty of the country we know as Iran today,
I submit it was the pre-Islamic Neoplatonic model (unified in image and word) that the
founding leaders/philosophers emulated (imitated) and infused with iterations of the religion
of Islam to suit their purposes. Similar to Foucault in The Order of Things (xxiv), I am
interested in the “history of resemblance” and the “Classical thought,” but from the
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standpoint of art and subjectivity. But Foucault’s criticism of power seems to not include
himself, according to Jean Baudrillard ([1977] 2007).
Watchful of the scholar’s power, I am further interested in Baudrillard spot-lighting
how “Foucault’s discourse is a mirror of the power it describes” (Forget Foucault 30).
Subsequently, recalling what Nietzsche notes in measure of man against man (2006, 45-50), I
echo Baudrillard in raising the question whether creating power techniques can be extended
to include the intellectual domain, hence explaining why Baudrillard argues Foucault did not
go far enough in his theory of power.18
I am hoping this study can exemplify an opportunity of knowing through alterity
rather than excluding or opposing the “other,” a process that took place in Continental
Philosophy in Europe and opened up philosophy from dialectic to dialogic.19 Similarly, I aim
to open up a space through an intermedial and intertextual study of philosophy in alterity.
The longer the clearing across time, to use Heidegger's term, the more opportunities for the
examination of patriarchal power techniques before the moment when absolute power reestablishes itself once again and conceals its secrets in order to prolong its hold.
To be sure, the institutionalization of patriarchy across time and space is a
confirmation of the fact that the accumulated wealth and the power status had to be
maintained and protected. This was true then as it is now. The striving to compete is
intimately interwoven with what Heidegger calls “enframing,”20 thereby allowing more
power to be gained systematically. This raises the question of whether an “authentic” versus
an “inauthentic” exercise of power is possible, which I will continue to ponder the question.
Although Heidegger notes this tendency as the modern “technological frame work . . .
[being] inherently expansionist” (Basic Writings 309), I emphasize the broader interpretation
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of “the ordering of . . . both nature and man [as being an] attempt to enclose all beings in a
particular claim—utter availability and sheer manipulability” to include the pre-modern eras
as well. This systematic operation has been formulated and reformulated, integrated and
appropriated, however, among different cultures in various regions including the Middle East
well before modern times. The detrimental consequence has been the historic conflicts in the
form of wars, economic and colonial competitions, and population displacement, among
many other challenges.
The subject formation affected by domination and superiority is significant when
studying colonialism and the role of art, for instance, as propaganda. This investigation will
require the insight of scholars such as Fanon and Said, both of whom specifically dealt with
the issue of alterity and the subjectivity of the people systematically treated as inferior
through various cultural means. Fanon expresses his concern and objective as “to get man to
admit he is nothing . . . and get him to eradicate his narcissism whereby he thinks he is
different from the other ‘animals’” (2008, 6). Said states his concern regarding the binary
division of “men into ‘us’ (Westerners) and ‘they’ (Orientals)” in another way: “such
divisions are generalities [i.e. collective] whose use historically and actually has been to
press the importance of the distinction between some men and some other men, usually
toward not especially admirable ends” (1979, 45). Inspired by Said, Linda Nochlin examines
a European “Orientalist” painting in the essay “Imaginary Orient.” Nochlin analyzes “Snake
Charmer” (late 1860s) by the French academic artist Gerome, in which she argues by
depicting the Middle Easterners in a negative light, the Orientalists romanticized and
exaggerated to highlight the distinctions between themselves and the Middle Easterners in
order to justify their own superiority and domination over them.21 This view illuminates the
colonial intentions behind such works, and in turn, I suggest, perpetuates the cycle of
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despotism in regions affected by colonialism, for the threatened colonialized and humiliated
individual is an operative-in-abjection par excellence; his/her (or their) subjectivity is shaped,
among other things, through the coded visual and literal forms asserting authority that
constantly oppress and suppress him/her by way of “order.” In Foucault’s view such order is
implied and created by our interactive experiences. He states: “Order is . . . that which is
given in things as their inner law, the hidden network that determines the way they confront
one another, and also that which has no existence except in the grid created by a glance, an
examination, a language” (The Order of Things xx). This, I argue, extends the power of
ordering to creativity and objects of art.
Taking Foucault's power theory further, I expand the power relationship between
humans to include the subject/object relationship in order to explore how the power imbued
by a dominant ideology into objects, specifically art objects, affects subjectivity with
deleterious consequences. Evoking Nietzsche's view on artistic expression as a manifestation
of “will to power” (WtP 419-422) in “man [who] can place himself so far distant from other
men that he can form them” 22 (WtP 419), I assert, through the self-alienation brought on by
the misinterpretation of such “forming,” the subject will either conform or become
radicalized. Either way, the damage to subjectivity is inevitable.
In the Middle East, in tracing back the systems of patriarchy through the philosophy
of Neoplatonism that was absorbed through Christianity by the dominant religion of Islam,
we see the production of art, philosophy, poetry, architecture, and literature. Such
productions manifest Neoplatonic thoughts and mainly mirror and serve a centralized power
that aimed to unify and promote a collective subjectivity. 23 In other words, Middle Eastern
and Western philosophical foundations overlap.24 Where my interest lies is in the

18

development of individual versus the collective subjectivity. For instance, rallying behind
patriotic or religious ideals creates collective subjectivity for both the West 25 and the Middle
East,26 and has unified around a common objective as testified to by recent history. I
maintain, however, unlike the West, the Middle Eastern regions have not successfully
experienced a healthy and independent subject formation. The reason may be due to
patriarchy’s unifying strategies and power techniques, whether through art, literature,
philosophy, religious or political ideals, without a chance to examine closely such works or
techniques. As a result, the Cartesian “I” has not fully emerged. 27 Such holds true in the case
of the sixteenth century emergence of the Safavids.
In the case study of the Safavids, royal art produced during the sixteenth-seventeenth
century Persia contains evidence of links between such visual imagery and Greco-Roman
philosophy. These images, then, aimed to facilitate the theorization of a foundation for the
new political system through a sort of rationalization and unification that was necessitated by
the incoming Safavids. This, I suggest, is when the ideological blueprints for the
contemporary government in Iran were drawn, for “the relationship between rationalization
and excesses of power is evident” (2000, 328). This association confirms the claim that
earlier religio-political models, which were continuously re-appropriated by all who sought
power, were not appropriated exclusively by Christian power-bases, but by non-Christians,
namely Muslims, as well.
Similar to Foucault’s “relational” method, I suggest the patriarchies-in-opposition fit
within the same common grounds of various struggles, as Foucault explains. Their conflicts
are “transversal struggles,” that is to say they are inclusive of all regions. Moreover, the
objective of the struggle is the “power effects as such,” or how the power is manifested.
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There are also “immediate struggles” that happen to receive news coverage, so to speak,
because of their immediacy, as opposed to seeking what may perhaps be the main culprit.
Further, there are “struggles, which question the status of the individual” in how the
individual is governed. Additionally, there are “struggles against the privilege of
knowledge,” and finally as denial of identity (2000, 211-212). Foucault thus sums up three
types of struggles: against domination, against exploitation, and against one’s own tendencies
to become subjugated. To this, I will add the struggle against subjugation to dominant
manifestations of artistic and philosophical works, which is fundamental in a free society 28
but lacking in despotic systems. It is noteworthy that Foucault’s three types of struggles can
potentially turn into hegemonic move themselves, but Foucault seems to be silent about it.
Nonetheless, these struggles are all applicable to the case study I will examine, but perhaps
most significant for our purpose are how power is manifested (through art), the governing of
the individual (the rule of One), and the denying of identity (the compulsive conversion).
I reference Iran's example at a particular moment in time, in which a major religiopolitical shift took place. It brought with it a new dynasty of kings claiming spiritual divine
associations, a new wave of artistic productions, and a new branch of the religion in
Shi’aism. Studying this shift uncovers the appropriation of some of the earlier patriarchal
paradigms, such as Plato's “rule of the guardians” and Aristotle’s art serving the state. The
synthesis between Plato's “rule of the guardians” and Plotinus's bridging the physical and
metaphysical realms through the material world hierarchically, as well as the eclectic weave
of Neoplatonism itself,29 has informed the foundation of the politics in the region to this day.
The appropriation (mimesis?) of Neoplatonic formulas by the Safavids and beyond
(including the present Iranian rule of jurisprudence) demonstrates the contemporary
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relevancy of an ideology disseminated through Neoplatonism, namely the theory of
“Universal Man” utilized to unify under patriarchy. One of the subjects in art reflecting this
theory is seen in the figure of Alexander, with which the Safavid sufi-kings identified not as
a historic figure, but rather as the mystic Iskandar, who is visiting a hermit depicted in a
sixteenth century painting.30
Whereas the appropriation of the theory of “Universal Man” and its infusion into
Islamic thought took place often by Muslim scholars, I will reason Islamic principles are in
conflict with it. This is due to the fundamental distinction between the Creator and the
created proposed by Islamic First Principle, al Tawhid. To accomplish these tasks, the study
of the medieval Andalusian sage and mystic, Ibn Arabi (1165-1240), who further articulated
the theory of “Unity of Existence” and gave it visual form through his writings and poetry, is
a key component of this research. Ibn Arabi’s iterations that are in excess to the original text
map well onto Derrida's parergon and the Marxian “interest,” and that “excess” benefited the
position of those in power. By adding details from his imagination (itself influenced by
Greco-Roman aesthetics), Ibn Arabi embellished the original Koranic text in such a way that
it generated “interest” in the particulars for the patriarchy in power; the imagery in turn
inspired further literary aspirations. This ‘interest’ as manifested through works of literature
or visual art then, I propose, powered by its Neoplatonic unifying attributes, creates a
commodity that was exploited by the patriarchy through what Marx, in economic context,
calls “the mystical character of commodity” (Capital 164). Ibn Arabi’s work, when projected
through Marx’s theory above, becomes intriguing. Marx states: “the mysterious character of
the commodity-form consists therefore simply in the fact that the commodity reflects the
social characteristics of men’s own labor as objective characteristics of the products of labor
themselves, as the socio-natural properties of these things” (Capital 163-165). Analogously,
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when a mystic sage, who claims he was given permission from the Prophet in a vision to
write (Bezels of Wisdom 45), adds details to the account of the event of Mi’raj, his status and
the work he creates transform the original text into a commodity that ultimately benefits the
Safavid kings.
These concerns, viewed through the lens of power, can expose the power relations
established not just through the traditional, institutional means of power (state apparatus,
juridical oppression), but also through the unifying, mutual inspiration of art and philosophy
that promoted collective subjectivities. I aim to go further by suggesting that patriarchies
need such unification and collective subjectivities to ensure their successful rises to power,
when clashing with other patriarchies vying for the same position at the top. To maintain the
position of power/domination, authority and unity, patriarchy has had to obtain a hegemonic
role by implementing three main strategies: to eliminate, to absorb and make everyone else
conform (results in collective subjectivity), or to marginalize.
The case study of the Safavids in this project exposes the inner workings of a
patriarchy at a critical moment in history, which I call a patriarchal “event.”31 The notion of
“event” is also taken up by Brian Massumi in Semblance and Event. If we understand
“event” as relational, that is the coming together of a series of other “goings-on,” then it
becomes necessary to examine the interrelation of things within an event, the culmination of
which brings about a new manifestation, in this case, a new regime of patriarchy.
Through artificial unifications the collective subject formation undermines the
individual subjectivity, that is to say, it curbs the efforts toward individuality and personal
freedoms in a society. While patriarchy cannot be eradicated, we can however become aware
of it and consequently keep it in check.32 In its position of absolute power, patriarchy
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conceals all the “gaps,” whether between text and image or text and text. Such “gaps” can
lead to individual and diverse understandings or expressions, in other words, dialogism. For
this purpose, I consider art and even philosophy as concrete documents that can trace back to
patriarchy how it achieves such concealment and manages to maintain its position of power.
Hannah Arendt notes how “the ‘imperishability’ of works of . . . art” connects us with the
past (Arendt 2005, xxvii) and by extension, I suggest with each other. This study can then be
extrapolated toward other institutions with patriarchal underpinnings, and through a network
of conscious minds (Agamben's Coming Community), free consciousness can be fostered and
maintained toward achieving an egalitarian society.
Tied together with the issue of subjectivity is the ever so significant notion of
responsibility. A critical problem with collective subjectivity is the lack of accountability that
accompanies it. Here, there is no oversight to set limits to radicalized actions. Arendt
demonstrates how such limitlessness can distort even “Kant’s notion of duty” (2005, xxii), or
how “personal responsibility” becomes subjugated by “acts of state” or “superior orders”
(2005, 37). In other words, such “acts” or “orders” give importance to collective rather than
individual subjectivity. However, the investigation of this issue must be postponed to another
opportunity.
The first chapter, “Where is the Subject?” provides a definition of the subject as
considered in this study, and addresses the problem in the contemporary conversations on the
issue of modernism with regards to the Middle East. What scholars mostly have suggested
thus far, even those who are mindful of the issues of “subject and object,” does not go
beyond the economic, political, religious, or historical perspectives in their formulations. By
intertextualizing philosophy and art against the backdrop of selected historical events, this
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study, however, intends to draw attention to the issue of “subjectivity” as engaged with “art”
and “artistic production” in the broadest possible sense necessary to develop a new critical
discourse, through which the current conflicts can be analyzed from a different vantage point.
“Subjectivity: Informed by a Long Tradition of Patriarchy,” in chapter two addresses
the preliminaries by offering definitions of patriarchy, but emphasizing the genealogical
definition, which entails placing the father at the top of the family/tribal structure, a move
stemming from the historical necessities that brought about the treatment of the first “other,”
women, as objects. This chapter includes Frederick Engels’ accounts of “the development of
the social institutions of the patriarchal family and private property” (Engels 8). A brief
historical investigation into the roots of patriarchy is followed by the role of the arts from the
early cities to the time of Greeks and the Romans. It then transitions into Christianity and the
development of Neoplatonic and mystic thoughts; this investigation will focus on how art
contributed to an artificial unification (e.g., through depicting “divine connections” of the
authorities) that led to collective subjectivity benefiting those in power every time. The issue
of equity will usher in the emergence of the third Abrahamic religion, Islam, and its
relationship with the other two, Judaism and Christianity, with particular interest in the
intertextualization of imagery, word and power. The examination of power dynamics within
Judaism and Christianity with regards to the notions of intermingling of religion and power
as a sure way to unify the population are considered. Furthermore, the infusion of GrecoRoman art and Persian artistic and governing models serving the early years of Islamic
dynastic rules will be of particular interest.
The study of Ibn Arabi, who became known as the “son of Plato,” is noteworthy here,
not only because of the association with the ideas from antiquity, but also due to the visual,
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descriptive nature of his writings and their far-reaching influence to the time of the Safavids
and the Ottomans. This chapter will end with a study of Islam and the issue of “other,” from
the Christian West and Muslims’ interactions with non-Muslims that were later to shape the
European Renaissance. The emphasis will be on how ideas from ancient Greece, Rome, and
Christianity that had been integrated through the works of Islamic philosophers/scholars
(some in Spain, others in Baghdad) were now being considered by the Europeans during the
Renaissance (a sort of knowing through their “other”), but all supporting patriarchy.
Chapter three will consist of the case study, the rise to power of a new governing
class, empowered by the already established Neoplatonic iteration of Islam. The background
to the incoming Safavids is noteworthy; they are closely tied to mystic Sunni tradition, yet
the founder, who is a Sufi Sheikh’s (spiritual leader) grandson, begins a campaign of
compulsory conversion of the country to the Shi’ite branch of Islam. By doing so, he creates
an Ideological State Apparatus, predicated on the Shi’ite tenets, to prevent Persia from being
absorbed into the great Ottoman rule. This ISA was fortified by the migration of the Shi’ite
religious scholars from the Amel Mountains (Jabal Amel) in Southern Lebanon, thereby
changing the socio, religio-political fabric of the region, the ties of which still exist today.
What role art played in this apparatus has its roots in Ibn Arabi’s major theory, the “Unity of
Existence,” and in his articulation of the “Universal Man” that proved instrumental in
unifying subjects. These thoughts transpire from Neoplatonism and form a foundation for the
sixteenth and seventeenth century Persian philosophers, theorists and artists. However, their
discrepancies with the principle text were never questioned. Examining the arts of this era in
comparison to previous art movements reveals the specific political agenda of the Safavids,
which was to underscore their divine connection. This chapter will also include a detailed
analysis of the Safavid royal patronage and art work that unified their subjects. Finally, a
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preliminary and comparative look at the development of German Idealism and an exploration
of the issue of subjectivity and its Neoplatonic roots, as well as a discussion on one of the
most influential Neoplatonic Persian Philosophers, namely Mūlā Sadrā wraps up this chapter.
When René Descartes wrote his famous “cogito ergo sum” in 1637, the Safavids were
at the tail end of their military conflicts with the Ottomans, and four years after Kant wrote
his renowned Critique of Judgment, another new dynasty, the Qajar dynasty, was taking
shape through the violent military and retributory campaigns of its founder. When we map
these events as reflected through artistic activities, the significance of the study of
subjectivity becomes evident. This includes Kristeva's notion of abjection and Lacan’s
interpretation of Freud on the subject of violence and the extreme in turning against the
“other ‘I’” (Lacan “The Subversion of the Subject,” Hegel and Contemporary Writings 219)
in connection with the threatened ego/self. The artistic and psychological dynamics of Shi’ite
Safavids, and Sunni Ottomans, with respect to their different iterations of Islam play an
instrumental role in how their patriarchal rivalries took shape and influenced subject
formation among their own people and among themselves. However, while the investigation
of "abjection" vis-a-vis artificial unities in this context is significant, it must be taken up in a
future project.
There is great significance in the examination of the three influential regions in the
Middle East, Qajar Persia, the Ottoman Turkey and Egypt, during the time of modernization
and reform. The examination of their art reveals, on the one hand, the nature of the rivalry
between them and their art as source of pride and identity, and on the other, a competitive
European economic engagement, which will be discussed in turn in chapter four. Among
topics of special interest are the state of the subject during the reformation as the fruits of
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technology offers glimpses of individuality and criticism. This chapter thus, will address the
pressures that were building upon the contacts (military and diplomatic) already made
between the West and the Middle East, particularly Persia, that brought with it new
technology, and education. It demonstrates that the external centers, around which European
ideas and identities had gathered, were rapidly changing.
There were two obstacles in the path of achieving social and political reforms in
Persia. These were the Shi'ite doctrine and the intrusion of the great powers. There was
earlier a change in the ethos of the society when the country had been converted to Shi'ism,
which viewed political power different from the Sunnis. Whereas the Sunnis would accept an
unjust rulers and seek to legitimize their position of authority (a sort of an artificial
unification), the Shi'ites refused to follow such rulers; instead, they considered their religious
leaders the only authority to follow (another type of simulated unity). 33 Moreover, due to the
intrusion of foreign powers (e.g., Britain and Russia), the Persian government was reluctant
to expand trade and communication relations with the European States. Islam (or whatever
iterations of Islam that suited the power base) held the country together, and the monarch was
seen as the ruler who was supposed to defend the "Islamic land" against the non-Muslims.
The notion of emulation is a significant part of this argument, because it is both a
destroyer of the space and a dynamic that requires an unequal relationship. Foucault’s insight
draws our attention to the fact that “[t]he relation of emulation enables things to imitate one
another from one end of the universe to the other without connection or proximity: by
duplicating itself in a mirror the world abolishes the distance proper to it […] However,
emulation does not leave the two reflected figures it has confronted in a merely inert state of
opposition. One may be weaker, and therefore receptive to the stronger influence of the
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other” (1994, 20). The emulation of the Western systems of education and artistic training
had already led to the sending of groups of young students to Europe. It brought about the
founding of the first Art school in 1851 in Tehran.
This investigation will demonstrate how ideas from antiquity that strengthen
patriarchy have endured and served as paradigms for various groups, informing subjectivities
that are inclined toward an external center and away from individuality and individual
thinking. In other words, there is no equivalence here for the Cartesian thinking “I.”
However, this is certainly not the whole picture. Chapter five highlights the interconnected
intellectual exchange with Muslims that indeed manifests itself through the theory of optics
and proves critical to the European Renaissance. These thoughts continue to promote the
goals of eminence and prominence among the male-dominated political and religious powers
in contemporary times. But, most important is how the collective subjectivity has informed
human history through conflicts and psychologically damaged and undermined individual
subjectivity. The early Orientalism and colonialism are then examined through pertinent
philosophical theories, as they map onto the dynamics of a mobilized economy, and the
systematic way through which identities and subjectivities are shaped. Fanon’s and Said’s
discourses on colonialism are of particular interest here, because a greater part of this history
involves how subjugation of humans by other humans has been justified through the
collective consciousness. This chapter will also address the concept of taqlīd, a variant
technique of mimesis that ensured the continuity and unity.
Following the collapse of the Qajar dynasty, and the rise to power of the Pahlavi
dynasty’s founder, Reza Khan, further modernization of the country got underway, which
included the founding of the country’s first university and establishing the cross country
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transportation and railroad lines. However, the modernization was met with the disapproval
of the religious camp. Suppression of the competition and the movement toward a
nationalistic, centralized power had already begun by Reza Khan, who upon later assuming
the position of monarchy, became known as Reza Shah. Thus, the final chapter will
commence with a brief history that links the early modernist movements to nationalism and
government sponsored reforms. While there had been grass-root movements since the
Constitutional Revolution to implement women’s education, social, economic and other
health reforms, the centralized power of the king eliminated such initiatives in order to
establish its own programs (e.g. the emancipation of women from the veil in 1936).
Following the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, nationalism as an ideology was
promoted by the European powers, since it ensured the fragmentation of the Middle East. It
was also coincided by the crack-down on the opposition and the tightening of personal
freedoms by the autocratic rules. The more actions taken by the secular, centralized
government toward modernizing their countries (as with Iran and Turkey), the unhappier the
religious class, who had grown and penetrated every aspect of people's lives. Strategies were
adopted by the secular government to keep the clergy in check. The tensions between the
religious and secular authorities turned them into each other’s “other.” By mid-nineteenth
century, “imitation” (taqlīd) is implemented into religious rituals and everyday activity,
fostering collective subjectivities and discouraging individual agency on matters of faith. The
broadening of power base from religion to political, even to the economic domain, eventually
made the clergy class very influential and powerful with great access to organizing and
mobilizing the population, particularly those in the central commercial market (bazaar).34
The steps taken by the government disadvantaged domestic merchants against the foreign
merchants and investors, and this, among other undercurrents, was one of the grievances of
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the merchants, associated with the central market merchants, pertinent as we approach the
1979 revolution in Iran. Thus, the support from domestic merchant class for the religious
leaders was growing.35
The final chapter will focus on the formation of the Islamic Republic of Iran
emulating the Platonic formula, but appropriated as the ‘rule of jurisprudence’ rather than
rule of philosopher. The mapping of the formation of collective subjectivity from the
Constitutional Monarchy to Constitutional Revolution, from democratic movements toward
Modernity, and what role the arts played in this equation, is the objective in this chapter. The
investigation of how the religious authorities eventually step out from under the shadow of
the secular government (the king) and finally achieve political rule after the revolution of
1979 in Iran is of great significance here.36
An evaluation of the philosophical constructs that supported the founding of a
patriarchal government based on religious perspectives will also be of interest here, and can
be traced back to the migration of the Shi'ite clerics from southern Lebanon. The formation
of a political system predicated on a specific reading of Islam enables patriarchy to maintain
a position of power and domination over everyone else. Studying the works of ideologists
like Ali Shari’ati (Iran), with his new definitions critical to the revolution of 1979, provides
evidence to yet another philosophization and politicization of Islam once again facilitating
patriarchy’s absorbing and unifying powers. Shari’ati actually distinguishes his
interpretations from what he calls "the Safavid Islam" that he saw as a courtly endeavor, and
argues in support of the independency of Islam (according to how he interprets it) from the
court. The point was capitalized on by the clergy vying for power with the monarchy, leading
up to the revolution of 1979 in Iran.
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The gradual process of complete takeover and elimination of the “other” groups
(particularly those who had helped bring the class of clergy to power in an initial move
toward unity) and restricting individual rights and freedoms soon ensued. Constant
restrictions and tight control over every aspect of people's lives, particularly in artistic
expressions, became dominant. Foucault's notes on revolution (2000, 449) and his letter to
Mehdi Bazargan, the prime minister of the Islamic Republic at the time (2000, 439), will also
be addressed. This chapter will end with the intertextualization of some of the current
philosophical theories.
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CHAPTER ONE
WHERE IS THE SUBJECT?

And . . . where, strictly speaking, am I? My historical coordinates are altogether different
[…] The sequence of historical periods means nothing to me […] I talk about history, think
about it, do my best to understand its mechanisms and linkages, . . .[b]ut during this short
period, which marks my formal entry to a time of ever-broadening horizons, on the psychic
level I have continued to inhabit a meta-history in which the before and the after are
confused with the after and with post-history. And between the two, I find myself postponing
an End without which there can be no Beginning.37
— Daryush Shayegan

In September 2014, the Berlin-based research program, Transregional Studies Forum
and the Beirut Orient-Institute, organized a conference (Summer Academy) held in Beirut,
Lebanon, under the title “Language, Science and Aesthetics – Articulation of Subjectivity
and Objectivity in the Modern Middle East, North Africa, South and Southeast Asia.” 38 In
this conference, the three domains of Aesthetics, Science and Language were structured for
focused discussions. Each group argued the effects of Western-led modernist movement on
the three fields in the region, with the emphasis that “the notions of subjectivity and
objectivity, the individual and the subject [are] . . . key concepts of modernity.”39 Aside from
a series of lectures that were offered at the Beirut Orient-Institute, and the American
University of Beirut, all conference formats (i.e. research project presentations, plenary
sessions, etc.) “were restricted to [the] Academy participants.”40 While many “key notions,”
such as “center/peripheries, global/local,” modernity/tradition, and translation/mistranslation
were “intensely addressed,” the discussion on the “subject” itself seemed conspicuously
absent from the program.
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This study, with particular attention to the Middle East and Iran, sets out to develop a
critical discourse that centers on the power and knowledge that is constructed and dispersed
through art, in its broadest meaning—which includes and deems patriarchy and
Neoplatonism as artistic endeavors—in a process that impacts social practices, influential in
shaping subjectivities and defining the interrelationship between the subjects.
In this chapter, following a brief definition of the term “subject,” it is necessary to
address the problem of Neoplatonist philosophy, particularly with regards to “beauty,” as
developed through multi levels of “translations” and “interpretations.” The issue of
“translation,” is of great interest in this project, for it is through the process of translation that
attempts are made to cover the “gap” between meaning and text/art work. Keeping the
“subject’ in view, I will then present selected current conversations on the tension between
the advent of modernism and the Middle East region. This is to demonstrate that, despite
being conscious of the key components in modernism, the acknowledgement of the notion of
the subject as shaped by many factors, especially art—that which this project is engaged
with—remains beyond the scope of contemporary theorists’ concerns with regards to the
Middle East. Despite the current discussions signaling an awareness of the modern theories
among the thinkers in the Middle East, the criticism revolves around the usual suspects:
politics, religion, legal matters, etc, and not inclusive of the issue of the subject. This
necessitates the present study that underscores the opening-up of a space for the “subject” as
an independent, but critical component of modernity, pertaining to the region, without
excluding the other concerns. Prior to entering the conversation, however, it is imperative to
define the term “subject,” pivotal to this study.
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DEFINING THE SUBJECT
While it is not clear when the use of the term “subject” entered the humanities
initially, the traces of it in the history of the Western philosophy lead one back to Kant, and
farther to Descartes.41 But, for the purposes of this project, the term “subject” references that
which has been shaped or constructed by variety of external elements. At the core of this
subject lies ego, which is distinct from “subject” (Lacan [1966] 2004), and is the product of
misrecognition, but critical in the process of individuation for the child (Lacan 1978). The
ego is predicated on “being there” (Dasein in Heideggerian terms), and its subjectivity takes
shape around it as moving through time and space. Once the subjectivity expresses itself
independently, it manifests individuality. Therefore, while intimately related, these terms are
not meant as interchangeable in this study, but rather they each represent a specific phase.
The issue of subjectivity is perhaps the initial stage and the interface with the subject’s
surroundings, including the subject’s “other,” which is why it is critical to address.
There is very little argument on the recognition of the formation of the subject as a
crucial component in modernism. What is unclear is how the notion of the “subject” is either
taken for granted or is curiously absent from the conversation, when discussing modernism in
the Middle East. Moreover, the ambiguity of the term has contributed to this challenge. The
term “subject,” connotes a grammatical agent (as in the one who acts), yet it is also legally
and politically charged (as in being a subject of a ruler/king); while it is active (as in “subject
of”), it can be passive (as in “subject or subjected to”) as well.42
The matter of language43 can complicate things further still, as noted by the French
linguist, Emile Benveniste (1902-1976). He argued for a distinction between the one who
“speaks” and the existence at the core of the very subject who performs the act of
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“speaking.”44 Therefore, contends Benveniste, it is the language that first shapes the subject.
Benveniste states: “It is in and through language that man constitutes himself as a subject,
because language alone establishes the concept of ‘ego’ in reality, in its reality which is that
of the being” (Benveniste 224). He notes the problem in the self-declaring Cartesian cogito
and further explains: “Consciousness of the self is only possible if it is experienced by
contrast. I use I only when I am speaking to someone who will be a you in my address”
(ibid). This definition appears to complement what Lacan argued in his “mirror phase”
theory, for the child “seems . . . to manifest in an exemplary situation the symbolic matrix in
which the I is precipitated in a primordial form, prior to being objectified in the dialectic of
identification with the other, and before language restores to it . . . its function as subject”
(Lacan 2004, 4).
I submit, then, being a subject to oneself, requires passing through the stages of
“misrecognition” to form the child’s ego (Lacan), to shaping the subjectivity through
language (Benveniste), connecting with others,45 and becoming aware of this process, with
the “being” intact at the core as the primordial necessity. Although becoming conscious of
one’s subjectivity is extremely critical—that which has yet to fully materialize in the Middle
East and has been the source of imbalance between it and the West—it is not an end. In other
words, my objective is not merely to remain in a fixed position within the Humanist view of
subjectivity that subsequently requires dignity and rights for the individual alone; it is to also
underscore what proceeds this development, more in-line with the continental philosophers
(e.g. Derrida, Foucault), who advocate decentralization of power and, as best articulated by
Deleuze and Guattari, connecting to one’s “other” in a more organic way.
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The question may be raised with respect to a comparison between Europe/Christianity
that has experienced reformation, and the Middle East/Islam that is struggling to reform. I am
aware of the problem that is noted by Talal Asad (1993). In his Genealogy of Religions, Asad
addresses the problem that through modernism, the West has created the impression that
somehow there is more significance in studying its history of thought, in comparison with the
history of non-Western, namely Middle Eastern regions. He notes:
It has sometimes been noted that peoples from non-Western countries feel obliged to
read the history of the West (but not each other’s history) and that Westerners in turn
do not feel the same need to study non-Western histories. The history of modern
Western thought, for example, can be (and is) written on its own, but not so the
history of contemporary Arab thought. One opposition between the West and the nonWest (and so a mode of connection between them) is constructed historically by these
asymmetrical desires and indifferences.
Asad, in contrast to Said’s theory in Orientalism, which argues that Western
knowledge was a “systematic discourse” through which Europe has come to terms with its
“other” (Said 1979, 3), draws attention to the importance of agency of the colonized (1993,
2). While Asad brings up a critical point, he does so as a collective consciousness, and the
issue of the subject is eclipsed by his broad anthropological and historical concerns,
particularly with respect to the role of religion. In his argument, Asad suggests that
anthropologists should understand the West first, if they are to make sense of that which is
imposed on the non-Western population in the name of modernity. For example, he
approaches the problem “by discussing . . . two elements in medieval Christianity that are no
longer generally accepted by modern religion: the productive role of physical pain and the
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virtue of self-abasement” (1993, 2). Nonetheless, while he demonstrates the significance of
knowledge and power, Asad seems to be more interested, not so much in the subject, but in
the larger, encompassing issues.
The process of becoming subject to oneself, nonetheless, since the formation of the
early cities, as I have suggested in chapter two, has involved the elements of “debt” and
“fear” that motivated and impacted the fluctuation mixed with tension between the individual
and the group consciousness.46 Stated differently, the fear of becoming a “subject or
subjected to” the conquering power agencies (due to debt, for instance), frequently has given
rise to a tendency toward a struggle for (or to join with) a superior position at the cost of
individual consciousness, effects of which are still felt today.47 There is a gap between the
subject and the issue of “individuality,” misunderstood in the context of mystic tradition
(erfan) in the Middle East that this project is engaged with. Nader and Fereshteh Ahmadi in
Iranian Islam: The Concept of the Individual (1998) is an example of such misunderstanding.
What is perhaps best refracted in the work of Ibn Arabi and in his theory of Perfect Human
(al Insan al Kamel), is a “subjectivity with considerable potential” (Vahdat 126), to which I
will return in detail in chapter three.
Despite the significance of the topic of “subjectivity,” and what has formed and
informed it in the Middle East, the discussions have, more often than not, steered either
toward the direction of praising a glorious past, a sort of “regression toward an original
mythology”48 in the region, or the consequences of modernity as imposed by the west,
infringing on the region’s traditions. A significant component in the tradition within the
Middle East has been the influential, however problematic, Neoplatonic philosophy.
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THE PROBLEM OF NEOPLATONIC PHILOSOPHY
Generally speaking, there are three groups of philosophers under consideration in this
study: philosophers who are preoccupied with creating systems (e.g. Plato, Hegel), and those
who are focused more on the individual responses (e.g. Kant, Nietzsche). The third group
searches for an intersubjective, dynamic balance between the two. Setting the third group
aside for the time being, much of what constitutes the base of Western philosophy,49 is
entangled in a tension: the tension between the two former groups. This tension is akin to the
tension stemming from how one theorizes the relationship between the individual and the
group; between content and form; particular and universal, or stated more broadly, how one
finds one’s place within the larger scheme of things. Plato’s Republic aimed to create a
system in response to what he saw as the Athenian democracy (people-power) having gone
corrupt. This system received its authority and legitimacy from Plato’s philosophy on what
he deemed as “good” and “ideal,” predicated on the idea of perfection beyond this world
(Republic, Book 6 and 7). The theory Plato had imagined and crafted, could not tolerate other
interpretations and competing views put forth through others’ imaginations. Therefore,
Plato’s system, in promoting a centralized source of power (knowledge), required the
expulsion of the artists (Republic, Book 10). In his re-interpretation50 of Plato’s philosophy,
Aristotle argues for using the artists to create a “space” to purge from the community what
would potentially be disruptive to the republic (Poetics, xxxviii). But, times of stability are
often interrupted by periods of chaos for reasons beyond what the members of a community
can control. Such times often leave people looking for answers by turning to an inner world.
There are different names for this “world:” Plato calls it the “real,” others use terms such as
“metaphysical,” “spiritual,” or see it as one with the Divine. It is not my intention here to
negate such a “world,” but to emphasize the subjective nature of the language and
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interpretations used when we describe it for each other. I argue, it becomes problematic,
when such subjective knowledge, as real as it may be to the one who believes it, becomes
form and imposed on others. This is the case in Neoplatonism.
Neoplatonism developed following the formulation of the highly personal and
imaginative, albeit a hierarchical, philosophy of Plotinus. Plotinus (204/5-270 CE) was active
during the Late Roman Period, (third to fourth centuries CE), “almost coextensive with one
of the most disastrous periods in Roman history” (Russell, 284). Plotinus also suffered from
ailments of the body, even “seemed ashamed of being in the body,” according to his pupil,
Porphyry (Enneads, 1), which may have influenced his philosophy as evident in his teachings
(Enneads, 2). Katharine Gilbert and Helmut Kuhn in A History of Esthetics also notice that
Plotinus
lived on easy terms with religious mysteries of purification flourishing in Rome and
Alexandria at the beginning of Christian era[;] . . . he was a practical teacher in the
busy heart of a complex stirring world (91).
“Withdraw into yourself and look,” states Plotinus himself, inviting all to “close the
eyes and call instead upon another vision which is to be waked within you, a vision, the
birth-right of all, which few turn to use” (I.6, 8-9). As still true today, during the times of
crisis and the collapsing of the external support, when there is no place to turn to for
reassurance, and as also later noted by Kandinsky, one is compelled to turn inward, at a
“spiritual turning-point” (AiT, 86-87), which is necessarily and initially in the personal realm
and indivisible from imagination, until it enters the collective consciousness through
aesthetic manifestations.51
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One of the significant arguments in the Enneads is the role of “beauty,” to remind the
absentminded of its essence (I.6.2). In fact the two are so intertwined that some have even
argued “[o]ne of the best ways to begin a study of Neoplatonism is through a study of its
aesthetics.”52 But, I believe, prior to tackling the aesthetics, or the concept of “beauty” in
Plotinus’s Enneads, it is critical to explore the philosophical system put forth by Plotinus,
through his pupil, Porphyry (Enneads, 1).53 It is not difficult to see the “valuation” system in
Plotinus’s thought process; as a true Platonist, Plotinus, believes that there is a “real” world
beyond the “illusion” to which we are exposed.54
The map of the foundation of Plotinus’s philosophy is laid out in the Fifth Ennead
(V.1). In “The Three Initial Hypostases” Plotinus begins by a question: “What can it be that
has brought the souls to forget the father, God, and though members of the Divine and
entirely of that world, to ignore at once themselves and It?” (V.1.1) Thus, he begins in the
material world, the environs of illusion, that which is created, and progresses toward the
“One”. He states:
Let every soul recall, then, at the outset, the truth that soul is the author of all living
things, that it has breathed the life into them all, whatever is nourished by earth and
sea, all the creatures of the air, the divine stars in the sky; it is the maker of the sun;
itself formed and ordered this vast heaven and conducts all that rhythmic motion: and
it is a principle distinct from all these to which it gives law and movement and life,
and it must of necessity be more [honorable] than they, for they gather or dissolve as
soul brings them life or abandons them, but soul, since it never can abandon itself, is
of eternal being (V.1.2).
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Plotinus identifies, therefore, in creation, there is a core (i.e. the Soul)—distinct from
what it creates, although connected to the source—which takes its worth from that source, the
“One,” and in turn, gives value to the “stark body . . . blankness of Matter, the absence of
being” by “entering the material” turning it into “a living and a blessed thing” (ibid). But,
unlike “the material body,” the Soul is unified, because “[b]y the power of the Soul the
manifold and diverse heavenly system is a unit: through soul this universe is a God: and the
sun is a God because it is ensouled” (ibid). Encouragingly, he then notes once one realizes
this, there is not much farther toward God. He explains: “The Soul once seen to be thus
precious, thus divine, you may hold the faith that by its possession you are already nearing
God” (V.1.3). However, in his greater scheme of things, there is another step, because “Soul,
for all the worth . . .is yet a secondary, an image of the Intellectual-Principle.” Therefore, the
Soul, receives its value from the “Intellectual-Principle.” Just as speaking of reason is not
reason, but only an image of it, “the soul is an utterance of the Intellectual-Principle,” in its
entirety. For its perfection, “it must look to the Divine Mind, which may be thought of as a
father watching over the development of his child born imperfect in comparison with
himself” (ibid).
Despite imperfection, Plotinus believes there is “loveliness . . . [in] this world,” which
“comes by communion in Ideal Form” (I.6.2). Plotinus attributes “a faculty peculiarly
addressed to Beauty” as belonging to the Soul, nonetheless, it recognizes “the Beautiful”
because it is “accordant with the Ideal Form” (I.6.3). There are “beauties of the realm of
sense, images and shadow-pictures . . . that have entered into Matter—to adorn, and to
ravish, where they are seen.” However, senses do not have access to the “loftier beauties . . .
[that] the Soul, taking no help from the organs, sees and proclaims them […] [s]uch vision is
for those only who see with the Soul’s sight” (I.6.4).
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This beauty, Plotinus further argues, “induce[s] wonderment, . . . longing and love
and a trembling that is all delight […] and those only that feel the keener wound are known
as Lovers” (ibid). Those who feel the difference between the worldly beauties, and “the
beauty outside the sense, . . . [must] declare themselves” (I.6. 4-5). To further clarify, he then
contrasts “beauty” with “ugliness,” to show that “Beauty is the Authentic-Existents and
Ugliness is the Principle contrary to Existence,” which he equates to “evil,” thus “BeautyGood and the Ugliness-Evil” (I.6.6). Ascending toward the “Good,” therefore, is
for those that will take the upward path, who will set all their forces towards it, who
will divest themselves of all that we have put on in our descent: so, to those that
approach the Holy Celebrations of the Mysteries, there are appointed purifications
and the laying aside of the garments worn before, and the entry in nakedness—until
passing on the upward way, all that is other than the God . . .(I.6.7).
In Plotinus’s system, this purification is justified because it unifies the “faculty
peculiarly addressed to beauty,” endowed by the Soul, with the beauty that resides in
material, that which we perceive, and more specifically, recognized by the artist.55The beauty
in the material form, argues Plotinus, comes from the “Ideal-Form;” this is what the faculty
recognizes and with which unifies (I.6.3). In the Fifth Ennead, Plotinus further explains how
this beauty is translated through the mind of the artist, already endowed with the “higher
beauty,” and when the work of art is created, it is thus not in the material nor is it in the
artist’s “eyes and hands,” but in bringing the two together, or as Plotinus puts it, “by [the
artist’s] . . . participation in his art” (V.8.1). The implications in this deduction have been
pointed to by Gilbert and Kuhn: “The beauty of the statue comes from the way it has been
worked by the workman, rather than from the simple external facts of relation of parts and
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color” (113). Nonetheless, the concern for shaping the subject due to this idea, rests outside
their interest. They go as far as emphasizing the act of unity that takes place in the process.
Gilbert and Kuhn state:
A product is dead and less than the artist; the artist is a particular man, and less than
his art; the art is dependent on an external material medium and so is not selfsufficient; the creative act dominating Nature is alone self-sufficient. Here act and
vision are one; color and shape arise together within the process (115).
Plotinus’s argument on “Beauty” solidifies the subject’s bind to his interpretation of
the Divine through “the material thing [that] becomes beautiful—by communicating in the
Reason-Principle that flows from the Divine” (I.6.2). This argument, elevates that which one
(i.e. the artist) creates, above the “being,” itself and takes for granted all that is predicated on
Plotinus’s interpretation of the “Divine.” Thus, there is a problem when one’s imagination or
interpretation, perceived as principle, mingles with subject’s faith, and dominates or rules
over others. But how does one’s subjective “truth” gain a superior position? There is an
economy of debt at work in such a dynamic: the excess meaning/value given to what has
been created (i.e. added interest) diminishes the being’s intrinsic worth, and due to lack of
independent verification, one feels taken over by the perceived power. On this problem
Nietzsche states:
All the beauty and sublimity we have bestowed upon real and imaginary things I will
reclaim as the property and product of man: as his fairest apology. Man as poet, as
thinker, as God, as love, as power: with what regal liberality he has lavished gifts
upon things so as to impoverish himself and make himself feel wretched! His most
unselfish act hitherto has been to admire and worship and to know how to conceal
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from himself that it was he who created what he admired [...] When a man is
suddenly and overwhelmingly suffused with the feeling of power—and this is what
happens with all great affects—it raises in him a doubt about his own person: he does
not dare to think himself the cause of this astonishing feeling—and so he posits a
stronger person, a divinity, to account for it.56
It is not just the admiration of a “creation” alone, but also how there is power in the
interpretation, itself created, albeit within certain predetermined cultural guidelines and
concerns. Nietzsche recognizes the art that is created by way of this interpretation when he
states “Man as poet, as thinker . . .,” for who would deny himself of the “beauty,” Plotinus is
pointing to:
Withdraw into yourself and look. And if you do not find yourself beautiful yet, act as
does the creator of a statue that is to be made beautiful: he cuts away here, he
smoothes there, he makes this line lighter, this other purer, until a lovely face has
grown upon his work […] When you know that you have become this perfect work,
when you are self-gathered in the purity of your being, nothing now remaining that
can shatter that inner unity, nothing from without clinging to the authentic man, when
you find yourself wholly true to your essential nature . . . (I.6.9).
Accordingly, Plotinus urges one to “withdraw into himself, foregoing all that is
known by the eyes” (I.6.8). If we consider “seeing” with one’s eyes an individual
act/experience (an act that in Lacan’s Mirror Theory leads to individuation), it then follows,
not surprisingly, that such outlook does not lead to the formation of the individual’s
subjecthood. Instead, one is enticed with ambiguous notions such as beauty and love—
subjective ideas that have turned into form—to become an “illuminati,” one whose claims of
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enlightenment is unverifiable. Evaluation of the “beauty” as inferior to the “beauty outside of
sense,” has implications: it means downplaying the lived-experience in favor of the
imaginary and interpretative knowledge that is debatable.
Beauty and love are the lure, although reliant upon the Intellectual-Principle, which
keeps Plotinus’s philosophical system together. Nonetheless, the system offers such exquisite
beauty and potential for creative endeavors, that artists and thinkers alike have overlooked its
problematic aspects. Gilbert and Kuhn note: “Plotinus makes Beauty both transcendent and
immanent, and this strains to the breaking-point the logical consistency of his system. But,
what is loss to logic is at least part gain to esthetics” (117). To be sure, the “being” in
Plotinus’s value system remains hinged to the metaphysical center, the “One.”. This may
explain how its interpretations generated, with ease, varied iterations in Christianity and later
in Islam. The history of Western religious art is filled with numerous examples of
Neoplatonic interpretations. Gilbert and Kuhn point out that Plotinus’s philosophy had far
reaching influences “on later thought—medieval, Renaissance, and even modern” (117). One
finds Saint Augustine nearly repeating word for word Plotinus’s description of the
harmonious way in which everything endowed with beauty moves together (ibid).57 Such
interpretations and literature spilled over during the systematic campaign of collecting and
translating knowledge from the antiquity by Muslims. Following the translation movement in
the ninth and tenth centuries, it is no surprise then that many of the Islamic geometric
patterns—interpreted according to the permissible cultural paradigms—also reflect such
harmony (S.H.Nasr 1992, 338). Therefore, to examine Neoplatonism in Islamic thought, one
must return to the earliest instances of the formation of “Islamic philosophy” and its reasons.
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Tracing back the notion of “Islamic philosophy,” in looking through any text on the
history of intellectual thought in Islam, one comes across references to a very well-known
text called “Theology of Aristotle.”58 Despite the title, this book is erroneously attributed to
Aristotle; however, it offers a revealing clue to the formation of philosophical thought in the
Muslim intellectual history. The so-called “Theology of Aristotle” is indeed the product of
the translation movement that took place in the early medieval Baghdad, and “is in fact an
Arabic version of parts of the Enneads” by Plotinus, with added “aspects of Theology that
seem to be genuinely innovative and original” (Adamson 2002, 2). It became “the most
important direct source for Neoplatonic ideas in the Islamic world.” This text informed many
scholars, “from al-Kindi to al-Farabi and Ibn Sina (Avicenna) to the later ishraqi
(Illuminationist) school.” 59 This line of influence continued in Iran, as it will be discussed
later in this study, to other Muslim thinkers, from al-Ghazali to Mūlla Sadrā, Hajj Mūlla Hādi
Sabzevāri and straight to Iran’s revolutionary leader, Ayatollah Khomeini. What is the
significance of this particular text?
Peter Adamson argues that the “Theology of Aristotle” came about to fill the gap in
Aristotle for Muslims, by “providing extensive doctrines about the nature of God and
eschatology.”60 This seems plausible since Muslims were clearly aware of two distinct
schools in Greek thoughts according to S.H. Nasr. He states:
Muslims came to distinguish between two different schools, each possessing a
distinct type of science: one, the Hermetic-Pythagorean school, was metaphysical in
its approach, its sciences of Nature depending upon the symbolic interpretation of
phenomena and of mathematics; in the other, the syllogistic-rationalistic school of the
followers of Aristotle, the point of view was philosophical rather than metaphysical,
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and its sciences were therefore, aimed at finding the place of things in a rational
system, rather than at seeing, through their appearances, their heavenly essences.61
The knowledge collected by the medieval Muslims from the antiquity was varied and
often conflicting. One of the objectives of the translation movement was to produce a
“unified” philosophy that reflected a cohesive empire (Adamson 2002, 3 and Gutas 29).
“[T]he growing insistence on the essential unity of philosophical truth, on the harmony
between Plato’s and Aristotle’s doctrine . . . is indicative of an attitude of compromise which
made philosophy fit to serve as a scientific interpretation of monotheistic and creationist
religion.”62 This means that it became necessary to produce a philosophical theory that could
also accommodate a political system, not to mention one that could respond to other
sprouting intellectual activities due to the translation movement that challenged that unity.63
Neoplatonist philosophy brought into the mix the perfect ingredient that facilitated a Platoinspired governing system.
Therefore, the translation movement in general, and the translation of the Enneads,
later known as Arabic Plotinus in particular, albeit in parts, was “purposeful and
systematic.”64 According to Dimitri Gutas, there were two paths of development, once the
translation activities commenced: “first it expanded in the direction of scholarly precision
and accuracy for the existing fields, and second into increasingly new areas and subjects
considered worthy of translation” (116). It must be noted the translation and other intellectual
activities in the region is often viewed as contemporaneous with the establishing of the city
of Baghdad, however as pointed out by Gutas, the intellectual work predates the founding of
the city, which indicates more of a continuity than a change as argued by Michael Morony
(1984).
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Morony’s argument is in agreement with the thesis in this study that the West and the
Middle East are not in a binary opposition. He draws attention to the advent of Islam in
“western Asia and northern Africa” not as “a watershed between the ancient and medieval
histories of . . . these regions,” but rather a continuity (3). He deems “two major forms of
continuity: direct survival . . . and continuity through transmission” (507). 65 This brings into
focus the institutionalization of pre-Islamic Arabia in Islam in the region (ibid). What is
noteworthy here is the role of political power behind this institutionalization, as the incoming
Abbasids were trying to solidify their rule.
In addition to “useful” knowledge such as astrology, astronomy and medicine (Saliba
2007), philosophy became a subject of interest, even though, “it was . . . a discipline for
which there was the least amount of practical need,” as argued by Gutas (119). Nonetheless,
very early on the rulers realized it was “socially relevant,” for it offered an opportunity to
“legitimize” an ideology to rule over their non-Arab subjects (Gutas 29). This required
developing a “religio-political discourse” and bringing together a number of competent
scholars. 66 Gutas confirms:
The introduction of philosophy into the Islamic world is indelibly linked with the
name of al-Kindi (died ca. 870), the first philosopher in Arabic, and the circle of
scientists and collaborators that he gathered around him.67
Gutas quickly reminds us that al-Kindi was not a philosopher in a contemporary
sense, but that he was a polymath and believed “mathematical or geometrical proof to be of
the highest order” (120). Admittedly, al-Kindi sought to “approach mathematical accuracy in
his argumentation” in order to “advance knowledge,” rather than reiterating or memorizing
the information from the texts. Further, al-Kindi aimed to utilize mathematical methodology
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to “the theological and religious discussions of his time” (ibid). For this reason, he required
the translation of key texts, such as “Aristotle’s Metaphysics, and selections from Plotinus
and Proclus in Arabic known as the Theology of Aristotle” (ibid).68 This task necessitated the
continuous sponsorship and support of the caliphs, princes and other notables (Gutas 121).
This makes the role of the patrons in the translation movement noteworthy, which
demonstrates the direct political interest in the translation movement. 69 The impact of the
translation movement paved the way for what was to become a unified Abbasid imperial rule
lasting five hundred years. But why is there significance in the role of interpretation or
translation, particularly with respect to power?

THE PHILOSOPHY OF TRANSLATION
The theorization of what constitutes the place of the individual within the group, or
the relationship between the subject and power, often requires an effective process of
translation and interpretation. Richard Kearny in the Introduction to Paul Ricoeur’s
Philosophy of Translation elucidates translation as exemplarily “performed” by Ricoeur, for
he “navigated and negotiated transits between rival intellectual positions”(vii). Further,
translation is not merely a “linguistic product,” but also “a form of intercultural mediation
taking place in a specific social and cultural context,” according to David Limon (29). The
space in between is taken up by Homi Bhabha (1994), who aims to decentralize the
Eurocentric discourse, and move his focus to what shapes our existence today , which is
“living on the borderline of ‘present’” (1). Whereas Limon is interested in the “gap” that he
“perceive[s] . . . between what many translation scholars say should be the case . . . and the
reality” (30), Bhabha proposes “to focus on those moments or processes that are produced in
the articulation of cultural differences” (2). The issue of translation in the era of post49

structuralism has become rather a complex discourse, for it engages many concerns, thus
itself a worthy subject of a separate investigation. However, for the purpose of this study, it is
necessary to briefly touch on the significance of the task of translation, but more importantly,
to draw attention to a specific concern, which is the added information and innovative results
through the process of translation.
In On Translation, Paul Ricoeur deems two models of translation: first is the
“linguistic paradigm,” which focuses on the link between words and their meaning, within a
language or between languages; second, it is the “ontological paradigm” that involves the
subject, whether internal (a subject to its own self), or intrasubject (between the subject and
its “other”).70Walter Benjamin, in the “Task of the Translator” ([1913-1926] 1996), argues
that “[t]ranslation . . . ultimately serves the purpose of expressing the innermost relationship
of languages,” and that it is the “intention” that the translator’s task is centered on (255).
Benjamin further notes that “languages supplement one another in their intentions […] the
way of meaning is supplemented in its relation to what is meant” (257). The issue of
“supplement” is noted by Derrida in The Truth in Painting (1987), when he brings up
“surplus value” (5). He states:
In another language, given enough space, time and endurance, it might be possible for
long discourses to propose laborious approaches to it. But, untranslatable it remains in
its economic performance, in the ellipsis of its trait, the word by word, the word for
word, or the trait for trait in which it contracts: as many words, signs, letters, the same
quantity or the same expense for the same semantic content, with the same revenue of
surplus value” (5).
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It is the “surplus value” that engenders the interest, that which refutes Kant’s “disinterestedness.” In The Truth in Painting, Derrida demonstrates, albeit interpreting between
the visual and written languages, because there is always a “remainder,” a “surplus” in
meaning, interpretation of the “truth” in something is never impartial, as in “the thing itself.”
He states therefore, “[t]he truth . . is no longer itself in that which represents it in painting, it
is merely its double,” no matter how good it resembles (ibid). Whereas for Ricouer text is
“any discourse in writing” (1981, 145), as evident in the aforementioned quotes, Derrida has
a broader definition for the text. The inclusive way in which Derrida treats “text,” facilitates
an understanding of the text as ranging from knowledge to events and visual works of art. In
his parergon theory, which lends itself well to the analysis of a work of art I have discussed
in chapter three, there is an overlap in the interest, which he argues always exists, with
respect to a work of art (or an interpretation of it), and the “surplus,” which exists when
representing it. In his analysis of Cranach’s Lucretia, with regards to the notion of parergon,
Derrida states:
If any parergon is only added on by virtue of an internal lack in the system to which
it is added . . . what is it that is lacking in the representation of the body so that the
garment should come and supplement it? And what would art have to do with this?
What would it give to be seen? Cause to be seen? Let us see? (1987, 58).
In the same spirit, I ask the question of the painting called The Ascension of the
Prophet (16th century, discussed in chapter three), where the visual version of the Koranic
text displays more details. It is the added details, I argue, which is the source of interest in the
subject, and as argued by Marx, it is the source of what benefits he who owns the product.71
The translation and the added interest can be analyzed from another perspective. As sources
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of knowledge and law, the scriptures have played an integral part in subject formation.
Mohammad Arkoun, in his article, Rethinking Islam, points to an intriguing aspect of
interpretation, when it comes to the “Heavenly Book.” He contends that in the “societies of
the book,” which he defines as “those that have been shaped since the Middle Ages by the
Book, as a religious and a cultural phenomenon,” there is a “ verticality which has
constituted the religious imagainaire in the Near East” that has made the criticism of the
subsequent interpretations of it “unthinkable” (2003, 30). He states:
Truth is located in Heaven with God, who reveals it in time and through the medium
He chooses: the prophets, Himself incarnated in the “Son” who lived among people,
the Book transmitted by the messenger M[o]hammad. There are different modalities
for the delivery . . . but the Word of God as God Himself is the same from the point
of view of the anthropological structure of religious imaginaire (ibid).
Thus Arkoun discerns two meanings for the “Heavenly Book:” one as the Word of
God, and the other as the “Word of God as God.” The interpretation of the “Word of God,”
has taken place in Abrahamic religions by the theologians, each in its manifested form (i.e.
Hebrew, Aramaic, and Arabic); “they used either literalist exegesis of the scripture itself or
rational categories and procedures influenced by Greek philosophy” (ibid). He further
explains that this was done through “[g]rammar and logic,” but not in a way that leads to a
critical method (ibid). Arkoun, therefore, argues that even though the belief is that the
scriptures are revelations from God, in mediation, and their expressions in human voices, and
later written form, they become “historical, social and cultural events and manifestations”
(ibid). Consequently, for example “[t]hat Jesus is presented as the “Son of God” and the
Qur’an a speech worded by God Himself are theological definitions (i.e. added interest) used
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in systems of beliefs and non-beliefs particular to Christian and Islamic dogma (2003, 31).
There is also a translation or interpretation of value that maybe considered here; an example
would be when Franz Fanon suggested—with regards to the Hegelian Master-Slave
theory—that the Lacanian theory of the “Other” was more relevant to the situation of the
colonized than Marx’s interpretation of master-slave ([1952] 2008). Analogously, in the postcolonial context, Bhabha offers a different interpretation of how to come to terms with
cultural differences. He states: “The borderline work of culture demands an ‘encounter’ with
newness that is not part of the continuum of past and present. It creates a sense of the new as
an insurgent act of cultural translation” (10). On the problem of translation, Asad highlights
the fact that there is “inequality of languages,” which he deems as “the global patterns of
power created by imperialism and capitalism.” He notes:
[m]y argument is directed against the assumption that translation requires the
adjustment of ‘foreign’ discourses to their new site[;] . . . they should retain what may
be a discomforting—even scandalous—presence within the receiving language (199).
The “interpretation of cultures,” as alluded to by Asad, in the context of social
anthropology becomes critical when it transcends the linguistics to enter “modes of
thought.”72 From this perspective, the issue of translation as applied to what transpired in the
process of importing modernism to the Middle East, and in particular Iran, broadens.

CONTEMPORARY CRITICAL CONVERSATIONS
Iranian thinker, Daryush Shaygan, in Cultural Schizophrenia, Islamic Societies
Confronting the West (1992) argues that as a “major historical phenomenon,” modernism “in
its broadest sense” has never been dealt with “objectively, in terms of its philosophic content,
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but always in terms of its traumatic impact on our traditions, our ways of living and thinking”
(Shayegan 3). The consequence has been what Shayegan calls a “moral component” that has
complicated the attitude toward the West in “either admiring . . . or shutting itself off from
European influence” (Shayegan 4). Further, he argues, during the reforms, when the Muslim
thinkers understood the importance of, and pursued the “individual rights and liberties,” they
overlooked the fact that such worthy objectives they were striving for did not occur due to a
sudden and miraculous appearance. Shayegan states:
[O]ne essential [element] escaped the earliest thinkers, as it does most of their
present-day successors: these basic ideas, whose qualities were so admired, were not
the results of some recent miracle, but the end-product of an exceptional historical
process . . . [that] could not be transplanted without displacing and marginalizing the
traditional values to which we are so attached, and which occupied every corner of
our public space.73
From another direction, meaning Europe’s interaction with the art and culture of
Persia, some interesting arguments have been proposed. In his book, Persophilia (2015),
Hamid Dabashi takes on Europe’s literary and culturally-charged love-affair with “all things
Persian.” By juxtaposing the two interconnected lenses of Raymond Schwab (The Oriental
Renaissance – 1950) and Edward Said (Orientalism – 1978), and by drawing on Jüregen
Habermas, Dabashi argues: “critical as these two texts are,” neither one considers the
“category of bourgeois society . . . as the principle site of knowledge production about the
Orient” (2). Therefore, he emphasizes how “European bourgeois society . . . contributed to
the creation of the public space—in both form and content” (5). In Dabashi’s view, for
example, how Europe formulated its perspective about the “Orient” impacted how the
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“Orientals,” or more specifically Persians, ultimately viewed themselves (22-23). However,
the issue of power as tied to the uncritically cited examples does not enter the argument.74 As
with Shayegan, Dabashi considers the “public space,” but ties it to the issue of identity, and
aims to demonstrate how that identity was shaped through the perspective of the Europeans’
admiration of the Persian art and culture (228). Nonetheless, Dabashi, focused on the
“societal” approach, is ultimately “interested in Persian cultural heritage and what happens to
it when, in the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and under the influence of
European imperial encroachment, it finally exited the Persianate court and emerged to form a
bona fide public space that it would eventually call Vatan/Homeland” (11).
Both Dabashi and Said (in Culture and Imperialism – 1984-86) point to “resistance”
through “national independence” and “self-determination” (Said 1984-86, xii and Dabashi 5)
as consequences of European imperialism, but neither author locates the place of the
individual (i.e. the subject) within such self-determination or “public space.” Dabashi
nevertheless, strives to demonstrate how the “postcolonial public sphere [in Persia] was
triggered by the European bourgeois public sphere in formal and representational
affiliations” that was either rejected or emulated by the Iranians (Dabashi 228). As his
“concern is with the active formation of a public sphere on the colonial site, where both the
local bourgeoisie and its antithesis were concurrently constructed,” he acknowledges both
“the bourgeois culture of accommodation” as well as “the multiple and varied cultures of
resistance.” Thusly he explicates the chasm in the bourgeois space as appropriated from the
European model, which he argues became augmented for the “colonial site” (Dabashi 5).
Shayegan, however, articulates this chasm in
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[t]he tension between the unveiling of new zones of reality and the atavistic
compulsion to exclude or eject them from the field of knowledge, [which] was bound
to create fissures in the consciousness: although things were changing externally,
mental projections still functioned according to the old mode of representation (4).
Utilizing literary art forms, Dabashi delineates a path through which Persian literature
entered the “various European intellectual movements,” displacing it in a way that “was
shocking, destabilizing, yet also invigorating, provocative, [and] self-regenerative.” It is due
to these nuances, that a “critical momentum” was engendered, in time for the “Persian poets
and literati,” as they were searching to create a “public space” to “rearticulate themselves”
(Dabashi 13). Conversely, Shayegan notes the problem of “mental distortion” emerging from
an “internal chasm,” that stands in sharp contrast to the external nuances. He states this
“problem can only be raised by people born into these civilizations” (Shayegan 4). Whereas
Dabashi focuses on the transcultural exchanges between the bourgeois “public spaces,”
Shayegan is concerned with the internal conflict, which he terms “a contradictory double
fascination” that stems from “the enchanted vision of a world still infused with the aura of
collective memory, and the equally compelling allure of the new and unknown” (Shayegan
5).
Perhaps Shayegan, more clear and to the point, but without addressing the issue of
subjectivity directly, provides a picture of the subject that is caught in the gap between the
traditional and the modern. He eloquently highlights the ‘delay’ which exists in what such
subject projects and what is actually present before it, that which is “not just a chronological
dislocation, but an ontological divide” (Shayegan 6). The world of such subject remains
protected from “revolutions caused by scientific and technical upheavals [that] produced
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paradigm shifts which molded consciousness to the imperatives of each new way of
looking.” The consciousness of such subject “is still rooted in a world of enchantment;”
while it is continuously stimulated and drawn “to new things[,] but their genealogy and
archeology remain unknown” to it (ibid). But Shayegan’s work is not without criticism.
In his book, Venture of Philosophy in Contemporary Iran (2013), M.H. SadighYazdchi analyzes Shayegan’s thoughts, and finds traces of a peculiar connection. Shayegan
was a pupil of Henri Corbin (1903-1978), the renowned French Iranologist and professor of
Islamic Studies at the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Études in Paris. Yazdchi argues that Corbin,
who was trained under Louis Massignon (1883-1962 - a Catholic scholar of Islam and an
expert on the Sufi, Mansour Hallaj), developed an affinity for the theological and
philosophical Islam (Yazdchi 88), particularly in Shi’ite apocalyptic narratives. According to
Yazdchi, utilizing a critique of Heidegger and the nihilistic philosophy of Nietzsche (which
he argued signaled the end of philosophy and end of the subject in the West), Corbin closely
examines the idea of Shi’ite jurisprudence (velayat), as the redeemer of what he calls
“subjectivity’s impasse” in Western philosophy (90). Thus, he innovatively melds together
the Shi’ite theology with philosophy, and declares it “the panacea to the impasse of
metaphysics in the West” (ibid). This becomes significant when Yazdchi reveals Corbin’s
influential thoughts were picked up by Ahmad Fardid, theoretician of Islamic Republic of
Iran, and S.H. Nasr, Islamic Mysticism scholar. Yazdchi also argues that Shayegan, up until
recently,75 thought along the same lines in situating Iran and Iranians within the mysticinfluenced/constructed cultural past (121). Therefore, as what undermined the process toward
modernism and true reforms, Yazdchi highlights a connection that brings Neoplatonic
tendencies to the twentieth century for Iran.
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One of the recurring themes in addressing reforms in the Middle East has been how to
reconcile modernism with traditionalism. According to some thinkers such as Tariq
Ramadan, “there is indeed, in the classical Islamic tradition, a central reference to the need
for a renewal, revival, and consequently, reform of our reading and understanding”
(Ramadan 36). On the issue of tradition, particularly post September 11, 2001 however,
many theoreticians have turned to a critical view of the religion, namely Islam, when
addressing the current problems in the Middle East. There seems to be a gap between a “socalled Islamic revivalism [that] has monopolized the discourse on Islam,” and what Arkoun
calls “silent Islam” (2003). Arkoun argues for “a need to encourage and initiate audacious,
free, productive thinking on Islam today” (2003, 18). In his view, currently, the politicized
Islam has dominated all “cultural and social space,” thus making it nearly impossible for
other thinkers within Islam to put forth their “critical approach” (2003, 19). Emphasizing
“thinking,” Arkoun states:
[T]he main intellectual endeavor represented by thinking Islam . . . today is to
evaluate, with a new epistemological perspective, the characteristics and intricacy of
systems of knowledge—both the historical and the mythical. I would even say that
both are still interacting and interrelated in our modern thought after at least three
hundred years of rationalism and historicism (2003, 19).
Arkoun explains by pointing to “thinking Islam,” he aims to “indicate a general
direction of thinking and the main conditions necessary to practice an ijtihad,” which he
interprets as “[one’s own] intellectual effort to find adequate answers . . . recognized equally
by Muslims and modern scholars” (ibid). Nonetheless, he distinguishes this practice, from
the traditional ijtihad, which was established by Islamic jurists in the 8th - 9th centuries and
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was restricted to the epistemological work—that which still exists, but strictly within the
domain of orthodoxy. Instead, he proposes “a modern critical analysis of the structure of
Islamic reason.”76 In his “critique of Islamic reason,” Arkoun requires bypassing the practice
of “traditional Islamic studies” by Muslims, as well as the “orientalists’ historical
philological analysis,” which he calls “classical Islamology.” 77 Arkoun argues that the
traditional Islamic studies approach has not been able to appropriately address the modern
problems of Muslims in the modern “Muslim societies.” As a result, the political scientists
and fundamentalists have moved in, (those who created, or contributed to creating, the
political Islam) to fill the vacuum (Arkoun 2002, 10-11).
As an example of “tools for new thinking,” Arkoun offers his criticism of the
“periodization of the history,” which he argues has been “dictated by political events” (2003,
20). We identify periods in Islamic history by the dynastic rules, such as “Umayyad,
Abbasid, and Ottoman periods.” Instead, Arkoun suggests, one must look to the
“discontinuities affecting the conceptual framework used in a given cultural space” (ibid). He
explicates:
The concepts of reason and science (ilm) used in the [Kor]an, for example, are not the
same as those developed later by the falasifa [philosophers] according to the Platonic
and the Aristotelian schools. However, the . . . episteme introduced by the [Kor]an
has not been intellectually reconsidered (ibid).
In his argument, Arkoun utilizes the example of the phrase “the problem of God,” and
states that such a phrase remains beyond the “thinkable” and consequently becomes
“unthought” in the “‘orthodox’ Islamic thought.”78 Thus, Arkoun describes a chasm between
the “cultures and systems of thought related to pagan, polytheistic,” and by extension, their
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“modern secularized societies” and “Muslim orthodoxy” with regards to thinking (ibid). He
proposes that the “implicit postulates” within the discourse should be “discover[ed] and
analyz[ed],” if one is to “control the epistemological validity of any discourse” (ibid).
Arkoun is concerned with unraveling the enduring ties between the “unthinkable/unthought”
and the orthodoxy to demonstrate a path toward “a radical reconstruction of mind and society
in the contemporary Muslim world” (Arkoun 1994, 1). This task, he aims to achieve by, for
instance, placing the Koran in its “historical, cultural, social, psychological and linguistic”
context, by way of a “multidisciplinary analysis employing socio-historical psychology,
cultural anthropology, semiotics, semantics, and hermeneutics.”79
In response to Arkoun, Nasr Abu Zayd, in Reformation of Islamic Thought (2006),
asks the question whether there is “a genuine possibility of achieving real reformation
without constantly clinging to . . . religious tradition, to justify and appropriate the
acceptance of reformation” (2006, 101). According to Abu Zayd, it appears that the model of
associating modernity with Western influence still persists, which has widened the gap
between reformists and the traditionalists. Abu Zayd acknowledges the flow of the
wave of civilization [that] was probably born somewhere around the basin of rivers,
probably in black Africa, Egypt or Iraq, before it moved to Greece, then returned to
the Middle East in the form of Hellenism. With the advent of Islam, a new culture
emerged absorbing and reconstructing the Hellenistic as well as the Indian and
Iranian cultural elements before it was handed to the Western new world via Spain
and Sicily (2006 101).
He further notes the contributions of thinkers such as Averroes, through whose work
“new intellectual light” was transferred to the “European dark ages.” Nonetheless, just as
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Arkoun does, Abu Zayd brings his focus back to the Koran in order to initiate any kind of
reform by Muslims themselves. Abu Zayd’s contribution to the conversation, however, rests
in bringing the “human dimension to the historical and cultural dimension of the [Kor]an”
(2006, 97). He points to the often-overlooked interactions of humans (such as the
rearrangement of the Koranic chapters, and the addition of signs of vocalization, after the
passing of the Prophet), as well as referring to the historical context by both sides—the
orthodoxy as well as modernists—in order to justify their own interpretations (2006, 98).
Abu Zayd further states:
Like the classical theologians and classical jurists, the proponents of modern
hermeneutics endeavor to articulate their positions by creating a focal point of gravity
that can be claimed as universal—the irrevocable and the eternal truth. The antimodernists would merely shift the focal point of gravity to claim the opposite.
Abu Zayd is keen to recognize that the solution lies in a “focal point of gravity to
which all . . . variations . . .[can] be linked.” He further expands on the “human dimension,”
not in the “canonization,” but in viewing the Koran as discourse(s) rather than text (2006,
98). Therefore, Abu Zayd emphasizes the “communication” aspect of the Koranic revelation
and calls for a “democratic and open hermeneutic” approach that is about “the meaning of
life”(2006, 99). Despite his critical approach, similar to Arkoun, Abu Zayd finds himself in a
binary position with the West, whereas in this study, I argue for interpreting the emergence
of monotheism initially as a method of criticism; this approach liberates Islam from being a
binary to polytheism, Neoplatonism, and generally to the West, a method of criticism of
systems which have led to self-alienation, undermining social justice.
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Comparable to the focus in this study, Abu Zayd underscores the lived experience,
which he has referred to as “the meaning of life” to be connected to the “meaning of the
[Kor]an,” for “the [Kor]an was the outcome of dialogue, debate, augment, acceptance, and
rejection, both with pre-Islamic norms, practices and culture, and with its own previous
assessment, presuppositions and assertions” (2006, 99). However, he makes no mention of
the subject within this “meaning.” In conclusion, however, Abu Zayd asks: “[a]re Muslims
ready to rethink the [Kor]an or not?” Rethinking the Koran (from a fixed, closed text to a
dynamic discourse), he argues, requires willingness to discuss the relationship between the
West and the Muslim world. Abu Zayd does not seem optimistic on this subject (2006, 101).
From the anthropologic perspective, Talal Asad is compelled to respond to current
Western anthropologists, whose publications “containing the word ‘Islam’ or ‘Muslim’ in the
title” are on the rise, for “political reasons” (Asad [1986] 2009, 1). For this purpose, he has
introduced the concept “discursive tradition,” which is an “intervention in the anthropology
of Islam,” by shifting from “the interpretation of behaviors” to the “inquiry into the relation
of practices” (ibid). This is due to the idea that there is no one Islam, but rather islams,
according to Ovamir Anjum, and it is within the diverse interrelations of the latter that Asad
centers this idea (Anjum 659). Recently, responding to the current movements within Muslim
regions, Western scholarly work has attempted to “conceptualize Islam” in order to be able to
“speak of the issues of authenticity, continuity, and legitimacy of Islamism”(Anjum 656). He
further argues that Orientalist theoreticians have failed to notice the “lived Islam” that cannot
be “essentialize[d].” This is where some anthropologists, like Asad, have countered the
essentialist views; but, there are also others. Anjum states:
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Some scholars, primarily anthropologists, have responded to the tendency to
essentialize by giving up the idea of conceptualizing one "Islam" and instead have
focused their inquiry on what they call various "local islams." Others have focused on
sociological or political-economic approaches in explaining the modern forms of
political and social activism among Muslims to the exclusion of "scriptural" Islam
from their analysis (656).
Still there are others who have striven to seek the answer to individual freedoms, such
as freedom of expression, within the legal and moral domain of the main religious texts
(“[Kor]an and Sunna”). Islamic legal scholar, Mohammad Hashim Kamali, in Freedom of
Expression in Islam (1997) has undertaken such a task. Kamali’s framework consists of two
major themes: “affirmative evidence in support of freedom of expression, and the limitations,
whether moral or legal” (1). He aims to demonstrate that the “main objectives of freedom of
expression . . . are the vindication of truth and the protection of human dignity,” and that
there are plenty of references to ensure individual freedoms in Islam.80 (ibid). However,
despite exposing the orthodoxy in Islamic Shari’a, Kamali does not explain how these
principles are constantly undermined and not practiced in the majority of governments in the
Middle East claiming to abide by the Islamic principles. The discussions on rights and
freedoms after the advent of modernism, without the establishing the place of and
acknowledging the subject and all that shapes it, therefore, has not been productive.
However, looking back at the pre-modern times, one may be able to find instances of
demonstration of human dignity among Muslim literary figures that have been misinterpreted
as individualism.
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In his autobiography, Jalal al-Din Suyuti, the fifteenth century Egyptian scholar,
follows a specific format, which is modeled after the “recognized tradition of Arabic
autobiographical writing” (Reynolds, 1). This convention encompasses a number of
motivations put forth by the author, such as: “Speaking of God’s bounty,” (qtd from Koran
93:11), as well as acknowledging the life circumstances of his forbearers and guides. Most
importantly, the idea that encourages Muslims “to emulate one’s virtues and meritorious acts
. . .[which is] found in many areas of Islamic intellectual and spiritual life” is the same idea
that holds Prophet Mohammad as an example of the “Ideal Man.” (Reynolds, 3). On
individuality as contrasted to conformity, Amin Banani argues against such binary division,
and considers a practical aspect for “conformity,” particularly with respect to the members of
Persian noble class, which possibly could have had political effects (19-20). On Al-Suyuti,
despite its contrast to “some medieval and pre-modern European autobiographies the public
recognition (‘confession’),” such form, contrary to the author’s suggestion, does not signal
individuality of the “self.” Al-Suyuti directly states in writing his autobiography the role of
his guides:
I have emulated them and have written this book in order to speak of God’s bounty
and to thank Him, not out of hypocrisy, nor for my own credit, nor out of pride. God
is our source of help, and to him we entrust ourselves.81
This statement appears more in line with what Abu Zayd’s criticism notes in
“creating a focal point of gravity that can be claimed as universal” (2006, 98), than
individualism. The main point here is that the issue of the subject was not in the domain of
the “thinkable,” to use Arkoun’s term. Ramadan, on the other hand, argues that despite all
disagreements between various groups of Muslims—whether among the experts or the
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general community—there is consensus that “the tool of critical interpretation of texts . . . are
indispensable means to face contemporary challenges” (36). Nonetheless, there is no mention
of the place of the subject. Arkoun’s objective is to “historicize” the “divine category [of]
Revelation” and transition the “religious imaginaire” to a “social imaginaire” that would
bring about the “deconstruction” and applicability of the hermeneutic method (2003, 31).
The appealing idea of hermeneutic, with respect to the religious text has prompted
Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari to express astonishment at those who question criticism of
religious thought. Shabestari notes asking such inquiries “is due to a lack of regard for the
notion of criticism on the one hand, and equating religious thought in [such an] era with a
finalized truth” (193). He proposes in his book, Hermeneutik, the Book and the Tradition
(2005), albeit to the community of the religious scholars, the necessity of diverse
interpretations and establishing interactions between the fields of knowledge, yet does not
include the issue of the individual (Shabestari 7, 200).
Unlike Arkoun, who is seeking historicization of religion, Abdulkarim Soroush paints
a transhistorical picture of religion in his More Abundant than Theology (1996), underscores
the significance of ideology. However in his view, which is colored by Neoplatonism,
religion does not abide by the same limitations (Soroush 125). The idea of the individual for
Soroush is predetermined, and is exemplified in a specific figure (Abuzar Ghafari), who
epitomizes the hero against social injustice (Soroush 102). His solution from delivering one
from getting caught in between “modernism” and “post-modernism” lies in mysticism
(Soroush 363). However, contrary to Soroush, Seyed Javad Tabatabaei has his sight more on
the administrative problems and chaos that have ensued due to systematic incompetence and
mismanagement of the resources. Having abandoned any hopes of religious reformations,
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Tabatabaei proposes his theory of “Iranshahri,” which is predicated on the pre-Islamic
political thoughts of the Sasanian period (2015, 139). In his view, as a model, the political art
of government of ancient Iran is the only solution to eliminate current administrative
problems. Nonetheless, the conflict between the ancient Iranian civilization and what it
became following the advent of Islam is problematic for Aramesh Doostdar, for he sees the
source of the problem in Iranian’s affinity for all religious matters, which has led to the
problem of not thinking for the population (414). Neither Shabestari, nor Soroush or
Doostdar have brought up the issue of the subject, which is fundamental in the rights issues. 82
There are only a handful of thinkers who look to philosophy to make sense of what
has taken place in the recent history in Iran. Sadigh Yazdchi draws attention to the fact that
within Islamic culture philosophy has consistently been viewed as a religious endeavor (5).
He is keen in his criticism of misappropriation of European philosophy by theoreticians who
aimed to justify an Islamic revolution. He names Ahmad Fardid, whose theories were built
on intentional misinterpretations of philosophers such as Heidegger to such a degree that
toward the end of his life he had stated “Heidegger [was] in the direction of the Islamic
revolution” (Yazdchi, 13-14).83
The preceding pages offer reviews of selected current literature on the topics of
interest in this research. The topics vary from modernism versus tradition, to religious
reformation, to postcolonial discourses. I demonstrated that, despite the engaging and
dynamic issues debated, the discourse on the place of the subject and the power of artistic
endeavors, in their broadest sense—that which is the focus of this project—is absent from the
conversation. To effectively set up the context, I began the chapter with a definition of the
subject, clarification on my approach, and then transitioned into discussing the main ideas of
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Neoplatonism, with the focus on its aesthetics. This also necessitated briefly addressing the
philosophy of translation, and its significance in this study. What follows in the next chapter
explicates in detail the formation of the subject, and a thorough accounts of how I have
defined the artistic endeavors in this study.
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CHAPTER TWO
SUBJECTIVITY: INFORMED BY A LONG TRADITION OF PATRIARCHY

[T]he modern Western state has integrated into a new political shape an old power technique
that originated in Christian institutions. We can call this power technique “pastoral power.”84
—Michel Foucault

Patriarchy traditionally has established itself on two seemingly conflicting strategies:
an artificial unification through apparatuses of power (identity, nationality, law, economy,
art) on one side, and maintaining its position of power based on “othering” and conflict on
the other. Like well-oiled machines, patriarchal mechanisms of power have been shaping
subjectivities in accordance with their interests and positions.85 Such apparatuses, which
historically include artistic productions, have been so effective that distinguishing between a
subjectivity shaped by patriarchy and one that is critical of it has proved challenging. In what
ways has patriarchy shaped to its own ends individual and collective subjectivities through
works of art?
Historically, feminist or pro-feminist discourses have mainly fallen within the
patriarchal binarism in various paths they have taken, from liberal feminism to radical and
cultural feminism; that is to say, they have striven to counter symptoms of patriarchy in order
to achieve equality and recognition, and thus have defined their objectives along the same
dualities.86 One of the theories feminists or pro-feminists have often referenced has been the
“matriarchal myths” employed to “redeem and revalue ‘the feminine’” without the
consideration that arguably the sources of such myths themselves may have been patriarchal
(Eller, 2000, 15).
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Therefore, what I aim to achieve in this chapter is to draw attention to the
phenomenology of patriarchy through a genealogical examination of the links between
patriarchy, art and subject formation in their historical contexts. To reach this aim, it seems
necessary to trace back the history of human creativity to its earliest known stages. I argue,
once the early humans learned how to give material form to what impressed them the most,
namely “power” they experienced in their environments, they discovered a way to possess
what was intangible.87 Similarly, throughout history, patriarchy, itself a manufactured idea,
has given tangible forms to ideas that have secured its power and shaped the identities of
those it subjected to this power.88
Giving physical form to ideas was the predicate of what eventually manifested as
property and itself subject to debt and economy, inevitably and eventually encompassing
human relations in the early communities, as argued by David Graeber.89 In this chapter,
similar to Foucault,90 I am interested in particular in the moments of disruption in history—in
the case at hand specifically—that which changed human concern from life-centered
communities to land and property-centered societies that further affected the relationship
between its members, particularly women, from subjects to objects. I am also interested in “a
history no longer constrained to be a history of the past, but capable of being a ‘history of
present’.”91

A GENEALOGY OF PATRIARCHY: ORIGINS OF ART, ALTERITY AND STATE
It is difficult to speak of the term “patriarchy” without finding oneself, on the one
hand, entangled in the history of its metamorphosis, and on the other, in feminist discourses
on the subject. Using the term “patriarchy” in our own time seems antiquated and irrelevant,
if we are not conscious of how it came into existence or of its ever-changing, long and varied
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history. Feminist movements, now in multiple branches, have tried to provide definitions of
patriarchy. [B]ell hooks opens her essay entitled “Understanding Patriarchy” with:
“[p]atriarchy is the single most life-threatening social disease assaulting the male body and
spirit in our nation.”92 Judith Butler notes that feminism has gone as far as to “establish a
universal status for patriarchy in order to strengthen the appearance of feminism’s own
claims . . . held to produce women’s common subjugated experience” (Gender Trouble 5).
Luce Irigaray defines patriarchy as “an exclusive respect for the genealogy of sons and
fathers, and the competition between brothers” (The Irigaray Reader 23). Such statements fit
and serve patriarchy well, for it benefits from distinguishing itself in opposition and
“othering.” Nearly all feminist discourses at one point or another have placed patriarchy in a
binary position with regards to gender, even though they fully understand that patriarchy is
too great a phenomenon to be reduced to gender alone. Such discourses have extended to
pro-feminist views nonetheless.
Leonard Shlain, in his national bestseller work The Alphabet versus the Goddess
(1998) draws a line between patriarchy and the female-centered communities by juxtaposing
them in the contrast between the word and image respectively. This leads us to the question:
can there be a more encompassing definition of patriarchy? Gerda Lerner acknowledges the
problem with using the term “patriarchy” in its “narrow, traditional meaning.” She defines
patriarchy as “the system, historically derived from Greek and Roman law, in which the male
head of the household had absolute legal and economic power over his dependent female and
male family members” (1986, 238). However, as David Graeber demonstrates, the history of
this phenomenon goes farther back to the time of the early cities, stemming from the dynamic
encounters between the “desert pastoralists” and the “urban life” (176-178). Nevertheless,
neither scholar considers the role of art or creativity in the equation.
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In this study, I define patriarchy as a creative endeavor itself; it is a manufactured,
man-made conception, formed through a synthesis between pastoral authority and cityinspired systems/organization. Characteristically, it is adaptable and metamorphic, thus
multifaceted, and strives to disguise itself as a natural or eternal entity, thereby justifying its
existence through domination and the diminishing of differences at any given time. Such
domination has led to inequity established and maintained partly through art.
As testified to by art historical evidence, more than any other method, patriarchy has
instituted its presence through imagery. How does imagery, then, come to be associated with
the feminine as suggested by Shlain? I argue, contrary to what Shlain has proposed, both
image and word have been patriarchal instruments that have formed and informed the
subjectivities of dominated subjects in favor of maintaining patriarchy’s own position of
power. I further suggest, as the “one” atop the pyramid of power and as an ideology,
patriarchy thrives through control and demands recognition from its collective subjects; it is
uneasy with the issue of individuality and its unpredictability. 93 For this purpose,
traditionally, it has sought unity by way of conflict, even in the guise of ‘matriarchal’
spiritual theories, which it has successfully achieved, albeit an artificial unity, through works
of art among other creative products. I call it “artificial” because this unity is predicated and
reliant on inventiveness, and it comes from a necessity.
The historical accounts of patriarchy correspond to a phenomenological definition,
for there is a moment in history when the female/mother-centered societies changed to
patriarchal structures and spread throughout the early communities. At least, that is part of
what has been circulating widely among many groups.94 It may be necessary here to
distinguish between the terms female or mother-centered with “matriarchal,” for I believe,
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historically, “matriarchy” implies a hierarchy akin to patriarchy. Nonetheless, there is no
evidence a similar structure between the female-centered and the patriarchal societies existed,
or if such societies existed, they were not part of patriarchal power apparatuses. Moreover,
matriarchies have fueled an evolutionary theory that leads us toward the supremacy of
patriarchy. 95
Cynthia Eller in The Myth of Matriarchal Prehistory feels compelled to dispute that,
historically speaking, there was a matriarchy (2000, 7). She challenges feminists’ support of
the theory and notes that “there is a theory of sex and gender embedded in the myth of
matriarchal prehistory and it […] is drastically revalued in feminist matriarchal myth.” She
argues the image of women goes from “shame or subordination” to that of “pride and
power,” which “up until now . . . has done an excellent job of serving patriarchal interest”(7).
What is of particular interest here is the shift in focus from interpersonal dependence to
relying on the land, from mother caring for her children, to mother-earth feeding all (Shlain
33-34).

Prehistory, Myth and the Birth of Art
The task I have embarked upon is a criticism of what humans, since prehistoric times
(although through different processes and mechanisms), have created by way of imagination;
they have subsequently added further layers of “artistic” and inventive interpretations to
these creations, but elevated them to a divine or supernatural status, while they remain human
creations. By doing so, humans have not only created inequity, but also shaped subjectivities
toward an imagined and fictional collective subjectivity to suit one group’s interest against
another. This process precipitated by the materialization of visions and ideas. In this study, I
define imagination as that which takes shape in a sense of urgency and necessity, but without
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the presence of reason. As the forthcoming explanation and experimentation will
demonstrate, the human mind creates images and ideas, where it needs to connect what he
has no logical explanation for. This can be distinguished from intuition, which as Bergson
believed, comes from a place of hyper sensitivity (Caygill 2013), and is a kind of
“sympathetic impulse.”96
We may consider a distinction between what prompted giving shape and material
form to figures and what might have been a preceding, rudimentary form of oral cultures.97

Fig. 1. Hall of Bulls. Paint on limestone. c. 15,000 BCE.
Lascaux Cave, Dordogne, France.

Fig. 2. Woman of Willendorf. Carved
limestone and red ochre pigments. Ca.
30,000-25,000 E. Austria.

Humans (in their present form) have been around for approximately one hundred fifty
thousand years; however, creation of what comes close to what we call “art” today has taken
place only in the last one-third of that existence.98 In the late prehistoric times, the evidence
that does reach us includes female statuettes and cave paintings; these bring to mind
examples such as Woman of Willendorf (Austria, circa 24,000 BCE), Hall of Bulls (Lascaux
Cave, France, circa 15,000 BCE), or the Oxen in Altamira (Spain, 11,000 BCE). There have
been many theories, although none with absolute certainty, on what the meaning, purpose or
even the context of such works may have been. These theories range from “art for art’s sake”
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to Henri Breuil’s “sympathetic magic,” to such art being “a symbolic system.”99 What we
may be able to continue to ponder nonetheless is what the experts have named the “creative
explosion,”100 or the birth of what we call “art” today, and what that “art” can tell us about its
creators.
What did compel the early, prehistoric humans to reproduce forms found in nature?
How did they determine what to reproduce? After all, these images are far from child art and
nothing if not naturalistic. Archeologists, anthropologists and art historians have been
debating about the subject of such art for decades. Prehistoric female statues that have been
found all over Europe, for instance, have puzzled the experts to this day in whether they were
meant as goddesses to be worshipped or as charms that may have brought the hunters luck.
Others see their overstated features as symbols of what mattered to the prehistoric people,
namely fertility and new life, as is suggested by the exaggeration of gender specific parts of
the body.101 Eller disagrees with the ‘fertility’ interpretation—mostly taken for granted by
others—as she notes both in Paleolithic and Neolithic female figurines, “the most
conspicuous problem . . . is that they rarely show signs of pregnancy, childbirth, or lactation”
(134).
Whatever the purpose may have been, the link between creating “art” and some level
of consciousness in the prehistoric people cannot be overlooked. Georges Bataille in Lascaux
or the Birth of Art argues that the moment of birth for art came when “[r]esolutely,
decisively, man wrenched himself out of the animal’s condition and into ‘manhood:’ that
abrupt, most important of transitions left an image of itself blazed upon the rock”
(preface).102 More recently, through the analysis of images and the later development of
writing, another theory has been proposed. Shlain, projects a conflict between the patriarchal
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and the female-centered societies with the written “word” as the suppressor of “image.” In
other words, he sees imagery more in line with the feminine and deems its decline to be due
to the emergence of writing.103 Shlain argues “that the central factor in the fall of the
Goddess was a revolutionary development which occurred during the . . . period – literacy.
First writing, and then its more sophisticated refinement, the alphabet, tolled the death knell
of feminine values both metaphorically and . . . literally” (39). Nonetheless, considering the
alphabet or the written language itself developed from imagery, can it be argued that both
images and letters were associated with patriarchy, with one patriarchy replacing another? In
order to better understand this question, one must look further into the origins of prehistoric
human creativity and imagination.
The theories suggested by the experts on the subject of Paleolithic art, as briefly
mentioned earlier, vary from the art as being “sympathetic magic” 104 to such caves being
places of worship, hence tying art and religion closely. 105 These views were later challenged
when further scientific studies were conducted. In a study by Andre Leroi-Gourhan and
Annette Laming-Emperaire, the theory of “sympathetic magic” was rejected, because the
scientific analysis demonstrated the animals hunted and those consumed by the Paleolithic
people were different from those depicted in the cave paintings (Gourhan [1983] 1989, 31).
In the late 1980s, Leslie Freeman, following her study of the Altamira Cave in Spain,
rejected the idea that the various images showing a herd of bison “dead, asleep or disabled;”
she argued they were indeed showing the animal dust-wallowing – a behavior seen during
mating.106
These new theories demonstrate, as expressed by David Lewis-Williams in The Mind
in the Cave (2002), that “[w]hat is now needed is not . . . more data (though more data are
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always welcome), but rather a radical rethinking of what we already know” (8). The
evidence, then, suggests that such imagery may have been created to embody, pin down and
possess what was seen as magical, fleeting and intangible power, whether in life, death or
just sheer physical power. Could such illusions have happened when humans took fire inside
the caves and saw the shadows moving on the cave walls, or is there a “neuropsychological”
explanation for the process behind the cave paintings? While I have no intention to validate
my argument through science, the scientific evidence outside of what is mainstream thinking
has proven to be noteworthy on what may have stirred the cave painters’ imagination. This
evidence is predicated on light deprivation producing shapes and colors in the visual cortex
in such a way that the person visualizes images.107
Painted images during the late Paleolithic period are mostly found inside the deepest,
darkest parts of the caves, and it seems plausible the prehistoric artists may have experienced
a hallucinatory vision of the powerful animals they observed outside. The absolute darkness,
or very little light, then, may have incited images of the animals whose powerful presence
and behavior had already made an impression on the prehistoric artists. Once inside the cave,
it must have seemed like magic when the visual part of the brain recalled the experience in
hallucinatory forms and colors.108 Prehistoric humans may have wanted to hold onto the
experience, thus painted the images and sometimes shapes and colors inside the caves.
Lewis-Williams explains that consciousness is a “historically situated selection” and “not a
universal, timeless ‘given’” (104). The theory of giving material form to contemporaneous
experience can apply to both two and three dimensional works of art. The question that arises
here is: why give material form to an experience or idea? And more critical to this study,
what were the implications of such development for the early communities?
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Answering these questions may be facilitated if one addresses theories such as
“goddess-worshipping” or “woman-honoring,” both of which have artistic repercussions and
have preoccupied feminist movements and others to this day. However, this preoccupation
has occurred without the questioning of how the creation of these myths may have had its
own history (Eller, 2000, 30). In fact, thanks to works of cultural theorists such as Shlain,
these myths have become women’s own view of their own matriarchal past.109 While
acknowledging that no paintings of female figures have been found, Shlain emphasizes the
importance of exaggerated, gender specific features of female statuettes found in great
numbers in southern France alone (Shlain 30) and quotes Joseph Campbell, who states: “So,
from the Pyrenees to Lake Baikal, the evidence now is before us of a Late Stone Age
mythology in which the outstanding single figure was the Naked Goddess…”(ibid).
Such “invented” myths, as argued by Eller, have prevented women from achieving “a
future that helps all women, children, and men flourish” (2000, 8). Thus, it is critical to pause
here to consider the problematic nature of such myths. While prehistoric times aimed to pin
down hallucinatory images in the caves, is it another level of consciousness that strives to
create a sense of pride or identity by inventing myths in later times? Consequently, here I
must draw a direct link between the consciousness that prompts the creation of, for instance,
the prehistoric art and the developing of the myths transpiring from such creations. Stated
differently, the art works in question do not just represent what could have been owned (and
enjoyed, which would substantiate the positions of privilege for their owners); the
interpretations and myths emanating from this art can also prove epistemic, to be possessed
and to become a source of claimed privilege. 110 Therefore, the material representation of the
“goddess” is primarily at the center of this discussion.
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There are numerous examples in the history of the early cities111 that demonstrate
material form given to an idea or ideal serving as a symbol or sign signifying some sort of
domination and power. This may have taken the form of a human figure representing a deity
within a community. However, what has been taken for granted is that the sources of the
attributed power have been what humans themselves projected onto the art work, just as
historically, experts’ speculations have had the potential to become historical facts over
time.112 Matriarchalists, Eller argues, insist that somehow worshipping goddesses “enhanced”
the position of women in society, yet we have no proof of this (106). Through examining
three key Neolithic cultures, “heralded by feminist matriarchalists as matricentric,” namely
Çatalhöyük, Malta and Minoan, Eller reveals that there is not enough convincing evidence to
believe they either were engaged in goddess worshiping for long, if any at all, enjoyed a
matriarchal rule, or even if goddess worship benefited women (Eller, 2000, 142-156).
Further, Eller blurs the line between what Shlain tries to neatly divide, with respect to
images being associated with female and written language with patriarchy, by noting that in
both Western cultures as well as others, “[d]isproportionate images of females is a
widespread . . . phenomena . . ., and we know that it can coexist with male dominance” (141).
She also draws attention to an important point that substantiates how patriarchy defines itself
in opposition. Eller comments that there is an abundance of female imagery present among
cultures with “male monotheistic religions,” where “deities are not always represented; in
fact they can be completely—or largely—invisible, as is the case with the putatively male
god of the major Western religions” (ibid). An example of this is Ishtar in Mesopotamia,
whose absence in text is well compensated for in the production of her images, whereas
“numerous male deities discussed in the texts have no ‘visual counterparts’,” 113 which Shlain
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deems as the distinction between the two (female/image versus male/word), but it may also
point to their co-existence (ibid).
While such images can be viewed as remnants of the past, they appear to have served
patriarchy in defining itself through its opposition.114 Eller’s argument here not only
undermines Shlain’s thesis, but also could mean that one patriarchy may have absorbed
another, without the total elimination of the signs of the old patriarchy. But, the questions of
whether there was a “patriarchal revolution” and where the underpinnings of misogyny lie
still remains.

Foundations of Misogyny from the Neolithic Cultures to Antiquity and Beyond
There is very little argument about the male voice having been the dominant voice in
the written history of not just the Western cultures, but humanity in general. Margaret L.
King and Albert Rabil Jr. in the introduction to the series “Other Voices in Early Modern
Europe” (2003) note “[t]he recent achievements [of women] have their origins in things
women (and some male supporters) said for the first time about six hundred years ago. Theirs
is the ‘other voice,’ in contradistinction to the ‘first voice,’ the voice of the educated men
who created Western culture.”115 How the male voice came to dominate has a direct bearing
on how men treated their first “other,” that is to say, women. Lerner states: “[l]ike men,
women are and always have been actors and agents in history […] [yet] women have been
kept from contributing to History-making, that is, the ordering and interpretation of the past
of humankind” (1986, 4-5). King and Rabil Jr. point out:
The other voice emerged against the backdrop of a three-thousand-year old history of
the derogation of women rooted in the civilizations related to Western culture:
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Hebrew, Greek, Roman and Christian. Negative attitudes toward women inherited
from these traditions pervaded the intellectual, medical, legal, religious and social
systems that developed during the European Middle Ages (xi).116
From where did this “inheritance” originate? Was there a link between subordination
and derogation of women historically? Surely the traditions mentioned by King and Rabil Jr.
were not where it all started. Lerner explores the different positions on the subordination of
women. In the course of her investigation, various voices in the debate, from traditionalist to
Marxist to anthropologist, trace the subordination of women to different corners of history
and human experience. However, following the examination of “hard evidence,” including
those from Çatalhöyük, Lerner concludes that “female subordination is not universal,”117
regardless of lacking proof for a “matriarchal” society (35).
Both Eller and Graeber agree that “a decisive change” took place around 3000 BCE
that changed the “social organization” in ancient Mesopotamia and brought on “a more
patriarchal, hierarchical, and warlike direction” (Eller 2000, 157 and Graeber 178). Graeber
detects in the Sumerian texts of the period a marked change in the status of women and the
social freedoms that “[render] them wards of their husbands” at the end of the Bronze Age.
He argues there is a relationship between the signs of ‘human progress’ as evident in the
“advance of science and technology, the accumulation of learning, economic growth” and
freedom; however, the connection works in the opposite direction when it comes to women
(Graeber 178).
An uneven rate of development seems to have occurred, as Neolithic, rural
communities gradually transitioned into urban centers, otherwise known as “archaic states”
or early civilizations. Social organizations changed from “kin dominance to patriarchal
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families as the chief mode of distributing goods and power” (Lerner 54). However
unequivocally, they all did not make such transitions, especially if we consider those who
decidedly, or unavoidably, remained “pastoralists” in the margins of the urban areas despite
their continued interactions with the inhabitants of the cities. As Lerner and Graeber note,
these changes nonetheless affected women’s status. Lerner states:
In Mesopotamia . . . female subordination . . . becomes institutionalized and codified
in law; prostitution becomes established and regulated; with increasing specialization
of work, women are gradually excluded from certain occupations and professions.
After the invention of writing and the establishment of formal learning. Women are
excluded from equal access to such education.118
Therefore, according to Lerner, the social reorganization and the development of
hierarchy brought about a shift from “kin-based” to “class-based” society and yielded two
distinct conflicting communities (55). Graeber picks up on this shift and further explores the
dynamics between the two: the kin-based, which he calls “pastoralists,” and the urban
communities. While he confirms the “profound cultural changes” brought on by the
“pastoralists,” Graeber appears dissatisfied that the slow “restrictions of women’s freedom”
were merely the outcome of the “gradual infiltration of pastoralists from the surrounding
deserts who, presumably, always had more patriarchal mores” (178).
Graeber is in agreement with the feminist view that war and “centralization of the
state that accompanies it” are two of the most important factors in the harsh treatment of
women. Nevertheless, to these he also adds the issue of debt. He states: “In . . . Mesopotamia
. . . an explosion of debt . . . threatened to turn all human relations—and by extension
women’s bodies—into potential commodities” (179). Therefore, Graeber deems an
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“economic game,” with an underlying interchangeability of debt and morality, to be the
determining element in the relations: the losers would lose everything, including their
women, and the (male) winners would seek extreme measures to protect their own women
from falling into the same circumstance of “being bought or sold” in this game (ibid). The
fallout of this economic arrangement was that the life for the poor on the fringes (i.e. among
the pastoralists) came under the protection of the father, and the rural areas became a safe
haven for those running from the laws of the cities. There is clear conflict between the two as
Graeber explains:
Patriarchy originated, first and foremost, in a rejection of the urban civilizations in the
name of a kind of purity, a reassertion of paternal control against great cities like
Uruk, Lagash, and Babylon, seen as places of bureaucrats, traders, and whores. The
pastoral fringes, the deserts and steppes away from the river valleys, were the places
to which displaced, indebted farmers fled […] religious literature . . . echo this voice
of rebellion, combining contempt for the corrupt urban life, suspicion of the
merchant, and often, intense misogyny. 119
The existence of the tribal people outside the cities and their interactions with the city
people have always occurred according to Graeber. One of the signs of their intermingling is
the supplanting of the language of the city people (who are often associated with civilization)
with the language of the desert people (Graeber 178), which perhaps demonstrates the
versatility and accessibility of the oral versus the written language often associated with the
elites. This leads one to think upon the differences that emerge culturally and, as focused on
by Graeber, economically. A sort of “othering” always takes place that then gets balanced
when the language of the pastoralists dominates, or in the case of the post-Roman era with
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the so called barbarian tribes, they become the nobility in Europe. Therefore this holds true
for the early Medieval Europe after the fall of Rome, as it did for ancient Mesopotamia.
Perhaps observing the position of the first “other” (i.e. women) can illuminate further the
dynamics of the othering process. What was the status of women in the oral tradition, as
traced back to the early Greek life, for instance, illustrated by Homer?
According to Eller, Homer’s references to women fall under two categories:
aristocratic women and slaves (2000, 168). Despite the freedom enjoyed by aristocratic
women in Homeric Greece, as pointed out by Eva Cantarella, “a . . . [Greek] woman’s
principle tasks were . . . to be beautiful, to take care of domestic tasks, and to ‘above all be
obedient’.”120 The pseudo-scientific works of Aristotle, who wrote in the fourth century
BCE, still reflects the misogyny that existed. Aristotle believed women were inferior to men,
based on his binary reasoning. He thought form, deemed the essence of all things, to be
associated with men, and matter linked with women.121 Hence, he argued that “male principle
in nature” is active and perfect, and female is passive and incomplete. Further, Aristotle
suggested that the “male principle in nature” always seeks to reproduce itself, and viewed a
progressive path for the “deprived” feminine in seeking that perfection, of course through the
guidance of men. (King and Rabil Jr., xii).122
Aristotle’s writings has had long lasting ramifications, not just for the Greeks, but
beyond the geographic boundaries of ancient Greece, anywhere touched by Greek language,
art and culture.123 “Greek poetry, drama, and myth are full of the ‘problem’ of women [as,]
[…] the misogyny evident in Greek literature permeated Greek society.” Further, inequity
between men and women extended to their sexual relationship, as “[h]eterosexual sex was
understood as ‘an unequal transaction by which woman steals man’s substance,’ and so men
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were better advised to have sexual relations with one another” (Eller 2000, 168). But,
perhaps more telling of this misogyny is the law that gave the male head of the household the
power of guardianship over women and children that could even determine their life or death,
as more baby girls were left to die than boys (Eller 2000, 169).
Graeber paints a similar picture of classical Greece, however from the economic
stand point. The era of an established Homerian value of man predicated on his honor came
to an end, as argued by Graeber, “when commercial markets began to develop” following the
issuance of coinage to pay soldiers and to serve as a means to transact “fines and fees and
payments made to and by the government” (186-187). Graeber states:
One of the first effects of the arrival of a commercial economy was a series of debt
crisis, of the sort long familiar from Mesopotamia . . . ‘The poor, as Aristotle
succinctly put it in his Constitution of the Athenians, ‘together with their wives and
children, were enslaved to the rich’ (ibid).
While the “male honor” developed in the aristocracy’s disdain for the market (albeit
emulated by all, even those in rural communities), women’s honor, argues Graeber, was
reduced to “sexual terms: as a matter of virginity, modesty, and chastity.” Women’s honor
was marred if she “played a part in public life” or appeared without a veil in public. 124 The
issue of veiling of women is also addressed by Lerner, although she sees it as a manifestation
of class. According to Lerner, veils were visible marks that distinguished women who were
under the protection (or ownership) of a man (139). This was an established regulation, the
disobedience of which had severe consequences for the poor, slaves and prostitutes who
attempted to veil themselves, and it was deemed “a major offense against the state.” Lerner
references an Assyrian document that gives any man who “has seen a harlot veiled . . . [to]
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arrest her, produce witnesses (and) bring her to the palace of tribunal” (135). Interestingly,
many of the punishments from the ancient texts of laws and regulations have found their way
into one of the most influential books in the foundation of Western civilization and
particularly its art: the Bible.

EMERGENCE OF MONOTHEISM: JUDAISM, CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM: WORD, IMAGE AND
POWER
The advent of monotheism approximately 3800 years ago in Jewish tradition was
when Abraham received his “first encounter with God, who made a covenant with him.” 125
The weight of this covenant, as pointed to by Lerner, has been at the foundation of what
distinguishes the “chosen people” from everyone else (163). But what significance does
monotheism represent emerging at the time when polytheism was more tolerant, well
established, practiced, and persistent despite this new competition? Before addressing this
significance, we must consider that Judaism, Christianity and Islam all trace their heritage
back to Abraham as the biblical patriarch, and all deem themselves monotheistic. Further,
there seems to be correlation among Judaism, Christianity and Islam with how word, image
and the hybridization of the two were utilized. Stated differently, Judaism established itself
through words; Political Christianity began with words, but solidified its power through
image; and Islam took advantage of both word and image in rising to prominence and in
maintaining its position of power. In short, whether in writing symbols or visual imagery,
they successfully transformed monotheism, from—what emerged to accomplish initially—a
new way of thinking and critical assessment of the status quo, to a system of laws and rules,
adaptable for political and patriarchal purposes and gains.
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Monotheism and Patriarchy
Monotheism conflicted with how the place or relationship of people was defined
within the community and with how communities interacted with one another in connection
to the sources of power dominating those communities. Shlain notes:
The Israelites’ sectarian prejudice stood in sharp contrast to other religions of those
times. Polytheism had many hierarchical layers. There were national gods, local gods,
family gods, and even personal gods. […] Monotheism encouraged people to think in
new ways.126
Shlain, points out that despite the many “bloody conflicts fought over land, women,
booty, or to avenge a perceived wrong, there were no religious wars in the ancient world
before monotheism” (80). It seems to follow then that monotheism had been viewed as a
binary alternative—what was to replace the polytheistic structure of the societies of that
time—for monotheism, as argued by Shlain, had no tolerance for other deities. From another
perspective, it can also be argued that monotheism initially emerged as criticism of how the
hierarchical and unjust systems, predicated on material representation of dominant ideas and
deities, had led to inequity for the majority of the people, particularly the impoverished
members of the society, for it promoted a sort of a leveling of the playing field, so to speak.
Nevertheless, following its synthesis with the urban formulas of organization (just as
language did in the aforementioned examples), monotheism was adopted as a model for
governing, thus was solidly built into autocratic systems. If we interpret the Jewish law of
prohibition of imagery beyond material to encompass formulas and abstract thinking, and if
we were to view patriarchy critically, this was clearly in violation of the commandment that
forbade creating anything in the Divine’s “image,” to which I will shortly return.
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It is curious that Shlain notes monotheism to be a religion that “does not mirror
human society,” and whereas humans are “social animals,” in monotheism essentially, God is
alone, has no parallel, nor does he have a mother, father, wife (on the assumption of Him
being male) or offspring. However, instead of exploring what possibilities the significance of
this perspective offers, he suggests: “if everyone agrees that only one God exists, and
different groups conceive of Him in different ways, then whose perception of that deity is the
correct one?” It may be reasoned that the idea was: no one’s perception was indeed correct,
therefore a sort of equality could have prevailed. To be fair, Shlain builds this argument in
order to proceed toward demonstrating the abstraction monotheism allows, which “can set
people free from superstition. But there is a terrible price to pay for devotion to an abstract
God” (81). What Shlain is missing here can be further elaborated addressing the prohibition
of imagery.
The Second Commandment, “Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven images, or
any likeness of any thing that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in
the water under the earth” (Exod. 20:4) has been interpreted by Shlain and others as a
“proscription against making images . . . repeated throughout the Torah . . . (Deut. 4:15-19)”
(82). Taken as a stand-alone statement, which is what appears to be the case with Shlain, it
prohibits imagery of any kind. Nonetheless, being mindful of the established conventions of
the polytheistic societies, as what follows the First Commandment, “I am the Lord thy God.
Thou shalt have no other gods before me” (Exod. 20:2-3), the Second Commandment seems
to be closely connected to, thus following, the preceding statement. Law and order in
polytheistic societies were heavily reliant on physical representations of their deities in
material form, that is to say human-crafted likenesses of what they believed the deities
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represented. Shlain, emphasizing that God’s Second Commandment “injunction is all
encompassing,” questions:
Why would drawing a bird in flight or a fish leaping in sunlight represent a threat to
Him? The Second Commandment forbids Israelites from conveying any iconic
information: no illustrations, no colorful drawings, and no art . . . Why should a
prohibition against making images be the second most important rule for righteous
living? (83)
What Shlain questions here is in support of his argument on the intolerance of
monotheism as a male-oriented tradition in its opposition to the worshipping of idols as a
female-oriented practice. Whereas, it should have been directed toward the criticism of the
problem of polytheistic societies that were predicated on the hierarchy grounded in the access
to the gods obtained through physical possession. The ancient societies may not have fought
over their religious beliefs, but the possession of the representation of the deity (or symbols
of wealth) of the conquered people was certainly critical to the triumphant side and seen as
the sign of that deity sanctioning the winner, or the conqueror’s deity as more powerful. This
was due to an overlap between the sacred and secular powers. As Lerner notes in the ancient
Mesopotamia, “it is characteristic of leadership in . . . [the] early period that there is a
merging of divine and secular power personified by the ruler” (59). In some cases, the ruler
established himself by taking over the temples (Lerner 62). So, perhaps the prohibition of
giving material representation meant there would be no symbol of oppression against the
vanquished, hence undermining an artificial and imposed hierarchy that undoubtedly led to
inequity. Generally speaking, possession of the physical manifestation of people’s beliefs
was one way through which power was exerted over the population. Although this may be an
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example where one could argue that among the ancient cultures, no one had sympathy for the
vanquished and they were expected to receive the harshest of treatments, to which my
response would be, perhaps this is what monotheism had emerged to change. However, in
reality this is not what happened.
It seems the study of patriarchy necessitates a closer look at what documents the
beginnings: The Book of Genesis. Lerner believes that we often forget how much of what is
written in the Bible is actually drawn from earlier texts, and how much of the Bible has been
instrumental in forming laws to this day. She states:
It is . . . taken for granted that earlier Sumero-Babylonian, Canaanite, and Egyptian
cultural materials were adapted and transformed by the writers and redactors of the
Bible and that contemporary practices, laws and customs of neighboring peoples were
reflected in its narrative.127
Lerner keenly points out that regardless of the belief in the Divine essence of the
book, it has been “the work of many hands” giving it shape, in the case of the Book of
Genesis, over a period of four hundred years (162). Her numerous examples bring into focus,
not only the linkage between the pre-existing traditions, but also the different and sometimes
conflicting accounts in the biblical stories of creation (182). What is certain nonetheless is
that the woman represents man’s first “other.” Thus, more pertinent to this study are the
stories about women and specifically the portrayal of Eve in the story of Genesis. According
to Lerner, the two different written versions of the creation of Eve reveal an inconsistency in
relation to Adam.128 One interpretation, which is also the most literal, has dominated the
studies of the subject for thousands of years; it is that which deems Eve inferior to Adam, for
she is believed to have been created out of Adam’s rib (183). Although feminists have tried
89

to offer alternate interpretations, it seems it has been a great challenge to dispute the one
dominant interpretation that indeed has suited patriarchy so well. As a result of this
dominance, other perspectives are then marginalized and eventually forgotten. Among such
alternate interpretations, Lerner mentions a brilliant one from a seventeen-year old Rachel
Speght, the daughter of an English clergy man. Rachel argued, as quoted by Lerner: “Shee
[Eve] was not produced from Adam’s foote, to be his low inferior nor from his head to be his
superior, but from his side, near his heart to be his equal” (Lerner 184, and Rachel Speght, A
Mouzell for Melastomus, the Cynical Bayter and foul-mouthed Barker against Evah’s Sex,
London 1617). Therefore, the challenge here may not lie in the lack of creative, competing
interpretations, but rather in how one becomes dominant and serves the interest of patriarchy.
The short answer is through violence that alienates individuals and prevents them from being
a subject to themselves. History of monotheism offers great examples of this alienation,
almost all involving a sort of “sleight of hand,” that is to say a creative way of unifying with
one stroke, and discriminating with another, for patriarchal purposes.
The canonization of the Mosaic Law was finalized around 450 BCE by Ezra, the
scribe, during the time the Kingdom of Judah became allies with and under the domination of
the Persian Empire (Lerner 162). With the political and military support of the Persian
Imperials, a particular interpretation of Jewish history rose to prominence in Ezra’s work. 129
In his version, Ezra gave the emphasis to the purity of the blood of the “chosen people.”
(Book of Ezra, 9:2).130 Therefore, with violence enforced by the Persian Imperial rule, Ezra
“dislodged” the Jewish inhabitants of Jerusalem before he was able to instate his own
interpretations of the Mosaic Law. While generally Moses has been regarded as the founder
of Jewish monotheism, the roots of monotheism, as mentioned earlier, go back to
approximately four hundred years earlier, to the time of the biblical patriarch Abraham,
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whose covenant with God is a fundamental factor in distinguishing his descendants,
presumably through a paternal lineage, as the “chosen people” (Lerner 163). The key to
understanding this presumption, Lerner argues, is in “the social conditions which are
reflected in the Book of Genesis.”131 Noteworthy here is, Ezra’s interpretation of “chosen
people” is held up to assert a debt to be paid, a debt for which war and vengeance seem to
have been recurring themes among the people in that region since the biblical times.132
Considering the fact that such social conditions continue to hold contempt for women and the
“othering” of non-chosen people, Ezra’s interpretations effectively preserve the same regard
for the place of women as for alterity in the non-chosen people. In such conditions, most
appropriate here is the examination of the exchange value in a human economy.
Graeber elaborates further on such “conditions” discussed by Lerner from the
perspective of debt. He unpacks the issue of “violence” and its institutionalization during this
historical time period to explain how a unique being, particularly a woman, whose identity
and ties were defined by her relationship to her family or community, would be “ripped”
from her social cohesion before she would be subject to slavery or exchangeable with objects
through war or vengeance (159). Such violence, according to Graeber, is not merely a
metaphor, but actual, as in when “the ancient Hebrews spoke of their daughter in ‘bondage,’
they were . . . talking about literal ropes and chains” (ibid). “I am not speaking strictly of
slavery here,” Graeber exclaims however, “but of that process that dislodges people from the
webs of mutual commitment, shared history, and collective responsibility that make them
what they are, so as to make them exchangeable—that is, to make it possible to make them
subject to the logic of debt” (163). But, what does the “logic of debt” do to the individual
subjectivity beyond a material exchange? One way to explore the link between “debt” and
subjectivity is to explore the power of words.
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In the example of Ezra, the carefully arranged words provide credibility by
referencing the sources of past authorities in Jewish history (e.g. Juda, Benjamin, Israel) and
the edict of the Persian kings (Ezra, 4:1-24 and 6:10-11).133 Terms such as “chosen people”
or “Philistine” are constant reminders of how a patriarchy both unified and strengthened its
own position through alterity. Lerner states: “The Israeli victory and the need for unity
against the Philistines reinforced tendencies toward strong leadership among the twelve
tribes.” This need for unity eventually brings about the rise to power of biblical kings (165).
With the formation of states and monarchy, the undisputed authority of patriarchy
evolved from strictly a feature of the tribes to a characteristics of the clan in general. By 1050
BCE, which, according to Lerner, was when the period of state formation began in Israel,
monotheism, monarchy and patriarchy had already melded. Such overlap was not unlike
what already existed among “Israel’s Mesopotamian neighbors” (168). What the state
formation entails is, on the one hand, curtailing the father’s unlimited power over his
family’s life or death, and, on the other, the arrangement of property, in particular
landholdings, which was a patrilineal responsibility. Lerner explains: “The effect of these
landholding patterns was to strengthen clan allegiance and to give great stability to the
patriarchal-tribal organizations from one generation to the next (169). The Jewish women,
however, held less privileges than their Mesopotamian counterparts (171). Yet, Lerner
underscores the role biblical women played in the transition of matrilocality to patrilocality,
significant with regards to property (168). Her indirect hint at the link between the
‘teraphim,’ or the ‘house-gods’ and what legitimized one’s title to property/estate is an
example of the main thesis in this study. 134 This reference is not unlike when in the 9th
century the monks at Conques stole the reliquary of Sainte Foy (St. Faith) from Agen,135 as
they both point to the value bestowed by humans upon a physical and artistic representation
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of what was deemed to be of spiritual importance and which signaled prestige and wealth.
Thus, as was through words, the establishing and domination of one interpretation was
achieved in imagery as well. In fact, the use of imagery never went away and has been an
integral part of any established authoritative system. Here, it is necessary to address the
significance of imagery and image-making in relation to patriarchy.

Patriarchy’s Image and Imagination
Being a product of imagination itself, patriarchy has relied on art and imagination for
centuries, as attested to by art historical evidence. The associations between artistic
productions and both religious and secular establishments recede far in time. Perhaps it can
even be traced back, as discussed earlier, to the time when humans understood how to
imagine projecting power to represent physically something intangible, and then link this
process to some mystical and magical source. Nevertheless, what Foucault calls “pastoral
power technique” (a synthesis between the rural beliefs and customs, and the established
urban infrastructures) should be kept in view in the creative process and its utilization by
patriarchy. Through what process has the power of imagination and by extension
exaggeration played a key role in shaping individuals under patriarchal domination? The
answer rests in the historical accounts of sacred images.
The power of imagination, as argued by anthropologists, may have even preceded the
act of creating iconic objects, that is to say, objects resembling humans or animals. Edwyn
Bevan, in Holy Images (1940) states:
[A] material object identified with a god need not resemble anything else . . . [I]t may
be a shapeless stone or a tree […] Anthropologists have told us that image worship
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was preceded by an earlier stage in which the material objects treated with religious
regard by man were aniconic, rocks and trees, springs and rivers, not things shaped
by man’s hands to resemble any living thing (13).
Clearly, as it appears from this passage, what the earlier humans achieved had more
to do with their imagination tightly interwoven with their emotions (possibly dominated by
the emotion of fear) and passions than just technical skill in shaping the material itself. The
primeval human emotion of fear, then, has been preserved or protected within what his
imagination could conjure and transferred from one generation to the next. Whereas the early
humans’ fears were part of their necessary survival mechanism, the deeply buried fears find
new ways of manifestation in later times, as “deferred action,” and remain a determining
factor in subject formation.136
Edmund Burke, in A Philosophical Enquiry notes “[n]o passion so effectively robs
the mind of all its powers of acting and reasoning as fear” (53). Friedrich Schiller, in On the
Aesthetic Education of Man argues that “[m]an is superior to every terror of Nature so long
as he knows how to give form to it, and to turn it into his object” (121). Both Schiller and
Burke acknowledge the link between the emotions and art, but argue for regulating the
passions under reason toward idealistic goals. However, the imagination that veils the
primeval fear is not excavated deeply enough to expose this emotion. Perhaps Baudelaire
expresses it most aptly:
Countless layers of ideas, images, feelings have fallen successively on your brain as
softly as light. It seems that each buries the preceding, but none has really perished.137
The link between the products of imagination and the emotions can explain why art
has been expected, for the most part, to be responded to by way of emotions. It further makes
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clear how art has been an effective part of the patriarchal techniques of power. To investigate
how such techniques work, one must look to a time when fear prompted human imagination
to select objects for the spiritual appeasement of forces he has felt threatened by, yet did not
have any control over.138
Believing a piece of wood or stone to have “power for good and evil” prompted
certain treatment of it in order to attract the benevolent forces and to deflect the evil ones
(Bevan 14). This treatment corresponds to the vulnerability humans experienced with regard
to natural occurrences, for instance. Further, as gathered from the developed rituals
surrounding objects of worship, simply making an image did not necessarily bring about the
qualification of divine status (Bevan 31). The development of such rituals adds another layer
of creative and imaginary work. Selecting a particular piece of stone or wood, or perhaps
enhancing a found natural form to resemble a familiar object, such as a face, was then
accompanied by some sort of justification to attenuate humans’ senses of uncertainty,
insecurity, powerlessness and fear. Objects imbued with human-projected imagined powers
eventually were adopted, classified and ranked into systems established by urban structures,
thus being absorbed into organized, religious structures. The belief that somehow there was
an unseen link between an object and a living being crystallized into rituals and practices
such as “sympathetic magic” (Bevan 27). In the times of distress, such as invasions by
foreign armies, as argued by Bevan, cries to an unreachable divine helper might have been
redirected to the deity at hand in material form, for the relief sought as such was deemed
more immediate (28).139 Lerner deems this ability to be what distinguishes humans from
animals, for humans “make mental constructs to explain the meaning of their existence and
their relationship to the supernatural” (199). Such connections were clearly not reason-based,
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as explained by Bevan, but rather “understandable as the outcome of intense desire and
passion” (27).
What this study is concerned with, however, following the establishing of the
aforementioned connections, is how the products of imagination and their dominance have
impacted the shaping of passive, subservient subjectivities. I will be focusing on the two key
emotions Aristotle is concerned with in his Poetics: “fear” and “pity.” In the opening, I noted
the seemingly paradoxical strategies upon which patriarchy has established itself: imagined
grounds for unity and “othering,” which are in fact two sides of the same strategy. How has
this strategy translated into works of art, for instance, the syncretic transferring of the power
of one deity’s representation, when necessary, into another? And how did objects, or even
ideas, imbued by imagined power become the center of artificial unities and instrumental in
systematic othering, benefiting none other than patriarchal systems?

ARTIFICIAL UNITIES: FROM ANTIQUITIES TO THE INFUSION OF NEOPLATONIC PHILOSOPHY
INTO ISLAMIC THOUGHTS, ART, MIMESIS, PURIFICATION AND THE STATE

There is very little argument about the influential power of art and its ability to shape
a culture, forge a civilization or even inform who we are today. What is often taken for
granted, however, is how artistic products can operate beyond the level of consciousness,
through emotions, when involving the collective, particularly in the hands of the state. After
all, humans have been called “social animals,” but that is not by default. All social
interactions are predicated on learning the skill, given the emotional traits they bring into the
mix with them.140 I could have considered “pleasure” or “pain,” but as Corey Robin concurs
with Locke (Second Treatise of Government, 84), and Burke (An Enquiry, 32), “without fear,
we are passive; with it, we are roused to ‘the strongest emotion which the mind is capable of
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feeling.’” (Fear: The History, 4).141 Arendt also notes human action to be driven not by
“pleasure but pain,” and “not desire, but fear are his true guides” (The Human Condition,
309). Therefore, the “rousing” factor has been the element of “fear.” Art has served as a
“unifier” predicated on managing “fear” long before Aristotle wrote his Poetics. But, perhaps
Aristotle’s Poetics is the first time such art is considered within a political context.
To be sure, it is not by accident that Aristotle pivots his idea on the two emotions,
“fear” and “pity.” 142 Both are grounded in movement or action for change. Robin, in Fear:
The History of a Political Idea notes:
[F]ear alerts us to real danger or propels us to take action against it . . . [F]ear is
supposed to arouse a heightened state of experience . . . It quickens our perception as
no other emotion can, forcing us to see and to act in the world in new and more
interesting ways, with greater moral discrimination and a more acute consciousness of
our surroundings and ourselves (4).
The definition of “pity,” as indirectly elaborated on by Aristotle, is when the feeling
of sadness takes over, when one understands the injustice in the unfolding of events, when
the audience beholds one does not deserve what one gets (Poetics, xxi). Aristotle does not
directly point to the link between “pity” and justice, nor does he state anything regarding the
“othering” involved in the process of “catharsis.” This is because he is concerned with
purging the undesirable and potentially dangerous, unpredictable emotions that could
threaten the republic his teacher had crafted.
Thus, Aristotle sets out to channel and manage the emotions of fear and pity through
tragedy, with its most important element, plot (Poetics, xxi). This formula has been a perfect
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match for patriarchy’s two sided strategy: creating artificial unity and systematically
promoting alterity.

Patriarchy’s Artificial Unities: from Antiquity to Modern Times Imagined through Art
It is necessary here to discuss and demonstrate how art has been an effective
instrumental State Apparatus that has altered the ability of a society toward change by means
of the Aristotelian formula. The use of “fear” to create a cause to bring about political unity
is one objective still in use to this day; even though “modern writers and politicians oppose
political fear as the enemy of liberty, reason, and other Enlightenment values, they often
embrace it . . . as a source of political vitality.” This is evident in the “collective renewal of
the fear” in the aftermath of events such as September 11 or, further back, Soviet despotism
during the Cold War era (Robin, 4). But the “political fear,” which must be established on
political events, according to Robin, cannot be effectively accomplished if the emotion of
fear had not been capitalized on as it has been.
The glorious history of artistic and cultural development in the foundations of
Western civilization is filled with examples of art aiming, on the one hand, to put fear in the
hearts of people, make them feel insignificant and self-alienated and, on the other, to
synthesize collective passive subjectivities, in other words, artificial unities. An early
example that brought people together in a ritual-related location is the relatively recently
discovered “Göbekli Tepe” in Turkey.
While the excavation is still ongoing in Göbekli Tepe, some information has come to
light. A number of “walled enclosures” in circular form have been found on this site, dated to
be approximately 7000 years older than Stonehenge, but share “an enigmatic sense of
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unfathomed ritual significance.”143 Upright carved stones, quarried in one piece, in T-shape
forms, and have been decorated using shallow relief carvings of animals, foxes, cranes,
boars, etc. Evidence tells us people came from near and far, and they gathered there possibly
for religious purposes, because no remains of permanent settlements have been found for
about a 50 mile radius (Spivy, 47). Nevertheless, according to the site’s excavator, Göbekli
Tepe marks ‘the dawn of a new world, a world with powerful rulers and a complex,
stratified, hierarchical society’ (Spivy, 48).

Artistic Implications into the Present Time
What have the implications of art serving patriarchy been? How have they shaped
subjectivities? Where do the Abrahamic traditions fit in? The development and utilization of
the visual arts within the Islamic cultures is a peculiar problem. At its strictest, in accordance
with the same Commandment put forth by Moses, Islam forbids the depiction of living
beings. Yet, there are numerous examples of figurative imagery found throughout Islamic
lands. The compelling question here is why? What is the concern with imagery?
To be sure, the fear of returning to idol worshipping may be the first answer that
comes to mind. However, as mentioned earlier, the issue should be considered in the broader
scope of the human potentiality to imagine, to create, and to exaggerate. Just as we are able
to make things out of wood or stone, we have the capability of projecting intangible
meanings on to what we make: a sort of intellectual creation that parallels the physical
fabrication. According to recent studies explicated earlier, when brought under certain
circumstances, our brain, which is hardwired for such activity, can generate vivid images. 144
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In the minds of prehistoric humans, experiencing such visions must have seemed like
a supernatural event and attributed to contacting another world, hence blending into religious
rituals and beliefs. As the early cities developed and religion became institutionalized, such
activities were organized and utilized to serve the priest-kings and temples. Here rests the
connection between religion, politics and image making, which enabled a few to claim access
and exclude or control other members of the community’s access. This produced a privileged
class protected and enforced by religious rules and rituals that implemented unfair policies
and did not regard individual rights; additionally, such a class was divisive and in
competition with rival religious groups that had their own hierarchies, and often led to
constant warfare. But, the issue goes beyond the physical idols and idol worshipping; it is
deeply rooted in the human tendency to believe in self-produced illusions of the Divine and
illusory concepts of self-righteousness. What better way to distinguish oneself from one’s
“other?”
There have been serious implications, as testified to by history, for societies with
religious practices based on such illusions if we are concerned with values like human and
civil rights. The focus here, however, is on recognizing the power of human creativity and
distinguishing it from the Divinity or the Devine Himself. This is why image making was
forbidden in monotheism, mostly evoked when speaking of the Islamic faith; yet, as with
their Jewish and Christian predecessors, it did not inhibit Muslims from creating imagery,
visually or intellectually. The reason may rest in the infusion of patriarchy with historic
monotheism.145
It may be considered that often, following the domination of new ideologies in
regions with established cultures, the pre-existing traditions, in resistance and response to or
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out of reconciliation, prompt the philosophers and theoreticians as well as artists to lay out
different ways of explaining and interpreting the new ideas in order to create unity within a
culture and to prevent its complete disintegration. 146
This has often taken place as a means to maintain a sort of consistency, albeit through
conflicts, and a political power’s domination. The ongoing violent events in the Middle East
are constant reminder of this and cases in point.147 Therefore, it is not implausible that these
integrated theories and philosophies have been utilized to construct image, prestige and
power through words and the visual arts, and this has proven a particularly significant and
effective strategy for an emerging culture, civilization, or even an ideology. 148 But, creating
unity, which I will call “artificial unity,” is only half of the story. The other half is the
systematic “othering” that ensures conflict. Anywhere there is a patriarchal rule, one finds
both “artificial unity” and “alterity” as two strategies working alongside one another.

MONOTHEISM AND THE ISSUE OF THE “OTHER:” INNER VERSUS OUTER ALTERITY
Holding in view the first instance of “alterity” that “others” the woman for the man, it
seems necessary to begin here with a definition of the term. Emmanuel Levinas, in Totality
and Infinity defines alterity as “the radical heterogeneity of the other,” that which stands
radically different from the self representing the other (36). But the point of departure is
where the “I” stands, as the “I” is consistently reassessing its “identity,” for a great deal
happens to it as it moves through time. Levinas states:
A term can remain absolutely at the point of departure of relationship only as I.” [...]
The I is not a being that always remains the same, but is the being whose existing
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consists in identifying itself, in recovering its identity throughout all that happens to
it. It is the primal identity, the primordial work of identification.149
Thus, Levinas deems two states of alterity: all that stands distinct from the self and a
state in which the self stands as its own “other.” Such relationships exist among people and
cultures, and it has even permeated the written history of philosophy. Peter Park argues, for
instance, that the exclusion of Europe’s “other,” namely Africa and Asia, was because the
Europeans “deemed them too primitive and incapable of philosophy” (Park 2013, 2). Here, I
have no intention of proposing why that is the case or whether we can do away with the issue
of “othering.” What I am interested in is the idea that learning, the progression of thoughts
and ideas, consciousness in short, have all taken place in moments when they have been
projected through the cultural “other,” but we rarely hear about it. Perhaps this is because the
monotheism that reaches us is a “historical” monotheism that has primarily been operating in
a divisive manner, within or without its own boundaries. 150
A case in point is the development of the Continental Philosophy in Europe. The
Hegelian dialectic discourse, which itself developed from the Cartesian “I” through Kant’s
autonomous self, was decentralized and became dialogical once the discourse on the issue of
subjectivity was moved to the “edges” or parerga, to use Derrida’s term, when transcended
the German border, spilling back over into France. This “slippage” happened analogous to
Lacan’s theory of the development of individual consciousness forming by reflecting off of
others, as in the case of the philosophical consciousness between the German and French
philosophers in their alterity.151 According to Lacan’s theory, this takes place through the art
of language (Lacan in Keenan, 210). While the German philosophers insisted on the
aesthetics as the interface facilitating the process of the development of consciousness and
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subject formation, the “French” philosophers, or better said what evolved there from, directly
or indirectly emphasized the art of language as key in this process. 152 The German
philosophers therefore, I suggest, projected the subject onto a narcissistic mirror that
concealed the need for “other,” but the French called attention to and disseminated through
language, voice and verbal communication apparent in the writings that reflect “several
Hegels” that emerged subsequently. 153 The resulting egocentrism in German philosophy
could not get beyond the central axis of the self, around which the Idealists and the
Romantics had gathered.
Analogously, subsequent to the “translation movement” in Andalusia and in the 10 th
century under the Abbasid Caliphate in the Middle East that was manifested through
sciences, upon returning to Europe, became instrumental in the European Renaissance. 154
However, this exchange had no reciprocations on the same scale whereby a dialogism could
continue.

The Role of “Islamic Philosophy” in Helping to Shape European Renaissance
While there has recently been more attention paid to the role the Muslims played in
Europe’s rebirth in science, there has been very little discussion about the underlying
philosophy. While the West sees itself as the true heir to Greco-Roman achievements, it is
not through Ancient Greece or Rome that the West accesses those achievements. To be sure,
not all the translated texts were Greek in origin, and as Peter Adamson (2016) has argued,
Muslims did more than just preserve the knowledge from the antiquity (8-9).
Hans Belting (2011) points to the “explosively controversial implication of such
texts” that “did not become evident until the Renaissance, in the work of Copernicus, for
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example, or, in the case of the camera obscura, in the work of Kepler and Descartes.”
Referencing the “visual,” Belting demonstrates the significance Western and the Middle
Eastern cultures’ place on perspective and light. He sums up the Arab contribution: “[I]t may
suffice to note that while Arab visual theory gave a predominant role to light, which is
essentially aniconic, it relegated pictures to the realm of the mind exclusively.”155
Viewed from another angle, Belting’s argument that the “invention of perspective and
its essential tie to the gaze of an observer” rests at the root of the differences between the
“West and the Arab world” (55) seems incomplete.156 He does note the combination of the
two informs the “sharp contrast to the restrictive control placed on the gaze in many Islamic
societies” (ibid). Nevertheless, the monolithic gaze offered through the already determined
linear perspective of the artists (often representing the establishment) seems to escape
Belting’s keen eye. Thus, there exists “control” over what is viewed collectively in both the
“West and the Arab world.” However, as with Lacan’s mirror stage, necessary in the
development of the child’s individuality, the control that takes place (mis)leads the individual
to believe it is his/her own view in the West. This is due to the conflict, or “gap,” that
ultimately materializes, which raises questions and the individual answers to such questions.
Contrastingly, for instance, the decision to “plaster over” images, as in 1847 after uncovering
of the murals in the Aya Sofya in Istanbul by Sultan Abdülmecid (ruled 1839-1861), speaks
to how the manipulation of the “gaze” in imagery prevented the same experience from taking
place among the Muslim population. The “gap” is therefore concealed from the Muslims
view.157
The question here still persists as to how such activities led toward individualism,
more or less, in the West, but did not bring about the same results for the inhabitants of the
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Middle East. I pose this question with the understanding that “individuality” is not the
ultimate destination in the project of human freedom; it is rather a step toward that direction,
just as in the child’s development of the self/individual (Lacan in AiT 620).

The Space between the Individual and the Collective
In the human freedom project, the individual’s relationship with respect to the
collective (community/society) has, to a large extent, been the subject of numerous
discussions among philosophers and other thinkers, virtually since the beginning of
philosophy as we know it. Here, I am not aiming to review all that has been proposed on this
matter, as that lies beyond the scope of this study. I intend to investigate nevertheless this
relationship from the perspective of the “gap” that exists between two seemingly opposing
entities, i.e., the individual and the collective in this case.
In The Truth in Painting Derrida raises, from a footnote in Kant, an argument that
questions the “finality without end” in Kant’s Critique of Judgment.158 In other words, he
detects a space-in-between, a “gap,” that blurs the edges in the judgment of taste as
articulated by Kant. If we understand “gap” to appear where there is apparent conflict, then, I
suggest, just as it did with Derrida, it can offer opportunities to arrive at the possibility of
multiple answers to the question raised in this study, which is: why hasn’t individuality
flourished in the Middle East?
Earlier, I established a connection between patriarchy’s “artificial unity” and
“othering” strategies that manipulate subjectivities. Aristotle’s answer to Plato’s separation
of the “pure” and “impure,” to use Kristeva’s terms,159 in his republic was his justification of
mimesis and the experiencing of the “tragedy” for cathartic purposes in his Poetics. Put
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differently, the “gap” between the “pure” and the “impure,” in Aristotle’s view, is
transformed into a space in which the undesirable emotions of “fear” and “pity” can be
purged and homogeneity can be maintained to protect the unity needed within the republic.
Therefore, “gaps” are threatening for patriarchy’s desired uniformity; thus, they are either
transformed, as in the case with Aristotle, or concealed through imagination, exaggeration
and creative endeavors in the art sponsored by patriarchy in power, as with the Safavids in
seventeenth century Iran.
During the Renaissance and upon the revival and reemergence of the works from
antiquity, initially there was concern over the conflict—gap—between Christianity and
pagan knowledge and art, as well as science/reason and religion/faith. This is evident in the
works of artists of the period, such as Michelangelo (1475-1564) and Veronese (1528-1588).
While both artists worked closely with the patriarchal establishment, they expressed a certain
degree of individuality in their work that did not always meet with the authorities’
approval.160 In his book The Cheese and the Worms ([1980] 2013), Carlo Ginzburg’s
research on the story of a sixteenth century miller, who was tried and executed by the
inquisition tribunal, highlights another such moment of individuality. Among his accusations
was that “he maintained that the world had its origin in putrefaction” (xi). Whereas his
worldview had taken shape from a “peasant culture,” (using the analogy of how cheese is
produced through the natural process and the worms to explain creation) that which came
from lived-experience, it did not bode well with the church’s interpretation, which was
predicated not on the real world, but idealistically and through imagination.
The art that concealed the “gap” sponsored by the Safavids, prevented in Persia the
kinds of individual expressions that were taking place in contemporary Europe. The primary
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purpose of the ideology and supporting art was to preserve the unity. To this end, the added
“supplement outside the work,” which Derrida calls parergon, is “what comes to be added to
Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone without being a part of it and yet without being
absolutely extrinsic to it” (1987, 55).
Furthermore, the question arises as to who claims and ultimately benefits from the
added interest? In Europe, the artist initiates this process, and is even admonished for it; the
surviving documents of the trials of the artists and scientists attest to the presence of the
conflict. In Safavid Persia, the king’s divine claim is well established, and therefore art
merely gives the claim its material form, and nearly without any traces of conflict.161 The
development of the Safavids and their philosophical foundations are subjects of the next
chapter.
In this chapter, I demonstrated that there is interest in the developmental process of
creativity, patriarchy and subject formation. The phenomenological investigation reached
back into the earliest known times of human artistic endeavors, in the caves. My argument
draws attention to an alternative explanation for the creative endeavors that is predicated on
the necessity (a lack or void in reason) and what matters the most sympathetically or
culturally. I also discussed historic examples that explicate the development of patriarchy,
underscoring the ever so important issue of debt that has shaped and continues to inform
subjectivities.
Patriarchy’s strategy of “alterity,” brings up its first “other,” which is women. I have
discussed the roots of misogyny from the Neolithic cultures to the antiquity and beyond. The
emergence of the Monotheistic traditions, and their relationship with “word” and “image,” as
well as the infusion of Neoplatonism in these traditions have also been addressed. This
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chapter also demonstrated how learning through “alterity” has been fruitful for the
Europeans, but in turn the same process did not occur in the Middle East.

108

CHAPTER THREE
THE EMERGENCE OF THE SAFAVIDS:
THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND ARTISTIC AFFIRMATIONS

Oh my beautiful Shah [Ali] my moon, the fulfillment of my desires, the beloved of my heart.
Oh Thou, in whose beauty God manifests himself.162
I am Faridun, Khusrow, Jamshid, and Zohak. I am Zal’s son (Rustam) and Alexander . . . I
belong to the religion of the ‘Adherent of the Vali [Ali]’ and on the Shah’s path I am a guide
to everyone who says: ‘I am a Muslim.’163
— Shah Isma’il (Khata’i)
The nearly two and a quarter centuries of the Safavids’ rule (1501 - 1722) has been
heralded debatably as the time during which the groundwork for modern Iran was laid
through the resurrection of ancient ideas.164 The story of the Safavids can therefore be
thought of as a story of revival, of rebirth, however Persian in style as the founders identified
with Persia’s splendid mytho-historical past. This revival was eventually implemented by a
powerful central governing system inspired, at least in part, by the pre-Islamic idea of “king
of kings.”165 However, just as the ancient model of the “king of kings” (Shahanshah) implied
the ascent of the Persian king above all kings, the Safavids “created” and promoted an
ideology—from the infusion of Hellenistic thoughts, myths and preexisting beliefs with
iterations of Islam—that allowed the Safavid king to view his position above the diverse
groups that the Safavids subjugated in their rise to power. How the Safavids achieved this
objective through artistic endeavors in practice is the subject of this chapter, which not only
aims at offering a different perspective on the meaning and purpose of the creative arts they
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espoused, but also seeks to open up the significance of the “creative arts” as a process that
maps onto “patriarchy” so well that at times they seem imperceptible and inseparable from it.
The investigation of “creativity” as such is of particular concern in this study, insofar
as it manipulates subjectivities at the expense of individualism.166 Hence, in this chapter, I
am interested in how, through the creative process, the Safavids maneuvered to promote a
unified, crafted discourse that shaped “Modern” Iran’s religion, culture, and identity, albeit
from their diverse contemporary discourses. Moreover, I am concerned with how the
Safavids successfully established the basis for alterity that strengthened and ensured the
longevity of the newly founded dynasty. Both strategies have had long lasting imprints in the
region, and their impact are still felt to this day. I intend to examine the link between these
strategies and “imagination,” and its extension, “exaggeration.” On the basis of that link, I
suggest, while the Safavid project may have brought political unification, to the country we
know as Iran today, it left “individualism” reliant on the Safavid patriarchal ideology
predicated on imagination and exaggeration, made tangible and claimable through
artistic/creative activities. As a result, collective subjectivity grew stronger to the detriment
of individual, diverse thinking. This is in contrast to the views of the German Idealists, whose
vision, just as with the Safavids, coincidentally align with Neoplatonic philosophy, and who
deemed art and creativity to represent a pathway to freedom.167 Consequently, contrary to the
German Idealists’ understandings of the liberating powers of art, under the Safavids,
creativity in general and its manifestations in various art forms in particular, contributed to
the production of a collective cultural ego and a “herd instinct,”168 both instrumental in the
longevity of Safavids’ religio-political ideology.
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In the Safavid Iran: Rebirth of a Persian Empire, Andrew Newman notes the
endurance of the Safavids in comparison to their European contemporaries, concluding that
such survival was due to “[t]he distinctly heterogeneous ‘discourse’ of the shah” (8).
Newman maintains the success of the Safavid story may rest in how they unified the various
constituents. He states:
[T]hat discourse itself comprising both statements and actions – reflected and thereby
legitimized the individual discourses of each of the polity’s constituent elements and
facilitated both the recognition and incorporation of ‘new’ constituencies into the
project . . . and [therefore] the transcendence and thus the subordination of each.169
This chapter will therefore begin with the genesis of the Safavids and the contributory
role of “imagination” and “exaggeration” in their rise to power as the new patriarchy.
Further, concerning the sources of inspiration for the ideology espoused by the Safavids, the
exemplary visions and influences of Ibn Arabi will be discussed. What follows next will
include the examination of selected visual works, from the preceding conventions to the
repertoire of the artists at the Safavids’ court, to underscore and expound two instrumental
concepts, namely the “Unity of Existence” and the “Perfect Man.” Finally, a comparative
look at the Neoplatonic connections between the Safavid art, as inspired by the philosophical
thoughts of the period, and the German Idealist views on art will suggest why the artistic
endeavors have not ushered in free-thinking individualism under and beyond the Safavids.
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THE ORIGINS OF THE SAFAVIDS: NEW PATRIARCHY, NEW DOMINANT ITERATION OF ISLAM, NEW
POWER TECHNIQUES AND THE ROLE OF ART IN THE IDEOLOGICAL STATE APPARATUS

The “conventional wisdom” traces the lineage of the Safavids to a Sufi order, based
in Ardabil, founded by Shaykh Safi-al Din (1252-1334) (Newman 2). However, as the
founder of the Safavid dynasty, the complexity of Shah Isma’il’s formative years speaks
directly to how the preludes to his unifying idea took shape. What makes the Safavids an
appropriate case study here is that the elements facilitating the formation of the new
patriarchy are, in one way or another, predicated on a sort of “creative” or invented
discourse. These elements include, among others, a hybridized heritage, military loyalty and
capacity, a climate of diverse discourses and constituents, and internal as well as external
politico-economic tensions and opportunities.
There is very little dispute in how Shah Isma’il saw himself, as he put forth an
encompassing and transcendental image of himself in his poetry, the examples of which open
this chapter.170 Nevertheless, during his formative years, those who surrounded him,
protected him and rescued him from being eliminated by rival forces may have had a hand in
how this image was molded.171 While much of the history written about Shah Isma’il tends to
create a mystical aura around his persona,172 in retrospect, perhaps in part prompted by the
necessity of what was about to happen (i.e. the emergence of the new Safavid dynasty),
historical evidence validates a long and trying process with extraordinary circumstances at
work prior to his arriving at the helm of the new empire.173 Even so, ultimately his image in
his poetry, which was to address his Qizilbash supporters (who became his devoted military
forces),174 as an example, reveals the propaganda of how he shaped his supporters’ heart and
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minds, and this played an instrumental part in his ascent to power. 175 But the affiliation of
the Qizilbash to the Safavi house had begun earlier.176 (See Appendix I)
The devotional ties of Qizilbash to the Safavi Order can be traced back to around
1447, when “owing to an influx of levies from a number of Turkish tribes, the order is said to
have embraced a new militant, messianic religio-political discourse” (Newman 2). These
devotional ties were predicated on ghuluww, or exaggeration, in viewing the leaders of the
order as divine, which appears to have been part of Safavid propaganda. Savory deems this to
be a kind of “extremism” which came about due to the Mongol invasion interrupting 600
years of caliphal orthodox rule. For the “religious tolerance . . . of the Mongol rulers deprived
Sunni or ‘orthodox’ Islam of its dominant position” (23). A breathing space was thereby
created for the development of other groups including the “extremist” Shi’i and the popular
Sufi religions that flourished. Babayan differentiates between the terms ghuluww and
“extremism” (xlvi) in that ghuluww manifests an identity closely linked with a particular
belief in the cyclical nature of time and its continuity and rejects the emphasis on the “endtime” discourse (xvii). Referencing Ricoeur’s “pervasiveness of time,” she notes the
relationship between the “temporal conceptions to the way we act,” and even to the way we
create cultural products in particular (xix, xxiii).177
How does the “temporal conception” link with “exaggeration? How do we explain the
phenomenon of “exaggeration?” Is it associated with imagination? Is this exaggeration the
remnants of what the prehistoric artists expressed in the statue of the Woman of
Willendorf?178 In other words, is it an innate instinct that aggrandizes what is important to
humans at a given moment in history?179 Or, is it the equivalent of what the Greeks in the
Riaci statues willfully tweaked, as demanded by their culture, to create an overwhelming
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transcendental effect through exaggeration (Spivy 81)? 180 Does our view of time determine
what we create? What is the role of culture in modifying how we perceive these creations?
Here it appears necessary to elaborate on the notion of “ghuluww,” or exaggeration
with respect to imagination. Early on, in chapter two, I argued for the possibility of
imagination, and particularly visualizing pictures, when there is light deprivation to the brain
in the visual experience. Similarly, the brain, in the interest of self-preservation, creates its
own links when it feels endangered. The brain fills the gap of the unknown when not enough
information enters the active mind. Viewed differently, is it plausible then to ask: when the
reality is too harsh to face, do humans tend to surpass or circumvent the reality by way of
exaggeration? Do “fear and pity” play a role in the act of “exaggeration?” As the product of
the mind, exaggeration is directly linked with our temporal conception. If we consider the
link between the “temporal conception” and the exaggerations about the Safavids’ founder,
and if Shah Isma’il’s crafted persona can be seen as a cultural product, predicated on the
Qizilbash’s cyclical cosmology, as suggested by Babayan, Ricoeur’s theory holds that all
cultural productions such as “literary . . . visual . . . and [the] symbolic” are subject to the
influence of “the pervasiveness of time.”
Ghuluww or exaggeration means in Arabic, “to exceed the proper boundary”
(Babayan xlvi), and while denoting transgression, it can also point to limitations or
deficiencies. Alexander García Düttmann, in Philosophy of Exaggeration notes a link
between “thought” and “exaggeration,” arguing that the latter not only signals a boundary,
but that it exposes the thought itself (15). The question here is: what does constitute the
boundary? Düttmann states:
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Every inside and every outside that arise through a demarcation of a limit are in
themselves open and cannot enclose this openness without in turn exposing
themselves to it. What opens within them is the abyss of the unmanageable or the
sublime, of pure exaggeration, which can no longer be contained by any given
demarcation and transgression of a limit. 181
Can the boundary be the unbearable reality, as in what T.S. Elliot asserts in his Four
Quartets: “humankind cannot bear much reality?” 182 Exaggeration, therefore, can be seen as
a way to get past the limitations of what may be challenging or nearly impossible to face or
tolerate. This may bring further into focus why Babayan deems ghuluww to be a form of
resistance; the syncretic synthesis of myths is a “creative way in which cultural production is
negotiated” in opposition to dominant discourses (xviii, 135). I must clarify. I use the term
ghuluww here not just in its particular capacity as applied to the devoted followers of the
Safavids, but rather in its broader meaning that includes the creative act of exaggeration as a
counter force and an opposition—with the idea of preservation behind it—to the dominant
thoughts.
It can be argued that the “exaggeration” became institutionalized once the Safavid
dynasty materialized. This took place through the “unified language of [Kor]anic truth,”
according to Babayan, which eliminated the “very language with which they led a successful
revolution in early Modern Iran” (xix). However, it was well replaced by other forms of
cultural productions, encompassing literary works (e.g. history, poetry, epics), visual
products (e.g. painting, architecture), and symbolic inventions (e.g. rituals, celebrations) that
served the Safavids more effectively.
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Creativity as an Ideological State Apparatus
Perhaps, Shah Isma’il’s own poetry is an appropriate place to commence addressing
this topic. Both Newman and Babayan take note of Isma’il’s pen name, Khata’i (the
culpable), but make no connection between it and his poems, as a mark of humility, in which
he claims to be “the absolute truth” (Newman 13), and “of divine nature” (Babayan xxxi).
Babayan does bring up the fact that as a Muslim ruler, Isma’il would have seen himself as the
heir to the legacy of Abraham and other ancient prophets, beginning with Adam.
Nonetheless, considering the notion of the eternal nature of time in Isma’il’s
perspective, he did not believe in a beginning or an end to the line of spiritual leadership
(Babayan xxxi). Therefore, he sets claim to contradictory notions, as stated in a poem
(quoted by Babayan): “know that Khata’i . . . is of divine nature, that he is related to
M[o]hammad Mustafa. He is issued from Safi, he is the scion of Junayd and Haydar . . . he is
related to Ali Murtaza.” Consequently, he creates a “fictitious” spiritual genealogy for
himself (ibid). Newman assesses from his poems “rather a distinctly heterogeneous, multiconfessional messianic dimension . . . lying at the heart of his spiritual discourse” (Newman
13), despite contradictions therein.183
From the perspective of the visual arts production, the establishing of “the royal
academy of painters, illuminators and calligraphers” by Shah Isma’il in Tabriz continued to
be maintained by his successor and son, Shah Tahmasp (1514-1576).184 The idea of the “king
of kings” found no better place of expression than in Firdowsi’s Shahnameh (Book of
Kings), composed in the tenth century. Stuart Carey Welch, in his A King Book of Kings,
noted Shahnameh “was practically a part of any Iranian ruler’s regalia – usually along with a
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poem extolling the king himself” (15). However, the visual work could not have been
imagined without the Neoplatonic ideas that assumed the elevated position for the king.

NEOPLATONISM AND THE THEORIZATION FOR THE NEW-INCOMING POWER – IBN ARABI’S
INFLUENCE ON THE SAFAVIDS
With the birth of Islam in the early 7th century, the scattered people of the Arabian
Peninsula, entangled in their tribal laws and feuds on the one hand and pressured by the
Byzantine’s and Sasanian’s on-going conflicts on the other,185 found a unifying identity that
ultimately brought them political prominence. By the mid eighth century the coalescing
presence of Islam had reached the western border of China in the East and Southern Spain in
the West. Through Islam, they found their independence, and in order to maintain their newly
achieved identity and eminence, they resorted to politicizing Islam with the vehicle of “art”
as their ally, just as their neighbors and predecessors had done with their own ancient
religions in the past.186 Therefore, inasmuch as it was difficult to completely forget the old
ways, they created an amalgam of old traditions and the new idea of Islam, justified and
unified by a cohesive art, supported by—and in turn promoting—a strong and wealthy
political system, constituting what we know as an Islamic culture riddled with paradoxical
ideas today.187
It is not by chance that the formation of “Islamic” art coincides with the formation of
the first Islamic dynastic rule by the Umayyads (r. 661-750), who, disregarding the Prophet’s
teachings, dictated the necessity of art, as a unifying element of power and prestige,
emulating it from Persian and the Greco-Roman Byzantine empires, and consequently from
every other culture they encountered.188 The construction of the Dome of the Rock in 691 as
a political statement perhaps is just one of the earliest examples supporting this claim. 189
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The political and cultural image of the Islamic rule is further enhanced when in the 9th
century the Abbasid Caliph, al Ma’mun (ruled 813-833), formed the Dar al Hikma (House of
Knowledge or Wisdom), through which the translation movement commenced, and the
knowledge from the antiquity became available to Muslim scholars, leading to its
consequential disbursement through the translation movement throughout the known
world.190

Neoplatonism and Mysticism in Islamic Thoughts – Ibn Arabi and His Vision
Among the achievements of the philosophers of antiquity, the Gnostic knowledge had
already permeated Christianity through the wisdom of the Greeks and the political power of
the Romans;191 it finally found its way into the Islamic culture by the medieval times through
the translations of the ancient texts under Muslims.192 The Gnostic interpretation of Plato’s
“Allegory of the Cave” perhaps is one of the more widely known mystic ideas from
antiquity. When studying the theories of real versus illusion argued by Medieval Muslim
mystics as discussed in the “positive symbol” and the “negative illusion,” we are reminded of
Plato’s “Allegory of the Cave.”193 The negative and the positive appear in Persian poetry, for
instance, and referred to as the microcosmic (alam-i-asghar)—the profane man—versus the
macrocosmic (alam-i-akbar)—the spiritual man.194 Rumi points to this notion in his poem to
awaken his own spiritual potential:
Therefore in outer form thou art the microcosm,
while in inward meaning thou art the macrocosm.
In the investigation of cultural integrations, one of the most influential figures whose
impact is seen to this day is the Andalusian sage and mystic, Mohyiddin Mohammad Ibn
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Arabi (1165-1240), who is a profound example in contributing to the synthesis of pre-Islamic
cultures into Islamic thoughts and even artistic activities. Undoubtedly, not only was he
familiar with such theories, but also incorporated them into his own. Hence, the notion of
Wahdat al Wujud (Unity of Existence), synthesized by Ibn Arabi espousing Plato’s “Allegory
of the Cave,” which is viewed as its origin, was the significant pivot that connected the
western and eastern mysticism and earned Ibn Arabi the title “Ibn Aflatūn” (son of Plato); 195
it fostered the formation of additional mystic traditions in various regions, including the
Middle East and as far as Indonesia.196
Ibn Arabi’s personal life story to a great degree informs his views and later scholarly
works. He came from a city in the south eastern region of Spain known as Murcia in the mid
twelfth century, during a time in which, despite the constant conflicts between Christians and
Muslims, the field of literary and visual arts thrived in the multi-cultural atmosphere of
Spain. His family moved to Seville for political reasons when he was about eight, during
which time he began to learn the literary knowledge available to him. 197 According to his
own accounts, he became familiar with the mystic tradition when he was nearly twenty. He
remained in Seville for another decade, but managed to travel around in Spain and to meet
contemporary scholars and mystics, including a ninety-five year old woman in Seville, whom
he mentioned in his al Futuhat al Makkyya (Mekkan Revelations). Ibn Arabi’s travels took
him around many Islamic regions such as Alexandria, Mecca, Baghdad, Konya, all of which
are considered major cultural and intellectual centers, finally bringing him to settle in
Damascus; during his years in Damascus, he wrote prolifically until his death there in
1240.198
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Ibn Arabi is one of the few figures who has been revered and respected by Sunnis,
Shi’ites and Sufis alike; further, Muslims take such pride in his writings and theory that his
works are currently part of Islamic advanced education, not to mention recent non-Muslim
interest reflected in conferences, societies and online communities created in order to learn
about and share Ibn Arabi’s literary works. Yet, his work has never become the subject of an
extensive critical study to point out his inconsistencies (gaps) with Islam itself. Very few
scholars have raised concerns about the subject. Nasr Abu Zayd, for instance, when
discussing Ibn Arabi and the modern conflicts in the Middle East, goes as far as proposing
the solution of not elevating Ibn Arabi as a figure of authority in order to promote a sort of
intellectual pluralism.199 However, he never mentions the existing discord between Ibn Arabi
and Islam as one of the fundamental problems.
One of the most significant contributions of Ibn Arabi’s, manifested in the theory of
“Unity of Existence,”200 has pervaded not just the Middle Eastern region’s cultures, but has
reached the Islamic world from the African Continent to Southeast Asian territories and
beyond. R.W.J. Austin, referencing Asin Palacios in the introductory remarks to his
translation of the Bezels of Wisdom, Ibn Arabi’s magnum opus, even extends the Andalusian
sage’s impact to Dante’s Divine Comedy and recognizes the conjured images by the author to
have been inspired by Ibn Arabi’s mystic visions. 201
Ibn Arabi’s articulation of the theory of “Unity of Existence,” is founded on the idea
that all creation is connected to an intellectual center. For the existence of every creation, it
deems an aspect that is real and one which is an illusion, and to put it visually, places them
on concentric circles connected through radii to the center.202 It is noteworthy that the visual
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arts associated with esoteric Islam that mirror the ideal geometric or circular patterns are
inspired by and in many cases correspond to this.203
The theory of “Unity of Existence” argues for the manifestation of the macrocosm in
the microcosm with an intrinsic connection to one another.204 Thus, it sees existence as one
and interprets that unity as the Divine. This perspective promotes the belief that humans
have the potential to unify with God, or to reach divine status, through the idea of al Insan al
Kamil, or the “Perfect Man,” just as Prophet Mohammad was believed to have done. The
Ascension of the Prophet, as a subject of artistic productions, is a key example as interpreted
by Sufis in that it represents the unification of humans with the Devine.205 This theory was
first put forth by Plotinus who argues for the possibility of this unification through ecstatic or
mystical vision.206 Ibn Arabi’s writings reflect appropriation of thoughts and ideas from Plato
and Neoplatonists to Mutazilis and Ismailis, which tremendously influenced his thoughts and
works, most prominent of which is the very theory of Wahdat al Wujud argued for in his
book Fusus al Hikam (Bezels of Wisdom).207
The Fusus al Hikam from its inception is riddled with Ibn Arabi’s personal
perspectives and experiences that cannot be confirmed on an individual or non-individual
level, yet they occupy a place of privilege and authority within the Islamic cultures. His
writings and thoughts are supported only by his “intellectual speculation” and “ecstatic
visions,” and admittedly neither is compatible with reason.208 In the Preface of his book, he
claims he received in a vision the prompt to write this manuscript.209 In each of the twenty
seven chapters that follow, he discusses a selected prophet-figure, each as a facet of God’s
wisdom, to validate his thesis. Titus Burckhardt draws a comparison between Ibn Arabi’s
illustrations of these facets that include prophets from the Old Testament to the Gothic
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sculptures that filled the portals of cathedrals, such as Chartres, with such figures; the only
difference, Burckhardt notes, is the portal figures are all looking to the central figure, the
Christ.210
The notion of “unity” is emphasized throughout the book in the love that binds God
with all creations; this is how unity is achieved, and according to Ibn Arabi, “it cannot be
arrived at by . . . means of any rational thought process . . . [but] only [revealed] by divine
disclosure.”211 Therefore, Ibn Arabi deems a special place for ecstatic visions and the
prophets that ornament his chapters, each prophet a sign of an aspect of God’s Knowledge
symbolized in “word.” He explains that the essence of God is bestowed upon each of his
prophets in order to refract and make Him known, for by being in “existence [they] would
reveal to Him His own mystery.”212 The first chapter, for instance, begins with Adam as
God’s manifestation on earth that justifies the beginning of the process: the creation of the
“Perfect Man.” This notion is manifested thus through each chapter and appropriately in each
example. No doubt, in the Introduction to his book, by sharing how he was compelled to
write the Bezels, Ibn Arabi is revealing his own experience as a case in point and proclaiming
his place among the other “universal men” (Bezels of Wisdom 45).
To be sure, Ibn Arabi is not the first mystic or scholar to discuss such matters;
previously, others such as Avicenna, Sheikh Shahab al-Din Sohrevardi, Sheikh Farid al-Din
Attar, Mansour Hallaj, Shams al-Din Tabrizi, and others commented and left their
impressions regarding this subject. The significance of Ibn Arabi’s contribution in proposing
the doctrine of Unity of Existence, however, is in his consolidation of the previous thoughts
and works into a practical formula that became a main source of reference and authority,
inciting creativity and emanating enough power and spirit to eventually attract the support of
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great political powers, such as the Ottomans, who adopted his writings as major textbooks in
their madrasas.213 Even the Ottoman’s rivals to their east, the Shi’ite Safavids, recognized the
value of Ibn Arabi’s works as interpreted through works of Persian Scholars like Mullā Sadrā
(c.1571-1640),214 his teacher Bahā’ al-Dīn Āmilī (c.1547-1625), and Mir Dāmād (d.
1631/32);215 these artists and scholars have been credited, however in a positive way, with
philosophizing Islamic views that in turn inspired the creation of the visual and literary arts
in 17th century Persia. One example is the Safavid Mosque of Sheikh Lotfollah in Isfahan
that constitutes one of the four pillars of the Safavid architectural expressions. 216 Most
importantly, I think the vivid language and visual quality in Ibn Arabi’s writings has inspired
the inventive interpretations in the visual arts produced within the Islamic lands, particularly
in seventeenth century Persia, which clearly contributed to the prestige and image of the
Safavids.
It must also be noted Ibn Arabi had his critics as well; in fact the theory of Wahdat al
Wujud had very steadfast opponents, namely Ala Al Dawla Semnani (from the North Eastern
region of Iran, during the post-Mongol invasion era).217 Although, such discourses never
made it outside the ecclesiastical domain or were relevant enough to current affairs to create
any sort of long lasting mark. 218 Sheikh Ala’Oddolleh Semnani, a Sufi himself, in opposition
to Ibn Arabi’s theory, warns against the outcome of such scheme by drawing parallels
between what happened in Buddhism before and after the advent of visual imagery.
Following the invasion of the Mongols, understandably, Semnani is concerned with such
implications affecting the dominant Islamic culture. 219
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GREEK TEMPLES AND FLYING HUMAN-HEADED HORSES: GREEK ELEMENTS IN THE ART
KNOWN AS “ISLAMIC,” ARTISTIC EXPRESSIONS OF THE IDEAS OF “UNITY OF EXISTENCE” AND

“THE PERFECT MAN”
How do Greek temples connect with a seventeenth century painting from Persia
called Mi’raj showing Prophet Mohammad’s Ascension to heaven on a human-headed
horse? What does this connection reveal about subject formation and the visual arts in
seventeenth century Persia, and by extension the region of the Middle East? Who benefited
from such art works?

The Image of the Sufi-King in Visual, Literary, and Philosophical Works – Unity of
Existence and the Universal Man
The analysis of examples pertaining to the image of the “Sufi-King” in visual,
literary, and philosophical works and their Greek and patriarchal associations are the subject
of investigation here. The influential power of Plato’s political and Plotinus’s metaphysical
philosophies are acknowledged. But what may not be as widely known is that the similarities
between these Western-based philosophies and the Middle Eastern thoughts are not
coincidental, but rather a common, continuous narrative that signal the patriarchal agencies’
appropriation of Platonic and Neoplatonic philosophies as a (constructed) unifying narrative,
a move that is not exclusive to the Middle East. This took place well before the advent of
Islam, and it did so with detrimental consequences for the individual consciousness, in
particular, in the Middle East.
I must note the use of terms such as West or Middle East, while binary and
questionable, are unavoidable in this study for the time being. Equally problematic here is the
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term “Islamic” as applied to an art reflecting contradictions on multiple levels. Likewise, one
should not treat Platonism and Neoplatonism as mere theories that attempt to bridge the
space between the physical and metaphysical worlds;220 but rather, one needs to understand
them as phenomena that have concrete consequence in shaping the world. Therefore, they
function as vehicles transmitting models of resemblance from antiquity to the present time,
serving patriarchy by concealing the contradictions. And finally, the term patriarchy is the
underlying phenomenon in the persistence of systems predicated on absolute power.
I describe patriarchy as a human-constructed presence that is artificially inflated and
elevated (by humans over humans), but it diminishes all other presences and expressions, and
strives to assimilate or conceal differences using artistic endeavors among other measures.
This assimilation, exposed in the hybridized art produced through the royal and aristocratic
patronages, has then been supplemented with words articulated by philosophies predicated on
a transcendentalist idea, namely the “Universal” or “Perfect” man. This ideal then enabled
patriarchal systems that appeared in different clothing at different times, such as the Medicis
in the 15th-16th century Florence or the Safavids in the sixteenth through the eighteenth
century Persia, to ensure the continuity and domination of the doctrine of absolute power. I
understand there may be other perspectives on the subject, but there are two concepts that are
of interest here with respect to the mechanism of continuity and domination: The “Unity of
Existence” and the idea of the “Perfect Man.”
To establish the premise, I concentrate on one particular subject, the Mi’raj or
Prophet’s Ascension, a fine example of which is a prominent 16th century painting from the
Safavid period, in that it not only points to the Neoplatonic influences, but proposes that the
interpretations stemming from these influences are a sort of parergon that served the interest
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of the royal patrons, i.e. the agents of patriarchy. Considering the investigation of works of
art from the region, collectively known by the term “Islamic,”221 has been mainly limited to
formal analysis, not to mention the art is seen as a source of pride in the region (Fetvaci and
Gruber 874), and taking into account the significance of such art as evidence of patriarchy’s
culturo-aesthetic and religio-political apparatuses, in this case informed by Neoplatonic
thoughts (that which links the Middle East and the West, as argued early on), the critical
analysis of this painting seems timely and fitting here.
The issue of subjectivity with respect to the conflict toward the visual arts has only
recently received some attention by some scholars; nevertheless, the “viewers’ . . . responses
toward the painted images . . . remain largely uncharted terrain” (Gruber 2017). 222 By
employing critical theory in the analysis of this painting, it is my intention to commence a
dynamic investigation with the purpose of developing a theoretical reasoning that would
explicate, from a different perspective, the use and support of the art of this kind by
patriarchal systems, namely the
Safavid kings (r. 1501-1722).
In the Ascension example
there is more information in the
painting beyond the source of the
story, the Koranic text. The added

information, visualized in a
painting, then conceals and
discourages questioning the

3. Mohammed meets the prophets Ishmael, Isaac and
Lot in Paradise. From a manuscript called “Apocalypse
of Muhammad,” written in 1436 in Herat, Afghanistan
(now in the Bibliotheque Nationale, Paris).

discrepancy (gap). The added information as “surplus value,” (Marx), I suggest, in the
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parergon was commoditized and exploited by the rulers to further solidify and justify their
positions both as secular and religious figures in order to assure the continuity of their rule. I
submit, therefore, that Neoplatonism and, by default, patriarchy are not just ideas from
antiquity, but have been the active, fundamental ingredients in the models of assimilation
serving absolute power and shaping collective subjectivities, while undermining
individuality, particularly in the region of the Middle East. Thus, I propose, the artificial
unity brought on by such systems—what Foucault calls the “culture of resemblance”—has
been a major impediment toward respecting or even acknowledging individualism, a
preliminary step toward democracy in the Middle East.
In this investigation the study of the image of the Prophet’s Ascension or Mi’raj is
essential for a number of reasons: first: its Koranic source that connects it with “Islam,”
second: as a subject made into a visual work – commonly understood as forbidden in Islam –
but produced at royal workshops repeatedly, and third: as an example of art covering over the
“gap” between the original text and the single, dominant interpretation, but at the same time,
exposing Neoplatonic ideas infused with the Islamic ones.
The subject of Mi’raj is drawn from one of the most revered stories in Islamic
religious literature regarding the Prophet’s night journey, in which Prophet Mohammad is
said to have traveled from Mecca to Jerusalem with the guidance of Archangel Gabriel. 223
Some trace back the embellished, narrated version of the story to Tarikh Tabari or Tabari
History (from 10th century) that quotes Ibn Abbas, one of the Prophet’s uncles, as the
narrator.224
There are two types of journeys as explained by Christiane Gruber, a scholar in the
field of Islamic book arts, who has recently written on the subject: one horizontal, as in the
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journey from Mecca to Jerusalem, and the other vertical, which is to the various levels of
heaven.225 While the popularity of this story has engendered many renditions beginning as
early as mid-eighth century, a number of key elements are present in all accounts; in later
texts and paintings, the Prophet is described as riding on a human-headed horse, called
Buraq, flying through the heavens, and surrounded by various angels. Historically this
subject appears in three types of books: history, poetry and devotional manuscripts.

Pre-Safavid and Safavid Images of the Sufi-King: A Philosophical Analysis
One of the earliest examples comes from early 14th century. It is a page from Jami al
Tawarikh (compendium of chronicles) from 1307. The image of the prophet appears on the
left riding on a human-headed horse, and on the right there are two angelic figures just

4. Illustration on vellum from the book Jami' al-Tawarikh (literally "Compendium of
Chronicles" or History of the World), by Rashid al-Din, published in Tabriz, Persia,
1307. Now in the collection of the Edinburgh University Library, Scotland.
exiting the sky (heaven), in fact one is still on the threshold. The one closer to the center is
offering the Prophet sustenance—reportedly a bowl of milk. The tail of the horse is
peculiarly shaped into another figure similar to the horse’s head, but this figure is wielding a
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sword and a shield. There are stylized clouds in the sky on the upper left, and the low horizon
shows layers representing a shallow depth of space. An apparent appropriation of Chinese
linear descriptive marks link the clouds to the folds
in the garments and to the landscape, which is not
surprising, knowing there were Chinese artists in
Tabriz, North West of present day Iran, since late
thirteenth century according the Basil Grey. 226
In another example, which comes from a
15th century Mi’raj nameh, or a devotional book of
Mi’raj, now in Biblioteque Nationale in Paris, the

5. Prophet Mohammad shown scenes
from Paradise. From a manuscript
entitled Mi’raj Nameh, 15th century.

Prophet is shown scenes from paradise–he appears
on the upper right hand corner and Gabriel on the
upper left, and he is pointing to the tree and the
birds at the center of the painting. Lower in the
painting, a group of inhabitants of paradise are
riding on camels and exchanging bouquets of
flowers. In the lower left a couple appears – one
holding the hand of the rider. There are three
women and two men.
The next example comes from a book of
6. The Mi’raj or the night flight of
Mohammad on his steed, Buraq. Folio
from Bustan Sa’di. 1525-35.

poetry called Bustan e Sa’di from Bukhara or
Herat, now at the Metropolitan Museum (done
possibly in the style of Bihzad, the renowned

129

early Safavid artist). In this illustration, the Prophet appears in the center on Buraq
surrounded by angels. Below, there are three figures, one of which is sleeping (the youngest),
which may point to the fact that this event takes place at night, but the other two older figures
seem to be vigilant. The viewer’s eyes follow the positions of the three figures to a Mihrab,
or prayer niche, in the background out of which rays of light resembling flames project
upward and take our eyes toward the focus of the image. Archangel Gabriel is the one with a
crown. The poem is a praise for the high spiritual status of the Prophet and the inability of
Gabriel to accompany him after a certain point.
In a page from history of the prophets called
Qisas al Anbiya from the 16th century written by Ishaq
ibn Ibrahim, known as al Nishapuri–which was copied
in Shiraz and is now in the Berlin State Library–the
standard features of a Mi’raj painting are present. The
only difference here is that the prophet’s face is
covered, which appears to have started a new
convention.
Painted in 1539-43 for Shah Tahmasp (Shah
Ismāil’s son and successor) in opaque watercolor, gold

7. 16th century copy of the page
on the Prophet’s Mi’raj from:
Qisas al Anbiya, written by Ishaq
ibn Ibrahim al Nishapuri (12th
century). Berlin State Library.

and ink on paper, it is titled Mi’raj and is ascribed to
the renowned later Safavid court painter, Sultan Muhammad. In this painting the Prophet
appears with his face covered under a white cloth, at the center on a human-headed horse
floating in mid-air, surrounded by stylized rays of light, resembling flames, and encircled by
a number of gift-bearing angelic figures with various costumes signaling their status and
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ranks amidst swirls of clouds. On the left, the slightly higher-placed figure of Gabriel
identified by his crown leads the way by gesturing his arms forward; the upward movement
of the flames, painted in gold, implies motion toward the seventh heaven (as told in the
fourth of Nizami’s five tales), the edges of which appear where the blue of the star-filled
night sky meets the swirling clouds that occupy the lower half of the picture.
If the Koranic accounts do not provide these
details, what are we to make of the added information?
Considering the Safavids came from a line of mystics,
the story of Mi’raj as understood within Sufism may shed
some light. The concept of Mi’raj is significant within
Sufism as it exemplifies a sufi’s ultimate, unmitigated
goal of experiencing God. Sufis believe Prophet
Mohammad was a sufi par excellence, especially as
depicted in the night journey during which he travels
through the layers of heaven and reaches within the
presence of God. Thus, the event becomes a source of

8. Sultan Muhammad, Mi’raj,
The Ascension of the Prophet
through the Heavens from a
manuscript of the Khamsa
Nizami. 1539-43.

inspiration and a critical moment for the sufis and a
subject for artists.
One of the texts that contains the details of the night journey is the al Futuhat al
Makkyya by the already mentioned Andalusian sage and mystic, Ibn Arabi (1165-1240). In
the section on the Prophet’s Mi’raj, Ibn Arabi describes the details, including the name
(Buraq) and the appearance of the human-headed horse along with what the Prophet saw at
each stage. The visual and mystical appeal of these details prompted the producers of other
131

devotional texts, such as The Ilkhanid Mi’rajnama of 1286, to incorporate them into their
own versions of the story.227 While not illustrated itself, this Mi’rajnama virtually gives the
same accounts, including the human-headed horse in the story told by Ibn Arabi.
Before tending to the possible source(s) of the added information, critical viewing of
such addition, which I suggest to be a sort of Koranic parergon, seems appropriate here. In
The Truth in Painting, Derrida defines parergon as what “comes against, beside, and in
addition to the ergon, the work done [fait], fact [le fait], the work, but it does not fall to one
side, it touches and cooperates within the operation, from a certain outside” (1987, 54).
Aware of the necessity of connection between word and image, Derrida makes us conscious
of the space in between the two, which he calls passé-partout (1987, 7). It is this “space in
between” that yields the “interest” and, in this case, the added information and interpretation;
as Derrida puts it:
With regards to the idiom of painting, of that to which this . . . locution [...] can . . . be
understood in a multitude of ways. [...] But untranslatable it remains in its economic
performance, in the ellipsis of its trait, the word by word, the word for word, or the
trait for trait in which it contracts: as many words, signs, letters, the same quantity or
the same expense for the same semantic content, with the same revenue of surplus
value.228
But, the question with regard to the painting in question, to which I shall return, is:
who benefited from the “interest?” The Koranic accounts of the story come from two
chapters: 17 and 53.229 Chapter 17, Isra (The Children of Israel), verse 1 states:
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Praise be to the One Who made His servant travel by night from the sacred place of
worship to the furthest place of worship, whose precincts We have blessed in order
that We may show him some of Our signs.
Little more information is provided in Chapter 53, al-Najm (The Star), verses 6
through 18:
So, he acquired poise and balance, and reached the highest pinnacle. Then he drew
near and drew closer until a space of two arcs or even less remained, when He
revealed to His servant what He revealed . . . . He saw Him indeed another time by
the Lote Tree of the Limit beyond which no one can pass, close to which is the
Garden of Tranquility. . . . Indeed, he saw some of the greatest signs of His Lord.
As evident from these verses, there are no other details provided as to how this
journey took place, and what the specifics of the Prophet’s personal experience were.
However, in the literature produced later on the subject, there are no shortages of the
particulars that vividly describe the experience; it is the particulars that supply the
iconography in the images depicting this event, and in these details lay the clues to thoughts
colored by Neoplatonism. The specific painting that is the focus of this paper comes from a
book called Khamsa Nizami (five-tales [of poetry] by Nizami) commissioned by and
produced in the Safavid royal court just a little over a decade after the death of Shah Isma’il,
the founder of the Safavid Dynasty.
Analogous to Derrida’s theory, but reversing the order, i.e. text to painting in the case
at hand, more information appears in the painting that solidifies a dominant position. Here, I
consider a possible source of inspiration for the added information. The details depicted in
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the Mi’raj painting are astonishingly reminiscent of Plotinus’s narrative of ascending toward
the One.
Pertaining to the ascension and in order to “come to [the] vision of the inaccessible
Beauty,” Plotinus in The Enneads refers to it as “fleeing to the beloved Fatherland” and
points out this is not possible by foot. He states: “What then is our course, what the manner
of our flight? This is not a journey for the feet; the feet bring us only from land to land . . .”
Further, in III.8 Plotinus asserts that from nature all things are inspired to grow and produce
through Contemplation that has Vision as its end. All conflicting powers are then unified
toward this Vision.
The Charioteer (the Leading Principle of the Soul, in the Phaedrus Myth) gives the
two horses (its two dissonant faculties) what he has seen and they, taking that gift,
showed that they were hungry for what made that vision.
The resemblance of the details, whether in text or painting, suggests a connection
between the iconography of the ascension in the Mi’raj painting and this passage. At some
point, starting late 15th and early in 16th century, “an iconographical shift” took place where
the white veil covering the face was added.230 Another version, which is in the style of the
aforementioned Sultan Muhammad, is currently in the Rhode Island School of Design
Museum. If we view the Koran as the main source for this subject, more relevant here is that
the visual versions all include details that do not appear in the source text. Contrary to
common belief, and as evident from cited earlier examples, the covering of the face of the
Prophet did not always exist; it happened possibly due to more religious restrictions, but
more likely for propaganda purposes through a newly defined identity, as argued by
Gruber.231 Whatever the reason may have been, it does seem that covering the face, even
134

though it does not undermine the identity of the main character in the story, leaves the door
open to speculate whether the faceless image could transcend representing just the person of
the Prophet to include the ruler.
This speculation points to: who benefited from the “interest” yielded by the added
information. Generally speaking, royal artists produce with the status of their patrons in
mind; in other words, illustrations manufactured for royal patrons are almost always intended
to create an image and to send a particular message. Therefore, as represented in the
Prophet’s Ascension, there is more than just an illustration of the story. The details, similar to
what Plotinus describes in ascending toward the One, in the Mi’raj painting, underscore the
divine connection claimed by the Safavid Sufi-kings, who aimed to legitimize their roles as
both king and spiritual leaders (in other words, their image as the Perfect Man), thus ensuring
the continuity of patriarchy within their reigns.
A critical examination of the added details by way of Marx’s commodity theory may
articulate how the agents of patriarchy accomplished this task. In his theory of commodity,
Marx emphasizes value. He states: “. . . every commodity contains useful labor, i.e.
productive activity of a different kind, carried on with a different aim” (Marx 133). To make
something useful, according to Marx, labor has to be involved, and it is because of that labor
that commodity, and consequentially its profit-making attributes, exists. Marx notes how
from the raw material a useful object is produced and becomes a commodity. He argues it is
in the relationship between the “manifested social character of the products of the labor” that
the magic of commodification takes place. He points out, “It is nothing but the definite social
relation between men themselves which assumes here . . . the fantastic form of a relation
between things.” Thus, Marx deems the value imposed in the process of commodifying, a
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constructed, imagined, and arbitrary one. This theory lends itself well to explain how the
parergon or the added value to the texts and images just discussed can be seen as a
commodity; it is imagined and added, with help from the assimilating powers of
Neoplatonism, to fuse the image of the ruler with the divine. Because of these surplus values,
the rulers, at whose workshops these illustrations were made, were able to maintain their
positions of absolute power, consistent with Neoplatonic ideas. A resemblance is not difficult
to see between the human-headed horse carrying the figure of the Prophet and the NeoClassical architecture –in its assimilated form – that was borrowed in the West to project
economic or political power.
Foucault, in the Order of Things, points to the history of resemblance and how “a
culture experiences the propinquity of things, how it establishes the tabula of their
relationships and the order by which they must be considered.” He expresses concerns “with
a history of resemblance: on what conditions was Classical thought able to reflect relations of
similarity or equivalence between things, relations that would provide a foundation and a
justification for their words, their classifications, their systems of exchanges?” 232 The
conditions Foucault is referring to here are not unlike the relationships between things as
defined through Platonic and Neoplatonic ideas. One of the examples is in the transformation
of the figure of Alexander in Safavid illuminated manuscript.
The tradition of book illumination goes back to pre-Islamic times.233 One of the great
literary works serving as an inspirational source for imagery is the work of Shahnama (book
of kings) completed in the year 1000 by Firdowsi (940-1020); it is of the collected accounts
of Persian history written in epic poetry. Many versions of this book were produced and
illustrated, but the only remaining copies were produced after the Mongol invasion (Gray
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19). One of the perplexing
characters in Shahnama is
Alexander, who has transcended
the historic figure.
The transformation of the
historic figure of Alexander,
who arrived in the fourth century
BCE on his campaign to form his

9. Battle of Iskandar (Alexander) with the Dragon,
from Shahnama Firdowsi (known as Demotte), Tabriz,
dated 1330-1336.

own empire and conquered a
great part of the Middle East, including ancient Persia, but is commemorated, and his
heroism and piety celebrated in illuminated manuscripts deserves a closer look. Two sources
are cited as examples: first one is from a series of paintings of a Shahnama known by its
former owner’s name Demotte that survives only in dismantled folios, exemplary of the
Ilkhanid courtly arts, titled Battle of Iskandar (Alexander) with the Dragon (Tabriz, 13301336), and the other is from Khamsa Nizami called Iskandar Visiting a Hermit (Herat, 15351540).
The notion of al-Insan al Kamil, (the Perfect Man), finds visual expression in
manuscripts; one example is of the myth and the stories about Alexander (Iskandar) in the
region.234 In a page from a 14th century Persian illuminated Shahnama, Alexander is shown
riding on his white horse wielding his sword at the so called dragon – referred to in the title
included at the top of the image as “rhinoceros” – but clearly a monstrous depiction of an
imaginary animal associated with evil. Alexander is charging ahead fearlessly, while his
troops, shown in a cluster of riders, follow behind him. A hint of landscape in the
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background is indicated in overlapping hills and trees. The scene is so fraught with fear that
even his horse turns its head away, rearing. The image underscores Alexander’s heroism,
which should appear peculiar, since historically he is the one who overthrows the Persian
Empire.235
In another page from the same Shahnama, shown in a painting titled The Bier of the
Great Iskandar, a devastated crowd has
gathered around his coffin and is mourning
his death. (Gray 32) Each corner of his
coffin is punctuated with a tall
candleholder. One figure has its back to the
viewer and has thrown himself (or herself?)
on the cloth-covered coffin. Figures in the
foreground have raised their arms over their
heads in mourning gestures; some have

10. The Bier of the Great Iskandar, from
Shahnama Firdowsi (known as Demotte),
Tabriz, dated 1330-1336.

even torn their robes off their bodies in their grief. Such expressions of sorrow seem
implausible for the historic Alexander, but not for Alexander as the “Perfect Man.” More
puzzling is when the historic Iskandar becomes mythical Iskandar in the literary works where
he is transformed into a Salik (a pupil on the mystic path) who sets off toward the East in
search of enlightenment. In this interpretation, the military campaign is completely
substituted with a spiritual journey. In another painting attributed to the Persian 16 th century
painter Mir Mussavir, produced in the Safavid royal workshop in 1535-1540, Iskandar,
young and handsome, dressed in a richly brocaded Persian coat, appears before a hermit; he
is seated with legs folded underneath, in the manner the pupils traditionally sit in the
presence of their master. The sage is depicted within the opening of a cave, outside of which
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a tree stands. Iskandar’s horse is being tended to in the foreground, and a few other figures of
attendants fill the composition. The picture frame seems open on two sides as the stones from
the cave and the leaves from the tree spill over the
edges.236 The story might have been inspired by the mystic
story of a supposed meeting between Alexander and
Diogenes.
As demonstrated in these examples, there are two
distinct roles in which Alexander appears in text and
image: one portrays him as a warrior and a hero, the other
as a seeker of mystic knowledge, on a spiritual quest. In
11. Mir Mussavir, Iskandar
Visiting a Hermit, from
Khamsa Nizami, 1535-1540.

either role, no hostility is shown toward the man who
was a conqueror of the region. Alexander reached as far

as India in 326 BCE, before his death in Babylon in 323 BCE. 237 Instead, assimilated well
into the visual vocabulary, the cultural and ideal values are projected through him, and
perhaps exploited by the rulers who identified with him and commissioned the works. The
written text for both roles reveal a constructed image of Alexander, not as the historical
figure, but as the manifestation of a constructed identity representing the “Perfect Man,” one
who accomplished greatness militarily through his courage and prowess, and one who had
connections to the Divine through his mystic quest; this is consistent with Ibn Arabi’s
formula of al-Insan al Kamil.
If we view Alexander’s military campaign in the region in late 4th century BCE as a
symbol of the arrival of Classical Greek culture, and realize that the philosophical and mystic
influences from ancient Greece had already reached and been established in the region by the
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time Islam was introduced (in 7th century) with such stories already part of the existing
folklore, and following the translation movement and the dissemination of knowledge
including Greek philosophy in the 9th century, Ibn Arabi’s theories must have seemed
familiar during and after the Middle Ages in the Middle East. Nonetheless, as with the earlier
example, in Alexander’s case we are once again confronted with a parergon and surplus
value in comparison to the historic texts,238 as well as the Koranic text with regards to the
Perfect Man. This necessitates further examination of the subject, since the notion of Perfect
Man appears to be the hinge on which the patriarchal powers have claimed legitimacy and
divine sanction.
The concept of Perfect Man is in direct conflict with Koranic text that not only makes
no reference to such an idea, but contradicts it in many places. The statements, “. . . God is
Greater239 . . . (29:45),” “He has no equal (112:4)” or “there is no divinity but God (2:163),”
are a few examples among many that oppose the “Perfect Man” and clearly distinguish
between the Creator and the created. To be sure, in citing these contradictions, I do not intend
to carry out a sort of a purification or redemption of Islam. The raising of such discrepancies
is aimed at drawing attention to the “gap” that exists, so that it may open up a space for
individual responses. Furthermore, the elevation of humans to divine status is a concept that
reaches well before the advent of Islam and to ancient Mesopotamia, Egypt and the time of
Greek antiquity, in which the kings and heroes were declared gods or sons of gods. The
Romans further continued this tradition by the process of apotheosis, declaring their favorite
emperors as gods.240
Just as the Greco-Roman visual vocabulary entered Christianity, 241 the whole notion
of humans becoming interchangeable with God permeated Christianity from antiquity as well
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and integrated into Christian doctrine represented by the institutionalized religion, while
quintessentially there is evidence pointing to a difference between the Creator and the created
in all Abrahamic monotheist traditions.242 Therefore, Ibn Arabi’s thoughts are more in line
with the exchangeability between the Creator and the created than with monotheism. In a
poem he writes:
I am in love with no other than myself,
and my very separation is my union ...
I am my beloved and my lover;
I am my knight and my maiden.243
The apparent conflict in the poem above has the potential to reveal a “gap” that
should lead to individual responses. However, the assumed authority that dominates and the
creativity involved lead to the concealment of that “gap.”

THE SAFAVID DREAMERS AND THE GERMAN IDEALISTS: NEOPLATONIC IDEAS IN THE WORKS
OF GERMAN PHILOSOPHERS AND THE ROLE OF ART AS COMPARED WITH THE DEVELOPMENT OF

ARTS DURING THE SAFAVID REIGN
It may appear peculiar to speak of the Safavids and the German Idealists in the same
breath. However, upon a closer look, one can recognize both sides’ affinity for the
transcendental Neoplatonic ideas, itself predicated on Platonic philosophy. To unpack this
statement it is necessary to begin with a brief analysis of the link between Platonism,
Neoplatonism and their patriarchal association, followed by a brief analysis of German
Idealism and Romanticism. The objective here is to expose the “gap” that exists between the
“misrecognition” of the self, shown through the Neoplatonic mirror as “perfect,” “ideal,” and
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“divine”, and the potential to advance the individual from this illusion, as suggested in
human development by Lacan. Then, keeping the individuality intact, I intend to examine
how this phenomenon unfolds in the European instance, or as the case is in the Middle East
particularly with respect to the Safavids, how the individual remains dissolved in the
collective (through an artificial unity) with its fate finalized.

Platonism, Neoplatonism and the Lacanian “Mirror Phase”
The power of imagination in Plotinus has had consequences in the development of
Neoplatonism. Kevin Corrigan, in Reading Plotinus notes “Neoplatonism is sometimes
thought to sublimate or bypass the individual or other person entirely” (2). Plotinus’s
thoughts, presupposing the Pre-Socratics, are a sort of contemplation on, and at times
creative interpretation of, works of philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, Stoics, Skeptics,
and others.244 Thus, in his system, he is very much reliant on Plato, and Platonists, like
Aristotle, and other “ancient philosophers.” According to a Neoplatonist expert, his major
work, the Enneads, is “not so much a body of philosophical opinions as fifty-four
philosophical meditations, many of which are quietly revolutionary in their scope and
creativity” (Corrigan 23). Such assessment compels us to view the Enneads as a work of art,
but nonetheless a highly pervasive one and easily adaptable to patriarchal values, hence a
parergon itself.
The whole patriarchal synthesis hinges on the idea of guardianship of one over the
rest. The reverberations of the soul in nature, as argued by Plotinus, may link to the
Intellectual-Principle, however they are imperfect. “[F]or its perfection . . . [the soul] must
look to that Divine Mind, which may be thought of as a father watching over the
development of his child born imperfect in comparison with himself” (V.1.3).245 The Platonic
142

idea of the philosopher as the guardian provides specific instructions for such a guardian.
According to Plato, the education of a young man246 groomed to be the guardian should
include “arithmetic, geometry (plane and solid), astronomy and harmony,” not in a utilitarian
capacity, but, as stated by Bertrand Russell, “in order to prepare his mind for the vision of
eternal things.” (131)
Plotinus’s answer to the question posed by the early philosophers in bridging the gap
between the physical and the metaphysical world is in his hypostases, that which is “real
existence” and “underlie everything we experience” (Corrigan 23). His three principles, The
One (or the Platonic Good), The Intellect (or Being that encompasses all beings and
intellects), and the Soul (encompassing all souls, and all creations in the material world
inspired by One through the Intellect), the unity (Plotinus considers “all beings are beings by
virtue of unity”), of which is fundamental to grasping his answer to the above question and to
understanding Neoplatonism (V.1.5, V.1 and 10, VI.9.1).
The Intellect (nous) “stands as the image of the One,” because “[the One] in its selfquest has a vision: this very seeing is the Intellectual-Principle” (V.1, 7). The One emanates
the “Divine Mind.” Just as the Intellect determines its being from its origin, the One, the Soul
has the Intellect as its underlying principle, but itself issues the material world and operates
by reasoning. Therefore, it is possible to know the Divine Mind, which we forget through our
self-will. Plotinus begins the Fifth Ennead by asking “What can it be that has brought the
souls to forge the father, God, and, though members of the Divine and entirely of the world,
to ignore at ones themselves and It?” (V.1.1). In knowing the Divine Mind, one can and must
study one’s soul, at the point which is most like its true source. To that end, one must also
purify that which has given shape to the body and the senses; that which remains is the
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Divine. Therefore, the element of cognition is critical in understanding the relationship
between the three that unfolds through a process of purification (V.1.10). By purification
Plotinus does not mean negation or elimination, rather transcendence beyond the material
world, however, through the material world.
It is in this state, according to Plotinus, that one can not only see nous, but also see
the One, and therefore establish direct connection with the Divine (V.1.2). The problem with
this theory is an existentialist one in that it does not distinguish between the seer and the
seen, the creator and the created (V.3.7). This flaw then leaves the door open for patriarchy to
substitute itself for the “One” and assume all its privileges. This view is predicated upon the
conformity to the “One” who does not recognize the “other.” Thus, Plotinus, in contrast to
Plato, does not equate nature or the senses to evil.247 By extension, the representation of
nature or senses in art is not negated, for it is deemed the handy work of the Soul, from what
it remembers of the One, through the nous. What connects the hierarchy of the One, Spirit
(nous) and Soul, Plotinus argues, is love that is stimulated when things are remembered (I.6.2
and III.5.1).
There is determinism in this “love,” and free will is seen as an obstacle (Russell 296).
There is a clear purpose for this artistic beauty as well. Therefore, he emphasizes the beauty
perceived through the senses and considers it key to recognizing what lies beyond. This
beauty of nature is then extended to configurations created by artists representing natural
forms, which are also primarily reliant upon “seeing;” thus, visual art becomes an important
player in Plotinus’s scheme of things.
Analogously, Plotinus holds up a mirror to humanity claiming what is reflected
(whether in nature or in a work of art) in fact signals the perfection all must strive for;
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however, this is nothing but an illusion. Since it looks toward the One, where “rest is
unbroken” and “all is content,” there can be no change or movement (V.1.4). Plotinus’s
mirror disregards that as humans we “see” things differently, are all dependent on one
another in many ways, and have our experiences shaped through one another’s. As Anthony
Kenny notes on Wittgenstein, “[e]ven the words that we use to frame our most secret and
inward thoughts derive the only sense they have from their use in our common external
discourse.”248 Plotinus’s philosophy, however, makes the individual dependent upon the
“One” that historically has easily been replaced by patriarchal aristocracy or religious dogma,
and has led all toward absolutism. This dependence is solidified in the power patriarchy
acquires by making its own possession all that can reflect that perfection or ideal based on
Neoplatonism, including art. In this, Plotinus provides what serves as the foundation of
aristocratic, patriarchal rule.
It is then a small wonder that Plotinus’s notion of the “One” seems strikingly similar
to Plato’s “Idea of the Good,” though it appears to have originally come from Parmenides.
Kenny asserts “the dominant place in Plotinus’ system is occupied by ‘the One’: the notion is
derived through Plato, from Parmenides, where Oneness is a key property of Being . . . [I]t is
the basis of all being and the standard of all value, but it is itself beyond being and beyond
goodness” (92). This may explain why Russell calls Plotinus a “melancholy optimist.”
Plotinus, in the unstable and unhappy world in which he lived,249 was seeking happiness
through “reflection upon things that are remote from the impressions of sense.” This,
Plotinus achieved through the power of “thought and imagination” (Russell 286). In other
words, he sought freedom from what he could not control or change, in thought and
imagination, an idea which centuries later Kant relies upon to develop his theory of criticism,
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or well beyond that, Deleuze and Guattari form their Schizophrenic excursions as means to a
creative escape from the all-encompassing ties of capitalism.250
In the Fourth Ennead, Plotinus explains how the soul, which has no independent
reality, descends and enters a body suitable to it. It then “has the desire of elaborating order
on the model of what it has seen in the Intellectual-Principle” (IV.7.13). However, joining a
body separates the soul from its place of unity with other souls as essence, and is made to
govern “what is lower than itself” (IV.8. 2-3). Here is when we are confronted with an
individual entering the natural world.
There are similarities between this individual in recognizing himself/herself as the
one who descended from an essence connected to the Divine Intellect and the child who sees
himself/herself in the mirror for the first time, according to Jacques Lacan. The child
perceives a seemingly complete image of the self, and that forms the foundation of his/her
ego; this is a necessary step, albeit an incomplete image of the child as a being who is very
much dependent upon others to fulfill his/her needs. This is what Lacan calls
méconnaissance, and it is experienced through “seeing.” 251
In order to explain human subjectivity and account of the individuated self, Lacan
asserts in his ‘Mirror Phase Theory’ that such a development takes place based on an illusion.
“This image is a fiction because it conceals, or freezes, the infant’s lack of motor coordination and the fragmentation of its drives. But it is salutary for the child, since it gives it
the first sense of a coherent identity in which it can recognize itself” (Mitchell & Rose 30).
The result in the self that is shown to the individuals through Neoplatonism is not dissimilar
to this principle. It gives an inaccurate portrayal of the individual, albeit a coherent spiritual
identity in theory; it turns one inward toward seeking and longing for the essence or
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purification. The difference is the Lacanian child has the opportunity to move beyond this
stage, while the Neoplatonian soul does not, because of the latter’s predetermined
destination.
Interestingly, the metaphor of mirror is often used by Neoplatonists to encourage the
individual to recall the connection with the Divine. 252 To visualize this connection, Plotinus
places the “Intellect” (Spirit) in between the “One” and the “Soul” and speaks of the beauty
that exists there: “. . . all is transparent . . . so that everywhere there is all, and all is all . . .
There, is all the stars; and every star, again, is all the stars and sun . . . while some manner of
being is dominant in each all are mirrored in every other” (V.8.4).
Comparably, the same pattern is repeated even with the progression of thoughts in
philosophy with regard to the shaping of the idea of the “I.” Philosophically speaking,
Lacan’s theory can also apply to the Cartesian cogito in that it confirms the existence of the
“I.” The moment Descartes draws this conclusion is the moment in which the philosophical
“child” sees itself in the philosophical symbolic mirror and becomes aware of its
philosophical ego, but there is no mention of the thoughts being shaped by any other being
other than the “I;” therefore, it lacks the ability to identify the valuable connection with
others. This ego becomes the center of the philosophical discussion from this point on upon
which philosophers like Kant, for example, base their thoughts. 253 Where there is a
difference, nonetheless, is when the “seeing” shifts to “thinking” beginning with Descartes.
None of these philosophers however, question the issue of the “point of origin” until Mikhail
Bakhtin (1895-1975), who draws attention to “utterance” and dialogism.254 The distraction
toward the self, whether in the psychological development of the biological child or the
philosophical development of humanity, can be seen as the impediment in striving to connect
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dialogically with others. In Plotinus, as stated by Russell, this is seen as a flaw, as he believes
Plotinus’s philosophy discourages willing any change. In fact, being reliant on deterministic
principles in Neoplatonism, the free will is viewed as a sin (Russell 296).
The shift from the “seeing” to “thinking” opened up the possibility for a deeper
investigation of what is being “seen.” This brought forth the notion of the individual as a
thinker, who, while still isolated, was beginning to claim an identity, based on reason,
distinct from what it had experienced as a subject to a patriarchal system. However, the
Neoplatonist influence endures because the individual remains dissolved in the collective
(through an artificially imposed unity), and during the times of uncertainty, has no path other
than moving inward. In the words of Kandinsky: “When religion, science, and morality are
shaken . . . when the external supports threaten to collapse, then man’s gaze turns away from
the external toward himself” (AiT 87).

Idealism in German Philosophy, Neoplatonism and Creative Expressions
In the course of the development of consciousness in Western philosophy, if we
consider the Cartesian “I,” 255 as the starting point of the journey toward subject formation, it
is Kant who builds on what Andrew Bowie calls “the shared structures of our subjective
consciousness which are the ‘condition of possibility’ of objective knowledge,” in order to
lay the foundation for a subject formation independent from the Divine (2). Therefore, what
Kant did (and his followers pursued along the same lines) was replace nature, as predicated
upon the Divine,256 with a nature defined through aestheticism and beauty as responded to by
the human mind (Bowie 3). This substitution gave some sense of empowerment to humans,
albeit an “imaginary” one to use Lacan’s term in the case of the individual,257 or in a broader
scope, to the new incoming bourgeois class, nevertheless.
148

The individuation of the child as a subject in “I,” according to Lacan, is reliant upon
the theory of “mirror stage,” in which the child sees himself/herself in the mirror and realizes
he/she is a separate being; however, this is in fact a misrecognition (méconnaissance) that
comes at the cost of seeing the image misleadingly as perfect. This misrecognition, Lacan
argues, contributes to the narcissistic formation of his/her “I,” and “the narcissistic image,
which [comes] from the pleasure derived from meeting himself in the mirror, becomes when
confronting his fellow man an outlet for his most intimate aggressivity” (qtd in Keenan 218).
Similarly, the “I” becomes pivotal to the development of Western philosophy in the process
of subject formation as it unfolds through the works of German philosophers.
In Bowie’s attempt to reposition subjectivity within Kant’s aesthetic theory in
response to recent postmodern theories, he argues both Idealism and early Romanticism to be
“immediate consequences” of Kant’s philosophy striving to define subjectivity,258 while both
place the “I” at the center. I submit, there is a correlation between the notions of perfection
and the autonomy of the “I,” and the Idealism or even Romanticism that emerged out of
Kant. Idealism and Romanticism are predicated on a predetermined unity with the natural
world in which consciousness can take place in the case of the former, or can never occur in
the case of the latter259 (Bowie 98); both consequences were influential in the development of
proceeding philosophical theories in Germany. These theories are significant, as justified by
Bowie, for “they regard the experience of natural and artistic beauty and the fact of aesthetic
production as vital to the understanding of self-consciousness” (Bowie 2).
An example of Idealists’ thought would be in the philosophy of Fichte. Upon Kant’s
emphasis on the subject as being where the object can be recognized, Fichte took it as far as
stating that it is the “I” that produces the world, and that “the absolute . . . is the action of the
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I” (Bowie 70, 75). Consciousness, Fichte argues, happens in what he calls “reflexive
splitting,” in which the “I” both splits and is unified spontaneously. More importantly for
Fichte, this is not a chain of events, one leading to another, but rather he turns the “I” toward
itself in apperception. He states: “the activity . . . does not . . . lead endlessly to other effects,
but can instead . . . ‘go back into itself,’ and thus has a ‘being for itself’: I and activity which
returns into itself are completely identical concepts” (Bowie 73).
The early Romantics, however, were unconvinced of the “spontaneous splitting and
unity” in reaching consciousness while remaining “absolute” at the same time, and believed
that the “imagination” played an important role in the formation of subjectivity. Novalis
rejects the ‘view from nowhere,’ responding to Fichte’s “eye” in the conscious self’s ability
to “‘see’ itself seeing” (Bowie 75) and argues that the consciousness process “is not
transparent to itself,” but rather it has to be represented to itself (Bowie 89). Novalis argues:
“consciousness itself is a ‘being outside being in being.’ This means it is an ‘image’, ‘an
image of being in being’” (Bowie 90). However an image of the “I” is not the same as the “I”
itself; this, Novalis resolves by maintaining “the very sense of its absence points to its
undeniable existence” (Bowie 91). This “negative recognition”260 that informs “. . . Novalis’s
Romantic notion of art” arises from “the necessary failure to represent an absolute ground, in
this case the I . . .” (Bowie 95). Novalis states:
Self-consciousness in the greater sense is a task – an ideal – it would be that state
within which there was no movement in time . . . In real self-consciousness we would
just change – but without going any further . . . we are not I by inferences and
indirectly – but immediately . . . All our memories and events link to a mystical unity
which we call I (ibid).
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The Idealism in Hegel is in his collapse of the subject into object. For Hegel, the
ultimate objective is “Absolute Truth,” to be arrived at through the mind’s mediation of
empirical knowledge (phenomena), awarding it new meaning and situating it within its
rightful place in time; this is guided by Geist (i.e. essence, spirit, mind), and it continues until
self-consciousness is achieved; it implies change of human spirit across time, but suggests a
path toward a destination for art and for history. Therefore, the more we acquire knowledge,
the more we unite with it, and the closer we get to “Absolute Truth.” To avoid Kant’s binary
problem of acquiring knowledge from the “outside” world and uniting it with our faculties on
the “inside,” Hegel, as with the other Idealists, shows “how thought and being are
inseparable” (Bowie 141).
The further criticism of Kant’s binary division of the world into phenomena and
noumena brings in other philosophers, such as Schopenhauer, who argues the “world’s most
inner essence” to be the “Will.” Never appearing on its own, the Will manifests itself through
the desires of body; therefore, “the phenomenal world is grounded in the Will, which
objectifies itself in different ways in all of nature” (Bowie 262). The link Schopenhauer
establishes between the Will and subjectivity is then picked up by Nietzsche in the “will to
power” which eliminates “a metaphysically grounded notion of history” (Bowie 275);
Nietzsche rejects any “higher collective historical goal,” as in Hegelian “philosophy’s
continuous self undermining […] as constituting a progression that incorporates the refuted
views of the world into a higher synthesis” (Bowie 275). Similar to Schopenhauer, Nietzsche
believed in the intuitive accessibility of the ‘one truly existing subject’ (i.e. Nature, Life,
Will, etc.) rather than rationalism, and saw the point of art as “the pleasure for the ‘true
creator’.” Nietzsche sees “our highest dignity in the significance of works of art – for only
aesthetic phenomenon is existence and the world eternally justified” (Bowie 280). However,
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those who create culture in Nietzsche’s view are not from the masses. While Nietzsche sees
the “essence of modernity” in its “lack of center” and in the diversity of cultures, he does not
have a favorable view of it. His proposed solution to “the de-centered state of culture [is] in
terms of a ‘re-birth of German myth’,” which is the creation of “superior beings” and not
consequence of “education, cultural opportunity, and democratic debates” (Bowie 281).
In The Origin of the Work of Art, Heidegger returns to the issue of “essence” and of
“Being” (Heidegger 143). He asks: “[I]n defining the essence of the thing, what is the use of
a feeling, however certain, if thought alone has the right to speak here?” (Heidegger 151). To
answer, he “interprets” feeling as “more intelligently perceptive . . . more open to Being than
all reason” (ibid). Here is where he notes a rift: “[T]he current thing-concept always fits each
thing. Nevertheless, it does not lay hold of the thing as it is in its own being, but makes an
assault upon it”(ibid). As a solution, Heidegger proposes a “free field” in which the thing can
“display its thingly character directly” (ibid). This is the field of aesthetic (aistheton). To be
sure, Heidegger is looking to Kant here when he defines aistheton as “perceptible by
sensation in the senses belonging to sensibility.” He further notes: “Hence the concept later
becomes a commonplace according to which a thing is nothing but the unity of manifold of
what is given in the senses” (ibid).
Heidegger’s investigation into the “thingness” of things and tracing the words back to
their origin also is suspiciously reminiscent of Freud’s method, but he never opens it enough
to move beyond the central discourse of the essence. Heidegger notes that, the reason
everyone thinks is in understanding of a meaning of a word, is due to its “core.” However,
there is a “leap” between the underlying experiences (as also later pointed to by Foucault)
and its origin that will not carry over in translation (Heidegger 149). In a different time
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period, this will leave us not with the presence of the same core, but rather with layers of
interpretation and re-interpretation of the word.261 He then concludes: “No wonder that the
current attitude toward things – our way of addressing ourselves to things and speaking about
them – has adapted itself to this common view of the thing” 262 (ibid). This is not unlike what
Foucault is interested in: the “history of resemblance” (Foucault xxiv).

Safavid Idealism through Creative Reverberations: Mūla Sadrā
What defines “Idealism” among the Safavid kings is not a consistent idea and is
intimately interwoven with the patriarchy’s objectives that reveals it was continuously facing
a paradox: constancy and unsustainability. 263 Whereas Shah Isma’il’s military campaigns
necessitated a divine leader (one that could liberate – a messiah), we witness him claiming
such a position. However, once the control of the land had been achieved and such a position
could no longer be sustained, and when his successor, Tahmasp, is confronted with a
different set of challenges in order to manage, he is forced to claim to be, not the divine, but a
representative of someone like Prophet Mohammad, who received revelations (Babayan 92).
This image is expressed well in the exemplary subject of Mi’raj discussed earlier. In his
memoirs, Tahmasp projects himself as a “Muslim king and friend of God (vali)” (Babayan
99).
Thus, once the fragmented region was consolidated under the Safavid founder, it
became necessary to establish a rule of law (shari’a), which had to come from the Shi’a
school of thought due to converting the country into Shi’ism. There had been no precursor to
such authority to administer or pass down the law from a Shi’a position of power. This
problem was remedied through the migration by invitation of the Shi’a ulama (religious
authorities) from Jabal Amil located in the mountainous region of Southern Lebanon
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(Babayan 2002, 407). This move eventually set in opposition the shari’a-minded theologians
against the combination of the “alchemical, mystical, and philosophical spheres” that had
resurfaced “in the early modern period” in Iran, and resulted in the fragmentation of the
mainly Greco-Roman, pre-Islamic beliefs and practices.264 It was crucial nevertheless, for the
Safavids to maintain their domination over all despite such opposition.
Perhaps nowhere more appropriate than in the transition that paved the way for the
reign of Shah Abbas I (r. 1588-1629) is the location we witness another creative aftershock.
At this time, a sweeping motion replaced the ghullāt worldview that had initially brought the
Safavids to power, thus giving way to the rise of the “philosopher king” (Shadow of God on
Earth), as defined by a reconciliation between Shi’ite and Sufi (itself with Platonic and
Neoplatonic) views. Hence, a balance was called for between the two that was achieved in
the works of contemporary philosophers such as Mullā Sadrā, to whom I shall return. As was
necessary, therefore, the Safavid patriarchy modified and morphed, forged a new ideology,
and even eliminated its own ideological progenitors to remain in power.265
By the time of Shah Abbas I, the messianic phase that had established the Safavid
Imperial rule dwindled due to not only the need for law and order to manage and administer
the affairs of the empire, but also a desire to forge a new encompassing image of the king. 266
This diminishing, however, by no means eliminated the various Alid perspectives and
sentiments as testified to by Shah Abbas’ precursors’ change of position. Babayan explains:
Unlike his father [Isma’il], who claimed to be messiah/God, Tahmasp positions
himself within that comfortable distance of dreams that had become a recognized
mystical medium of communicating with the divine, an accepted distance between the
holy and the human.267
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Further, there is the issue of creativity to consider that speaks to the existing
understanding of how different styles of piety were viewed as possessing the knowledge of
the unseen (ghayb), sometimes labeled as “magic” or “alchemy.” This was, to be sure, of
great interest to the king and other regional or local authorities, who believed “mystical
circles and spiritual guides . . . [to be] the repository of temporal authority” (Babayan 94).
Babayan further notes the “creative act” as significant to Medieval Muslims, whether it be in
“fashioning the universe, a beautiful poem, a painting or a song,” as it was deemed emulation
of the act of creation, for it “stimulated sensual responses” (Babayan 95). She states:
Artists were believed to be endowed with a special power and ability to perform
miracles in the way that they could mirror the magnificence of creation. The ability to
capture that splendor was deemed to be magic, through words strung together in
poetry that aroused emotions or colored images that constructed realities.268
Also noteworthy here is the understanding of “nature” among the “philosophers
(hukamā) and the alchemists,” which was predicated on the knowledge from antiquity. Such
views can be traced back to the time after Alexander’s arrival to the region, when the Greek
and the Babylonian ideas were exchanged.269 These ideas were established on the balance
between the four elements (air, fire, water, earth) and the view of the interchangeability of
the elements and their potential toward purity. What was deemed significant and sought after
was an equilibrium. “[T]he purest compound was analogous to the perfect individual”
(Babayan 97). The other notion came from the idea of the heavenly bodies’ influence on
people’s lives and events. Peter Adamson explicates how by the second century AD there is
an “intimate connection” between astronomy and astrology, evident in a work called
Almagest by Claudius Ptolemy that found its way “even into Arab tradition” (196-7). What is
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of particular interest here is how “[m]agic could be explained using ideas from Stoic and
Platonist physics, in particular the idea that the whole cosmos is like a single organism.”
Adamson states:
The parts of the universe relate like parts of a body, so that they are capable of being
‘jointly affected’—in Greek sumpatheia, [a] word that lives on in English as
‘sympathy.’270
The task of the sciences then was to reveal the underlying patterns of the cosmos, so
they can rationalize the creation of a parallel symmetry in the material world. Babayan
exemplifies: “[T]he circular motions of heavenly objects and the fourfold nature of elements
were used as frameworks through which harmony could be created on earth” (97). Therefore,
the cosmic patterns, mathematical principles and rules of proportion translated into models
and motifs and were manifested in various art forms, from poetry to painting and
architecture. However, for Shah Abbas I, this was only part of the plan.
Shah Abbas I faced many challenges upon arriving at the Safavid throne in 1587 in
Qazvin, both internally (with the supporters of other Safavid potential rivals) and externally
from the Ottomans to the west, who had captured Tabriz in 1585, and the Uzbeks to the East,
who had seized Herat and were moving toward Mashhad.271 Aside from his politico-military
challenges, Abbas I also had to resolve the challenges posed to his spiritual leadership (as
pir) by various Sufi elements, who openly questioned his authority (Newman 51). Shah
Abbas’s court chronicler, Eskandar Beg Munshi, according to Newman, deems his military
successes and victories over his rivals to be due to “Abbas’ divinely inspired creation of the
ghulam or qullar corps—small forces composed mainly of non-Qizilbash Arab and Persian
tribal volunteers” (52).
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The term ghulam, meaning “slave,” already existed during the reign of Abbas’
precursor, Shah Tahmasp. However, it proved to be a most effective system during Shah
Abbas’s reign to “preserve the vitality of the Safavid household.”272 The master-disciple
relationship that existed through the Sufi hierarchy was easily transitioned into a master-slave
structure, through which much of the same expectations (total devotion and loyalty)
applied.273 In the meantime, Shah Abbas moved his capital to Isfahan in 1590 to proclaim the
dawning of his new era. “Isfahan served as a new physical and cultural environment from
which the ruler and his slave household extended their power throughout the empire.” 274
However, Newman speaks of a “spiritual disquiet on the urban scene” (68). The spreading
out of the urban life had contributed to the rise of “urban ‘popular’ classes . . . [that]
encouraged the expansion of links between urban artisans and craftsmen and urban-based
messianic Sufi discourse,”275 with those trades congregating in and patronizing “some of the
capital’s coffee houses” in which “oppositional discourse [was] on offer” (Newman 68-69).
Out of his concern for such congregations, Shah Abbas “delegated clerical associates of the
court to monitor the activities of these venues.” 276 The objective of the clerics was to
“influence ‘popular’ spiritual discourse in the period” and align it with the Twelver Shi’ism
(Newman 69).
Earlier, the socio-religious influence of the messianic ideas, as argued by Babayan,
had kept the criticism by the “shari’a-minded ul[a]ma” at a minimum. However, the
migration of the Shi’a jurisprudence from south of Lebanon brought on a shift. Still, among
the “Jabal Amil intellectuals” were those renowned individuals, like Mir Damād and Shaykh
Bahai, who found the “shari’at-minded quest for God insufficient.” For this reason, “[t]o
their studies on religious sciences (fiqh and hadith) they added philosophy (hikmat) and
mysticism (irfan) (Babayan 407). Their student, Sadr al Din Mohammad Shirazi, known as
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Mullā Sadrā (1571/2-1640), followed the style of his teachers in synthesizing, as stated by
Babayan, “philosophy or sufism with purely rational quest for God” (ibid). Newman points
out Ibn Arabi’s influence, among “other prominent Muslim thinkers from the twelfth to the
sixteenth century,” on Mullā Sadrā’s “reconciliation of philosophy with gnosis (irfan),”
predicated on the Andalusian mystic’s gnostic formulations, however “grounded . . . in the
revelation of the Twelver Shi’ism” (Newman 70). But how did he actually accomplish this?
Mullā Sadrā’s influential contribution rests on the question of “being,” in other
words, on what later becomes “a leitmotif in . . . the eastern tradition: existence” (Adamson
2016, 388). He drew from two opposing views.277 One view is predicated on the “primacy of
essence,” as had been argued by Suhrevardi, and the other is the “primacy of existence,” a
belief closer to the Neoplatonists and mystics, particularly the Andalusian mystic, Ibn Arabi
(ibid). The philosophers in the former group “hold that there are real things outside the mind,
but no existence that would belong to those things,” for “existence is a judgment of the
mind.” The second group believes, on the other hand, that “existence or ‘being’ does have
reality outside the mind,” and in Mullā Sadrā’s view this existence is light. Adamson
explains, according to Mullā Sadrā:
God is pure existence or pure light, whereas other things are always limited in their
existence or illumination. Like Suhrevardi, then, Sadrā describes created things as
suffering from darkness. Like the Sufis, he says that such things are compromised by
non-being and privation, lacking the perfect existence that belongs to God alone. And
like Avicenna, he says that this is because created things are contingent, whereas God
is necessary.278
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By stating “there is nothing real apart from existence,” Mullā Sadrā is clearly
following the same Neoplatonic formula of “Unity of Existence,” and equals it to God. He
further distinguishes the perfection of the Divine—because God is pure existence—from
other things created, for in the latter there exists “lack or limitation” (Adamson 2016, 389).279
Adamson argues that Mullā Sadrā solves the Platonic problem of real versus illusion by
thinking “not only that all existence is marked by continuous variation in intensity, but also
that all existence is in constant motion, even in respect of substance” (Adamson 2016, 392).
Mullā Sadrā explains this motion in his “philosophical masterpiece,” The Four
Journeys. The phrase had already been applied by Ibn Arabi, when expounding the centrality
of “God as the guide for those who travel ‘from Him, to Him, in Him, and through Him’.”
Closer to Mullā Sadrā’s time, the metaphor had been used again by a precursor of Mullā
Sadrā’s.280 Therefore, it is not by accident that Mullā Sadrā chooses this as the title of his
book. The journeys, according to Mullā Sadrā, take place “along a two-way street”
(Adamson 2016, 388). First the creations “come forth from God like rays from a shining
light.” The role of light is key, for it will serve as the “path back to the divine” (ibid). The
journey back requires one to change, admits Mullā Sadrā. He argues, existence does go
through changes, although so slowly and gradually that we tend to overlook it. Adamson
notes here that the idea of “transformation . . . by soul as it inclines towards the body,” had
already been expressed by the later Neoplatonists (395). Sadrā’s contribution, however, is in
the way in which he illuminates how “all existing things strive to return to God.” Most
important in this process, in Sadrā’s view, are the humans and required for this change is
“knowledge” (ibid). But, knowledge is not merely something to acquire through senses.281
Rather, “[r]eal knowledge” requires becoming one with it (Adamson 2016, 396). 282 The
process of “knowing” here maps onto what Fichte explains in the consciousness of the “I”
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(Bowie 70, 73, 75). The separation of the creation, and the returning, by unifying the mind
with knowledge, mirror the “splitting” of the “I” in order to arrive at consciousness. It is
Mullā Sadrā, however, in the case of Iran in particular, that remains the bridge linking the
antiquity’s philosophy to later philosophical, political, and Islamic thoughts.
As rightly pointed out by Adamson, there is little doubt about Mullā Sadrā’s long
lasting impressions, which reach well into the Modern times, as his philosophy remains a
religiously and socially relevant subject of study among the religious scholars in Iran today
(Adamson 2016, 441), and to which I shall return in the final chapter of this study. However,
before examining the contemporary links, it is necessary to travel through the events leading
to the period called Modernism, not just as it impacts Iran, but affecting two other important
powers in the region, namely Egypt and the Ottoman Turkey, particularly following the rude
awakening brought on by Napoleon’s Egyptian military campaign.
In summary, this chapter focused on a number of critical points. First, by bringing in
the case study of the Safavids, it made concrete in an historical situation, the thesis in this
study. After a brief overview of the emergence of the Safavid dynasty in Iran, I focused on
how the Safavids, in rising to political power, despite their roots in mystic-Sunni Islam,
employed creativity, both in literary and in visual forms. I further identified the
Neoplatonism in Islamic thought, by highlighting one of the most revered mystics, Ibn Arabi.
As Ibn Arabi’s work was highly visual, and served as inspiration for further creative
endeavors, I analyzed several examples that reveal the two principles of his philosophy: The
Unity of Existence, and The Universal (Perfect) Man, as projected through the court
sponsored arts.
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It was also necessary in this chapter to identify the shared Neoplatonic ideas within
both the German Idealist works, and the Safavid-supported philosophy and art that show
traces of Neoplatonic and idealistic concepts. I concluded this chapter by drawing attention to
the most influential figure in philosophy during the Safavid reign, Mūla Sadrā, whose impact,
as I will demonstrate in the final two chapters, still continues to this day.
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CHAPTER FOUR
MIDDLE EAST BEYOND THE SAFAVIDS:
THE PRE AND EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY: MODERNISM, NATIONALISM, AND
THE ARTISTIC ENDEAVOR

When this process which we can call ‘modern’ began, the greater part of the Middle East was
ruled by the two great empires, those of the Ottomans and Safavids […] they were the
product of the whole process of Islamic civilization to which they were the heirs […] they
were societies dominated by cities, and by the relations between city populations and those
who ruled them.283
— Albert Hourani
There have been many perspectives through which “modernity” can be defined,
explained or critically investigated. The conventional consensus on the term “modern”
however, often draws on what is measured in scientific, technological or even cultural
achievements encompassing city life,284 while the history of the development of thought in
Europe demonstrates a necessary undercurrent to the scientific or hegemonic cultural
progress.285 This undercurrent is the development of the consciousness of the “I” or the
subject-hood, which has also been influential in the advent of modernism. I am aware of the
problem of the subject that objectifies. As Horkheimer and Adorno point out in the Dialectic
of Enlightenment, “Man’s domination over himself, which grounds his selfhood, is almost
always the destruction of the subject, in whose subject it is undertaken” (54). Thus,
consciousness of the “I” alone is not as important as how the “I” then becomes aware of its
“other” and connect to it via language as noted by Mikhail Bakhtin. However getting through
this stage is a pre-requisite to reach the next stage, at least in learning from the Western
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experience. Here, I won’t get into the role of subject-hood in the opening a new social
space/class in a society as it took place in Europe. One might argue, there is bound to be a
clash of the “I’s” due all sides becoming self-centered, at some point, as it happened during
the world wars within the western civilizations. But all can learn from that experience.
Hourani’s statement above, therefore, may be considered with the discernment that
his use of the term “modern” does not necessarily reflect the process of the development of
new ideas that were taking shape in eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe focusing on
the individual, but rather the fruits of the advancements of that understanding through
technology, primarily as linked with military purposes. 286 The view that exposes the issue of
subjectivity and subject formation (or lack thereof) with respect to the concept of
“modernity” has been continuously overlooked when it comes to studying the Middle Eastern
regions, specifically Persia, or as known by its “modern” name, Iran. I propose, the absence
of the question of subjectivity and subject formation as an inevitable part of the discourse on
modernism in the Middle East in general, and Iran in particular, has been due to the
overlooking and bypassing of the portion of the philosophical investigation of the “I,” from
Descartes to Kant (or an equivalent to such thoughts). The comparison of such discourses
within the recorded history of philosophy has been argued against by Peter K. J. Park in
Africa, Asia and the History of Philosophy: Racism in the Formation of the Philosophical
Canon 1780-1830. Park notes that Africa and Asia were not without philosophy, but they
were intentionally excluded from the history of philosophy by Western philosophical minds.
Park, however, does not present any evidence that points to the slightest attention paid to the
individual as a subject to itself within African or Asian philosophies. Indeed, the exclusion
itself attests to what I aim to demonstrate here.
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In this chapter, I will continue pulling on the thread of the ever-present Neoplatonism
that blurred the space between the individual and the collective, the universal and the
particular, i.e. subject and object. I aim to demonstrate, while the bulk of modern scientific
achievements in the nineteenth century were initially dedicated to military purposes, some of
the technological advancements that trickled into the production of the arts began to pave the
way for hybridized and diverse cultural productions that can be considered the early steps
toward individuality that hint at a diverse subject formation in the Middle East. 287 Stated
differently, the democratization of the modern way in which cultural products could be
created (i.e. photography, graphic arts, theater, and mass publications) offered opportunities
to capture early occurrences of different viewpoints—on many occasions opposing the
dominant positions of power—critical to modernity in the region of the Middle East.
Nevertheless, because the discourses, philosophy, and theories on issues such as the “self “or
“alterity” were absent in that instance,288 those artistic and cultural achievements found no
validation or acknowledgement and were reduced to fragments of recorded history, whether
viewed favorably or negatively, without a chance for anyone to critically study them. This
view is not unlike what Daryush Shayegan refers to as “false consciousness” (Shayegan 1997
ix). Therefore, the cultural achievements of modernism were often capitalized on by the
dominant patriarchal powers, particularly in creating a modern image of themselves to the
outside world.289 Here, I aim to discuss in detail the Europeans’ arrival at the self and
individual experience due to the works of Muslim scholars, and in particular, the theory of
vision. However, I maintain it was this important theory that was overlooked by Muslims, for
the implications of the theory of vision did not find a place to flourish in the pragmatic
political structure in the Middle East at the time, yet it was explored fully by the Europeans,
as attested to by the Renaissance artists’ works.290 Therefore, as exemplified in photography,
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bypassing the individual experience has been one of the consequences of this disregard.
Another corollary has been due to the West’s possession of key archeological information,291
but historically, not sharing equally and fairly the finds with the people of the Middle East.
The inequity in information distribution is another subject that shall remain beyond the
boundaries of this study, and it must be postponed to future opportunities.
The view of the self in the Middle East is so distorted and problematic that the
dilemma has even permeated the works of the Middle Eastern scholars in Diaspora.292 In
discourses on modernism in the Middle East, by taking an originary approach, some
researchers appear to get caught in a competitive 293 (a kind of my-culture-is-superior-toyour-culture) approach; they race toward uncovering the proof of which culture has had the
most advancements before anyone else did in history. For instance, some argue the ancient
Persian civilization preceded the West in modernism, in their cultural and technological
advancements, and even praise the wisdom of the divinely sanctioned ruler (according to the
Bible), Cyrus the Great, embracer of diversity and human rights.294 Abbas Milani in Lost
Wisdom: Rethinking Modernity in Iran, argues that contrary to the belief that modernity
began in the west, there were many waves of modernism in Persia since the ancient times,
waves that in turn influenced other civilizations,295 namely the European art and culture.
Milani downplays the fact that Persia itself received these influences from Egypt, Babylon,
Assyria, and other nations it came to conquer. Instead, he highlights a global high esteem for
the king as: “[T]his . . . praise was partially in recognition of . . . the fact that the vast Persian
Empire of the time was a paragon of religious and cultural tolerance (12). The issue of
tolerance has specifically become a subject of interest ever since concerns have been raised
over the increase of intolerance in recent decades, following the establishing of the
revolutionary government in Iran. Nonetheless, without a clear view of the consequences of
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such broad statements, one is not able to critically investigate the causes of such intolerances
in recent years. These broad, sweeping views undermine the question of individuality and
subject formation, for tolerance in the modern sense requires respect and acknowledgement
of alterity and the individual rights.
The issue of modernity in the Middle East is a massive subject, and for this reason, I
will limit this study to the three Middle Eastern regions of Egypt, Persia, and Ottoman
Turkey in the nineteenth and twentieth century, post Napoleonic invasion of Egypt in 1798.
To further clarify boundaries, this study chiefly focuses on the intersection of certain
historical events with specific, selected examples of artistic endeavors represented in theater,
visual arts (painting, sculpture, architecture and photography), as well as journalism, all of
particular interest here due to their link to modernization programs. This is not just to reveal
a similar pattern of Western influences that impacted the waves of modernity in these
countries, as manifested in the technology, cultural, and artistic products, but also to locate
and investigate the early instances of individual, critical, and diverse thinking in these three
influential regions. These instances have rarely been considered beyond historical interests
because the experiential process of individual awareness and subjecthood has repeatedly
been disrupted by the dominance of patriarchy.296 Patriarchy, infused with and drawing
legitimacy from the ever present Neoplatonic sentiments, continuously has returned to
artificially unifying against the basis of differences and alterity, even under the guise of
modernization, in order to maintain its own status of power.297
It must be further noted that this study is within the premise that the written history
about the Middle East has either been recorded by those from outside the cultures, or when
recorded from within, it has gone through periods of erasures and manipulations, therefore,
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suffering from a lack of reliable and verifiable continuity. Consequently, the historical
evidence alone is not adequate and must be investigated as it intersects with the artistic
products and carefully examined through a philosophical lens. Since the advent of modernist
movements, no thorough, independent, and self-critical investigation of the available
recorded history, as crossed with the relevant creative cultural products has taken place,298 it
is the aim of this study to open up a space necessary to begin with the question of the
self/individual-awareness, albeit an initially self-centered one, like those found among
Napoleon’s soldiers in his Egyptian campaign (Cole 2007, 11). 299

THE PRESSURES OF THE WAVE OF MODERNISM AND THE SUBSEQUENT REACTIONS
At the turn of the nineteenth century, military competition appeared widespread with
Europe enjoying a hegemonic position over the Middle East. This era had as one of its
significant markers, the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt that had occurred only a couple of
years earlier. Its impact, however, was not just restricted to Egypt. Napoleon’s campaign was
based on what historians have viewed as a way to establish France’s political status and
domination as a world colonialist power, in competition with the British. (See Appendix
II.A).

Egypt and Modernism: Napoleon’s Invasion of 1798
Egypt in the second half of the eighteenth century was not in a suitable socioeconomic condition. In a brief paragraph, Cole sums up Egypt’s situation in the decades
leading up to the Napoleonic invasion:
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The eighteenth century was not kind to Egypt. Between1740 and 1798, Egyptian
society went into a tailspin, its economy generally bad; droughts were prolonged, the
Nile floods low, and outbreaks of plague and other diseases frequent. The slavesoldier houses fought fierce and constant battles with one another, and consequently
raised urban taxes to levels that produced misery. Now a new catastrophe had struck,
in the form of Bonaparte’s plans to bestow liberty on Egypt.300
Indeed, Napoleon had underlined his Egyptian campaign as one that was going to
“liberate” the “unfortunate inhabitants of the Nile,” who had been tyrannized by the slave
soldiers, the Mamluks. In his address to his soldiers, as he prepared to invade Egypt, keeping
his arch enemy the Great Britain in view, he capitalized on Egypt’s poor socio-economic
status and the autocratic leadership in phrases emphasizing the tyranny and exploitation of
the people by the slave soldiers, who were serving the Ottomans. In one of his proclamations
that was written aboard the Orient he states: “[s]oldiers . . . you are about to undertake a
conquest, the effects of which on the civilization and commerce of the world are
immeasurable. You shall inflict on England the surest and most palpable blow, while
awaiting the opportunity to administer the coup de grace.”301 Overall the image was being
created for the French army, who envisioned their campaigns as comparable to those led by
likes of Augustus and Alexander.302 Napoleon, as the master of propaganda, also had plans in
place to communicate his mission as clearly as possible to the Egyptians. But, there was the
problem of language.
Worse than “ungrammaticality and awkward wording,” Cole argues, was the content
of Napoleon’s proclamations that “sought to express concepts for which there were no
Arabic words,” so they were met with confusion and were difficult to understand (Cole 2007,

168

30). It is in the examination of such instances that one realizes not just the cultural
disconnections, but how much Neoplatonic philosophy is deeply rooted in the region. One
significant term in these proclamations is the term “republic.” In quoting from Abd alRahman al Jabarti, the Cairene cleric and historian, Cole notes, al Jabarti’s explanation of the
term that appears “less like a democracy and more like a rule of philosophers similar to that
proposed by Socrates in Plato’s Republic . . . is no accident[,] [for h]e was a Muslim
Neoplatonist” (Cole 2007, 33).303
Another significant issue was the incompatibility between the Egyptian and French
military. The Egyptian military forces were far behind the French, both in number and in
technology.304 The French army was more orderly and disciplined to the point that the
Mamluks had noticed and were quoted as having said “[t]he French army, which marches in
tight squares . . . are linked with one another, and . . . they march like the pyramids” (Cole
2007, 69). The acknowledgement of this incompatibility meant taking actions to promote
improvement. Roger Owen in Egypt and Europe: from French Expedition to British
Occupation notes in early nineteenth century the predominantly agricultural economy of
Egypt experienced two sets of forces exerting pressure toward reforms: a number of
reformist rulers, and Europe’s expansionist economy (114). The former prompted programs
by rulers such as Muhammad Ali (r. 1805-49), Said (r. 1845-62), and Ismail Pasha (186379), and the latter brought forth increasing trade, first in European export and then in their
investments (ibid). (See Appendix II.A).
During the nineteenth century, the issue of debt plays an important role in shaping
Egypt’s path toward modernism, meanwhile producing subjectivities suited for colonialism.
Owen submits that this is perhaps the first time in the history of Great Britain that it attempts
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to colonize without the use of military power, at least initially; he further deems the
subsequent invasion of Egypt “occupies a central role in the genesis of theories of capitalist
imperialism (111-112). Europe’s commercial and financial expansion, therefore, initiated
new methods of colonialism in the Middle East at this time that were mainly guided by the
“financial community” but has had long lasting impressions on the colonized. In the words of
Maurizio Lazzarato: “The ‘modern notion of economy’ covers both economic production and
the production of subjectivity” (Lazzarato 11).
The modernization campaign, backed by European finances, included building
projects, and perhaps the most significant one, the construction of the Suez Canal, which
opened in 1869. Artistic productions that aimed to project a modern view of Egypt played an
important role in this very international event. Concurrent with inaugurating the Suez Canal,

12 & 13. Pietro Avoscani and Rossi (architects of Cairo Opera House, left),
opened in 1869. Comparable to La Scala in Milan (right, opened in 1778).
Ismai’l Pasha, (also known as Khedive Isma’il), had planned to celebrate the opening of the
first Opera House in Cairo by employing European architects’ services. Designed by the
Italian architect, Pietro Avoscani (1816-1890), the tripartite structure with an arched portico
closely resembled La Scala Opera House in Milan which had opened in 1778.305 While
Avoscani used wood instead of stone in this royal opera house, he maintained the clarity and
rationalism of neoclassical design in the use of architectural elements such as pediment and
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decorative columns. The theater structure was accentuated at the entrance, with two
neoclassical and allegorical sculpture groups, personifying the visual arts. The Khedivial
Opera House burned down in 1971.
Perhaps no evidence more directly than the guest
list can speak to the fact that the Khedive wanted to
showcase Egypt as a modern state, however, in
appearances. The names on the guest list included heads of
state, dignitaries, and artists; for the opening ceremony of
the Suez Canal, Khedive Isma’il welcomed the wife of
Napoleon, Empress Eugenie, Emperor of Austria, Emile

14. Allegory of the Arts,
Mohammad Hassan
(1892-1960).

Zola, Henrik Ibsen, and Eugene Fromentin among others.
The Opera House, also known as Khedival Opera House, made its debut during the
celebrations “with a cantata in honor of Isma’il and a performance of Verdi’s Rigoletto”
(Hourani 2013).
Similar to his grandfather’s modernization campaign, Khedive Ismai’l was trying to
carry out an objective that proved to hold contradicting consequences: borrow money from
Europe to modernize, and at the same time, maintain Egypt’s independence from Europe and
the Ottomans (Owen 116). From the side of the Europeans, this was an opportunity to expand
economic interests and political influences. Marx explains this phenomenon in Capital from
the point of view of expansionist, capitalist Europe, in that “[w]hatever the social form of the
production process, it has to be continuous [;] it must periodically repeat the same phases”
(715). This means the same formula of debt spills over into non-European regions, by way of
the export of capital, when necessary. Nevertheless, the conflict within Khedive’s goals
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offered opportunities for criticism. The moments of contradiction (gaps) always make for an
ideal opportunity to engender different perspectives, whenever possible. For Slavoj Žižek
(2012), it is such conflicts that signal importance. In addressing the space in which power
and resistance interact, he paraphrases Foucault stating that “power itself generates resistance
to itself.” By resisting, one becomes the subject of that power (Žižek, 106). On this basis, the
resistance to the power of patriarchy in the form of reaction through the arts deserves a closer
examination in nineteenth century Egypt.
The Egyptian National debt did not escape the keen eyes of the political satirist,
James (Yaqub) Sanua (1839-1912), who captured it in his publication, Abou Naddara Zarqa
(man with blue spectacles) in the issue dated November 25, 1878, which shows Khedive

15 & 16. The Abu Naddara published by James Sanua (1839-1912), (left, front
page). Critical view of Egyptian politics: political ills of the day. November 25,
1878 cartoon showing the Khedive begging for money to bail out Egypt.
Ismai’l as a street musician with a tambourine, singing to collect money in order to pay off
Egypt’s debt.306
A modernist himself, Sanua had been active as a playwright, before the publication of
Abou Naddara.307 Sanua’s activities in the realm of performing arts brought in mixed results
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from the Khedive. Upon requesting and receiving funding from Khedive Isma’il to form a
theater company, as he had learned it was done in Europe, Sanua was able to produce three
of his plays, and subsequently perform at the Khedive’s Qasr al-Nīl. Two of his plays, Anisa
ala Muda (The Fashionable Young Lady), and Ghandur Misr (The Egyptian Dandy) were
met with such enthusiasm and encouragement from the Khedive that, following one of the
performances, he came up to Sanua on the stage and exclaimed: “You are truly the founder
of our national theater, you are our Egyptian Molière.”308 Even so, not all was accepted
during the modernization movement in Egypt, which underscores the superficiality of
modernism in the region. A single example here can suffice. When Sanua’s play, al Durratān
(The Two Co-Wives), which was a harsh criticism of polygamy, went on the stage, the
Khedive was said to have been “furious and told Sanua that if he were not man enough to
satisfy two wives, he should at least leave the ones who were able to do so alone.”309 Thus,
there appears to persist a continuity in the traditional, patriarchal manner of thinking, even
from those who were seemingly striving to modernize. This demonstrates how steps taken
toward modernism in the region did not go beyond the surface, as criticism of established
conventions was not looked upon favorably. In Persia, the tradition of patriarchy persisted,
however, mainly through the domination of the religious authority of the Shi’ite doctrine in
the decades leading up to the eighteenth and subsequently, nineteenth century.

Qajar’s Persia: Modernism and Patriarchy
While early in the nineteenth century steps had already been taken toward
modernizing Persia (Lambton 151-154), the relationship between the internal entities,
whether they were religious or secular, with the external influences, such as British, French,
or even American, was a complex one. To better understand the advent of modernity in
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Persia, Ann K. S. Lambton suggests one must consider both the “Shi’ite doctrine towards the
holders of political power and . . . the intrusion of the Great powers into Persia” (145). 310
Therefore, due to the conflict of interest between the former and the latter, any attempt
toward implementing reforms remained superficial.
Clearly, the modernization had its compulsory beginnings in the military realm.
While the reforms were, not surprisingly, for military purposes initially, they were bound to
bring about changes politically and socially. Lambton confirms: “The first impulse for
change almost certainly came from contact with the alien civilization of Europe in the
military and the diplomatic fields. […] Indirectly, however, the military missions encouraged
political and social change.”311
Insofar as Shah Abbas had successfully manipulated and integrated the two strands of
religious thoughts—Shi’ite and Sufi—into one cohesive political system with the king as the
highest position of authority, by the late seventeenth century the monarch’s political status
failed to uphold its balance of influence. In the fourth quarter of the seventeenth century, one
man became the dominant influence behind the last Safavid king, Shah Sultan Hussein (r.
1694-1722). Muhammad Baqir Majlisi (1627-1699 or 1700), “a leading theologian,” was the
“power behind the throne.” Majlisi’s writings became the principle authority on matters of
government under the banner of specific iteration of Shi’ism (Afary & Anderson 42). He
pursued a severe suppression of “all Sufi and philosophical tendencies within Shi’ite Islam
and sanctioned the relentless persecution of Sunnis” (Afary & Anderson 43). 312 He further
reinstated the power of spiritual “mediators and intercessors for man with God.”313 The “new
interpretations” in Majlisi’s writings, “aimed to transfer the public’s devotion from the Sufi
mystics to the twelve Shi’ite imams,” which placed shariat authority above all other sources
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of power (Afary and Anderson 43). However, it was no more than a creative and imaginary
theory to eliminate competition, to dominate and move toward strategies to artificially unify
non-conforming factions.314
As this, in some respects Islamic, or better said, Shi’ite oriented “counter
reformation,” was sweeping against the harmony and balance established earlier by Shah
Abbas between the various sources of religious authorities, the literature on two key concepts
was articulating further the required active life of
piety. These concepts are none other than jihad
and shahadat that both found reflections in the
specific interpretations (among the Shi’ites, of
course) of the Karbala narrative as “the themes of
martyrdom and unjust usurpation of power by
earthly rulers,” between the Prophet’s grandson
Hussein, and the Umayyad rulers respectively
(Afary and Anderson 43). These narratives
manifest themselves in various commemorative
gatherings and ritual performances that seem to
have had solidified the specific iteration of Shi’ite

17. Royal Theater (Tekiyeh
Dowlat). Painting by Kamal al
Mulk, late nineteenth century.
Round architecture, amphitheater
style, where Ta’ziyeh (passion
plays) were held.

doctrine, but also acted as a sort of Aristotelian
catharsis through performance of tragedy. 315 This is not surprising since there are historical
and cultural links. One such ritual performance is known as Ta’ziyeh, which according to
scholars like William Beeman, has pre-Islamic connections. Beeman argues mourning rituals
in Ta’ziyeh resemble those events performed in ancient Greece for the death of Dionysus, or
in ancient Egypt for Osiris that signify “cosmic renewal and rebirth” (Afary and Anderson
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44).316 Others have also pointed to the ancient Persian roots of such ritual performances, such
as the death of Siavash, son of the Persian mythical king, Keykāwus.317 Regardless of the
origins, the cathartic influence of such rituals is hard to overlook. “The spectators freely
show their anger and hatred toward the antagonists by shouting at them and cursing them,
and they show sympathy for the protagonists.”318 The cathartic effect plays well into
patriarchy’s greater program of artificial unification, while alienating the “other” and further
shaping a sort of a collective subjectivity that suited patriarchy. This and other mourning
rituals engaged the participants emotionally and physically to a degree that it etched the
message of Karbala tragedy in their “hearts and minds . . . helping to shape their world
view.”319 Furthermore, some scholars have noticed the similarities between the Shi’ite and
Christian passion plays. Afary and Anderson find “troubling appropriations of Shi’ite and
Christian passion plays,” a noteworthy aspect missing from the contemporary studies about
the ritual performances about Karbala in the month of Muharram. They state:
The medieval passion plays of Europe contrast the purity, decency, and love of Jesus
with the fiendish, mischievous actions of the Jews, who were blamed for his death.
Likewise in the Iranian Shi’ite passion plays, the saintly qualities of the Shi’ite
leaders are contrasted to the unethical and vile conduct of the early Sunni leaders,
who supposedly snatched the mantle of leadership unjustly, taking it away from
Hussein and showing no mercy toward his family, including infants. 320
Ta’ziyeh, a derivative of the term azzā, meaning mourning or “to express sympathy
with, to console”321 and to mourn, has become a term referring to passion plays in Iran that
dates back to the sixteenth century (Afary and Anderson 45). As a demonstrative part of the
Shi’ite sympathetic sentiments toward the Prophet’s lineage, through his daughter Fatima and
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son-in law Ali, the tragedy of Karbala that took place on the 10th day of the month of
Muharram, 61 AH (October 10, 680 CE) and concluded in the massacre of the Prophet’s
grandson, Hussein and 72 male members of his family, initially served as a commemorative
event through the ritual of mourning.322 “By the middle of the eighteenth century, the
mourning rituals had developed into a new form of theatrical performance. In the nineteenth
century, numerous guilds of players and performers were organized with the support of the
royal court and the elite” (Chelkowski 1991, 214).323 The significance and success of such
passion plays have been measured by the large number of audiences they attracted, as noted
by European diplomats and compared with European theater that only “attracted a small elite
group” at this time (Manafzadeh 1991, 317).324 Therefore, in the nineteenth century, in the
Iranian capital of Tehran, it became necessary to build a theater to accommodate such a
crowd.
One of the most famous theaters in Iran was commissioned by Nasser al-Din Shah
Qajar (1831-1896), who was reportedly very fond of Ta’ziyeh, and ordered the construction
of the Royal Theater (Tekiyeh Dowlat) built in ca. 1873. Willem Floor in The History of
Theater in Iran (2005) suggests the Shah was influenced by his trip to Europe in ordering the
building of a modern theater. However, being
concerned with the religious leaders’ reaction,
he designated the Royal Theater for religious
performances, and the European plays were
instructed to be performed at the hall of the
Dar al-Fonun, the first modern polytechnic
institute of higher education, which had been

18. Tekiyeh Dowlat, central courtyard,
1873.
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established in 1851 (215).
The round structure of the Royal Theater, included three tiered archways wrapping
around a central court, holding a raised round stage in masonry with the diameter of 58 feet,
in addition to another 20 feet around it, which served as seating area for women and
accommodated “thousands on thousands.”325 The circumference of this area consisted of four
steps, providing the seating place for men. The three-tiered arcade that rose to 78 feet high
consisted of balcony seats reserved for the aristocratic and wealthy families. The structure
was supposed to have a dome, but after the construction efforts failed, wooden ribs were used
to hold a tent like cover in place to provide shade during summer afternoon performances. 326
At night, the space was illuminated by a large number of glass lamps in various colors
“concentrated against the wall in immense glittering clusters.”327 Tekiyeh Dowlat survives
only in nineteenth century photographs and in a famous painting by Mohammad Ghaffari
(Kamal al Mulk – 1847-1940), for it was dismantled in 1947 and replaced by a bank.328
Contrary to common belief, Kamal al-Mulk
was not self-taught329 and had attended Dar alFonun, shortly after he arrived in Tehran at the age
of twelve. He was discovered by Nasser al-Din
Shah during one of his end-of the-year-visits to the
school, when the king saw a portrait the young

artist had painted of a deceased courtier.330 Kamal
al-Mulk’s teacher at this time was Mirza Ali Akabr

19. Kamal al-Mulk (Ghaffari). The
Hall of Mirrors, before 1896. Oil on
canvas.

Khan Muzayyan al-Dawlih, who had studied at the
École des Beaux Arts with Ingres. 331
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Kamal al-Mulk himself got an opportunity to go to Europe in 1896 to study; upon his
return, he brought back to Iran what is considered European Academic style, however
viewed as “modern” style in Iran.332 During his travels in Europe, he visited and studied in
museums by copying from the old masters (Diba 2013, 95). By this time, the Academic style
in Europe was seen as rigid and associated with the establishment, and new styles such as
Impressionism had already made a space for itself through exhibitions and reviews by the
critics.333 Nonetheless, it is the Rembrandt’s, the Titian’s as well as William Bouguereau’s
paintings that Kamal al-Mulk was copying to study at the museums of Europe.334. When
compared with the Persian established styles, such as those developed by Bihzad, or
idealistically executed by Sultan Mohammad (mentioned in chapter three of this study),
regardless of its European connections, it was deemed modern. One of his celebrated
paintings, The Hall of Mirrors that he completed before1896, the year of the assassination of
the king, has been viewed as an example of his photographic style (Diba 2013, 95).
Layla S. Diba, in her article “M[o]hammad Ghaffari: The Painter of Modern Life,”335
explains that before Dar al-Fonun, there was no distinction between arts or crafts. Artists
learned and produced through the old apprentice system, but a hierarchy of the arts was
observed, with calligraphy holding a more elevated place than easel painting (Diba 2012,
646). According to Diba, “[t]he year 1862 marked a turning point in the history of Persian
painting and its relationship to modernity,” because the status of painting was changed from
court sponsored workshops and being considered as “crafts,” to a distinct “academic
discipline” (ibid).
Persia, early on during the reign of Nasser al-Din Shah Qajar, the last of the Qajar
kings who “exercised true power” from 1848 until his assassination in 1896,336 had already
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begun to experience a wave of modernization. His teacher, and later Prime Minister, Mirza
Taghi Khan (Amir Kabir, or Amir Nizam, 1807-1852), during his brief time in office, had
undertaken great modernization campaigns, one of which was the founding of the school Dar
al-Fonun and engaging Europeans in teaching there. However, his dismissal and
assassination, on the order of the king himself in 1852 nearly brought modernization progress
to a halt, as his successor, Agha Khan Nūri did not support the school (Lambton 154).
Modernism in nineteenth century Persia was seen as “novelty,” argues Diba. Some of
the earliest groups of students sent abroad, included those who were sent to learn painting
and printing.337 One of the most prominent court painters of the Nasiri court was Abu’l
Hasan Ghaffari, Sani’ al-Mulk, who was sent to Italy in 1861, and upon his return was
assigned to teach the two aforementioned subjects to the students at Dar al-Fonun in 1862.
Diba notes the printing press was used to produce a courtly “illustrated newspaper” that was
aimed to exhibit a carefully constructed modern view of the Persian court (647).338 Lambton
notes “the introduction of the printing press in the first half of the nineteenth century and the
foundation of the official gazette in 1851 were also factors making for modernization” (157).
However, once the printing tool was made available, it was difficult to restrict it to court
propaganda. Diba informs, during the final five years that Abu’l Hasan was at the height of
his activities, “the images he produced for the court newspaper revealed its evolution from a
propaganda tool to a record of urban life and social issues dangerously close to social
critique.”339
Lambton, nonetheless, deems the publication of the “Persian press abroad”340 to be
more influential “in stimulating political change” toward the end of the century, than
“encouraging social change” (Lambton 157). Among these publications, was the “newspaper
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Akhtar which had been published by Iranians in Istanbul since the 1870’s” and “Qānūn
published in England by Malkum Khan, a European educated son of an Armenian convert to
Islam.” These publications encouraged criticism of the government “from a more modern,
reforming, and nationalist view point” (Keddie 1972, 336).
Despite these efforts, Nasser al-Din Shah remained in favor of the art for state
propaganda in order to maintain his image and visibility through the modern technology. He
was well aware of the connection between the academic styles of art in France and such art’s
link to the state. Nasser al-Din Shah also modeled state sponsored exhibitions, similar to
Paris Salons, which he himself would attend. Noteworthy is the change in the format of
painting from album to canvas and frame (Diba 2012, 650), which transformed the viewing
experience from individual and private of a few elite to a shared and communal event. Just as
with Europe, the advent of photography which had already been introduced in Persia by mid
nineteenth century, proved influential in the art of painting as it “provided Persian Painters
with a shortcut to illusionistic and naturalistic paintings.” 341 Diba argues “[t]he interaction
between photography and painting illustrates Iran’s original response to modernity and
creative reuse of European technology” (Diba 2012, 651).
Of great significance here is that photography that began as a personal hobby of the
monarch,342 as with printing, quickly spread beyond the court, and within a short period of
time not only spread to provinces but also began to cater to the new bourgeois class and
branched out into “commercial photography studios.” Like many contemporary scholars of
Iran, Diba views the role of the new technology instrumental in transitioning toward
modernity; however, she stops short of further developing the issue of subjectivity. She
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states: “Most importantly, the new medium responded to Iranian aspiration toward modernity
and new definitions of identity” (Diba 2013, 91).
It is worth mentioning an incident involving a contemporary Neoplatonic
philosopher’s encounter with photography, for the philosophical implication of this anecdote
supports the principle thesis in this study. 343 On one of his trips to Sabzevar, Nasser al-Din
Shah visited a prominent Muslim philosopher, Hajj Mulla Hādi Sabzevāri in 1869-70. The
king was so thrilled by this visit that he ordered his Court Photographer (akkasbashi), Âghā
Ridā to take a picture of the philosopher. Iraj Afshar cites two versions of the story, 344 in
both of which he confirms that Mulla Hadi had never before seen or heard about
photographs.345
Hajj Mulla Hādi was a pupil of the school of Mullā Sadrā346 (discussed in chapter
three) who believed, in accordance with Neoplatonism, that only the soul was capable of
producing images,347 “and this faculty was beyond the scope of any man-made machine.”
Therefore, when the process of imprinting his image on the silver plate was explained to him,
Hajj Mulla Hādi thought it impossible (Afshar 264).348
By the end of the nineteenth century, photography in
Iran was enjoying a commercial life. The Tehran-born
Armenian Antoine Sevruguin, who was known as “Anton
Khan,” is one of the names associated with commercial
photography. He has been heralded as “the most prominent and
prolific commercial photographer in Iran at the end of the
nineteenth century” (Stein 119).349 In addition to numerous

20. Sevruguin, 1880s.
Isfahan Bazaar.

photographs he took, he has been credited as having authored “a
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treatise on photography for Muzafar al-Din Shah in 1878 when he was in Tabriz” (Stein
120). Sevruguin traveled extensively and photographed people, historical locations, and
architecture along the way “with equal facility.” Sevruguin was conscious of the aesthetic
possibilities of his subjects and their surroundings in front of the camera, as demonstrated in
his staging, backdrops and angles. 350 However, the diversity in his subject matter, from
images of ordinary people, women in the traditional chador (all-over cover), young and old
dervishes, to public executions, attest to how he used this new technology to capture not just
royal subjects (which he also did, given his prominent court position), but also to offer a
close account of different facets of life.351
The contacts with Europe that had been established earlier continued during Nasser
al-Din Shah’s reign with the increasing availability of Western cultural exemplary products,
such as published literary or visual material as well as fashion (Stein 125). However, the
“shah was still padishah-i Islam and Persia the mamalik-i Islam” (Lambton 150). Therefore,
the role of the king as the protector of the Islamic land was still a status accepted by the
religious leaders (ulama) at this time. While there was uneasiness concerning the new
technology supported by the monarch, there seems not to have been much organized
objection from the ulama. This uneasiness fueled the continued resistance to modernization
despite efforts by contemporary theoreticians and intellectuals such as Malkum Khan, who
had tried to “clothe modernization in an Islamic garb” (ibid).352 Similarly, but earlier in the
eighteenth century, the Ottoman rulers, too, faced the concerns regarding the reaction of the
ulama on their attempts toward modernization. The difference was that the arising occasions
of conflict did not prompt the Qajar rulers to initiate “a program of reform as happened in the
Ottoman Empire or Egypt.” 353
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Despite the importation of technology and cultural exchanges on different levels on
the one hand, and “a melding of elites—upper ‘ul[a]ma, large-scale merchants, court
bureaucrats, tribal leaders, and large landowners—through intermarriage and shared
interests” on the other, a deep gap remained between classes. As Lambton surmises, “the
fundamental issue in social change, which concerns the relationship of man to man and the
purpose of society, received little consideration and it was, perhaps because of this that social
change still remained very limited” (Lambton 166).

Ottoman Turkey at the Threshold of Modernity
In the early decades of the eighteenth century, the earlier military successes of the
Ottomans, were giving way to a series of defeats and shrinking borders. This turn called for a
change in policy and attitude toward Europe, from an adversary to be “crushed” to an
“indispensable element of the Empire’s policies, through establishing embassies and
expanding the responsibilities of their diplomats.”354 However, as with the Egypt and Persia,
Ottoman Turkey seems to have commenced reforms in the military sphere first.355
Similar to Egypt, although at a different pace, the pressures of modernity on the
Ottoman Empire coincided with the weakening of the political hold, due to economic
dependence on Europe. Regardless of the dependency problem, nevertheless, the interruption
brought on by World War I provided “new opportunities for freedom of action; the
capitulations were abolished and . . . ‘the Turks were finally masters of their house’.” 356 This
led to socio-political and economic changes, including the encouragement of women to join
the work force, all elements needed to transform the country into a modern state. 357 While I
will offer a more analytical examination on the role of the religious leaders, a major
difference between Qajar Persia and Ottoman Turkey or Egypt with regards to reforms, there
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remains in the Shi’ite philosophy of distrust in the temporal government; hence, the ūlamā
did not effectively participate in the official programs aiming at reforms in Persia (Lambton
146). The Sunni philosophy (in Ottoman Empire and Egypt), on the other hand, did not
prevent the religious leaders from participating; they were already involved in institutional
judiciary and educational institutions in the Empire (Heyd 29). 358
Perhaps the willingness of some of the ūlamā359 to participate in the reforms
undertaken by the Ottoman Empire can be seen in their support of the new technology of
printmaking, introduced as early as 1727, of which the şeyhül-islām had demonstrated his
support through issuing official religious permission (fetva).360 (See Appendix II.B).
The role of religion in reforms merits a deeper investigation, more than what a
historical review may reveal. The resentment of the members of the religious class toward
the European reforms and the mediating role of the ūlamā reviewed from Nietzschean
perspective can be rewarding. In Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche introduces the figure of the
“ascetic priest,” (Nietzsche 2006, 86) who gives meaning to resentment risen from suffering,
thus shaping subjectivities.361 While he has Christianity in view, his argument maps onto
establishment-oriented Islam and the undermining of individuality as well. Of great interest
here is the “ascetic priest’s method,” which according to Nietzsche aligns with “herdorganization” and the “awakening of the communal consciousness of power to such a pitch
that the individual’s disgust with himself becomes eclipsed by his delight in the thriving of
the community” (Nietzsche 2006, 103). He further notes: “[H]e has obtained the mastery,
corrupted the health of the soul’ (Nietzsche 2006, 109). But how does the “ascetic priest”
accomplish this task?
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Nietzsche calls it a “change in attitude, […] an artist veering round into his own
opposite”362 (Nietzsche 2006, 68). Nietzsche explains further: “[A]n ascetic life is a selfcontradiction: here rules resentment without parallel [;] . . . here is an attempt made to utilize
power to dam the sources of power” (Nietzsche 2006, 86). He also notes “at every single
period the ascetic priest puts in his appearance: he belongs to no particular race; he thrives
everywhere; he grows out of all classes” (ibid). If we view this “change of attitude” in the
ūlamā from Nietzsche’s perspective, the significance of the role these religious leaders in
mediating the reforms, while justifying their ruling to the population, becomes evident. Heyd
suggests that the ūlamā were fearful “of the Sultan, particularly of Mahmud II.” He makes it
clear that “the Sultan made use of the ūlamā’s spiritual influence on the people to obtain
religious sanctions and secure popular respect for his innovations” (Heyd 39). In a masterslave relationship, in which the master demands complete submission of all his subjects (as
did in Mahmud II), the role the ūlamā played was not just administering to religious
permissibles and non-permissibles, but also to craft just the right language to manage the
resentment of the oppressed. Nietzsche states:
When he has to tackle sufferers of the lower orders, slaves, or prisoners (or women,
who for the most part are a compound of labor-slave and prisoner), all he has to do is
to juggle a little with the names, and to rechristen, so as to make them see henceforth
a benefit, a comparative happiness, in objects which they hated—the slave’s
discontent with his lot was at any rate not invented by the priests.363
Heyd seems to be critical of the Sultans’ decisions regarding including the ūlamā in
the government, nevertheless disregarding the long-standing position of the Sunni
justification of temporal power. While the integration had brought unity within the Ottoman
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Empire that prevented a conflict between the religious and secular entities within the
government, “it hampered the free spiritual development of Islam during the decisive period
of its confrontation with Western civilization” (Heyd 54). Even so, a centralized government
with a “new ruling class” of bureaucrats called “memurs” emerged out of the reforms
(Tanzimat).364 The reforms also engendered a group of young Turks, who received modern
education because of the reforms and were sent abroad to complete their studies; they
brought about intellectual consciousness to a certain degree, which manifested itself in
cultural productions.
Stanford J. Shaw in the History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey notes the
“emergence” of the middle class and “intelligentsia” following the decline of the religious
leaders’ role in Ottoman Turkey, which were potentially posing concern for the ruling class.
Shaw states:
The emergence of an Ottoman middle class in turn produced an intellectual
awakening and was paralleled by the development of a new Ottoman intelligentsia,
which displaced the ūl[a]mā in their traditional role of cultural leadership in the
Muslim community. Ottoman intellectual reorientation manifested itself in many
different ways. Its most general characteristic was the displacement of both forms and
themes of traditional Ottoman literature, produced largely by and for the Ruling
Class, and the substitution of different ones imported from the West – plays, novels,
operas, short stories, essays, and political tracts, treating not merely themes of love
and passion and the lives and interests of the rulers but also presenting great political,
economic, social, and religious problems and ideas that were of concern to everyone
in the empire.365
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Thus, the vehicles of disbursing new ideas, which were consequences of
modernization, began to make a space among the population and to help circulate and mingle
ideas throughout different population groups. One important group to note is the “Young
Ottomans” (Yeni Osmanlilar), who were active during the decade of 1865-75. They took on
the responsibility of being “the self-appointed critics of the system and . . . began to create
public opinion while introducing concepts such as parliamentarianism, nationalism, and
patriotism into the Ottoman political consciousness” (Shaw 130). 366 Their preferred medium
was the press, which had been the earliest form of mass communication.
Of course, the printing press had facilitated the disbursement of information and
knowledge since 1835 (Shaw 128). In addition to the publishing of books, it is “the
newspapers and other periodicals” that were published and took away the monopoly of the
government publication, Takvim-I Vekayi (Calendar of Events), which was first published on
July 25, 1831, following in the footsteps of Egypt’s Muhammad ‘Ali, who published Vekai-i
Misriyye (Events of Egypt) in 1829. One such publication was Çeride-i Havadis (Chronicles
of Events), published in 1840-60, interestingly founded by a British journalist, William
Churchill. Shaw lists the names of nearly half a dozen periodicals that were published during
the period of reformation (Tanzimat) until the later decades of the nineteenth century to
demonstrate how widespread this medium was (Shaw 129).367 The explosive publishing
wave of newspapers and periodicals was accompanied by the new literary wave led by the
“Young Turks” (Shaw 130).
Spear headed by Ibrahim Şinasi (1824-1871), the new movement benefited from his
experience and studies with the French.368 In 1861-1870 Şinasi published his own paper,
Tasvir Efkār (Description of Ideas), “which soon became the leading forum for the
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expression of new literary forms and political ideas.” In his Selection of Works, he failed to
praise the sultan and had enough problematic ideas, such as “no taxation without
representation” to cost him his post at the Council of Education at the time (Shaw 131). The
Tanzimat government, despite its reformatory intentions, saw the potential threat in the free
expression of ideas in publications such as Tasvir Efkār and began to suppress the
movement. As a result, many members of the movement escaped to Europe in order to
continue their writing and distributing freely, by way of the “foreign post offices,” which by
Capitulation terms, “were beyond the control of the Ottoman government” (Shaw 131).369
The spreading of the ideas was not limited to published media. Here is where the role of
theaters should be examined.
The earliest recorded theatrical performances in Ottoman Turkey go back to the time
of the French Revolution, and took place at the embassies and mainly for the foreigners,
although they were sometimes attended by the Sultan and the Crown Prince (Shaw 129).
However, by the time of the reform (Tanzimat) campaigns in 1839, three theaters had been
built, and served as venues to Italian plays, even though still mainly for foreign audiences
(ibid). The development of theater briefly can be traced from the first Ottoman theater, called
French Theater (1840), which was built by an Italian by the name Giustiniani, co-funded by
the Ottoman and foreign European resources, to the first Turkish-language theater (1867)
called Ottoman Theater (Tiyatro-i Osmani), founded and managed by an Armenian company
in old Istanbul, to a small popular theater (Tuluat Tiyatrosu) opened in “the Muslim quarters
of Istanbul.” In 1855 the first royal theater was built in neoclassical style as part of a palace
complex called Dolmabahçe Palace, built in an eclectic European classical style, to which I
shall return under architecture.370The theater appears to be a medium at which, not just
translated European plays (to avoid censorship) were produced and performed, but also
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controversial, patriotic, multi-lingual, and even subjects from everyday life would be
produced and brought to the stage (Shaw 129). 371 Regardless of its focus on modernization,
the Tanzimat government, however, remained uneasy about the activities of the new class of
intelligentsia that was basically moving toward limiting the powers of the monarch, and
advocating a representational type of government. This put the official modernization
campaigns at odds with the democratic movements in the nineteenth century; it indicated

21. Ottoman Dolmabahce Palace one of the last ostentatious Ottoman buildings. Cost $1.8
b. The style of the palace itself is a fusion of Neoclassical and Baroque (1843-1856).
conflicting objectives that seemed to curb democratic moves at every turn by the Tanzimat
government, to ensure the stability of the monarch’s rule. To maintain a modern image of the
ruler, one of the areas of concern was the modernization of the sultan’s place of residence, as
an expression of his power, particularly when receiving European envoys. However, for the
Ottomans, the expression of power through architecture in the context of modernism began
earlier.
Shirin Hamadeh argues it was following the Ottoman defeat of 1683 in Vienna and
the acknowledgement of Europe’s military supremacy over the Ottomans that the importance
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of architecture in a modernization process was understood (Hamadeh 2004, 4). 372 This
understanding manifested in the emulation of great European Neoclassical, Baroque and
Rococo styles, which “gradually permeated the architecture of Istanbul, especially from the
1750s on.” By the end of the century, it was accepted, common practice for aristocracy to
hire European architects to design and
build their places of residence (ibid).
Palace complexes have been
built for centuries; it seems logical for
all offices of administration and
power, as well as the royal private
religious structures, to be not just in
close proximity to the residence of the

22. Dolmabahce Theater within the palace
complex. Neoclassical.

ruler, but also an expression of wealth and power. The Ottoman sultans were no different.
Thus, amidst all reform programs, modernization had to be implemented where it concerned
the palace complex as well. Shaw argues, a new sense of admiration and appreciation for the
West were fostered during Mahmud II’s rule. It was the sultan’s understanding that the
survival of the empire depended upon its modernization according to the European standards,
and that he had to act accordingly if the empire was to “hold its own against a
technologically advanced Europe” (49)
The arrogant way in which the Ottomans had viewed the Europeans, was now giving
way to active, systematic reforms in order to seek their approval/acceptance, and to be seen
as their equals. This new perspective influenced so many aspects of administration, military,
and basically life from change in fashion, to ideas, and even “entertainment” (Shaw ibid). It
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began with Mahmud II moving out of the Ottoman sultans’ historic and traditional dwelling
in 1815 (i.e. from the Topkapi Palace) to a “modern palace built along the Bosporus at
Dolmabahçe” (ibid).373 Built in 1857-1859, the palace complex includes the detached royal
theater that was designed in neoclassical style, “with two . . . pediments on the façade (Yazici
35). Unlike the Khedival Theater in Cairo, the theater in Dolmabahçe was finished in stone,
but similarly had three visible tiers, with rectangular and arched windows occupying the
second and third tiers in the case of the latter. The interior was lavishly decorated, with velvet
and gilt decorations, attributed to the designer of Paris Opera House, Sèchan (Yazici 36). It is
clear that the theater was a place of not just putting on theatrical performances, but a space in
which the sultan’s European and other foreign guests could be entertained.374
The palace complex was designed and built in such a way that from the Bosporus, it
projected an image of highest European,
classical, and historical standards. The
palace structure itself was an eclectic
collection of elements from various
European historical periods, including
Baroque, Rococo and Neoclassical. But at
the same time, the decorations of Ottoman
emblems, such as Tugra, or official seal
was integrated into the decorative elements

23. An example of calligraphic official
seal (Tugra) embedded into the pediment
of an administrative building within the
palace complex.

of the building. But these highly significant
and symbolic buildings were the products of reforms and a synthesis of European
architectural elements infused with the Ottoman taste that aimed to surpass the European
achievements. This itself is worthy of a separate study. 375 However, to demonstrate the case
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in point, as evident from the visual examination of some of the features incorporated in the
Dolmabahçe Palace, the Baccarat crystal balustrade in the administrative quarters of the
palace that shows this synthesis, is a prime example. In approving the designs of their palaces
like Dolmabahçe, the Ottoman aristocratic, ruling families were aiming to create such a
cohesive visual language from this synthesis that would wash over any mimetic and
illusionistic attempts on their part of the reforms that may have pointed to the gap existing
between the illusion of reforms and a real one. However, it is in another medium that some of
the aforementioned gap can potentially be viewed.
The arrival of the technology of capturing images in the Ottoman Empire, not
surprisingly, was closely associated with military, just as painting was initially taught for
military ends, for the practical purpose of this technology was recognized by the Ottoman
sultan and other reformers.376 This pragmatism has been discussed by Wendy Shaw in her
article, “Ottoman Photography of the Late Nineteenth Century: An ‘Innocent’ Modernism?”
in the examination of a royal portrait.377 She notices the portrait of Sultan Abudlaziz (r. 18611876), photographed in 1863, in comparison with portraits of other European leaders from
around the same time period, appears awkward with a lack of balance between light and
shade, which captures an unflattering impression of the sultan. He appears to take up much of
the space, with almost no breathing room around him (Shaw 2009, 84). Such early portraits
exemplify more of a straight forward documentation task, rather than project a specific idea
or angle to the subject presented. However, this soon changed and the intrinsic power of
mechanically reproduced images began to offer opportunities to create a positive image of
the Ottoman Empire with regards to the reformation movement.
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In 1893, Sultan Abdülhamid II presented to the British Library a set of albums that
contained 1,800 photographs (albumen prints) that represented “the Sultan, the sovereign of a
still considerable territory with a great history as a reforming and enlightened ruler.”378 This
may seem in conflict with what Wendy Shaw argues, that photography for the Ottomans
“provided . . . an innocent eye, coupling the technology of photography with the nineteenth
century positivist drive for information” (Shaw 2009, 80). Shaw bases her argument on a
comparison between the development of photography in Europe vis-à-vis the advent of this
technology in Ottoman Turkey. Whereas, the advent of photography in Ottoman Turkey was
concurrent with the art of painting and lithography, therefore initially, unlike Europe, it did
not have a previous referential source from which to draw; thus, it was free to operate in an
independent way (ibid). Nonetheless, the medium’s use and application was transforming
contemporaneous to the reformation movement.379
Some twentieth century scholars have analyzed the nineteenth century photographs
with a post-colonial perspective. However, the stereotyping and using blanket statements
have been challenged by other scholars recently. Michelle L. Woodward rejects such broad
labeling and states, after the mid and toward the late nineteenth century, the increasing
number of the commercial photographers and their independent photographs tell a different
story. She argues:
The photographic visual conventions of late-nineteenth century representations of the
Middle East were, contrary to the emphasis of much scholarship, not monolithic or
hegemonic, but rather reflect a complex range of perspectives—from fictional
Orientalist clichés such as erotic harem scenes to the documentary images of
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modernization found in the Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid II’s photographic
albums.380
There is no doubt that commissioning photographs by wealthy European travelers and
prearranged and staged images correspond to some of the photographic works produced in
the second half of the nineteenth century; these photographs and images were meant to
satisfy the Europeans’ curiosity about cultural aspects of the life under the Ottoman that were
out of reach for foreigners. But, as suggested by Woodward, there are plenty of examples that
demonstrate the independence of the photographers in capturing subjects that were
interesting to them. Woodward’s study shows, even though she focuses on the “people in
public” as subject, there are enough examples that not only reflect diversity in the sitters,
individuals who may have been marginal or seen as alterity in the Ottoman society,381 but
also examples that, contrary to stereotypical “Oriental” works that projected a negative light
on the Ottoman culture by way of inclusiveness, create a harmonic synthesis between the
authentically local as well as consciously modern. From a comparative assessment between
an Istanbul-based studio, that of the Sèbah family and a French family studio in Beirut,
owned by the Bonfils, Woodward proposes:
The focus . . . is on how these two studios chose to photograph people in public
places such as markets, streets, mosques, and baths in the period 1870-1900. Looking
closely at this portion of their work, it appears that the Bonfils work was generally
unable to transcend popular European notions of the ‘Orient’, while the Sèbah family
developed a mode of representation that combined a detailed view of local Ottoman
society with visual signs of a new modern order. In particular, the Sèbah family
created a unique style of photographing groups of people in public spaces—what I
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call ‘community portraits’. This style reveals a negotiation between tourist desires for
exotic images and local Ottoman self-conceptions as modern citizens, in the process
subverting common European notions of static and backward Middle East.382

24. Sèbah and Joaillier. 707: Marchand de
Kebabs à Stamboul, gelatin silver print, 8 ½
x 10 ½ in. undated. Visual Collection of the
Fine Arts Library, Harvard University,
James Ackerman Photographic Collection.
(Michelle Woodward’s article).

25. Bonfils. Magasin de tapis au Khan Khalil au
Caire, albumen print. 9x 11 ¾ inc ca. 1885-1901,
University of Pennsylvania Museum archives
photographic collection. (Michelle Woodward’s
article).

Here citing one set of examples from Woodward’s article suffices to demonstrate the
two different approaches to capturing the images of people in public places. Bonfils’ photo
shows a carpet merchant’s store front, with the owners and two of his employees (identified
by their clothing and seating arrangements) in a pose that anticipates a potential buyer, or in
fact offers the vantage point for the European spectator. Sèbah’s photograph, on the other
hand, shows a diagonal angle from which the camera is looking out toward a larger group of
the community members with diverse appearances and ages (Woodward 366, 369).
Woodward’s analysis demonstrates the Oriental approach in Bonfils, as opposed to
Sèbah’s style is more in tune with showing the diversity under the Ottomans. However, in
these and other similar examples, both photographers are responding to a kind of a market for
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such photographs, which demanded to see what the ordinary people did and how they lived.
Granted, these images also show conscious attempt on the part of the photographer to
provide a specific angle (according to Woodward); however, in the process, they both
manage to capture not just diversity in their subjects, but also different choices in
photographic approaches.
Further noted by Wendy Shaw is the intriguing point that he Ottoman experience of
photography is different from that of the Europeans, truly a modernist advent. She sees “the
bypassing” of the photography experience from the long standing tradition of painting (as
was the case for the Europeans) for the Ottomans itself “a modernist success” (81). In other
words, aside from the “exotic” subject matter, the Europeans must have seen a fresh
perspective unlike what their eyes were familiar with. Nonetheless, in the process of
modernism, “photography experience” is not the only experience that was circumvented.
When it comes to the development of the “I,” in the philosophical thoughts, whether it has
been done consciously or inadvertently, bypassing the individual experience has had grave
consequences, not just for the Ottoman Turkey, but for the Middle East as a whole. Here, one
must ask: where does this circumvention come from?
In this chapter, my objective was to demonstrate how pressures of modernism—
mainly felt initially in the imbalance experienced militarily—impacted other non-military
aspects of life in the Middle East. I argued that the reforms begin by upgrading technology in
the military and continued in creating a modern appearance. I examined three regions,
namely Egypt, Iran and Ottoman Turkey, that show exemplary attempts at reforms, but all
proved unprepared (due to the persisting traditional power structures) to adjust and accept the
consequences of modernism (freedom of expression, and press) in an enduring manner. I
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specifically selected a number of artistic endeavors that potentially could have served to
foster a polyphonic society, and led to the recognition of the subject, and passing through it,
in these regions. I argued the arts (visual and performing) as well as attempts at free and
critical journalism, which are essential in a modern society, began by imitation, followed by
creative transformation, which was dangerously moving toward criticism of the government.
Therefore, very quickly they were subjected to censorship and the wrath of the central
powers, and could not progress through the challenges between traditional versus the modern
tendencies. As a result, they became apparatuses for propaganda serving the patriarchal
powers.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Configuration of Power in the Context of Modernism:
Patriarchy, Colonialism, and Subject Formation

It is certain that mechanisms of subjection cannot be studied outside their relation to the
mechanisms of exploitations and domination. But they do not merely constitute the
“terminal” of more fundamental mechanisms. They entertain complex and circular relations
with other forms.383
— Michel Foucault

In the nineteenth century Middle East, the sidestepping of the discourse on
subjectivity and individual experience in the Middle East was followed by a gravitation
toward and merging with the Hegelian romantic and idealistic philosophy384 that saw no
distinction between the object and the subject,385 and was already embedded in the local
cultures through the Neoplatonic views.386 One of the artistic endeavors that consistently uses
Neoplatonic symbolic language is poetry, particularly in Persia.387 Hegel was familiar with
Persian poetry through Goethe and others.388 Ian Almond (2010) tells us of Hegel’s partiality
toward the Persians, particularly in terms of their poetry. He states:
Hegel talks about Persians like he talks about no other Muslims. Bearing in mind his
wholesale dismissal of Turks and ambiguous portrayal of Arabs, it is difficult not to
be impressed by the way he weaves poets such as Rumi, Nisami [sic] and Firdusi [sic]
in and out of analyses filled with a whole variety of reference to European
literature.389
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Hegel’s affinity for Rumi’s and Nizami’s poetry may be explained in their shared
Neoplatonic roots.390 It is the Neoplatonic undercurrent in the arts that we return to here to
pin point the domination of the idea that, despite the proponents of mysticism’s claim that it
encourages individuality, there is no subjectivity other than what is based upon “theomorphic
ontological foundations” (Vahdat 126).391 This dependent relationship between the individual
and the finalized destination, I submit, is not without its downside that actually undermines
the “I” through statements relying on imaginative finds that have become authoritative. The
consequence has been the reinforcement of the dissolved individual subject into factions,
may they be political, ethnic, or religious. It has further ensured the perpetual subjugation to
and identification of the population with the external sources of authority and power (i.e.
ideology), in other words, leaving no time or space to cultivate a way to become subjects to
themselves.392 Moreover, this created an uneven playing field that facilitated the Europeans’
colonialization of their recognized “other,” the Middle Easterners (that which has been called
Orientalism by Edward Said); after all, alterity is the other side of recognizing the “I.” This
was due to the advantage of the already developed sense of self, the “I” that served as a
Eurocentric measure, through which the Europeans could safely arrive at their position of
power and domination in the Middle East region throughout the modern era. In this
formulation, I am aware that Eurocentricism can be argued a collective subjectivity, but I
submit it is a collective subjectivity that has passed through the question of the Cartesian idea
of the thinking subject, albeit a self-centered one, and it has been a work in progress itself. In
that phase, while the subject still recalls its subjectivity, I suggest, it is taken over by
patriarchy (source of power/authority) under different banners, such as nationalism or
cultural superiority, even preservation of religious beliefs, rendered into a collective, and
turned against its alterity for the patriarchy’s dual purpose of artificial unity and inciting
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conflict to better strengthen its own position of power. Thus, the Dionysian energy is
channeled against the other.
I will discuss this in detail through Nietzsche, who reveals the unraveling of much of
the subject in the West by way of what he calls “killing God,” whether by the church or the
philosophers.393

THE CONTEXT OF MODERNISM AND THE ISSUE OF THE SUBJECT: ISLAM AS POLITICAL
IDEOLOGY AND IDEALISM IN THE SUBJECT: HEGEL FRONT AND CENTER
It is my intention in this segment, in the context of modernism, to trace back the roots
of a disregard for the individual experience to an earlier time in a specific locale—that
fostered the stimulation of the arts and sciences by none other than Muslim scholars—that is
in Medieval Baghdad.394 This is also the time when Islam as an ideology, which had been
shaped earlier (through the formation of the first dynastic rule – the Umayyads), was firmly
established due to the requirements of a new empire. The positions of authority among the
Umayyads’ successors—the Abbasid caliphs—were keen to attract the knowledge from the
antiquity; however, not all scientific threads were pursued to maximize full potential,
specifically with regards to the idea of the individual. Therefore, from that point, one must
follow the progress of arts and science to the European Renaissance, and specifically to the
development of spatial perspective. I assert that, even though many of the scientific finds
were achieved by the medieval Muslims (Belting 2011), starting in the beginning of the
thirteenth century, there is a shift in focus from critical, empirical, and scientific to the
metaphysical, which became dominant in the philosophical subjects studied by Muslims. 395
Around the same time in Europe, the opposite took place. As a result, the findings of scholars
and scientists such as Alhazen (Ibn al-Haytham) (965-1040) and his experiment-based work
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on optics, for instance, were not further pursued by the communities of later Muslim scholars
that served and were mainly supported by the centralized political power. Unlike the
aristocrats and merchants of the Renaissance, perhaps the Muslim religio-political rulers did
not find a practical purpose for Alhazen’s work on optics as they did in the application of
other works, for instance the writings of the Arabic Plotinus that chiefly adapted the
Neoplatonic philosophy to an Islamic one (Adamson 2002).
Accordingly, the constructed and hybridized Muslim position of patriarchal
authority/power, whether in Persia, or Ottoman Turkey that had drawn its inspiration from a
Neoplatonic iteration of Islam,396 the likes of which we have seen in the example of the
Safavids, indeed garnered the lasting impressions of an ideological Islam, which can be
traced back to the infusion of Islamic thoughts with Greek philosophical works during the
translation movement.397 Keeping this pattern in view, I suggest that, during the modernist
and nationalistic movements of the nineteenth century (detailed discussion of which is
forthcoming in the final chapter), the patriarchal agents of power gravitated toward and
followed a Hegelian philosophical alignment that encompassed both a transcendental and
political philosophy, rather than a Kantian one, which could have been more subjectoriented.398 The short explanation may possibly be because it suited securing the position of
established power theoretically and ideologically better, for it clearly projected an image of
the dominator and the dominated (within the master-slave frame) that the rulers could easily
plug into. At the same time, that which could break the dichotomy of the master-slave
formula economically was missing; there appears to be no substantial middle class
(bourgeois class) or its equivalent that, in their rise to prominence, could identify with what
Kant had proposed, as it did in Europe.399 The socio-economic structure in the Middle East,
and particularly Persia seems more complex;400 however, as Lambton notes, despite the
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advent of modernist reforms in the nineteenth century Persia, what defined the one-on-one
relationship and the individual’s relationship to and its place in the society as a subject did
not receive much attention.401
Consequently, when the technological advancements were brought over to
modernize, the pieces that could ignite an aspiration for individual experience that would be
specific to Muslims were not identified. Instead, as exemplified in photography by Wendy
Shaw,402 the technology carried the European experience of individuality. Viewed from a
mimetic perspective therefore, the reformers in the Middle East strove to superficially
emulate, and for those in the religious ranks, the technology’s endeavors were deemed as
competitive alterity. Subsequently, the traditional camp felt threatened by them, hence
resisted or rejected them where they could.

Modernism and the Disregard for Individuality in the Middle East
The tackling of the rise of new patriarchy against the backdrop of modernism in the
Middle East and the link to a nationalism movement in the nineteenth and the twentieth
century demands that we keep the issue of subjecthood and its history in view. The journey
of the seeing subject can be argued, to enter a materialized stage during the Renaissance,
which is the time of rediscovering individualism and reason. In fact, this is the time of not
just rediscovery, but also acquiring the position of learning from the antiquity through
Christian Europe’s “other,” the medieval Muslims. 403 One of the most influential theories
that reaches the Europeans at this time is the theory of vision, which has been credited to
Alhazen and is most critical to the development of the subject.404
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There is a correlation between the vanishing point in linear perspective—the viewer’s
position and vantage point—and the using of zero. This connection, which may seem
surprising at first, was initially noticed by Brian Rotman in 1987.405 Once one realizes the
fact that both are signs that can alter “the meaning of all other signs,” it becomes convincing
(Belting 9). Rotman “regards the introduction of zero to Arabic numerals and the invention
of the vanishing point as parallel occurrences.” Hans Belting explains Rotman’s argument:
The vanishing point is ‘unoccupiable’ by a person or indeed any physical object, but
it gives a viewer ‘the possibility of objectifying himself, the means of perceiving
himself, from the outside, as a unitary seeing subject, since each image makes deictic
declaration; this is how I see . . . from this particular spot at this particular instant in
time.’406
This finding had practical application during Renaissance, when artists began
implementing it as a technique and became increasingly engaged with it.407 But, why were
the Renaissance artists so preoccupied with this technique? The question of why there was
such an interest in the “accurate” depiction of space during Renaissance, aside from the
interest in science and reason, maybe answered as, because it was a kind of assertion of their
individual point of view, which was empowering. The key term here is “accurate,” which
basically connotes how the individual’s eye experiences what is in one’s field of vision, not
what is reality to everyone the same way and at the same time. This was one way the
individualism found a way to express itself during Renaissance, but it did not end there.
These artists were chiefly supported by the class of merchants and bankers. Not
surprisingly, then it is the “mercantile capitalism” in fourteenth century Italy that acquires the
use of both (linear perspective and zero) for “trade and technology purposes” (Belting 10). 408
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Therefore, what the artists created was what the patron wanted everyone to see; in a way, the
artists quickly relinquished their position for the benefit of their patron. Yet, the significance
of Alhazen’s theory and the “geometry of the visual field” in creating the illusion of space,
while made the translation of the three-dimensional world into a two dimensional picture
possible in the West (Belting 11), did not go very far for the Middle Easterners. If we believe
the Lacanian “Mirror Phase” theory to be true, the act of seeing is then an individual
experience, by way of which the symbolic child (subject) experiences autonomy, albeit as an
illusion, just as in the linear perspective. It is this experience that prompts statements like,
“The way I see it . . .” that underscore an individual’s point of view. This is also true on the
part of those whose perspectives (of political or religious power) were being given visual
forms, namely the members of the aristocratic groups or the church, specifically for
propaganda purposes.409 However, such an experience remained as part of the “unlived”
experience, to use Agamben’s term,410 even during the modernization, for the Middle
Easterners, who as subjects without a memory of the self being a subject to itself,411 often
saw through the eyes of their rulers, or in terms of spiritual guides, through the filter of
religious interpretations of their religious scholars.412 Additionally, the visual arts (that which
requires individual visual response) were not in place to the same extent, as they were in
Europe, to play a significant role before the advent of photography —for the obvious reason
of the long standing prohibition of imagery. 413 Therefore, the issue of “misrecognition” of the
self never comes up in the visual realm, let alone recognition of the self-hood, because it is a
given that the individual place and objective within the universal is predetermined
(Morewedge 51).414 What did come up, however, was the misrecognition through the idea of
the “perfect man” as I have addressed earlier, which was defined through the Neoplatonic
lens and has essentially gone without criticism to this day. Comparatively, the subject’s
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vantage point in Europe finds its way toward the Cartesian cogito, whereas the one who is
deterministically dissolved in the universal ideals, unaware of its subjecthood becomes the
collective subjectivity that can be easily persuaded by dominant powers for or against
something, in an artificial unity. The subject, whether individual or collective, however, is
not immune to objectifying the “other,” as I will explain shortly.
Through the translation movement, from the mid-eighth to the end of the tenth
century, numerous texts from antiquity were translated, from Greek to Syriac, then to Arabic,
thus preserved in Arabic, until their translation into Latin after 1198 (Adamson 2016, 182;
Gutas 1). The content of these texts then became the driving force behind the Renaissance
movement, as it has now become evident and argued by Belting and others. The Renaissance
becomes an instance in which the discourse on humanity touches on the rights and dignity of
man that can be traced to the translation movement in Baghdad. 415 From there, to continue
the journey of the subject, one can follow a straight path to Roger Bacon (1214-1292), who
“tried to apply his knowledge of optics416 to theological questions;” to Johannes Kepler
(1571-1630), who “was the first to describe [the eye] as an optical instrument;” to his friend
Galileo (1564-1642), who developed the telescope;417 to Rene Descartes (1595-1650) and his
cogito, “separating image and perception.” As he put it: “it is the mind that sees, not the eye”
(Belting 125). The gap left in Descartes on vision is subsequently filled by Kant. 418 The
subject becomes once again the topic of concern in Kant, whose freedom project frees the
subject from the established aristocracy and the church, and liberates to one’s own judgment
under the universal unification of nature and the faculties. 419
It must be noted, however, it isn’t until Nietzsche that even in Europe, the more
realistic picture of the self is revealed. Even then, it has taken another century for his views
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on subjectivity to find their deserved position. He is critical of the “modern” philosophy and
holds both the religious authorities as well as the philosophers responsible for “killing
God.”420 Nietzsche in Beyond Good and Evil argues:
So what is really going on with the whole of modern philosophy? Since Descartes . . .
all the philosophers have been out to assassinate the old concept of the soul, under the
guise of critiquing the concepts of subject and predicate. […] People used to believe
in “the soul” as they believed in grammar and the grammatical subject: people said
that “I” was a condition and “think” was a predicate and conditioned – thinking is an
activity, and a subject must be thought of as its cause. Now, with admirable tenacity
and cunning, people are wondering whether they can get out of this net – wondering
whether the reverse might be true: that “think” is the condition and “I” is conditioned,
in which case “I” would be a synthesis that only gets produced through thought
itself.421
For Nietzsche, the subject, after Descartes and Kant, becomes a construction and
contingent of “thinking,” thus interpreted as such, and by extension, a product of imagination
and creation. The implication is that it places thinking/imagination as superior to the subject.
This eliminates the opportunity to ask the question of why someone does something. 422
Instead, a “being” is identified and defined by its “thinking” faculties to be human, and
deserving of certain “rights.” This conceals the causal gap, that which encourages the inquiry
leading to consciousness of the subject. It is this subject (the one who does the defining) that
upon arriving at its subjecthood, as noted by Horkheimer and Adorno in ([1944] 1989), turns
to objectifying others, even itself.423 Thus, as understood by Nietzsche’s criticism, it can be
surmised that it is Hegel who puts the subject in place of the “predicate” within the collective
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consciousness, and formulates an ideology on this basis that creates a perfect, continuous
prescription for a perpetual concealment of the causal gap, that is to say, the contradiction
that exists between the subject and the object, or the particular and the universal,
undermining the possibility of raising questions that is so critical to the progression of the
individual/subject and its consciousness. At the same time, it ensures the duality of the
dialectic; if the subject is the one who defines the object (i.e. the other), then the unequal
relationship between the master and the slave thusly continues in a never-ending loop. The
Hegelian dialectic seems to have found an impression in the modern Middle East, but its
sympathetic seeds were planted long before the nineteenth century. 424

Modernism and the Birth of “Islamic” Ideology: Why Hegel but Not Kant
The widely documented period from approximately mid eighth century to the end of
the tenth century pinpoints the “transformative” epoch, during which much of what was
written and available in Greek “throughout the Eastern Byzantine Empire and the Near East
[was] translated into Arabic” (Gutas1). Some have even argued the ninth century to be when
philosophy began in the Islamic world (Nasr [1968]1992). Therefore, in tracing back the
“Graeco-Arabic scholarship,” one must examine the “translation movement” and its roots.
What brought on such a movement that lasted a century and a half with such influential
implications?
The critical necessity to establish Bayt al-Hikma (House of Wisdom) in Baghdad, in
translating and preserving the texts from the antiquity in medieval Baghdad, has been
thoroughly investigated by Dimitri Gutas (1998). Gutas makes a very convincing case
regarding the coinciding of the translation movement with the establishing of the new
“Abbasid dynasty as the manager of a world empire,” and as it pertains to “the special needs
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of the society in Baghdad” (Gutas 7). Adamson concurs that the translation movement began
almost at the point of the founding of the new dynasty during the rule of al-Mansūr (r. 750770), and continued during the time of al-Mansūr’s grandson and successor, al-Ma’mūn (r.
813-833) (Adamson 2016, 20).425 It is through the translation movement that the
“Hellenizing through the Islamic world” took place (ibid).
Adamson, in his extensive study, points to an influential figure who dominated the
translation movement and under whose supervision many scholars and translators were busy
poring through the ancient texts, namely al-Kīndī (801-873). Al- Kīndī’s credit as the first
Arab philosopher was “defined in large part by his engagement with the Greek tradition that
preceded him” (Adamson 2007, 3).426 Adamson draws attention to one of the most important
texts influencing the later Islamic philosophers; it is authored by the one named “The Arabic
Plotinus,” whose writings, known erroneously as Theology of Aristotle, are comprised of
translated parts of the Enneads, with commentaries, and even include “new philosophical
positions of its own” (Adamson 2002, 1). This clearly demonstrates from where the
Neoplatonic influences entered Islamic thought. But, why did the Greek philosophy so
preoccupy and dominate the translation movement?
It is important to remember, not unlike Christianity at its start, Islam began as a
humble religion of the poor and an advocate of social justice and equality. There were no
instructions within the teachings of the Prophet or the Koranic text on how to operate an
Empire, as the turn of events proved necessary. But, there were living examples (the
Byzantine and Persian Empires) not too far from Muslim borders. Although the narrations
from the Prophet’s accounts (Hadith) have been cited as a model,427 much of what has
become part of the administrative structure, court rituals, and even the political philosophy,
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has been developed based on the absorption of the cultures encountered, and essentially, how
a reconciliation can be reached between Islamic principles and other cultures that Muslims
encountered.428 To grasp the reasons and motivations behind such massive undertaking,
therefore, it is imperative to turn to what informed the “imperial ideology” of the Abbasids,
who were preparing to absorb one of the largest civilizations at the time (i.e. Persian), and
aimed to strengthen their own ideological positions against the Christian Byzantine. Gutas
recognizes that, “the Zoroastrian Sasanian elements” were effectively influential “in the
formation of this ideology” (Gutas 28). He names two astrologers in the service of the caliph
al-Mansūr as evidence to his claim. The caliph, according to Gutas as quoted from the
historian al-Ahbari, “had in his retinue the astrologer Nawbaht the Zoroastrian, who
converted to Islam upon his instigation . . . [a]lso, . . . Ibrahim al-Fazārī, the author of an ode
to the stars and other astrological and astronomical works, and the astrologer ‘Ali ibn-Īsā the
Astrolabist” (30). Gutas, through citing passages from three versions of a text that hold the
“formulation,” demonstrates that the “Zoroastrian Imperial ideology of the Sasaninas” was
focused on the consistent and continuous campaign of the successive Sasanian emperors,
who actively documented their legacy by contributing to the collection. He notes: “This
treasure-house of Zoroastrianism and Persian civilization also contained an account of the
transmission of learning and the sciences in Persia, from the earliest times until the reign of
Chosroes I” (35).
Clearly, the appropriation of the ancient Persian ideology of the “king of kings” in
this context became necessary for the Abbasids. It was not sufficient to just satisfy the
“demands of both Sunni and Shi’it Muslims,” by the Abbasids claiming they were
descendants of the Prophet;429 it was also crucial for the Abbasids to demonstrate that they
were true successors “of the ancient imperial dynasties in Iraq and Iran, from the
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Babylonians through the Sasanians” (Gutas 29). In order to fully absorb the heart and soul of
the Persian Empire, so to speak, as consistent with the history of other in-coming patriarchal
dynasties, it was necessary for the Abbasids to justify their rule over everyone, including the
Persians with an intellectual structure, i.e. philosophy. 430 Gutas confirms: “In this way they
were able to incorporate Sasanian culture, which was still the dominant culture of large
masses of the population east of Iraq, into mainstream ‘Abbasid culture (ibid). This
necessitated the possession of the contemporary knowledge, an encompassing philosophy,
and ideology that could satisfy the requirements of their ambition. This formula would be
applied again by the Safavids, who were pursuing a similar goal, as discussed in the previous
chapter. Gutas demonstrates that the undertaking of the translation movement following the
founding of the round city of Baghdad431 was to support the Abbasid’s multifaceted political
aims of rivalry with the Byzantine on the one hand, and supplanting the Persian hegemonic
culture on the other.432
Therefore, the translation movement did not just foster the preservation and
translations of the texts from the antiquity, but it gave rise to the flourishing of nuances in
philosophical thoughts and theories that aimed to unify under the new imperial rule.
Adamson names al-Fārābi (c. 872-950/51) as “[t]he first Muslim philosopher to offer . . .[a]
holistic original system” (Adamson 2016, 63). Significantly, this system included political
philosophy, among other subjects. His philosophy argues for the interconnectedness of
everything, which he applies to socio-political aspirations in his two books: Principles of the
Opinions of the Inhabitants of the Virtuous City and The Political Regime (Adamson 2016,
67). He blends together the “emanationist scheme of Neoplatonism with ideas from
Aristotle.”433 This fusion would cause a sort of a split among the medieval Muslim
philosophers, in that some, while maintaining Islam as their religion, followed the reason
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branch of his theory and became Aristotelian philosophers, like Avicenna (980-1037) and
Averroes (1126-1198), although, as Nasr points out, rejected Aristotle’s “question of motion”
(Nasr 1992, 126). Others would take the Neoplatonist branch, as in al-Ghazāli (1058-1111),
and move toward the East to eventually dominate the scene of Islamic philosophy. 434 But,
how did this divide unfold?
With the great translation movement came the development of schools or movements
that began actively discussing and arguing the important and sometimes controversial issues
of the day such as “determination and free will, the nature of the divine attributes,” 435 and
what is determined as eternal or as created. One of such issues was whether, for example, the
Koran was eternal or God’s creation. 436 This was clearly an important argument for a
governing system that identified itself as Islamic, because it was seen as a principle source of
authority, whose intellectual possession had to be justified. There are two schools that
flourished from these intellectual fermentations which were divided, interestingly, on the
issue of the human free will versus the absolute Divine power (Adamson 2016, 10, 13, 106,
109). The subscribers to the former, the Mu’tazilites, argued on the basis of two principle
predicates: first, God is one (as in one with his power, knowledge, attributes), and second,
God is just. Thus, they argued humans were responsible for their own actions, not God,
because “no one can be morally responsible for actions that are not in their own power”
(Adamson 2016, 13). This implicates their assumption “that there are moral laws that we can
discover using our own reason, and by which even God is bound” (Adamson 2016, 107).
However, this was met with the objection of the second group, the Ash’arites, who are
considered the instigators of a “Sunni revival” during the Middle Ages (Adamson 2016, 105)
and argued for the “Divine command theory of morality,” which was intended to maintain
the absoluteness of the Divine will and power (ibid). S. H. Nasr argues that the Ash’arites
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were theologians, and therefore, did not concern themselves with all philosophical questions,
rather only “religious matters’ (1992, 305). Nonetheless, Adamson presents an argument by
the Ash’arites that can explain the Sunni position of siding with the dominant and often
tyrannical political power.437
The Ash’arites’ “Divine command theory of morality” implies an entirely different
set of logic practiced by God that can often be counterintuitive to human logic, such as to
“torment innocent children,” or “punish believers, . . . [f]or justice means nothing more nor
less than agreement with God’s will” (Adamson 2016, 108). Actions receive their moral
context from God; thus, for example, in the determination of whether or not the act of murder
is justified, the Ash’arites argue that “inevitably depends on . . . [the] context . . . provided
ultimately by God’s law” (ibid). Naturally, the Ash’arites deem the responsibility of
interpreting “God’s law” to be under the authority of the judges and scholars of Islam. More
revealing is how, according to the above argument, justice or injustice becomes linked to
actions. These actions are then elaborated on by the Ash’arites, who are in agreement with
the Mu’tazilites with respect to the “physical theory,” and the “created things as atomic
bodies, which have properties or ‘accidents’ that belong to them only for one moment at a
time.” The atoms exist by way of these “accidents,” that have a “fleeting existence;”
therefore, they are not eternal and must have been created, which obviously means, they were
created by God. Therefore, “[i]t is He who creates every atom and every one of its attributes,
giving them existence at each moment they exist” (ibid). The Ash’arites thus underscore the
transitory and reliant characteristics of the “accidents” that directly fit in with what is created.
Consequently, as an example, the actions of an autocratic caliph or a victorious party in a
conflict can easily be viewed as what God has willed. In the eastern regions initially, despite
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the “spread of Ash’arite theology,”438 the development of thought and engagement with the
Greeks had taken a different turn.
As still is true both today and in the Middle Ages, no respected philosopher could
produce work without dealing with the works of the Greek philosophers. Both Adamson and
Nasr name the aforementioned al-Kīndī as the first Arab scholar, who was a critical
contributor to the process of incorporating Greek philosophy into Islamic thoughts.
(Adamson 2007, Nasr 1992). About al- Kīndī and his influence, Nasr states:
It was he who initiated the process of formulating a technical philosophical
vocabulary in Arabic, and of rethinking Greek philosophy in terms of Islamic
doctrines. In both these respects, he was followed by al-Fārābi, through whom the
basis for Peripatetic philosophy became well established in Islam. The philosophers
of this school were familiar with the Alexandrian and Athenian Neoplatonists and
commentators on Aristotle, and viewed the philosophy of Aristotle through
Neoplatonic eyes.439
Al- Fārābi then in turn was most influential on Avicenna, as admitted to in his
autobiography (Adamson 2016, 116). As the “greatest Islamic exponent”440 of the Peripatetic
school, Avicenna incorporated the rational aspect of the school, reworked the Aristotelian
thoughts into original philosophy, and even designated a new name, “Oriental philosophy,”
to differentiate it from that which was practiced in the West (Adamson 2016, 116). 441 It
appears the feeling was mutual from the Western corner. The Aristotelian influence reached
its height in Averroes, “who became the most purely Aristotelian of the Muslim Peripatetics,
and rejected, as an explicit aspect of philosophy, those Neoplatonic and Muslim elements
that entered into the world view of the Eastern Peripatetics, such as Avicenna” (Nasr 1992,
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293). Therefore, one of the points of departure seems to be Neoplatonism that marks the
separation of the Islamic Western and Eastern philosophies. This is certainly not to say the
Western Islamic thinkers did not demonstrate Neoplatonic flavors in their works, as the later
example of Ibn Arabi (1165-1240) can demonstrate. It is rather in the varied combination of
Neoplatonism with other philosophical or religious thoughts and interpretations that we see
the differences, for instance, as it is seen in its infusion with Ash’arism in the East while
denouncing philosophy at the same time.
Nasr deems the domination of the Ash’arite theology as a major suppressor of the
rationalism “with the help of Sufism,” and in short, a major blow in the “destruction of”
philosophy in Islam (Nasr 1992, 307). Adamson concurs and also points out that even though
the Ash’arites’ arguments were reason-based, they did not consider themselves philosophers
(Adamson 2016, 112), therefore seeking reasoning only to protect their faith (Nasr 1992,
305). It is Algazel (al-Ghazālī), the prominent Ash’arite figure, who accomplishes the task of
the criticism of the philosophers. However, as Nasr puts it, it is al-Ghazālī who “establish[es]
a harmony between the exoteric and esoteric elements of Islam” (ibid). Nevertheless, as
Adamson quickly brings to our attention, al-Ghazālī’s refutation of the philosophers was
more aimed at the Islamic Aristotelians (i.e. Avicenna), than Aristotle or Plato (Adamson
2016, 112).
Before tending to the essence of the intertextual conversations of al-Ghazālī (10581111) and Avicenna (980-1037) on some controversial issues, certain political, social, and
intellectual context seems necessary in order to understand the importance of the domination
of the Ash’arite over Aristotelian thinking in the East. While the intellectual discussions were
ongoing between various groups/schools of thought, up until mid-eleventh century, they were
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mainly court-patronized, or funded by aristocratic families, as was the case of al-Kīndī in the
former, and Avicenna in the latter. Following the rise to power of the Turkish Seljūqs in
1038, and their employment of a powerful pro-Ash’arite vizier, Nīzām al-Mūlk (1018-1092),
the status of sponsorship for such intellectual exchanges changed. Nīzām al-Mūlk established
a series of state-sponsored madrasas, or institutions of higher education that were named
Nīzāmiyya after him, and were designed to institutionalize the teaching of philosophy for the
first time in the Islamic lands (Adamson 2016, 142). These schools were located in places
such as Baghdad, Nishapūr, Herat, and other medieval intellectual centers in the Middle East
and Central Asia. The schools’ curriculum included “parts of philosophy, especially logic . . .
that educated legal scholars and theologians . . . around this time” (Adamson 2016, 142). The
main objective of the school was to advocate and actively promote the revival of Sunni Islam
following the demise of the rule of the Shi’ite Būyids (Adamson 2016, 142).
It is in the Nishapūr Nizamiyya that al-Ghazālī studied and trained in Ash’arism under
his teacher al-Jūwaynī, whose teaching curriculum included Avicenna’s philosophical work
that had already permeated kalām (rational theology). Al-Ghazālī developed such close ties
to Nīzām al-Mūlk that as a young professor, he was appointed by Nīzām al-Mūlk to teach at
the Baghdad Nizamiyya.442 However, al- Ghazālī’s assessment of the state of scholarly work
was increasingly making him anxious and skeptical. Adamson notes a “serious breakdown in
the summer of 1095 [when] . . . religious reflection on the meaninglessness of his daily
occupation as a teacher caused him to stop eating, and even rendered him unable to speak”
(140).443 It is worth noting this is the year he abandoned his prestigious post in Baghdad (the
same year the first Crusades were launched to capture Jerusalem) and traveled in the Middle
East between Damascus, Jerusalem, and then headed toward the east in 1099 (Moosa 6). It is
clear in his writings that he believed that the spiritual guidance should come from the
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“learned” and that they were the true “heirs of the Prophet;” however, he laments they are
lacking in numbers in his time (Moosa 8). While al-Ghazālī held a low opinion of taqlīd, or
“the uncritical acceptance of authority,” 444 and encouraged “careful personal reflection,” he
saw the “independent judgment” as a way that “can wind up giving us a reason to depend on
authority. In such a case, our acceptance of that authority no longer falls under the heading of
taqlīd, since it is not uncritical or slavish” (Adamson 2016, 143).
Most significantly in his personal crisis, it is the question of “skepticism,” which
plays an important role in al-Ghazālī’s own transformative experience.445 The skepticism that
came over al-Ghazālī, as argued by Adamson, was not the same skepticism that preoccupied
Descartes. Al-Ghazālī had learned that the sensory perception had to be corrected by the
power of the mind.446 However, the doubt had set in: what if the mind is in error? What then
was to deliver the mind from being misguided?447 Therefore, he reaches for the highest
authority. Adamson explains:
Like Descartes, al-Ghazālī sees skepticism as a challenge to be overcome . . . But alGhazālī does not point to anything like the Cartesian cogito to get himself out of his
skeptical fix. Instead, he tells us that it was God who released him: a light was
unexpectedly cast into his bosom . . . It is through this light that we must seek the
“unveiling” (kashf) of truth, and it is given only by divine generosity. 448
Therefore, al- Ghazālī incorporates into the Ash’arite and partial philosophical
doctrines the mystic experience. His attitude toward philosophy remains “ambivalent,” for
the reasoning and “rational theology” in al-Ghazālī’s view had a practical purpose in
“defending a virtuous religion against its detractors,” while he remained unsatisfied with the
proofs presented by the philosophers (Adamson 2016, 144).449 This, Adamson believes to be
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so, because of “Avicenna’s rigorous and influential studies in logic and epistemology” that
enriched the theological studies with establishing a “more self-conscious” study method
(ibid). Consequently, al-Ghazālī differentiates in the works of philosophers, where it is
“concerning natural philosophy,” which he finds more or less acceptable, and where it
involves “ethics and politics [which he thinks] are simply plagiarized from earlier prophetic
traditions” (Adamson 2016, 145).
Al-Ghazālī’s engagement with Avicenna had some interestingly ironic consequences.
It is true that not only Europe came to know Avicenna through the translations of alGhazālī’s work,450 which he had written to refute Avicenna, but that also al-Ghazālī played
an instrumental role in the survival of philosophy in the East. Adamson remarks that this was
because, “[h]e made the tacit, but crucial, assumption that explaining and then criticizing
Avicenna is the same as explaining and criticizing philosophy itself.” This consequence
secured Avicenna’s place, rather than Aristotle’s, “as the main point of reference.”451
As a result, in his book Tahāfūt al-Falāsīfa (translated as Incoherence of the
Philosophers), al-Ghazālī lays out his criticism of the “philosophers,” which as Adamson has
noted, was aimed mainly at Avicenna, by first summarizing and then critiquing Avicenna’s
work (147). There are three principle areas of dispute that al-Ghazālī outlines, all of which
fulfill his grounds for “heresy,” as in what qualifies one as not being a proper Muslim (even
to the degree of being subject to punishment). According to Adamson, al-Ghazālī believes
Avicenna to possess all three.452 These are: “claims that the universe is eternal rather than
created; that God has no knowledge of particular things, but only of universals; and that only
the soul lives on after death, with no possibility of bodily resurrection.”453
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Given al-Ghazālī’s criteria of religious orthodoxy, one can raise the question: how is
al-Ghazālī refuting Avicenna’s philosophical argument that, for instance, the world is
eternal? The answer is that al-Ghazālī used a dialectic method of first summarizing the
opponent’s arguments and doctrines, then evaluating them as “false or simply inadequate”
(Adamson 2016, 149). Avicenna had argued that “a temporally limited effect cannot come
from an eternal cause. God is eternal, so His will should likewise be eternal. And if He has an
eternal will to produce the universe, then surely the universe too will be eternal.”454
Al-Ghazālī refutes Avicenna’s argument on the basis of “the faculty of estimation”
(wahm), which “is . . . responsible for misleading impressions that we find almost impossible
to resist.” Further, al-Ghazālī complains that the arguments of the “philosophers” in question
do not meet his requirement of being adequately “demonstrative” (Adamson 2016, 150).
What al-Ghazālī calls “wahm” may refer to Avicenna’s “thought experiment” that assisted
Avicenna in making a “distinction between strict impossibility and inconceivability.”
Adamson states “thought experiment” was nothing new, and even philosophers from
antiquity employed it. He further explains: “intuitions are crucial in philosophical reflection,
often providing its starting points, or objections to what seemed to be a promising theory”
(Adamson 2016, 133). However, al-Ghazālī himself argues for the “direct contact with the
divine,” which is “beyond demonstration;” nevertheless, he names it “dhawq,” translated as
“taste,” pertaining to “the immediate perception of divine truth afforded the true mystic”
(Adamson 2016, 145). On al-Ghazālī’s favoring mysticism as a method, Ebrahim Moosa
notes:
Of all the methods he experimented with, Ghazālī found the method of the mystics to
be the most attractive and conducive for his purposes. Thus, his ethics was, in a sense,
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traditional jurisprudence mediated by mysticism. What I think Ghazālī found
persuasive about mysticism was the kind of imagination it cultivates within an
individual.455
To be sure, both Avicenna and al-Ghazālī drew from Neoplatonic ideas456 and
imagination in shaping their philosophical works. The difference is by attributing the source
to the divine, the latter obtained an authoritative position ensuring the credibility of his
views. It is one thing to have a mystical experience; it is, however, another to hold it as a
point of reference and judgment to formulate instructions on its basis. While the former
seems individual, the latter transcends individual experience and falls within the domain of
what shapes collective subjectivities. Adamson addresses this point. As if asking al-Ghazālī,
[w]hat about the rest of us, who are not so fortunate . . . and have not tasted the
sweetness of God, or seen His radiance? [Then he replies according to al-Ghazālī
that,] [w]ell, we should demonstrate whatever we can, following the philosophers as
far as they can take us—which is not nearly as far as they claim. But we must also
trust in the guidance of true prophets, who should be assessed and verified through
careful reflection on their works and deeds. 457
Therefore, al-Ghazālī asks that we believe in the “possibility of prophecy,” and at the
same time, “lays claim to a mystical insight that is beyond the reach of their [the
philosophers’] arguments” (ibid). Further, in al-Ghazālī’s view (as an Ash’arite), he limits
the issue of “agency to causes which act out of well-informed choices.” In other words, only
God is “really the sole efficient cause of the universe and everything in it” (Adamson 2016,
151). Therefore, there is no subject or free will other than what God has already determined
freely. In the notion of “agency,” al-Ghazālī differs from Avicenna, who considers (as a
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parallel to Plotinus’ Soul) an “Agent Intellect” to be responsible to give form to what is
created (Adamson 2016, 139).
Adamson states there are places in Avicenna that one is tempted to compare him with
Descartes. He refers to Avicenna’s “flying man,” which is a thought experiment regarding
Avicenna’s presenting his case on the man who has been just created, suspended in mid air,
and not even having limbs touching his body, with “total sensory deprivation.” Avicenna
claims that such a man is “self-aware,” however, as Adamson swiftly reminds us, not as a
thinking subject, or even in a material body, but as “essence . . . an incorporeal soul” (135).
In proving the separation between the soul and the body, too, Avicenna thinks differently
from Descartes, in that the former deems the “intellectual part of the soul—what he calls the
‘rational soul’—to be separate from the body in its activity” (Adamson 2016, 136).
Nasr argues philosophy was received differently by Sunni versus Shi’ite Muslims.
Whereas the Sunnis accepted only certain aspects of philosophy, namely logic and some
“methods of argumentation” that proved useful in their debates with their non-Muslim rivals,
in the Shi’a sphere there has been continuity in the teachings of “the philosophy of both the
Peripatetic and Illuminationist school . . . as a living tradition through the centuries in the
religious schools.” He further notes the fact that philosophers such as Mūllā Sadrā appear
nearly five hundred years after al-Ghazālī is an indication of this consistency (Nasr 1992,
294).
What is of great interest here is the notion that how the already influential
Neoplatonic philosophy was still firmly in place during modernity458 and continues to distort
the content of the individual subject to this day. There seems to be a confusion on mystic
subjective experience that quickly transforms into collective subjectivity and the subjecthood
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in the “grammatical” sense as meant by Nietzsche. This dilemma even extends to scholars.
Farzin Vahdat (2003) in response to Bassam Tibi, “one of the most erudite scholars of Islam
and modernity,” opposes the idea that human subjectivity is contrary to monotheistic
religions (126). Even so, he leans on Neoplatonic ideas first and foremost to make his
argument. What Vahdat draws upon in his argument is the “Islamic mystical tradition and
philosophy” that come directly from the idea of the “Perfect Human,” and Ibn Arabi as “one
of the founders of . . . Neoplatonic tradition in the Islamic world” (ibid). However, there is
nothing on the importance of individual’s lived-experience as a subject to oneself. He comes
closest to the idea of subjecthood, when he notes in Islam, “the emphasis on the
responsibility of the individual.” This responsibility, however, as he cites Armando Salvatore
(1997), is assessed with respect to “salvation” through submission to the Divine authority
(Vahdat 127). But, this Divine authority is often eclipsed under the various interpretations of
the clerics, and those who claim to be the mediators even argue for the “human as God’s vice
regent on earth (Koranic khalifat o’llah fi al-arz),” which “explicitly informed the discourses
of the architects of the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1960s and the 1970s” (ibid). The class of
clergy thusly created a position of power within the social structure that was interwoven with
a political system that can be traced from the medieval to the present time.459 Although most
influential, by the time we reach the nineteenth century, the religious class was not the only
member of the socio-political structure. (See Appendix III).
The social division of classes at this time in Persia, reveals a close interdependency
between all except one group: the ūlamā, who had sources of revenue in charitable taxes and
endowments (awqāf). They also had the most “influence among the laborers and peasants,
and in the incitement of mobs.”460 Therefore, those among the ūlamā that were not affiliated
with the court, were seen in as “the potential leaders of popular discontent” (Lambton 164)
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that lacked the “relationship of man to man” (Lambton 166). The individual experience,
therefore, remains a part of the “unlived” life for the Middle Easterners, and in the case at
hand, the Iranians. One may argue the individual experience in the West that quickly gave its
place to a collective consciousness after the Renaissance has been problematic in Europeans’
engagement with colonialism and exploitation of the “other” (Mignolo 1995). While this is
true, just as with the fact that humans have never forgotten how to make images, once the
individual consciousness is experienced and present as “being,” it is always there, even
though from time to time it will need to be brought to presence (Nancy 1993). This
experience is long overdue for the Middle Eastern subjects.
Considering this, just as the experience with photography lacked the background
process of individual vantage point for the Middle Easterners, modern reforms made
Romantic Movement and Hegelian aesthetics more appealing in the Middle East during the
nineteenth century, as received by a collective consciousness. The appeal perhaps was
because it seemed familiar in how “artistic plan was ascribed to the creator of the universe, as
had already been done by Plotinus” (Hauser 108).461
However, the problem of inverting the subject and the predicate persists in Hegel. As
the thinking, European philosopher who is defining discriminately who is a “being” and, who
is not, Hegel’s dialectic appears to only be applicable to his fellow European citizens.
Hegelian philosophy of “the manifold contingencies and particularities of world history into
one gradual universal direction (essentially that of German Protestant Idealism), has . . .
become a synonym for the archetypal Eurocentric thinker” (Almond 109). It is of little
wonder then that the accounts of places like Africa, or religions like Islam are absent in his
“unfolding World-Spirit,” even though he was very well read on the “orient.”462 Susan Buck-
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Morss (2009) argues this very point. She notes, despite knowing about the Haitian
Revolution, Hegel was silent about it (17). She finds a sort of hypocrisy in his philosophy of
the dialectic toward freedom. She argues: “Because of his own insistence on the necessary
interconnection between history and truth, Hegel’s philosophy cannot be divorced from the
repression through which the referent that we call Hegel has come to be historically known”
(Buck-Morss 16). This brings up the subjectivity under the domination of the subject aware
of itself, but poised to objectify its “other.” This is a discourse that paves the way for
colonialism. Some of the most significant intellectuals in the nineteenth century Middle East
were also among the influential figures in opposing colonialism. However, despite their
familiarity with Western modernist theories, they built their counter arguments by
maintaining the same patriarchal paradigms such as striving for an artificial unity i.e. PanIslamism. One of the most influential and recognizable names whose inspiration transcended
geographical borders in the Middle East and reached well into the twentieth century, and
even to this day, is Sayyid Jamāl ad-Dīn Asadabadi (al-Afghānī).

Modern Intellectuals of the Middle East: Sayyid Jamāl ad-Dīn Asadābādī (al-Afghānī)
There have been many debates on the origin of Sayyid Jamāl ad-Dīn (1838/39-1897);
scholars have been intrigued by the aura of mystery surrounding his biographical accounts
for years. In Sayyid Jamāl ad-Dīn al-Afghāni: A Political Biography, one of the most
comprehensive studies on Jamāl ad-Dīn, Nikki Keddie explains that due to his great ideas to
unify all Muslims in the Middle East against the European colonialists, Jamāl ad-Dīn, when
“in Sunni surroundings, maintained he was born and raised in Afghanistan, yet it can now be
shown that he was in fact born in the village of Asadabad near the town of Hamedan in
western Iran” (Keddie 1972a, 3). Keddie names Jamāl ad-Dīn “as a precursor of various later
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trends in the Islamic world,”463 and “one of the first important leaders to try to reinterpret
traditional Islamic ideas so as to meet the agonizing problems brought on by the increasing
incursions by the West into the Middle East” (Keddie 1972, 1). Keddie states, al-Afghāni’s
mode of reinterpreting the Islamic past in modern and nationalist terms displayed an
approach that was to become increasingly popular in the Middle East. That Afghāni
has been chosen as hero by so many modern Muslims gives his activities and writings
an importance that withstands all evidence that his influence during his lifetime was
sometimes small. His example of devotion to the cause of liberating Muslims from
their Western conquerors has added to his appeal in the contemporary Middle East.464
The idea of “an evolutionary history of civilization” and what its implications were
was “one of the seminal ideas of nineteenth century Europe.” 465 This idea, argues Stephen
Vernoit, “was disseminated in the Muslim world largely in the ideas of al-Afghāni, who was
inspired by the lectures of the French statesman and historian François Guizot (1787-1874)
on the history of civilization in Europe” (Vernoit 30). While al-Afghāni initiated the
translation of Guizot’s book into Arabic in 1877, it did not prevent him from criticizing the
Eurocentrism in Guizot’s theory, by insisting “that Muslims could also advance and
contribute to civilization’s future” (ibid). Additionally, in his exchange with Ernest Renan in
1883, one can see al-Afghāni’s Hegelian tendencies toward an evolutionary history.
Rejecting Renan’s “racial argument,”466 Jamāl ad-Dīn asserted that the modern evolutionary
idea was also applicable to Muslims, but attributed “the superiority of the modern Western
intellectual climate . . . to the fact that Christianity had an evolutionary head start on Islam”
(Keddie 1972a, 191).
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Jamāl ad-Dīn’s education included “the traditional Islamic disciplines,” but he
received a “considerable knowledge of the Islamic philosophers,” such as Avicenna who
played an instrumental role in shaping his later views (Keddie 1972a, 18). Despite the earlier
suppression of Greek influence and harsh criticism of Aristotelian philosophers like
Avicenna, Keddie argues in the nineteenth century there was actually “a living philosophical
tradition” in Iran that was taught in madrasas or religious schools (Keddie 1972a, 19).
Therefore, it seems plausible to deduce that Jamāl ad-Dīn aimed to reestablish a reason-based
argument in support of an anti-colonial movement against the Europeans.
Another influential factor forming Jamāl ad-Dīn’s thoughts was the development of
unorthodox movements during his youth. Keddie points to Jamāl ad-Dīn’s exposure to
traditions such as Shaikhism (a school of Twelver Shi’ism, founded in the late eighteenth
century by Sheikh Ahmad Ahsā’ī) and Bābism (a movement initiated in 1844 by Ali
Mohammad Shirazi); being a witness to both, these shaped Jamāl ad-Dīn’s thoughts and
writings (Keddie 1972, 19-21).467
The Shaikhi movement was a branch of Shi’a that “stressed both the philosophical
and mystical aspects of Shi’ism, developing theories found in earlier philosophers and
mystics about the coexistence of the real and spiritual worlds—worlds that the Shaikhis
further defined and subdivided.”468 Keddie’s research demonstrates that a treatise written by
a leader of the Shaikhis, namely Hajj Mohammad Karim Khan Qajar Kirmani (1809-1870),
who led the group between 1840’s and 1860’s, was copied by Jamāl ad-Dīn in the 1860s;
these writings, which left an impression on Jamāl ad-Dīn, reveal there could be many
different levels of meaning to the Koran as well as allusion to the ever-present opportunities
for guidance for Muslims. She explains:
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The idea of the Koran as mystically encompassing an infinity of varied meanings is
one that was used later by Jamāl ad-Dīn to attribute new meanings to this Holy Book.
Another Shaikhi idea later echoed by Jamal ad-Din was their key difference from
other Shi’is—what the Shaikhis called the “Fourth Pillar” of religion—the idea that
there is always in the world a perfect Shi’i who can guide men in right ideas and
action during the absence of the Twelfth Imam.469
In his stay in Egypt (1871-79, during which time he visited Istanbul), his ideas
gathered followings. One of his most notable students is Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905),
who “was soon to become . . . political activist and journalist . . . [and follow] the path of his
master and closest confidant,” Jamāl ad-Dīn (Keddie 1972a, 90). At the same time, Jamāl adDīn angered the “religious conservatives,” whether in al-Azhar University in Cairo, or as in
the time when he lectured in Istanbul on crafts. Keddie notes: “he referred to prophecy as a
craft on almost the same level as philosophy, and drew comparisons between philosophers
and prophets,” which caused his expulsion from Istanbul in 1871. Vernoit also notes Jamāl
ad-Dīn’s comments on the importance of the arts in education for “the advancement of arts,
crafts, and industry . . . were interpreted as placing the arts on an equal footing with divine
inspiration,” and caused the closure of the university in Istanbul in the same year (Vernoit
24).
Perhaps one of the most critical points in Jamāl ad-Dīn’s political life was his
understanding of the importance of mass media (Keddie 1972b, 46). He sought in his
arguments to “mobilize the masses so that they would defend their country’s independence
against the . . . encroaching West” (Keddie 1972b, 45). His anti-colonial and antiestablishment sentiments are reflected in his writings, public lectures, and pamphlets he
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distributed. One of the first newspapers that published a couple of articles by Jamāl ad-Dīn,
was the London-based newspaper by the name of an-Nahla. The articles’ title, “English
Policy in Eastern Countries,” and “The Reasons for the War in Egypt,” were both criticism of
British policies in India and Egypt, as well as noting the concerns the British had regarding
movements toward unification of all Muslims (through a “firm bond,” in Koranic terms:
‘urwat al wuthqā) which, of course, encompassed the Muslims in India. He had also argued
that the British were awaiting opportunities to undermine this “Pan-Islamism” under the
leadership of the Ottoman Sultan Abdülhamid II, and that they “knew [it] would endanger
their influence in the East and their rule in India” (Keddie 1972a, 184). 470
Jamāl ad-Dīn’s presence in France was reflected in James Sanua’s newspaper, the
aforementioned Abu Nadara Zarka (in chapter four) in the January 19, 1883 issue. Sanua
published an article by Jamāl ad-Dīn in his next issue, on February 9, 1883, titled “ash-Sharq
va ash-Sharqiyyin” (The Orient and Orientals).471 Jamāl ad-Dīn used this and another Parisbased Arabic language paper, al-Bashīr, to disseminate his idea on Muslim unification, even
if it meant supporting one’s undemocratic government. This is significant, particularly in the
latter publication, as its editor was a refugee from the Ottoman Empire, by the name of Khalil
Ghānem, who often criticized the Ottoman Sultan in his newspaper. It is clear that in his
writings in Paris, Jamāl ad-Dīn discouraged Ghānem’s criticism of the Ottoman Sultan, as he
saw it undermining the unity of Muslims in facing the foreigners. Keddie notes “when forced
to choose between advocacy or reform or self-strengthening for the Muslim world, Afghāni
gave priority to the latter” (Keddie 1972a, 186). It is this unity he was striving for, however,
by looking back at Islam’s Golden Age.
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Jamāl ad-Dīn (al-Afghani) was a man who was very conscious of the history of
intellectualism in Islam and, as his writings demonstrate, sought the solution to deal with
colonialism in Islam’s own glorious past. Ilan Pappé, in the Modern Middle East argues alAfghani “lamented the weakness of the Islamic world in the face of European colonialism
and imperialism, asserting that a return to the Golden Age of Islam was the best way of
tackling this predicament [colonialism]” (Pappé 274). Nonetheless, al-Afghani seems to have
been aware of the important role the individual has in modern times. Vahdat points out that
“[u]nderlying Afghani’s discourse there is a strong assumption that the modern world
necessitates a view of human agency” (Vahdat 131). This agency for Muslims, as argued by
Jamāl ad-Dīn, required manifestation in “activism, the freer use of human reason and
political and military strength” (Keddie 1968, 3). Yet, for Jamāl ad-Dīn, as a nineteenth
century Muslim intellectual, this does not seem to translate into individuality or subjecthood.
The reason may rest in a long-standing tradition that excluded the masses from the
intellectual circles, may they be theologians, Sufis or philosophers.
In “Intellectuals in the Modern Middle East: A Brief Historical Consideration,”
Keddie provides a history of intellectualism in Islamic lands. She notes theologians like alGhazāli actually “wrote treatise on the need of keeping theology from the masses.” This was
also practiced by the Sufis, who “restricted their higher truths to the initiated, as did many of
the Shi’is.” Most significantly for its persistence to this day, Keddie argues, it is the work of
the philosophers who developed this theory “most elaborately” by “[i]nsisting that their
Greek-based philosophy was enjoined on them by the [Kor]an,” and citing certain
interpretations from selected verses in the Koran as their evidence (Keddie 1972b, 42).472
Further, the exclusion was established in the idea “that humanity was divided into a small
elite capable of understanding philosophy and a large mass who could not be exposed to it,
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lest it upset their literalist faith” (ibid). It appears that Jamāl ad-Dīn also followed this
“duality” in his work. Vahdat asserts that Jamāl ad-Dīn
created two discourses, one for what he considered to be the enlightened elite in
Islamic societies, according to the principles of which individual subjectivity was
affirmed in such concepts as critical thought. He also developed a parallel discourse,
which appealed more to the “masses” motivated by his anti-imperialist goals, and
which in many ways was in sharp contrast to his first critical discourse.473
Without a doubt, Jamāl ad-Dīn was actively trying to educate elite leaders in the
Muslim communities, such as Abduh and others, by underscoring the importance of the
sciences. 474 Jamāl ad-Dīn believed “no reform [was] possible in Muslim countries until
Muslim leaders and ulama have reformed their outlook . . . and that the decline of Muslim
countries began with these leaders.”475 Furthermore, he harshly criticized the Muslim
religious scholars “for their blindness and hostility toward modern science and
technology.”476 He argued for the “scientific proof,” and deemed “no incompatibility
between science and knowledge and the foundation of Islamic faith” (Keddie 1972a, 163).
Nevertheless, he drew the inspiration for reasoning from philosophy.
Jamāl ad-Dīn’s emphasizing the importance of sciences and philosophy is evident in
one of his articles; however, mysticism and openness to creative thinking is never far from
his view.477 He cites names of philosophers such as Fārābi, Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna), and Mūllā
Sadrā among others, who are from more mystical traditions.478 Moreover, Jamāl ad-Dīn
criticizes the ulama, who “study . . . sciences that are ascribed to Aristotle with the greatest
delight, as if Aristotle were one of the pillars of the Muslims. However, if the discussion
relates to Galileo, Newton and Kepler, they consider them infidels.”479 He further states the
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purpose of philosophy “is man’s becoming man and living the life of sacred rationality. Its
aim is human perfection in reason, mind, soul, and way of life.”480 From the extant
documents written by Jamāl ad-Dīn, one can surmise his “ties to mysticism of a Neoplatonic
type” and continued interest in “this school’s combination of philosophy, mystical ideas, and
religious innovation” (Keddie 1972a, 38); one can also grasp his attempts to strengthen all
his bases against European imperialism, and primarily of the British colonialists’ intentions.
While his influences in the region, from India to Egypt, to Ottoman Turkey and Iran, paved
the way for multiple socio-political reformation movements, the issue of what happens to the
colonized subject remains beyond the scope of concern for reformists such as Jamāl ad-Dīn
and others and would have to wait until later in the twentieth century.

FACING COLONIALISM: SUBJECTIVITY AND THE ARTS IN THE NINETEENTH AND THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY MIDDLE EAST
Jamāl ad-Dīn’s concerns regarding colonialism and his plans to consolidate a
confident “Pan-Islamic nation” led to reformation movements that began in the later part of
the nineteenth century and continued in the first decades of the twentieth century. These
reformation movements sought to overhaul the religious traditional beliefs, but at the same
time the economy, and ultimately aimed to bring about modern states in the Middle East.
However, the colonialists left their marks on the region. In this segment, it is necessary to
discuss in further detail the implementation of colonial strategies that inflicted a sort of
collective subjectivity, undermining the space and time within which a meaningful,
“individual” stage may have come to be experienced. While nineteenth century reformers
like Jamāl ad-Dīn and Muhammad Abduh recognized the pernicious effects of European
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imperialism, it remained outside their reach to elaborate on the issue of the subject, such as
what was undertaken later by Frantz Fanon and Edward Said.

Colonial Discourses: Fanon and Said – the Imaginary Construction of the “Other”
The ethico-aesthetic paradigm emerged to explore ways to circumvent the formal
structure of power in order to bring about change when it would become necessary; it is
informed partly by works of philosophers such as Nietzsche and Heidegger, who saw in the
aesthetics and creative thoughts a pathway toward free consciousness necessary to bring
about change (Nietzsche 2006, 65; Heidegger 1993, 197). Heidegger also warns against the
calculative and systematic activities of humans that “enframe” earth’s resources, including
other fellow humans and their relationships (Heidegger, 325). However, without criticism
and critical examination, art and aesthetics can be another instrument in the hands of the
power bases. Interestingly, I believe the requirement of this criticism is implied in
Heidegger’s choice of the term “enframe,” even though he addresses the darker side of
technology, as it connotes a sort of misuse or abuse of creative endeavors.481 Instrumental in
this criticism is the examination of the mechanisms of colonialism, the subjects under the
imposed colonial powers, and the role of the creative endeavors (i.e. imagination) in
implementation of power mechanisms.
Frantz Fanon in Black Skin, White Masks sets out to demonstrate “that what is called
the black soul is a construction by white folk” (xviii). He analyzes the disruption through
systematic treatment to the process of collective consciousness of the colonized. Fanon
argues the process of transitioning from unconsciousness toward consciousness for the black
man is intercepted, thus “the [blacks’] collective unconscious is not governed by cerebral
heredity,” rather by what he calls “an impulsive cultural imposition” through which he [the
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colonized] internalizes the sense of inferiority and all things negative about himself (Fanon,
167). The imposed culture, through the negative representation of its “other,” immediately
tips the scale in favor of the dominant race, thereby engendering a debt for the dominated
people. Therefore, in this type of “debt economy,” their “lack” of the dominant culture’s
values places the dominated in the position of need to receive from its “other.”482
The “debt economy” finds a whole new meaning when viewed in “real” economic
situations as explained by Maurizio Lazzarato (2012). Lazzarato argues that in capitalism,
major creditors have become the recipient of exorbitant amounts of funds through what he
calls “the simple mechanism of interest” (Lazzarato 20). Through producing “credit” for the
population, the financial institutions have been able to “appropriate labor and wealth of
others.” He quotes Gabriel Ardent that credit and credit system is a “power mechanism of
exploitation” and “one of the most effective instruments of exploitation man has managed to
create” (Lazzarato 20-21). Lazzarato further argues that “even though neoliberalism equally
involves the economy and subjectivity, ‘work’ and ‘work on the self,’ it reduces the latter to
an injunction to become one’s own boss, in the sense of ‘taking upon oneself’ the costs and
risks that business and the State externalize onto society” (Lazzarato 93). Taking Lazzarato’s
formula between the state and the society and extrapolating it into the economic relationship
between Europe and the Middle East, as Roger Owen examined in the example of nineteenth
century Egypt, the imperialists’ strategy to subjugate becomes evident on the state level. In
other words, by closely controlling the state, they maintain a tight control over the
population. This explains the support of capitalist powers of autocratic rulers in the Middle
East, even to this day. Owen argues on the case of Egypt, “the role of the metropolitan states
in relation to their capitalists, [and] the nature of the Egyptian state and the changes in the
Egyptian social structure which imperial penetration produced,” all to be among the efforts to
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transform the colonized region, not by military might, but through dependent economy, into a
submissive colony (Owen 111).
In all examples above, the configuration of power determines the relationship
between the members of society, or on the state level, between the colonizer and the
colonized. Speaking from a post-modern view, we now have long left behind the early
models of power, as Foucault elaborated; it is “not the ‘center of power’, not a network of
forces, but a multiple network of diverse elements . . . [It is] . . . a strategic distribution of
elements of different natures and levels” (Foucault [1975] 1977, 307). Nonetheless, as
suggested in this study, the most powerful element remains the creative powers that can
operate on multiple levels, particularly in implementing imperialistic mechanisms. The
element of imagination has also played an instrumental role in colonialism and sustaining its
grips on the Middle East.
Edward Said in Orientalism (1979) asserts that the European colonial programs were
predicated on an “imaginary Orient” (Said 177). He scrutinizes the role of the academics in
taking part in constructing the “imaginative meaning of Orientalism” (Said 3). He argues
that without examining Orientalism as a discourse one cannot possibly understand the
enormously systematic discipline by which European culture was able to manage—
and even produce—the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically,
scientifically, and imaginatively during the post-Enlightenment period.483
Said further notes the power relation presupposes the idea of “Orient,” for it defines
“the relationship between Occident and Orient . . . [as] a relationship of . . . domination,
[and] of varying degrees of a complex hegemony” (ibid). It is this “hegemony,” Said
maintains, which ensures the continuity and power of the “Occident” over the “Orient.” It
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solidifies “the idea of European identity as a superior one in comparison with all the nonEuropean peoples and cultures” (Said 7). Therefore, by creating “us” and “them,” the West
has established and maintained its hegemony over the “Orient.” In all the political, cultural,
and military interactions with the Middle East, as situations evolved into more modern times,
the West’s written and cited authority on the Middle East has gone through a process as well.
Said explains:
The Orient needed first to be known, then invaded and possessed, then re-created by
scholars, soldiers, and judges who disinterred forgotten languages, histories, races and
cultures in order to posit them—beyond the modern Oriental’s ken—as the true
classical Orient that could be used to judge and rule the modern Orient.484
Thusly, Europe maintained its distance with the “Orient.” In the literary examples he
closely examines, Said disentangles how the Western observer of the “Orient,” while his
presence is not directly tangible, allows himself to speak of the Orient’s “backwardness, its
silent indifference, its feminine penetrability . . .; this is why every writer on the Orient . . .
saw the Orient as a locale requiring Western attention, reconstruction, even redemption,” not
to mention receiving the added support from the literature on “the biological bases of racial
inequality,” and those referencing “scientific validity” that quickly became incorporated into
the discourse and epistemology that further accentuated the binary state of the “advanced”
versus the “backward” subject (Said 206).485
Through the process of imagining and creating an “Orient,” the West successfully
dominated the “Orient.”486 This brings up the issue of mimesis through which the Europeans
imagined an Orient that they could then possess and exploit.487 But, on a more apparent level,
it is the general state of the visual arts during the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries that
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reveals emulation, whether from the European styles, or pre-Islamic arts in the case of Iran.
In both cases, while exhibiting some innovations, mimesis achieves a sense of stability and
continuity.

Modernism and the Visual Arts in the 19th and 20th Century Middle East
There appears to be a great difference in attitude toward the visual arts between the
nineteenth and the twentieth centuries in the Middle East (Vernoit 19). Whereas the
nineteenth century began with the domination of strict religious views on imagery,
particularly for the majority of the population and those “who did not enjoy court favor,” the
dawn of the twentieth century reveals “an unmistakable transformation in religious views” on
the arts. 488 The substantial changes were due to a series of religious edicts (fatwa), issued by
none other than Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905), the faithful pupil and follower of alAfghāni. In the spirit of modernization, Abduh argued for the “educational value” of the
visual imagery and ruled it had no incompatibility with the religious law (Vernoit 19). The
topic of visual imagery was not one that generally would be of concern to the Muslim
population, unless it was linked to idolatry. Therefore, as Vernoit notes, when it came to the
visual arts, not all held the same position. He explains: “The prevailing opposition to figural
art . . . was stronger in Ottoman and Arab lands than Iran or India” (Vernoit 22). Nonetheless,
with the emergence of Wahhabi’s movement in mid-eighteenth century, and their joining
forces “with the Ibn Sa’ud family of Dar’iyya” in the Arabian Peninsula, actions were taken
against shrine cities of Karbala, Mecca and Medina, which were meant as “directly
challenging the Ottoman rule” in the region (ibid). It is worth mentioning that in Wahhabi
belief, building elaborate tombs and mosques, as well as using any type of luxury material,
were prohibited. Therefore, they were “hostile both to the Ottoman and the Qajar rulers, the
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former on account of their Sufi tendencies . . . and the latter for their Shi’ism” (ibid). Their
fundamental views advocated an emulation of the practices from the early years of Islam’s
emergence.
With all the oppositions and resistance from the orthodoxy, the visual arts became an
inseparable part of the modernization in the Middle East. This is evident in the number of
portraits commissioned by the rulers (Ottoman and Qajar) (Vernoit 23), as well as the
funerary monuments for the Ottoman rulers that employed an eclectic combination of
Baroque, Rococo and Neo-Classical, which became known as the Ottoman court style.489
Similarly, the city of Cairo under Muhammad Ali underwent transformation, particularly due
to the demands of the “growing European community” (Behrens-Abouseif 111) there at this
time. The civil architectural style in the rapidly expanding city was “introduced mainly by
Ottoman Greeks, Armenians, and Italians.” Whereas the ordinary residences remained
faithful to local taste, it was the religious architecture that demonstrated more of the “foreign
influence (Behrens-Abouseif 112). Contrastingly, in building for industrial, administrative, or
educational purposes, it was the European building styles that were adopted (BehrensAbouseif 113).
While there are plenty of examples from Egypt and the Ottoman Turkey that show
emulation from European grand styles, early on, the Qajars in Iran looked to the examples
from the pre-Islamic past (Scarce 235-36).490 The Sasanian and Achaemenid styles of
architecture can be seen in the palaces as well as the carved stone relief narratives (Scarce
236). Nevertheless, in the second half of the nineteenth century, as argued by Scarce,
“Nas[se]r al-Din Shah’s interpretation of the pre-Islamic past” became distinctly different
“from that of his great-grandfather, as it was influenced by the impact of new technical
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resources that both interested him personally and were used as effective means of royal
propaganda” (Scarce 239).491
Whereas the visual arts may not have been central in the everyday life of the general
public in the nineteenth century Middle East, sending students abroad, the establishing of
European style schools, and training artists continued until the early part of the twentieth
century and no doubt left its impressions on the arts (Pappè 167), although the visual arts
were never linked to the issues of identity and belonging in the cases of Turkish or Arab
culture. It “indicates how the visual arts reflect the . . . hesitations of self and external
identity” (ibid). As for Iran, the pre-Islamic art and culture remains (to this day) a source of
inspiration, and “their revival and renewal . . . can be seen as an attempt to seek the security
of a unique identity” (Scarce 246). It is in the mimesis, therefore, that a continuity of stability
is sought.

MIMESIS: THE SCHOOL OF IMITATION AND THE UNDERMINING OF SUBJECTIVITY
By now, it should be clear that the process of modernization in the Middle East had as
its major component the ever-present element of emulation from the West, whether it be art
or technology. In the criticism of creative endeavors and what shapes subjectivity, therefore,
it is important to tackle the issue of mimesis here. I intend to examine mimesis in two
capacities: as a mechanism of representation, reflection, and imagination; and second, as a
practical application: a practice within the religious realm as taqlīd, or imitation (Adamson
defines it as “uncritical dependence on authority”), which developed as a way to facilitate
and follow the religious instructions. I suggest, as a “fundamental mechanism” of power, in
both capacities mimesis has been implemented by patriarchy to achieve unity and continuity,
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as well to maintain a collective (as opposed to individual) consciousness that can be easily
persuaded toward its own goals.

The Significance of Mimesis in the “Dynamics of Affirming Continuity”
The term mimesis in an Aristotelian context is a reminder of his argument with Plato
in defense of the artist in the republic (Aristotle Poetics 1996). Plato’s low opinion of
mimesis underscores the inadequacy of the imitative arts with respect to the realm of the
“real,” thus resulting in the alienation of the artists as alterity in the process. Aristotle’s
argument, however, emphasized the capacity of mimesis in illustrating human drama through
imitating the character in the story as well as acquiring knowledge (Poetics xii). Whereas the
concern with mimesis proved critical in the realm of the aesthetics, it is during the late
antiquity and through Neoplatonism that the notion of mimesis expands to encompass all
“philosophical issues from the sensory to the metaphysical domain” (Halliwell 2002, 313). In
turn, mimesis enters the intellectual realm with far and wide consequences; its evolution into
“mimetic theorization,” with the potential to adapt, reaches well beyond the late antiquity
“from the fifteenth century Renaissance to the era of romanticism.” Stephen Halliwell
elaborates:
Neoplatonism is so revisionist as to require a concept of Platonism as something more
than a static affiliation—rather as a kind of philosophical spirit capable of perpetual
revivification, though each time in a subtly different guise. [Therefore,] Neoplatonism
. . . became a primary channel for the transmission of Plato’s ideas beyond the
boundaries of paganism.492
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Plotinus appears to be ambivalent on the issue of mimesis. At times he appears to
view it in a positive light, as how a work of art can remind us of the ideal form which
manifests itself in the imagination of the artists; then, through technique and material, it is
given physical form (V.8. 1-2).493 In other places, he seems prepared to placate the Platonists
by downplaying the artistic products through stating they are inferior to nature (V.8.1. 33).
Then, once again he argues that the arts are not just products of a mimetic process. In a larger
scheme of things, Plotinus explains that in mimesis lies the intention of seeking and unifying
with the original form (V.8.1. 35-36). Plotinus, therefore, redefines mimesis and develops it
into a mode that itself can regenerate and transform according to one’s different purposes.494
There are others who have explored opportunities of redefining mimesis with regards to the
issue of interconnectivity of mimesis, continuity, and art.
Tom Huhn in an article picks up on the renewal theme and notes: “Mimesis is an
ideal term to describe the dynamics of affirming continuity between things and ourselves.” 495
In other words, mimesis bridges the gap between knowing and not knowing for us, between
the realm of illusion and the domain of the real, and wherever there is obscurity and
intermittence. Paul Ricoeur argues that the “reconceptualization” of mimesis actually first
took place when Aristotle parted ways with Plato; it is when Aristotle recognized the
“dynamism” and “action” involved in mimesis, and not just “producing a weakened image of
pre-existing things” (Ricoeur 1991, 137-138). Thus, Ricoeur submits, this “mimesis brings
about an augmentation of meaning in the field of action, which is its privileged field,” and
which he calls “creative imitation” (ibid). Therefore, here in mimesis, the emphasis is on the
“making of meaning,” which “is another mimetic means of forging continuities” (Huhn 204).
The mediation of mimesis, by way of creativity and imagination, was extended to
mechanisms of implementing power, particularly through religious authorities.
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Taqlīd and its Relation to Sufism and Philosophy
The term taqlīd, which means to imitate (it has also been translated as “to follow”496 Adamson translates it as uncritical dependence on authority), is a significant phenomenon
with respect to the issue of subjecthood. If we define free consciousness as one being a
subject to itself, it then follows that one is responsible for one’s own actions, just as the
Mu’tazilites had argued (Adamson 2016, 13). Thus the correlation between “freedom” and
“responsibility” becomes evident in the above statement.497 Adamson refers to the Sunni
criticism of taqlīd, as it has been practiced by Shi’ite tradition.498 However, both Sunni and
Shi’ite, even the Sufi traditions, implemented mimesis into their practices in one form or
another.499 Whereas the Shi’ites call it taqlīd,500 the Sunnis refer to it as qiyās (translated as
“reasoning” or analogy in Adamson 2016, 167).501 Similarly, the Sufi tradition calls for the
unquestionable submission to and the guidance of the pir or the master (the Perfect Man).502
Further examples, as discussed in chapter three, are the visual language used by Rūmī and
Ibn Arabī (Adamson 2016, 195 and 349), who were heavily reliant upon mimesis in their
literary works.
Consequently, while each denouncing the other, all three groups, emulating a
particular pattern of reasoning inspired at the source by Aristotelian reasoning, justified some
sort of mimesis that undermined the free conscious, thus limiting freedom by way of
relieving the individual of any responsibility. As a result, consistent with the master-slave
pattern (in its ideological sense), and the deterministic foundation (laid since the time of the
Ash’arites and al-Ghazālī), the binary division between those who “know” and those who
don’t ensured the dependency of the individual on the ulama. What qualified the ulama was
their studies in the Hadith and the Prophet’s Sunna (tradition) narrated by a chain of sources.
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These extensive accounts were extremely influential in how the laws were interpreted and
implemented.503
An important figure who played an effective role in the institutionalization of taqlīd is
Nasīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī (1201-1274).504 Al-Tūsī believed in the necessity of a teacher or guide,
since he was of the opinion that not
all humans are equal in intellect. This would inevitably lead to a kind of relativism in
which all believers would be equal, and there would be no point sorting true from
false. Thus, the more imperfect minds should look to a perfect mind to help them.505
The requirement of “intellect” (aql) had already been argued for by Avicenna and
established by him epistemologically; even though named differently by each, “intellect” was
part of both Shi’ite and Sunni tradition of reasoning (Adamson 2016, 332). What is of most
significance is that mimesis rests at the foundation of all judgments that have influenced, and
continue to influence, laws and policy that impact the individual to the benefit of patriarchy;
by removing all responsibility from the individual, such policies restrict freedoms as well.
This becomes more visible during the twentieth century, despite the democratic movements,
which I will examine in the next chapter.
To sum up the proposed ideas in this chapter, it is the notion of the subject that
continues to be the center of my concern. In this chapter my objective was to demonstrate
how the origins of disregard for the subjective experience go back to medieval Baghdad. This
is a significant point in the history of the Middle East, for it also coincided with the first time
that Islam was transformed into a political ideology. While the Abbasid period marks the
flourishing of the arts and sciences in the region, I demonstrated there was a political
motivation behind the translation movement that collected and preserved the knowledge from
242

the antiquity. It was to provide a stable and concrete theory to philosophically legitimize the
rule of the Abbasid empire. I established that while the knowledge was collected, translated
and commented on, some of the scientific leads, particularly what could have had an impact
on individual experience, did not reach their full potential. Instead, it was the Neoplatonic
interpretation that was favored and mostly applied, since it well-matched the patriarchal and
traditional structure in the region.
I also demonstrated that there is link between the notion of subjectivity and seeing, as
the idea was manifested through the camera obscura during the European Renaissance, but
this idea actually came from Alhazen, and his new theory on vision invited one to experience
for oneself through senses. However, unlike Europe, this idea did not find fertile grounds to
develop further in the Middle East. Moreover, what additionally undermined the
development of subjectivity was the important text, The Arabic Plotinus that consisted of
translation of parts of the Enneads, as well as original and complementary ideas. The
influential Arabic Plotinus eventually marks a watershed among Muslim philosophers as
they part ways at its juncture: one group, headed by Averroes becomes rationalist and proAristotle, and the other, led by al-Ghazali, takes the Neoplatonic approach and becomes
emanationist. The latter, not long after the split, dominates the scene of Islamic philosophy in
such a way that it infuses with matters of faith and religion, and becomes unquestionable.
Nonetheless, one witnesses in Europe, the subject turns against its “other,” even though they
arrived at that position through their alterity (i.e. Muslims).
Also considered in this chapter is the issue of colonialism, which not only formed
subjectivities in the region, as argued by Fanon and Said, but also played a crucial role in
shaping resistance against, now-the-Middle East’s other, the West. I discussed the theories
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that attempted to bring about reformation, however with the focus on the idea of using Islam
as means to counter colonialism. One form of coming to terms with modernism was to seek
mimetic strategies in the production of the arts. Considering the importance of this concept, I
concluded this chapter with an analysis of the idea of mimesis and mapped it on to a
comparable religious practice, Taqlid, which has ensured the continuity and stability in the
patriarchal system.

244

CHAPTER SIX
The Formation of Islamic Republic of Iran upon Imagination and Mimesis:
Subjecthood and The Rule of Jurisprudence

The Iranian revolution of 1978-79 shocked the world and set in motion a search for causes.
Most of the resulting analyses tend to locate the origins of the revolution in the errors of the
shah and of various Americans, although some scholarly works assay socioeconomic
explanations for the upheaval.506
— Nikki Keddie
In comparison with the revolutions in the West, the people’s uprising in the winter of
1979 in Iran stands out in that it was led by the high-ranking members of the religious class,
or the ulama, who toppled the last monarch and ended the rule of monarchy in Iran (Keddie
1983, 579). However, this was not the first time that the people of Iran had risen up to bring
about political change; during the course of the twentieth century and prior to the 1979
revolution, the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-11, and the oil nationalization movement
under Mohammad Mosaddeq from 1951-53, are the two major examples. Nevertheless, out
of the three rebellions/revolutions in the twentieth century Iran, the 1979 movement was the
first revolution that had led to the full usurpation of political power by the traditional,
religious patriarchy (Paidar 1995, 18). It compels one to inquire: how was the class of clergy
that historically always enjoyed a position of prominence, albeit in the shadow of the
monarchy, able to achieve absolute political dominance in Iran nearly a hundred years after
the start of the democratic and reformative movements?
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I argue, despite the campaigns toward modernization and political reforms, the lack of
a conscious subjecthood507 persisted into the twentieth century, mainly due to the
pervasiveness of Neoplatonic ideas that by this time had become part of the knowledge and
philosophy of the ulama,508 and after the Iranian revolution were implemented into the
ideology of the rule of jurisprudence.509 I further submit the analysis of all significant events
leading up to the Iranian 1979 revolution, as mapped onto Hegel’s master -slave dialectic,
provides additional evidence that it was idealism in the thoughts of the Iranian reformers that
paved the way for the rise to power of a theocracy. Moreover, the subjecthood as an issue has
conveniently remained obscure to the theoreticians and philosophers, who initially helped the
Iranian revolution to succeed, and later set out to resolve the inner conflicts of such a ruling
philosophy. These thinkers strove to restore the aforementioned religio-political philosophy,
either through a revival of the Hellenized Islamic philosophy, inherited from the philosophers
of the translation movement through the incorporation of Aristotelian reason, or by applying
Western hermeneutic philosophy, as in the case of contemporary reformists such as Mujtahid
Shabestari, or by invoking a historical Persian past in the idea of “Iranshahri,” by Javad
Tabatabaei. I maintain, thinking idealistically, none of these groups or individuals has taken
into consideration the importance of emancipating the individual from being subject to all but
itself first, prior to commencing any reforms.
The modernization that had carried the fruits of the Enlightenment and made
consumers out of the people of the Middle East, and in this case Iran, was extended to a
superficial version of the idea of political freedom, without any provisions for the individual
consciousness or recognition of the subject on its own merit. As a result, the subjects
continued to be recognized either as subjects to monarchy and nationalistic aspirations, or
later as subjects to their politicized Shi’ite belief, which had extended roots in medieval
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times—the time of politicization of Islam by incorporating Greek philosophy, first during the
Abbasids, then tailored specifically for Shi’ites through the Safavids as explained in the
previous chapters. Consequently, all political revolutions/movements for democracy in Iran
have failed to this point.510 Further, I submit, almost all studies on the twentieth century Iran
have sought the reasons behind these revolutions in the socio-econo-political factors. There
are two examples in consideration here. In Ma Chegoneh Ma Shodim (How did we become
who we are) ([1995] 2016), Sadegh Ziba Kalam criticizes all theories that reason the “falling
behind of Iran,” rejecting the “the Arab invasion,” “colonialism,” and “conspiracy theory.”
Instead, he argues this was due to the geography, harsh climate, underlying tribal nature of
the government historically, nomadic life style and lack of social stability, a centralized
government with a heavy hand, as well as “the extinguished light of sciences.” Another
author, Kazem Alamdari argues in Why the Middle East Lagged Behind; The Case of Iran
(2005) that the Middle East in general, and Iran in particular, lacked what capitalism made
possible for the west, namely the separation of church and state. He further argues it is
through a sociological study of the history that one understands the roots of the impediments
in the socio-economic developments in Iran, which underscores the deeply integrated state
and religion in Iran, as an antithesis to capitalism. Immanuel Wallerstein in his The Capitalist
World Economy ([1979] 2002) is well aware of this problem and has responded by proposing
a system of categorization that underscores the link between political power and economy.
This study, however, concentrates on the philosophical analysis of what informs
subjectivity and what has shaped the type of government emerging out of the 1979
revolution. Tracking the trails of patriarchy, Neoplatonic, and creative enterprises into the
twentieth century, I suggest a philosophical discourse acknowledging the issue of
subjecthood, where there is none, is required to counterbalance all other philosophical
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suggestions predicated on collective consciousness. I will limit the scope of this inquiry to
the case study of Iran and its reformative and democratic movements in the twentieth
century. The Shi’ites’ complex view of spiritual versus political authority finds a new
reflection after the 1979 revolution in taking over as a political authority, while maintaining
its religious content. Whereas the religious and the secular positions of authority have always
been important parts of the equation, I will begin by focusing on the relationship between
these two sources of power and how they shaped the subjects in the twentieth century. 511

THE RIVALRY OF RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR POSITIONS OF AUTHORITY – FROM THE
CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY TO THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION OF 1979
The Safavid period (1501-1722) was not just a turning point in the consolidation of
country and creating a strong economic partner to Europe, but it established Persia as a
country with a strong unified political leadership. Internally, however, this was made
possible through instituting the Twelver Shi’ism as the state religion at the cost of
marginalization and exclusion of other religious groups and branches such as the Sunnis,
Sufis, and even other Shi’a branches like the Ismailis.512 It is worth noting in comparison
Sunni Islam developed in an environment of “Sunni state,” which meant “political sphere
was incorporated into the doctrine of religious sphere,” thus the political establishment
enjoyed the support of religion (Momen 191).513 However, being a minority among the
Sunnis the majority of the time, the Shi’is drew authority from the “Imam” (a descendant
from the Prophet through his daughter’s line), in whom they sought and valued the spiritual
guidance, particularly in the pre-Safavid eras. Moojan Momen (1985) argues, it is at this time
that the model of kingship was emulated from the pre-Islamic Sasanian period and “the title
‘Shadow of God on Earth’ became an expression of that” (Momen 192). Nevertheless,
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whereas the Sunnis lived in a society of well-integrated sacred with secular, Shi’is felt as
outsiders, and maintained distinction, even a “rivalry” between the leadership of “Imam,”
what was represented in the ulama, and his followers and those who controlled political
matters (ibid). This equation changed after the Safavids and by nineteenth century the ulama,
had achieved many advantages.
Whereas the Qajar kings could not claim lineage to the Prophet’s family, similar to
what the Safavid had done, they required the assistance of the ulama to provide the
legitimacy of their rule. Momen argues “[t]he ulama were prepared to grant this but used the
opportunity to consolidate their position and affirm their independence” (194).514 A “Shi’i
political theory” emerged, which was predicated on the idea that “the Imam held both the
religious and the political leadership in the community.” Nonetheless, since the Twelfth
Imam had entered “Occultation” and was hidden, his authority was to be divided between
two groups:
[T]he Na’ibs (representatives or vicegerents) of the Hidden Imam: the ulama who are
charged with religious vicegerency and the rulers who have political vicegerency. If
these two co-operate then the affairs of the community run smoothly since the ulama
cannot apply the Shari’a unless the ruler establishes order, while the ruler needs the
ulama without whose guidance he will stray towards injustice and tyranny. 515
This, Momen argues, provided the “theoretical framework” until the revolution of
1979 (195). Parvin Paidar notes that at this time the institutionalization of Shi’ism was
accompanied by “acquiring features,” which made it distinctly different from the state of
Islam in other regions within the Middle East.516 She elaborates on these different aspects as:
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[f]irst, the institution of Shiism became economically independent from the state by
setting up mechanisms for acquiring donations and endowment land (vaghf) from the
public. Second, by the establishment of the practice of [i]jtihad, a process by which a
mojtahed used his own reasoning in addition to the [K]oran and hadith to arrive at
legal decisions and issued religious instructions to his followers in the form of fatva
[…] Third, the Shii faithful were required to follow the religious instructions and
judgments, fatva of a living mojtahed on all aspects of social life. Fourth, the Shii
clergy took over the secular judicial system of the pre-Safavid period. These courts,
which had government-appointed judges, were gradually replaced by shariat courts
and Shii clergy gained the power to make judicial decisions and even administer
punishment. Fifth, a ‘dry’ formal, dogmatic, legalistic style of Shiism’ developed
which was reflected both in scholarly works and in more mundane religious
instructions to the faithful.517
It was these well-established and deeply rooted substructures, as the above quote
summarizes, which eventually empowered the religious leaders during the 1979 revolution.
Economically and independently funded, with the exclusive authority to interpret the key
religious texts that could be (and were) decreed into rules and judgments, as well as the
mandate to follow (taqlid), by the third quarter of the twentieth century, the religious class
was poised to elbow its way all the way to the top.518
When the modernization campaigns in the nineteenth century brought the European
technological achievements to Iran as discussed earlier, it may be argued the intellectual
exchanges that inspired the ideas of equality, justice, and freedom for the Iranian intellectuals
on the basis of Western modernization also transmitted such ideas on the same superficial
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level.519 In the nineteenth century, the attempts made to remedy this problem took the shape
of anti-colonial arguments, as in the writings of Jamal ad-Din Asadabadi; his proposals were
predicated on the idea that Muslims should seek their own evolution toward such ideas by
drawing inspiration from Islam (Keddie [1968] 1983). However, as influential and
revolutionary as his ideas were, Jamal ad-Din was striving for a unity among Muslims
(Keddie 1983 [1968], 79), beyond ethnic and nationalistic differences, so that they may
counteract the incursions of the Europeans into the Middle East. In his writings he criticizes
the “egoism” and defines it as putting one’s own “personal interest above the general
welfare,” which causes “the bond of fusion and interdependence” to be broken (ibid).
Further, he was promoting a kind of “intellectual elitism” by drawing on “the traditional
belief in the necessity and utility of social distinctions . . . bolstered by religious teachings” in
order to elevate the masses (ibid). Combined together, the ideas of the reunification of
Muslims and their striving for “privilege and distinction” through religion were prescribed by
Jamal ad-Din as the solution to deal with European colonialism. However, one must keep in
mind his Islamic references by this time had gone through Hellenization, once during the
translation movement (Gutas 7), and then developed further and synthesized with
Neoplatonic philosophy during the Safavids (Adamson 2016, 399). Although some argue his
vision was inspired by what had taken place in the West (Adamiyat 1978, 32) and he was
calling for reforms to eradicate superstitious interpretations of Shi’ite Islam of his time, it
may be reasoned he was influenced by the Hegelian philosophy, itself influenced by
Neoplatonism.520 Jamal ad-Din “was an ardent anti-imperialist, who considered the adoption
of Western science and technology in Muslim countries as an instrument for waging an
effective opposition against imperialist advances” (Paidar 46).521 Therefore, in Jamal adDin’s mind, the concept of and what gave meaning to “freedom,” for instance, was
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interpreted as freedom from European colonialism, not the liberation of a subject toward free
conscious and individuality, similar to discourses that had shaped the European ego. 522
Among those who had seen modernism in Europe but viewed the implementation of
the rule of law as the most important reform is Yousuf Khan Mostashar al-Dowleh (18131895), who was a “decent man and a great diplomat and statesman.”523 Mostashar al-Dowleh,
in his book Yek Kalameh (One Word), argued for a state with laws that treated all equally.
Adamiyat regards Yek-Kalameh to be “the most important treatise on individual social rights,
which was published in 1870” (1980, 83). Seyyed Javad Tabatabaei (2007) argues, more than
being political, Yek Kalameh was a document advocating a legal system that necessitated the
transition from shari’a (religious laws), to a “common law system” (Tabatabaei 2007, 14). 524
Mostashar al-Dowleh,525 therefore, had understood that an important aspect of individual
freedom was to be held accountable, and that could be implemented through common law.
However, this notion was not understood this way in his own time,526 and the main concern
remained how one was going to negotiate and fare this legal authority with the center of
tradition, which was shari’a; thus, the question of subjecthood persisted as indistinct.527
Similarly, this ambiguity continued during the Revolution of 1979. At this time, too,
the ideas of freedom and democracy were being expressed without a clear, common and
agreed upon context (Abrahamian 1982, 515),528 and without the recognition of the
individual subject, equivalent to what had been experienced by the Europeans. There was
even no consensus on the definition of the word among the different opposition groups.
Consequently, while there may have been a diversity of ideas, in the absence of independent
subjectivity, there were essentially no effective intercommunication links; rather, there
existed only conflicting and competing debates, ideas, and road maps proposed and
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represented by the collective consciousness of the followers of each group. It is these
competitions that eventually paved the way for the oldest patriarchal group of them all to
take over the rest and eliminate its rivals.529
Furthermore, the ideology behind the Revolution of 1979, which was supported by an
established, synthesized religious philosophy that justified the interest and the role of the
religious leaders of the revolution, was met with no countering philosophy on the part of the
monarch that could bring to present the legitimacy of his rule philosophically.530 Hence,
whereas the mechanisms of power predicated on the religious philosophy were embedded
within the communities and in harmony with the masses (i.e. through charitable taxes,
exclusive authority of the ulama on religious texts, taqlid, ritual gatherings, etc.) and were
able to mobilize them,531 the secular and political state apparatus of the Shah had no such
popular positions and were made to situate themselves against the revolutionaries. 532 These
revolutionaries had powerful presence on the streets through demonstrations during the
months leading up to the night of February 11, 1979.
To closely examine the complex role of the masses, one must return to the Iranian
Constitutional Revolution that “introduced the constitutional system of government in which
‘the people’ were sovereign” for the first time (Abrahamian 1993a, 289). However
comparatively, the crowd on the streets during all three political events (Constitutional
Revolution, Nationalization of Oil and the ensuing 1953 coup, and the Revolution of 1979),
were representative of different ideas, even though their movements have been collectively
viewed as steps toward democracy in Iran. The Constitutional Revolution, for instance, has
been called the manifestation of “the early phase of the discourse of modernity” 533 and prodemocratic movement (Paidar 52), due to the direct involvement of the masses. 534
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The Significance of the Crowd and the Role of “Fear” and “Pity”
Prior to the mobilization of the masses toward a constitutionalist objective, it is worth
noting the earliest signs of public demonstration appeared in the late nineteenth century
following “an economic concession given to a British company by Naser od-Din Shah [sic] .
. . for curing and selling tobacco,” in 1890 (Paidar 50 and Keddie 1968, 29). The news of this
concession was made public and criticized by the contemporary Iranian newspapers
published abroad, which “gave rise to massive protests . . . led by clerics . . . with merchants
as [their] allies” (ibid).535
There was no “legitimate reason” for making such a concession to the British
company. 536 Adamiyat argues that this was a profitable domestic economic endeavor that
“the Iranian tobacco planters, businessmen and merchants were perfectly capable of
managing” (1978, 36).537 Even before the official announcement regarding the concession,
the opposition began offering their reasons for why this was a bad decision on the part of the
government and how it hurt Iran’s domestic economy (Adamiyat 1978, 37). 538 The ulama did
not remain silent on the issue and saw the concession as “the sale of Iran to unbelievers”
(Keddie 1968, 29). This reference is to Jamal ad-Din’s “famous” letter to the Shi’ite mujtahid
(religious authority) in Iraq and urging him to act, which he did (ibid). Mirza Shirazi’s decree
(fatva) was issued and prohibited the use of tobacco by the Iranian consumers (ibid). It can
be surmised, then, that when it came to imperialism and the British, Jamal ad-Din
temporarily set aside differences with the traditional ulama, and sought to utilize their
influence in any way he could in order to thwart colonial incursions. The consequence of the
protests both by the merchants, the religious crowd, and women in particular, of which
Paidar gives specific accounts, led to the cancelation of the concession.539 Paidar notes some
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of the insults shouted toward the Shah during the protests “calling him the female with a
mustache,” “scarf wearer” and “unbeliever” (Paidar 51). The fact that women themselves
were active participants is noteworthy according to Paidar; however, the use of terms that
were denigrating to women is telling of their unconscious subjectivity; it also reflects their
religious concerns.
The anatomy of the crowd in the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1905-9 has
been examined by Ervand Abrahamian.540 He argues, contrary to the portraits painted of such
a crowd as ‘criminals’ or ‘hired thugs,’ they were diverse groups of people, from
“merchants” to “religious authorities,” “shopkeepers, workshop owners, craftsmen,
apprentices, journeymen, and students” (Abrahamian 1993a, 306). Nevertheless, the
changing sides of some groups in the midst of the revolution is of great significance. During
1905-1906, it appears that the protests were initially for constitutional rights, and targeted the
royal court and the injustices carried out by the court-appointed officials (Abrahamian 1993a,
296; Paidar 1995).541 By mid-1907, however, the constitutionalists were not the only group
on the streets; the royalists began to gather influence and demonstrate on the streets as well,
challenging the constitutionalists (Abrahamian 1993a, 296).542 How some changed sides
(from liberalist constitutionalists to royalists) and how conservative royalists’ plight was
reacted to by the liberalist and even the intellectuals and the media is revealing.
Abrahamian makes the point that the constitutionalists, “anxious to stress the popular
legitimacy of the revolution, either ignored the royalist demonstrations or . . . dismissed them
in derogatory terms.”543 This pitted the royalists, consisting of “upper” and “lower”
classes,544 against the members of the bazaar, which was the center of urban economy. The
same conflicts happened in other provinces, and reportedly out of the conflicts, two groups,
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‘the people’s party’ and ‘the aristocratic party’ emerged. 545 The royalists’ demonstrations
received a boost from the support and participation of the religious leaders, which
“transformed these demonstrations from purely pro-Shah assemblies into ‘Shah and Islam’
rallies and riots” (Abrahamian 1993a, 298).
Up until 1906, there was indeed a divide, albeit an uneven one, between the religious
communities, with those associated with the court supporting the royalists, and others like the
“popular Mujtahids” (religious leaders) and traditional teachers supporting the
constitutionalists. In fact, a number of clerics, such as Mohammad Hossein Na’ini, argued
that there was no conflict between Islam and the constitutional rule. Na’ini also argued “that
it was the best type of rule in the absence of the messianic twelfth emam [sic]” (Paidar 52).
Eventually, this divide became more balanced once the liberalists “revealed . . . their secular
intentions: anti-clericalism, feminism and egalitarianism between Shi’ites and non-Shi’ites,
and Muslims and non-Muslims” (Abrahamian 1993a, 298; Paidar 1995, 56). In 1907,
progressive newspapers began criticizing the ulama and satirized their decrying that “religion
was dying.”546
The issues of non-Muslims and women, argues Abrahamian, were a tipping point that
compelled some of the ulama to “forsake the dangerous road of constitutionalism for the
safety of traditional despotism,” which was clearly echoed in their motto “No Absolutism,
No Islam” (Abrahamian 1993a, 299).547 They persuaded the “common people” to side with
the royalists, by calling the constitutionalists “irreligious, heretical and anti-Islamic.”548
There were also other factors, such as the rise in the price of bread, a staple food, and “the
fact that they had gained nothing from the revolution.” Abrahamian’s associating the proconstitutionalists with the bourgeois class here underscores the role of business and
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commerce, which proved to be not necessarily to the benefit of the “propertyless and lower
classes” (Abrahamian 1993a, 300).549 The consequences of economic advantages the liberals
received in the agricultural market translated into the continuous rise in prices that led to the
angry crowd turning violent against the wealthy. 550
The poor members of the crowd were beginning to realize they “had nothing to gain
from the revolution,” so they turned toward the religious leaders and the anti-constitutionalist
royalists (Abrahamian 1993a, 300).551 This further strengthened the king’s camp and
emboldened him to strike “harder by first organizing violent anti-constitutionalist
demonstrations and then bombing the Majlis in June 1909 (Paidar 1995, 56). The king,
Mohammad Ali Shah, accomplished the demolition of the parliament with the assistance of
the Russians’ Cossack Brigade, which was followed by the imprisonment and execution of
some of the liberal leaders (Abrahamian 1993a, 304). Despite the king promising “to reopen
the parliament in three months, purged not of patriotic constitutionalists but of irreligious
revolutionaries,” the unrest continued and spread to other provinces and cities and turned into
a civil war (Abrahamian 1993a, 305 and Paidar 1995, 56). Once again, the “bourgeois”
merchants in the bazaar began their strike, and by July 1909 “the Bakhtiari tribesmen and the
Caucasian fighters reached Tehran.” Not having enough money to pay his mercenaries, and
facing a “hostile bazaar, the royalist cause collapsed . . . M[o]hammad Ali Shah was deposed
. . . [and the] prominent reactionaries such as Shaykh Fazlallah and Mir Hashim 552 were
executed for ‘hiring thugs to create public disturbances,’ and the second Majlis553 was
convened.”554
The second through the fourth decades of the twentieth century was, according to
Paidar, “[t]he second phase of the discourse of modernity” in “nation building” that followed
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the “post-constitutional developments” (Paidar 78). By 1925 the Qajars, who were “weak,
corrupt and vulnerable to political manipulation by Western powers,” were replaced by Reza
Shah Pahlavi (1925-1941), who, contrastingly, “seemed to fulfill the demand for a strong
state capable of overcoming Iran’s economic, technological and military weaknesses” (ibid).
The centralization came, however, at the cost of the elimination of the many of the diverse
and grass root organizations as well as political parties that had been formed after the
constitutional movement (Abrahamian 1982, 135 and Paidar 80); the concentration of power
also alienated some of the clerics.555 There is much evidence that the clerics made their
influence throughout the twentieth century.
In the first half of the twentieth century, the struggle had been whether to maintain the
national unity, or preserve Islamic values, as interpreted by the ulama. One of the harshest
criticism toward the ulama came from Ahmad Kasravi (1890-1946). Kasravi was a judge and
an advocate of reforms in Iran, but not of a blind following of Europe (Abrahamian 1982,
161).556 However, his sharpest attacks were aimed at the Shi’ite clergy and the Sufis, to
which I shall return.557 In his evaluation of Reza Shah, which was published in an article in
1942, he lays out a criticism of what the founder of Pahlavi dynasty had accomplished, which
speaks to an uncertainty toward Reza Shah.558 While Kasravi praised him for “centralizing
the state, pacifying the tribes, disciplining the clergy, unveiling women, eliminating
aristocratic titles, introducing mass conscriptions, undermining ‘feudal’ authorities, trying to
unify the population, and establishing modern schools, cities and industries,” he admonished
Reza Shah for “trampling over the constitution, favoring the military over the civilian
administration, accumulating a private fortune, stealing other people’s property, murdering
progressive intellectuals, and widening the gap between the haves and the have-nots”
(Abrahamian 1982, 154).
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While it appears, initially Reza Khan (before taking on the title “Shah”) wanted to
establish a republic, in a move inspired by Ataturk’s newly founded Turkish Republic, he
realized the clergy was not in agreement with the idea of “republicanism.” Since he still
needed their support, he decided to abandon the idea (Abrahamian 1982, 134 and Paidar 81).
By the end of World War II in 1945, and the occupation of Iran by the allies’ forces in order
to defeat the Germans, Iran saw challenges from various provinces, through the formation of
leftist, and some pro-Soviet parties, such as in Kurdistan and in Azerbaijan, each seeking
autonomy. The fear of fragmentation of the national unity and the infiltration of communism
will become the two most critical concerns of Reza Shah’s son and successor upon his
ascension to the throne (Paidar 119, 123). It is early during his reign that the Nationalization
of Oil movement takes shape, which tragically ended in the removal of his progressive and
democratically elected premier, Mohammad Mosaddeq (1951-1953).559
The study of the crowd during the toppling of Mosaddeq, the Iranian premier in the
1953 coup d’état is also illuminating. Abrahamian argues that Mosaddeq called on his
supporters to stay off the streets on that fateful day; 560 instead there was a crowd of only
three thousand that came out, which were connected with royalists and those who were
receiving funds from the CIA, including those sent by a prominent member of the clergy
(Abrahamian 2001). Abrahamian maintains that this was no uprising, and had it not been for
the presence of 24 tanks, the three thousand who eventually came to the streets on August 19,
1953 would not have been able to bring Mosaddeq’s government down.561 (See Appendix
IV).
The crowd during the Revolution of 1979 further demonstrates, if nothing else, the
close connection with the clergy, once again, particularly through the merchants of the
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bazaar. Furthermore, there were theoreticians who facilitated and provided the necessary
ideology behind the change.562 Just as with the previous movements,563 the wave of the
revolution in 1979 gained momentum from smaller, but significant earlier events (Keddie
1993, 609). In a comparison with the climate during the Constitutional Revolution of 1905,
Keddie argues that in 1978-79, “increasing number of Iranians shifted to progressive versions
of indigenous Islamic ideology perceived as likely to restore Iranian self-esteem and combat
Westernization.” This, she explains, was due to the general discontent from many groups
among the population,564 who had witnessed attacks on their customs and beliefs during the
fifty years of “forced . . . Westernization” by the Pahlavi dynasty (Keddie 1993, 615).
Interesting to note Homa Katouzian’s analysis on Iranians’ discontent with their rulers
(2009). He states:
Iranians typically opposed their rulers precisely because their lives and property were
in the rulers’ power. But they nearly always welcomed a ruler who emerged in the
midst of chaos and brought order, although once this was done society went back to
its habit of adopting a negative view of the state.565
The public discontent at the end of the Pahlavi era, as argued by Amanat, was due to
“the socio-economic, demographic, and cultural changes”; however, it was “not enough to
explain the potency of the forthcoming revolution and its swift success” (705). While initially
the only groups who “yearned for a revolution on the Marxist model” were the Fada’iyan-e
Khalq and Mojahedin Khalq “guerilla organizations,” it was the mass support of a religious
figure, Ayatollalh Khomeini “and his cohorts,” who capitalized on the people’s discontent
that had been building for decades (Amanat 2017, 705).
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Abrahamian elaborates and distinguishes in the support of the masses, two middle
classes: the traditional and the modern middle class. He argues it was the traditional class,
mainly “the bazarris and the clergy” that were “the backbone of Khomeini’s movement.” 566
However, it was “the modern middle class that sparked off the revolution, fueled it and,
struck the final blows” (1982, 533). Among these were “[l]awyers, judges, and intellectuals
[who] began to publish open letters, and form human rights associations” (ibid). One of the
first open letters cited by Amanat is the letter dated June 12, 1977 to the Shah from Karim
Sanjabi, Dariush Foruhar, and Shapur Bakhtiar in which they listed complaints ranging from
the “seriously mismanaged” oil revenue to “the disregard for human right and personal and
social liberties, a breach of the very foundation of the constitution,” to “growing corruption,
decadence, and sycophancy” (706). Among the modern middle class demonstrating on the
streets were the university students, joined by “bank clerks, civil servants” and others who
had “crippled the economy due to the undertaking of mass strikes. An important question
Abrahamian asks is, “[w]hy was the modern middle class, which in the past had deeply
distrusted the clergy, willing to follow Khomeini?”
To answer this question, Abrahamian suggests three reasons. First is the Shah’s late
response to the complaints and criticism. He resisted negotiating with the secular opposition
organizations, such as the National Front and the Liberation Movement until the final month
in 1978; they were calling for a “conciliatory” action from the Shah to implement changes in
his “autocratic rule” and to honor the Constitutional values. (Abrahamian 1982, 533 and
Amanat 706). The second and third reasons rest in how Khomeini manipulated the diverse
groups among the modern middle class.
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In his statements in the fall of 1978, following the massacre of “Black Friday,” he
particularly addressed the secular population with concerns that the Shah was planning to not
only eliminate the ulama, but also the “intelligentsia.” He assured the population that neither
he nor any of his cohorts had any intentions of replacing the monarchy with a theocracy. “He
told the press that the future government would be ‘democratic’ as well as ‘Islamic’.” 567
Khomeini also promised equality of women, drafting of a constitution of an Islamic republic
by a “freely elected Constituent Assembly” (Abrahamian 1982, 533-34).568
It is worth noting that the students and other modern middle class, due to the Shah’s
oppressive measures, despite being familiar with the Constitutional Revolution, had missed
the real history and had no critical knowledge of the “progressive thoughts” from earlier in
the century. Abrahamian notes, therefore,
[n]ot surprisingly [the] intellectuals . . . tended to see Khomeini, not as another
“reactionary” Shaykh Fazallah[sic] Nouri—whom he admired for rejecting the
Western systems of government—but as another “progressive Ayatallah [sic]
Tabatabai or Behbahani—whom he despised for being “led astray” by Westernized
politicians.569
Finally, Abrahamian presents as the third reason, Khomeini’s ability to obtain the
trust of the followers of Ali Shari’ati,570 even though “Shari’ati’s works contain a great deal
of anti-clericalism.” Abrahamian argues that Khomeini successfully set himself apart from
other “proregime” clerics by “stressing such themes as revolution, anti-imperialism,” and the
message of martyrdom.571 By the end of 1978, Shari’ati’s followers saw in Khomeini, not
just a cleric, but a true revolutionary leader, who was able to finally establish a “classless
society.”572 They elevated Khomeini with the title of “Imam,” a title that until then had been
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reserved only for the twelve holy Shi’ite Imams, who were the direct descendants of the
Prophet (Abrahamian 1982, 534).573 Overall, Abrahamian’s impression of Khomeini’s
movement and thoughts is that it is best described as “populism,” because “this term is
associated with ideological adaptability and intellectual flexibility,” contrary to
“fundamentalism [that] . . . implies religious inflexibility, intellectual purity, [and] political
traditionalism” (Abrahamian 1993b, 2).
The relationship between the clergy and the secular authorities cannot be thoroughly
examined without a consideration of the role of the two emotions of fear and pity, which are
closely tied to success or failure of action as noted by Aristotle (Poetics xxi). The creation of
a thought and idea that incites fear has its roots in the past. The fear then becomes what
controls and steers the power and energy of the crowd toward the objective of those whose
imagination brought to existence that fear in the first place.
The opposition of the religious leaders to the Western powers in manipulating the
politics in Iran has long stemmed from a belief that the Westerners, who are considered nonbelievers by the Shi’ite religious authorities, have had the intention of undermining “Iran and
Islam.” Therefore, a defining factor in resisting foreign culture and influence has been “Shi’i
Islam’s encouragement of self-sacrifice to combat enemies” (Keddie 1993, 607). Those who
sacrificed were then the subject of pity from others, whom the clerics attempted to draw
sympathy from for their own causes.574 One of the ways the religious leaders exploited this
notion (Kasravi, 1943, 70) was when they channeled the crowd’s energy through the emotion
of pity (aligning the stories of martyrdoms of the Prophet’s grandson in Karbala) with
successful results during the demonstrations leading up to the revolution.575 This was not a
new strategy. Kasravi notes in Shi’ism (1943) that “ever since the massacre at Karbala
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happened, it has caused anger and pity among Muslims, and many rose up to avenge, and
there has been much blood-shed. However, it was the Jafari576 Shi’ites who most exploited
this event for political ends” (70).
The issue of fear appears frequently in other contexts as well. While there are many
accounts of protests and criticism by the opponents of Shi’i ulama and their influence on the
policies, laws, and government, unlike the support and the protection Martin Luther received
from Frederick III, the Elector of Saxony, 577 individuals like Ahmad Kasravi or Mohammad
Mosaddeq not only did not receive such protection from the secular authorities, but the
secular authorities seemed to always join forces and side with the religious class for the fear
of one thing or another. Following the assassination of Kasravi in 1946, the secular
authorities aimed to please and oblige the wishes of the clergy who were lobbying to free the
assassins. During the premiership of Mosaddeq, the fear of the leftist Tudeh party compelled
the authorities to be on good terms with the religious leaders because they “hoped to use
them against the Tudeh” (Abrahamian 1982, 258) out of fear of the spread of communism.
Perhaps one of the fastest growing influential ideas that emerged was the rise of the
left in Iran, following the Russian 1917 revolution, even though Reza Shah had taken
measures to suppress all socialist ideas, to the detriment of all progressive parties
(Abrahamian 1982, 138, 139). Nonetheless, Abrahamian argues that the 1953 coup was not
out of the fear of communism so much as it was for maintaining the “control” over oil. This
may be true, but if we consider the confidential documents and intelligence collected by the
British at this time, 578 it becomes clear that the element of fear of communism was clearly a
useful strategy not just to manipulate the authorities in Iran, but to convince the Americans to
get involved (Abrahamian 2001, 211).
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An examination of the different opposition groups that unified under the leadership of
Ayatollah Khomeini in the Revolution of 1979 demonstrates, argues Keddie, for the most
part they “merely wished to escape the related evils of internal despotism and of
‘Westoxication’579—socioeconimic and cultural dependence on the West” (1993, 616). This
had been formulated into what Ayatollah Khomeini capitalized on in his speeches as he
warned the population of the consequences (Abrahamian 1982, 533). If a more critical point
of view had developed from judicious analyses that Kasravi started in the first half of the
twentieth century, Khomeini’s statements perhaps would not have been as easily taken at
face value.

The Critique of Shi’ism and Sufism
I cannot discuss waves of modernism and reforms without including the works of one
of the most important figures of the twentieth century Iran, Ahmad Kasravi. It is Kasravi’s
direct and blunt criticism of the religious, social, and political conditions in Iran that, while
compelling him to become a prolific analytic writer, also brought his demise at the hands of
the religious zealots in 1946. Two of his studies are of great interest here; these studies
demonstrate the degree of his rigor and commitment to eliminate what he saw as backward
and contradictory in any kind of reform. Kasravi writings on Shi’ism and Sufism reveal his
deep understanding of some of the most challenging obstacles in Iran toward the path of true
reforms.580
Kasravi had studied as a religious scholar and even initially wore the attire of a
cleric.581 As early as the 1930s he began writing analytically on Shi’ism. It has become clear
that he opposed not religion itself but Shi’ism and Islam as interpreted by the clergy. He
made a distinction between what all religions initially offered and what they turned into later
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on.582 Kasravi believed that change for the people of Iran was not possible unless change
came to their religious beliefs and they rejected values imposed by such beliefs.583
In his introduction to Shi’ism he argues what he has undertaken has to do with the
“problems of Iran” and that he has presented great evidence and “has reasoned,” and asks
that the reader exercise “indulgence” and “wisdom” in reading. He states he understands
many of the points he raises are unfamiliar to some, and that they may be “disheartened” by
them, but that they should “read two or three times” because his strong reasoning requires
that they do so, “for what they weren’t able to agree to the first time, upon the second and
third readings, they will come to understand” (Kasravi 1943a, 36-37).
Kasravi provides a historical account of the spread of Shi’ism in Iran and traces it
back to the time of Umayyad caliphs, against whose domination many Persians resisted
(Kasravi 1943a, 73). It was their resentment toward the Umayyads, argues Kasravi,
specifically caliph al-Mu’awiyya and not necessarily their “love for Ali” (the Prophet’s
cousin and deemed by Shi’ites to be his rightful heir) that led to the consolidation of their
political movements against the Umayyad caliphs (ibid). It is worth noting that the
Umayyads were toppled by the Abbasids, with the effective help and support of the Persians
(Bloom & Blair 2002, 74). Therefore, from the start, politics are an essential component to
the idea of Shi’ism, but perhaps the most effective strategy implemented by the clergy is
what Kasravi bluntly calls “exaggerations” and “lies” in his criticism of the Shi’ism.
In evaluation of the Shi’ite belief, Kasravi enumerates the pernicious effects of such
belief. One of his complaints is regarding the exaggerations that he stated would “astonish”
in phrases like “anyone who visits Hossein[’s shrine] in Karbala, it is as if he has visited God
enthroned” (71), or phrases that are reminiscent of the papal indulgences during European
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Renaissance. One of the obligatory rites for a good Shi’a was, regardless of the individual’s
laxness toward the regular religious duties and committing every prohibited act, “visiting the
tomb of Imam Hossein and weeping for him, [which] would wash away all their sins” (ibid).
Kasravi also complains about the lies the clergy told, and the people believed. He also
presents evidence that he himself was witness to, belief in a bird in Karbala that speaks the
phrase “Hossein was killed,” or another instance, when two to three individuals rolled a
bolder to the tomb of Imam Reza (the eighth Shi’ite Imam’s funerary sanctuary in North East
of Iran), and proclaimed the stone rolled by itself to come visit the Imam’s tomb. Kasravi
points out that the clergy, fully aware of falsity of such proclamations, chose to remain silent,
for they believed such actions “would strengthen the belief of the populace” (166).
There are pages filled with numerous examples that Kasravi offers to prove that such
exaggerations and lies undermine the dignity of humans and are beneath the religion of
Islam. These are, however, expressions from the imagination that perpetuate the superstitious
belief among the Shi’ite, argues Kasravi. Thus, the role of creative imagination endures to
maintain the clergies’ grip on the pulse of the people. These statements further undermine the
issue of a conscious subject, one who is subject to one’s own existence. However, Kasravi
does not stop at the criticism of Shi’ism. He mostly despised what he called
“introspectivism” about which he wrote in his book Sufism.
In Sufism (1943b), Kasravi attributes the roots of Sufism to Plotinus and Greek
thoughts (1943b, 43). He explains Plotinus’ philosophy as how all is emanated from the
“One,” thus exists the possibility of one re-joining the Divine consciousness by way of an
“altered state of mind;” Kasravi goes on to note that according to Plotinus, human soul, by its
descent in this world, has become contaminated, so by rejecting carnal desires, and focusing
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on nurturing its spirit, it reduces that contamination and achieves piety. In criticism Kasravi
states “these are dreamt by Plotinus, without offering any proofs” (1943b, 44). Kasravi
sharply criticizes Plotinus’ statement that “we all separated from God, are from him, and
toward Him we shall return.” He argues as if asking Plotinus, “How did you come to know
this?” “How does one define the ‘altered state of mind?” and “If one needs to turn away from
what this world has to offer, why and for whom was this world even created?” (1943b, 45).
Perhaps most significantly, Kasravi laments the effects of Sufism in training up a
population to be submissive, docile, and in the name of rejecting worldly needs, to relinquish
home, family and the protection of the country (1943b, 57-59). He notes “the Mongols
wanted the population this way, and it was in their interest that the Iranians surrender the
country and its governance [to the Mongols], and to keep occupied with Sufism and things
alike. [Indeed, t]he time of the Mongols was [like] the spring for such mis-guidedness and
mis-directed education” (ibid).
Kasravi was even critical of the works of Orientalists in the West, which he
considered an impediment in the progress of the population. He argues:
Sufism is and has been one of the causes of misfortune of the people [of Iran]. You
see Orientalists, who don’t have the best interest of the [so called] Orientals in mind,
have spent much effort to keep this institution [Sufism] from collapsing, and they
write volumes and articles on the subject of Sufism, and under the guise of historical
research, visibly support the sufis. This is why . . . the Cultural Ministry in Iran,
which is an establishment founded by those opposing such groups, considers Sufism
as one of the major wellsprings of its culture, and strives to publish and disseminate
the literature by the Sufis.584
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In his second chapter, Kasravi’s criticism centers on the analysis of the harm Sufism
has brought on the population. One of his problems with Sufism is in the idea of Unity of
Existence. Kasravi argues, the philosophy of Unity of Existence is nothing but the product of
a creative mind that cannot resolve the conflict between the raising of humans to the status of
the divine on the one hand, and the lowering of the divine to the degree of the “chained wild
animals and quadrupeds” (1943b, 94). Further, he admonishes the Sufis for their idleness and
lack of productivity (1943b, 95). Moreover, he criticizes the “perverted” notion of love put
forth by the Sufis, and even casts doubt on whether the word was correctly translated from
Plotinus (1943b, 108). He contends that judging by the mystic poetry, 585 this is not the love
Plotinus meant, for the former leads to self-alienation, and monastic tendencies, and the latter
encourages doing good; if one searches goodness, one must strive to do good in order to find
love. However, Kasravi notes “what we least know the Sufis for is doing good deeds”
(1943b, 109). Finally, Kasravi harshly criticizes the Sufis for “showing animosity toward
reason.”586 He cites a quote from a Sufi that
our sage was asked once, what is reason? He replied one cannot reach the mysteries
of divinity with reason, for the latter is ‘created’, and the former ‘eternal,’ and the
created cannot fathom that which is eternal.587
Kasravi summarizes that the conducts588 of Sufis is in marked contrast with reason,
and that is why they negate reason and reason-based ideas, for it questions their
irrationalities. He is very critical of how the Sufis legitimized their actions by likening them
to some divine attribute. For example, they interpret “idleness” as not submitting to the
worldly affairs, and “vagrancy” as a self-imposed asceticism to “kill meaning and
selfishness” (1943b, 103).
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In both volumes, Kasravi lays out in detail examples and instances that clearly speak
to a corrupted consciousness that believes and internalizes what the leaders in these two
traditions suggest; he pleads for mindfulness and reason-based approaches to analyze what
religious groups such as the Shi’ite clergy and the Sufi sages craft in the form of narratives,
mystic accounts, and poetry. The more fantastic the narrative, the easier it is to compel the
population to submit. Unfortunately, Kasravi did not live to continue his work in establishing
his method of critique; with the support of the Shi’ite clergy, the second of the two
assassination attempts finally silenced his passionate voice and ended his sobering language
and his sharp criticism toward what he saw as ailment for the Iranian people (Kasravi 1943a,
36-37).
Kasravi’s criticism of the Iranian brand of Shi’ism inspired Ali Akbar Hakamizadeh
(Moin 1999, Rajaee 2007, Martin 2007) to author a brief but bitter criticism of Shi’i practices
in Iran, entitled Asrar e Hezarsaleh (Secrets of a Thousand Years), “refuting and mocking
many of the tenets of Shi’ism in Iran” (Rajaee 65). Most interestingly, he “proposed thirteen
questions in the final pages and invited readers to respond to them” (ibid).589 Hakamizadeh
thus challenged the ulama, for instance, on “the authority of the mujtahid and the legitimacy
of man-made laws” (Martin 104). While the impact of Hakamizadeh’s questions did not
reach very far, it was the young Khomeini who wrote a book in response,590 Kashf al-Asrar
(The Revealing of Secrets), because it had made him “enflamed with rage” (Moin 61) for
“undermining religion and thereby destroying the country’s independence” (Martin 104). In
Khomeini’s eyes this was reflective of Reza Shah Pahlavi’s systematic attacks on the clerical
establishment.591
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Perhaps Kasravi’s major error was, like Marx, that while he pinpointed the problem
and had an accurate diagnosis for where the issues were, he failed in the prescription and
solution, seeking to purify religion from superstition and backwardness. 592 Indeed, this may
have been influential in his elimination by the religious zealots. 593 Further, his sharp criticism
hit the Iranians’ collective cultural ego in its core from multiple fronts594 in such a way that
left him with no allies; as a result he had neither the popular support, nor the support from the
ruling or religious class. Consequently, his critical method did not develop further. From this
point on, the ulama remained, more than ever, close to the political power and continued to
assert their influences in the formation of policies despite the reformist campaigns. The
politicization of Islam that had taken place earlier was headed for a major revision to reflect
modernist philosophies and theories leaving major marks in the political and even
geographical scene.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF POLITICIZING ISLAM IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: THE STATE OF THE
SUBJECT

With the advent of modernism in the early twentieth century, the reformers were
faced with the question of how to develop policies and laws in-sync with the modern world.
At the same time, they aimed to reconcile the differences with the Shari’a law, which
continued to be under the tight supervision of the ulama and maintained a powerful presence.
Moreover, it is the interest in philosophy that had appeared dormant, but not annihilated,
since the time of Avicenna, that resurges with the particular sensitivity to Hegel and
Espinoza (Adamiyat 1970, 71). In this segment, I will investigate progressive and influential
ideas put forth by key thinkers and reformers spanning from the Constitutional Revolution
era and beyond the political changes in mid-century, to the Revolution of 1979. I aim to
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demonstrate the theoreticians’ attempt that began with mediating the common law and
Shari’a law evolved into idealistic thoughts and a political ideology with grave
consequences, by-passing significant sparks of individual and critical thinking.

Early Reformers: Yusuf Khan Mostashar al-Dowleh, Mirza Fathali Akhoundzadeh,
and Mirza Agha Khan Kirmani
The ideas of modernization and progress, while opposing the absolutism in
monarchy, took shape during the last decade of Naser al-Din Shah’s rule (1886-1896) with
the appearance on the scene of prominent political and intellectual figures such as Seyed
Jamal al-Din Asadabadi, Mirza Yusuf Khan Mostashar al-Dowleh, Mirza Agha Khan
Kirmani, and Mirza Malkum Khan (Adamiyat 1978, 28). Initiated by these notable
intellectuals, administrators, and statesmen, there were consistent attempts not just to
implement measures of reforms; they understood all too well that no reform could
materialize without the monarch’s support of the said reforms. However, this was not an easy
task to accomplish.
On the recommendation of his premier, Mirza Hossein Khan Sepahsalar (Moshir alDowleh), Naser al-Din Shah went on a series of European trips. Sepahsalar had such a
profound impact on the reform campaigns that his tenure is aptly known as “Sepahsalar Era
of law and reform.”595 He inspired and supported the efforts of Yusuf Khan Mostashar alDowleh Tabrizi (1813-1895) in authoring his book, the aforementioned Yek Kalameh (1853),
to which I shall return shortly. Sepahsalar’s objective was to expose Naser al-Din Shah to
Modern Europe and encourage him to support efforts toward modernization of Iran,
particularly its legal system. However, the Shah apparently did not make the connection
between the rule of law and setting limitations to his own power. 596 Upon returning from his
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third European trip, Naser al-Din Shah called a meeting and invited his administration and
royal members of the government. He compared what he had witnessed in the matter of
governance in Europe with what was in place in Iran, and expressed:
In this trip what we witnessed [was] that all order and progress in Europe is due to
having the rule of law. We too have emphatically decided to establish the rule of law
and order in Iran, and rule in accordance to the law.597
Nonetheless, a committee of five was formed to author laws for the country, and the
translation of European legal texts was undertaken (Adamiyat 1978, 12). One of these the
texts written was Yek Kalameh (One Word), which was about the importance of the rule of
law and significance of personal and individual freedoms, as well as the fact that the people
should be the source of legislation (MirzaYusuf Khan 11). However, as a student of Islamic
law, and later becoming familiar with European laws, Mirza Yusuf Khan wanted to reconcile
the two in his book. He compares the French codes of law with the Shari’a law in an attempt
to justify the separation of the latter from common law. He states:
[A]nd the most important . . . difference is that the code considers only the worldly
matter, so that it is suitable for the condition of every person, irrespective of their
ethnicity and religion. There is a different book for religious matters. In contrast in
the books of Islamic law, worldly matters are tempered and mixed with other-worldly
affairs, such as obligatory prayers, fasting and pilgrimage. This causes great harm in
administrating the affairs of the common people, because non-Muslim people living
in Islamic lands have no desire to read your code of law […] Thus if the foremost
‘ulama’, wherever they may be, were to write Islamic codes in separate book such as
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the book of acts of worship, the afterlife, and books of civil and commercial matters,
this would not be detrimental to the Shari’a.598
Mirza Yusuf Khan was not alone in pondering upon the separation of religion and
state. The aforementioned premier, Sepahsalar, shared this idea with him that “religious
matters such as congregational prayers,” should remain under the authority of the clergy,”
however, he advised, “not so much as [the measure of] a miniscule they [meaning the clergy]
should be involved in the affairs of the state, nor should they be placed in between the
government and the people” (Adamiyat 1980, 199). While Sepahsalar has been a prominent
secularist figure in the efforts to implement the rule of law, there are other intellectuals in the
nineteenth century who advocated secularism, freedom, and equality, particularly with
respect to the women’s rights (Paidar 46).
Rule of law indicated civility for Mirza Malkum Khan (1833-1908), who was also a
reformist during the reign of Naser al-Din Shah, at which time he was serving as Iranian
ambassador in London but was “dismissed from his post owing to disagreements with the
Shah” (Paidar 47). Malkum Khan published the newspaper Ghanun (Law) abroad that
reflected his passion for the rule of law “and attributed the backwardness of Iran to lack of a
constitution and codified law” (ibid). One of his efforts in advising Naser al-Din Shah was
the “drafting of a Book of Reforms” 599 that was prefaced by a “general warning” against the
foreign powers taking over the country “unless the shah immediately decreed laws for
reform”. Abrahamian notes the use of the term ghanun by Malkum was intended to
distinguish it from religious laws (shari’a) and “the old state regulations (‘urf ).” His advice
to the monarch was basically predicated on two pillars: “the improvement of public welfare,
and the equality of all citizens.”600 But, perhaps it was Malkum Khan’s widespread
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reputation that mainly came from his establishing a secret society, the “Faramushkhaneh
(House of Oblivion) in mid-nineteenth century . . . modeled on but not attached to the
European Freemasons” that ultimately was viewed as his emulation of the “foreigners,”
leading to his discredit by his opponents (Abrahamian 1982, 66). 601 Despite Malkum’s
reformist advice, the monarch became concerned when the objections from the religious
leaders “denounced the concept of [gh]anun as ‘heretical innovation’ (bid’a) and accused the
Faramushkhaneh as having connections to the ‘atheistic republican’ Freemasons in Europe.”
It resulted in closure of the establishment and sending Malkum to exile in Ottoman Turkey
(ibid).
An earlier figure of note is Mirza Fathali Akhoundzadeh (1812-1878), who has also
been viewed as a “reformist” and a “secular” thinker. Akhoundzadeh considered the source
of all problems was the Arab invasion of Persia in the seventh century, and he subscribed to
the view of returning to the pre-Islamic glories of Persia (Adamiyat 1970, Paidar 1995,
Amanat 2017). Akhoundzadeh had great esteem for the Western cultures; in particular, “he
was a great admirer of Russian high culture” (Amanat 322). Paidar notes “Akhoundzadeh
was a professed atheist, declared polygamy a social ill and argued for women’s right to
education”.602 Paidar astutely notes in praising the pre-Islamic Persia, Akhoundzadeh was
merely seeking for a solution to counter the type of religious domination that was being
experienced in Iran. She states Akhounzadeh’s “glorification of Zoroastrian Iran . . . had little
to do with the ‘reality’ of women’s position in ancient Iran. On the contrary, such a
presentation of the past was a construction relevant to the existing socio political situation”
(ibid). It cannot be overlooked that such strategy is seeking a solution within the binary of
Hegelian thesis and antithesis. In fact this strategy has been persistent throughout the various
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attempts for change in the nineteenth and twentieth century Iran, that is to say countering,
with the intention to substitute, of one source of authority with another.
Similarly, albeit with conflicted attitude, there were other reformists who believed the
problem was with the clergy themselves and saw them as unfit to be involved in the affairs of
the state. Despite proclaiming his “lack of confidence in the class of the clergy” repeatedly,
Mirza Agha Khan Kirmani (1854-1897) believed in seeking “the assistance of the ulama, if
political affairs made it necessary.” Adamiyat criticizes Kirmani for taking this strategy too
far, to a degree that it negates the enlightened thoughts, “of which he is oblivious himself.”
Nevertheless, Adamiyat cites from Agha Khan’s letters to Malkum Khan that to implement
reforms in Iran, “we must innately turn our hopeful eyes away from the Qajar clan and a few
witless mullas . . . [for] all their actions are derived by self-interest and thus they cannot be
trusted . . . these ulama of ours have no inherent independence of their own” (Adamiyat
1978, 29).
There is no doubt that Agha Khan’s source of inspiration “for modern thinking” was
the “Western world” (Adamiyat 1970, 26). The significance of philosophic thoughts in Iran
has been noted by Adamiyat. In a summary about the history of philosophy in Iran, he argues
that philosophy reached its peak during the early Middle Ages (10th-11th centuries), when
Avicenna (980-1037) was the most prominent figure. But there are no noteworthy individuals
in philosophy until the age of Nasir al-Din Tūsi (1201-1274). The gaps in between the two
and a gap that existed between Tūsi and the present time was basically filled with “Mūlla
Sadrā’s philosophy” 603 (i.e. Neoplatonic philosophy), who he sees as the “preserver of
philosophy in Iran.” From there on, it was Mūlla Sadrā’s students who guarded those
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thoughts until the nineteenth century and to the time of Hāj Mūlla Hādi Sabzevari (17971873) (Adamiyat 1970, 71-72).
One of Adamiyat’s criticisms of this philosophy604 in the modern times, nonetheless,
is that it was considered “superior to the matters of nature,” thus deemed inappropriate to mix
the two. Therefore, due to not being predicated on sciences and mathematics, as it was done
previously, the philosophy remained deeply rooted in human imagination (Adamiyat 1970,
72). He further points out that “our philosophers were unfamiliar with the new, practical
sciences” (ibid).605 This was not unlike what had taken place in Europe, argues Adamiyat, as
“the philosophers of scholastic era,” too, were reluctant to reconcile the tradition and
experience-based sciences at first. However, over time, “new philosophy in Europe
developed out of the heart of scholastic beliefs, and evolved by placing its foundation in
science and experience” (ibid).
In nineteenth century, one of the first attempts to translate and publish books on the
new philosophy of the West was the translation of Descartes’ Discourse on the Method of
Rightly Conducting the Reason (1637) that holds a contradiction in its preface. It was
published in 1862, with the title “Book of Diyakert,” or “Hekmat Naseri”606 In the preface to
the book, following acknowledging the king’s attention to this project, which was meant to
“establish laws and politics of the regions, the execution of reforms and planning for sciences
and industries and their patrons . . . and elevating the rule of order and justice,” it further
notes, “of course it will lead to the exaltation of the Divine laws (hekmat) that are the essence
of all” (Adamiyat 1970, 74). This conflicting attitude pervaded the nineteenth century
philosophy in Iran.607
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Adamiyat quotes from de Gobineau’s observation of the Iranian thinkers interacting
with the Cartesian Cogito, which he mentions as “memorable.” Gobineau had noted that even
though the Easterners were already aware of this “essential formula” from earlier times, how
they understood it was not what Descartes was seeking. He further notes “the Iranian
philosophers that I have met, are more interested in achieving complete knowledge of
Espinoza and Hegel, and the reason is clear,608 because the thoughts of these two
philosophers are Asian [Eastern]” (Adamiyat 1970, 74).609 The attempts to translate and
make the history of philosophy available in Iran continued in the work by Mohammad Ali
Foroughi (1877-1942), whose search for the philosophical wisdom and reason in the works
of European philosophers initially prompted him to translate Descartes’ Discourse (ca.
1931), but quickly realized he could not take on such a project without a thorough
investigation of the history of philosophy (Foroughi, Introduction 1938). 610
Foroughi is a noteworthy member of the twentieth century Iranian intelligentsia,
whose career spans from being “a member of Revolutionary Committee in 1905” to
negotiating an agreement on the exile of the founder of the Pahlavi dynasty, to furthering
modernization of the country and holding the post of prime minister multiple times during
the Pahlavis (Abrahamian 1982, 122, and 164). In authoring The Course of Philosophy in
Europe, he “may be one of the earliest intellectuals and statesmen in Iran to pay serious
attention to modern philosophy and to issues of rationality in modern Europe” (Jahanbegloo
2012). But, perhaps most important for our purposes is his contribution in making that
knowledge available in Iran. But, his contributions are not limited to this undertaking, as he
believed in the preservation and reform of Persian language and literature necessary for any
reforms in Iran (Jahanbegloo 2012, Amanat 2017). Foroughi’s strategy to reform, as argued
by Jahanbegloo, encompassed both his interest and work in completing the history of
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Western philosophy as well as his efforts to strengthen and modernize the Persian language
though establishing of the Farhangestan-e Iran (Iran House of Culture), which was founded
in 1935, “similar to Académie Française, [that] helped supervise the development and reform
of the Persian language” (Amanat 475).
The modernization tendency of Foroughi has been heralded by Jahanbegloo as
“dialogical modernization that is exemplified by the dual project of ‘Enlightenment from
above’ and ‘Enlightenment from below’.” Jahanbegloo further explains the objective in
Foroughi’s “dialogical approach” was “to accommodate Iranian heritage, as presented in the
canon of Persian history, philosophy, and literature, with modern European values”
(Jahanbegloo 2012).611 It is problematic, nonetheless, that Foroughi, who “through his career
. . . advocated liberal forms of citizenship,” supported the idea of “Enlightenment from
above,” as manifested through the despotic reign of Reza Shah, to implement reforms.
Foroughi’s solution to this problem, according to Jahanbegloo, was the balancing of
compulsory reforms from above with the reformation in language and literature, in other
words, his “Enlightenment from below,” until the Iranians “become more mature in their
political judgment and everyday reasoning” (ibid).
Foroughi’s efforts toward modernization, rule of law, and advocating reason612
paralleled with the way in which he integrated his works, may it be through his history of
Western philosophy, or his works on Persian literature “into the narrative of modern Iranian
nationalism.” Foroughi’s “progressive” works have been deemed as “a blue print for an
Iranian national identity” (Amanat 476, Jahanbegloo 2012) that were meant to offset the Shi’i
hold on the laws on the one hand, and to alleviate the tyrannical manipulation of the “blind
Westernism” on the other. I found this argument problematic, for nationalism itself places
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affairs back in the hands of patriarchy, albeit a modernist patriarchy; the need for a
centralized power at this time eclipsed the necessity of an individual consciousness, and the
need to change does not venture beyond a Hegelian synthesis.613 There can be no doubt that
Foroughi tried to initiate an Iranian search for finding their own place through becoming
aware of the modern philosophy’s use of reason, while standing firm on their own literary
tradition.
Virtually all attempts to reform in practice were formulated in a top-down model
since the beginning of such movements in the nineteenth century. Great thinkers such as
Jamal al-Din, in his grand plan to fight the British colonialism, had initially tried to persuade
the king, underscoring the leadership of the enlightened ulama. However, it seems toward the
end of his life he experienced remorse. Abrahamian explains:
On his death bed in 1897, Jamal al-Din expressed to a friend both hope and sorrow.
Hope because the “stream of renovation” flowing from West to East would inevitably
destroy the “edifice of despotism.” Sorrow, because he had wasted so much of his
precious ideas on the “sterile soil” of royal courts: “would that I had sown the seeds
of my ideas on the fertile ground of the people’s thoughts.614
During the modernist movements of the nineteenth century, Jamal al-Din was
arguably the first to propose the use of the religion of Islam to resist against colonialism
(Keddie 1968). While he was unsuccessful in ousting the British and their colonial intentions
from Iran, or even bringing about any reforms, he had been able to leave a legacy behind that
prompted followers to continue with his ideas after his death (Abrahamian 1982, 64). Keddie
extensively addresses Jamal al-Din’s legacy, not just in Iran, but in the Middle East, and even
in India (Keddie 1972). From the scholarly work done on the subject, it can be surmised that
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Jamal al-Din’s influence unfolded in two paths: in Iran, it radically reverberated in the
reactionary measure that materialized in the assassination of Naser al-Din Shah in 1896.
Abrahamian notes initially Jamal al-Din made very little impact in Iran (Abrahamian 1982,
64). However, the second path, which developed a more sustainable course came through
another direction.615
Muhammad Iqbal Lahori (1877-1938), poet and philosopher, who is renowned for his
efforts to divide India into two countries of India and Pakistan (1947)616 argues in his book
The Revival of Religious Thoughts in Islam (1930) that Muslims must rethink within Islam
without severing ties with the past. He also praises Jamal al-Din as “being the living link
between the past and the future,” as someone who fully understood the “significance and
magnitude of this responsibility” of Muslims (Iqbal 1930, 113). Iqbal was popular in Iran
among the intellectuals with his poetry, and among the religious class for his affinity for
mysticism (Irfan).
The individual in Iqbal’s understanding, which is colored by mysticism, is predicated
on three concepts that he draws from the Koran: first, that he is chosen by God; second, that
with all his fallibility, he has been given the responsibility to be God’s deputy on earth; and,
third that the trusted man is a free man, who accepts this responsibility against his own wellbeing (Iqbal 110).617 Contrary to Bergson,618 in Iqbal’s view, the “real’ individual experience
is in the understanding of the introspective unity, which he distinguishes from those he found
in the Islamic thoughts tainted by other traditions (Iqbal 111). He argues: “the perfection of
this experience in the religious Islamic life culminates in the expression of Hallaj’s ‘Ana’al
Haq’ [I am Truth/God]” (ibid). This makes the individuality defined by Iqbal a constructed
and an imaginary one, since it disregards the sense-based experiences.
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The definition of the “I’ in Iqbal eloquently describes a being that is incomplete in its
natural form and is understandably in search of a unity which is “more inclusive, more
effective, more balanced, and more cohesive” (Iqbal 114). In explaining this “I,” he cites
Ghazali, who deems it one with essence and distinct from “our varied states of mind.” It is
that which time has no influence on, and “our experience comes from the consciousness of
relation between the particulars and that expansive essence” (Iqbal 116). In response to
arguments on the determinism dominant over the Islamic regions at the time, Iqbal notes,
“[p]hilosophy is nothing but seeking the causes, in such a way that can be aligned with God .
. . and with pondering of time, which is like the foundation of the link between the cause and
effect, [one] cannot arrive but at the understanding of the Divine, which is above all in the
world.” In support of his argument he submits the example of “Hegel’s view on the Truth
and the Real, which he equates to the lack of limitation of the mind, and from which can be
surmised that all that is true and real contain the essence of the mind” (Iqbal 128-129).
Around the time that Foroughi was writing The Course of, Iqbal published one of his
most distinguished works in Persian language called Javid-nama,619 which is like “an
encyclopedia of Iqbal’s thought” guiding one through his philosophical, political, and even
his aesthetic ideas.”620 Admittedly, he utilized his poetry “as a medium for spreading his
ideas which he hoped would awaken Muslims from their centuries-long slumber.”621 Iqbal
opposed the idea of “art for art’s sake,” and stated in Javid-nama: “[i]f the formation of men
is the goal of poetry, then poetry is the heir to prophethood.” Nonetheless, while relying on
the traditional vocabulary and symbols, Iqbal sets out to fill the traditional symbols with new
idealistic meanings that reflect what needs to be done through martyrdom and sacrifice. 622
Iqbal’s affinity with mysticism in his poetry, and his political ideas predicated on Islamic
principles became influential for the next generation of reformers in Iran.
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Reformers in Mid-Twentieth Century: Mohammad Nakhshab, Ali Shari'ati, and Mehdi
Bazargan
In the period between the two world wars and the 1953 coup, following the rise and
fall of the Tudeh party’s influence, in opposition to the Tudeh party’s ideology, there was an
interest in combining the idea of socialism with Islamic thoughts. A number of intellectuals
such as Mahmoud Taleqani (1911-1979), and Mehdi Bazargan (1907-1995) (later
revolutionary government’s first prime minister) argued that “Islam had answers for modern
problems,” and that economic equity had been one of the objectives of Islam from the onset
(Abrahamian 1982, 459). One of the intellectuals who has been credited with “being the first
Iranian to attempt synthesizing Shi’ism with European socialism” is Mohammad Nakhshab
(1923-1976). Nakhshab is the founder of a movement called “God-Worshipping Socialists”
(Abrahamian 1982, 463). He was the first who saw “socialism and democracy as two
manifestations of the same truth of the rule of people over people.”623
Nakhshab’s contribution was in arguing for “morality” and ethics. In Marxism, he
believed Marx’s philosophy was a reaction to capitalism’s excesses as well as the church’s
corruptions. Thus, he insisted on “morality and ethics as a necessity in politics and society”
(Nekoorouh 2017). This morality could be arrived at by way of a sort of “nihilism” (elahiyyat
e tanzihi) of all that was conjured up by man in order to remove absolutism from all and any
human endeavors. At the same time, his approach on the Divine, in the context of politics
and administration, was nihilistic as well, in order to “reach progress on earth,” for “man hath
only that for which he maketh effort”624 meant no excess value (capitalism) and the
“consideration of morality until the [recognition of] rights of others” was necessary to
preserve the rights of the individual (Nekoorouh 2014). Other intellectual and political
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figures made attempts to find a middle ground. Khalil Maleki (1901-1969) had tried for a
“third” solution. Following his disillusionment of and leaving the Tudeh Party, due to
“political differences with the party’s leadership” (Abrahamian 1982, 256), Maleki had
proposed a “third force,” and elaborated on what this “third force” was:
We are independent of both Western imperialism and the Soviet Union, of both the
Tudeh party and the ruling class, of both internal militarism and international
communism. We identify with the peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America, with
the social democratic movements in Europe, and with the rank and file of the Tudeh
that is dissatisfied with their pro-Russian and undemocratic leadership. We stand at
the left wing of the National Front. The national bourgeoisie stands at its right
wing.625
Similarly,626 except for his inclusion of an Islamic faith–inspired ethical notion,
Nakhshab attempted to find a median ground. Therefore, what the “Movement of the GodWorshipping Socialists” proposed, was a “new school” in between the two super powers at
the time (Abrahamian 1982, 463). It is worth noting that Žižek in his analysis of the “Arab
Spring” in 2009, pondering upon an inscription in a clay dish, 627 argued the same point:
[I]nsofar as we tend to oppose East and West in terms of fate and freedom, Islam
stands for a third position that undermines this binary opposition—neither
subordination to blind Fate nor freedom to do what one wants, both of which
presuppose an abstract external opposition between the two terms, but rather a deeper
freedom to decide (‘choose’) our fate.628
Nakhshab tried to establish a new link between “rights, freedom, and morality” for
the first time that called for “human for itself,” or one who is “subject to itself,” which was
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predicated on a “self-sustaining reason.” This individual was very different from the tradition
that made him, historically and continuously, subject to a “God imagined on earth . . . in the
form of [a] king or [a] sage” (Nekorouh 2017). It was, however, Ali Shari’ati (1933-1977)
who “saw himself as continuing and completing what . . . Bazargan, Taleqani, and Nakhshab
had started: formulating a secular religion that would appeal to the modern intelligentsia
without alienating the traditional bazarris and the religious masses” (Abrahamian 1982, 467).
It is Ali Shari’ati (1933-1977) who argues Islam to be “a revolutionary ideology that
permeates all spheres of life, especially politics, and inspires true believers to fight against all
forms of oppression, exploitation, and social injustice” (Abrahamian 1982, 466).629
Shari’ati’s views prompted him, while studying in France, to write three letters to Fanon that
criticized Fanon’s negative assessment of the role of religion in colonialization (Fanon 1963).
Similar to Jamal al-Din Asadabadi, Shari’ati argued “the people of the Third World could not
fight Imperialism until they first gained their cultural identity, which in some countries was
interwoven with popular religious traditions” (Abrahamian 1982, 465). Therefore, for
Shari’ati, there was a clear link between cultural identity and religion that could be used
against imperialism. Nonetheless, he had a long list of ailments, from which he believed the
human society of Iran was suffering, that in addition to a global imperialism, included
“international Zionism, colonialism, exploitation, oppression, class inequality, cartels,
multinational corporations, racism, cultural imperialism, and gharbzadegi (blindly following
the West)” (Abrahamian 1982, 467).
Thus, Shari’ati opened a space that was distinct from all active and influential groups
that encompassed “progressive” thinking and the young population, while not excluding the
traditionalist merchant class. He clarified his position on two leading waves that had been
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struggling and at odds with one another to this point. On the one hand, he “denounced
Western Imperialism,” but distinguished his theories from those on the left (i.e. Tudeh party,
popular among the older generation of Iranian intelligentsia) in his criticism of Marx,
particularly of the “Stalinist variety.” One the other hand, he had turned on the traditionalist,
religious leadership for misinterpreting Islam as “apolitical” (Abrahamian 1982, 467 and
Momen 258) without being anti-religion or anti-Islam. In a series of lectures titled Bazgasht
(Return),630 Shari’ati argues for a return to one’s own cultural roots, but not to one’s race, as
in pre-Islamic Iranian Aryan roots, for he adamantly opposes racism. 631 He states “for us
return to our roots . . . means a return to our Islamic, especially Shi’ite roots.”632 Shari’ati
further explains these roots are embedded not in the Caliphate Islam, but the Islam of the
revolutionaries,633 that which has been exemplified in the martyrdom of the prophet’s
grandson and Ali’s son, Imam Hussein. He further clarifies: “[w]e want the Islam of fighters,
not that of rouhani [spiritual leaders]; the Islam of the Ali’s family, not that of the Safavid
dynasty.”634 Consequently, for Shari’ati the “passion plays depicting Hussein’s martyrdom
contained one major lesson: that all Shi’is, irrespective of time and place, had the duty to
oppose, resist, and even rebel against overwhelming odds in order to eradicate their
contemporary ills” (Abrahamian 1982, 466).
The political ideology was formulated by Shari’ati and well received by various
groups while raising controversy with those in positions of power.635 For Shari’ati it was the
“Alawi Shi’ism”636 and not the “passive Safavid Shi’ism” that had “an obligation to strive for
achieving the ideal Shi’ite society” (Momen 259).637 In Abrahamian’s view, “Shari’ati
produced exactly what the young intelligentsia craved: a radical layman’s religion that
disassociated itself from the traditional clergy and associated itself with the secular trinity of
social revolution, technological innovation, and cultural self-assertion.”638 Furthermore,
286

Shari’ati, in his ideal vision of an activist, created a synthesis between the intelligentsia and
the militia. This idea would be capitalized on by Ayatollah Khomeini, whose opposition to
the Shah went back to 1963, at which time he was sent to exile in Najaf (Momen 195). Safely
from his location in Iraq, away from Iran’s secret service, Khomeini began a campaign in
support of the ulama’s political role. In a book first published in 1971 called Hokumat-e
Islami (Islamic Government), he laid out his theory of the rule of jurisprudence predicated on
the executive and administrative role of the ulama (Khomeini 1979).

THE POST-REVOLUTIONARY IRAN – TOTAL MONOPOLIZATION OF POWER: FOUCAULT AND THE
IRANIAN REVOLUTION
The idea of Velayat-e Faqih (rule of jurisprudence) had been proposed earlier,
although in a different capacity, by two prominent Shi’i leaders, namely Mūlla Ahmad
Narāqi (d. 1829), and the aforementioned Mohammad Hossein Na’ini (d. 1936). 639 The
extent to which the ulama, such as Naraqi and Na’ini delineated the authority of the ulama,
was to offer “guidance” to the secular rulers to ensure their adherence to the Shari’a law, as
considered in the 1906 Iranian Constitution (Momen 196).640 Mehdi Hāeri, in Philosophy and
Government (1995), submits that Narāqi, who was a contemporary of Fath Ali Shah Qajar,
initiates this idea first, then in order to “reason,” sets out to collect references and evidence,
“without proper criticism and investigation,” which enabled him to “arrive at the desired
conclusion” (Hāeri 178). More drastic is Khomeini’s proposal that contrasts with others in
that he “asserts that the faqih should supplant the ruler and rule in his place (Momen 196).
In his book, Khomeini, without providing any references or sources, offers his
reasons for forming an Islamic government and argues that Islam is not limited to ethics, and
that it is not adequate for an Islamic society to just have laws. For this reason, he contends,
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“Glorious God, alongside of a collection of rules—meaning Shar’ia—has established a
government, and an executive and administrative system” (Khomeini 26). Further, he
substantiates his reasoning by a mimetic comparison (qias) with what the Prophet had done,
disregarding the different circumstances.641 He further notes:
[A]fter the passing of the Prophet (PBUH), enemies and the sons of Umayyads (may
God’s curse be upon them), did not allow Ali to establish Islamic government . . . and
changed the foundation of the government. The regime and the way in which they
managed and the Umayyads’ and the Abbasids’ politics were against Islam. The
governing system was turned completely upside down, and was turned into a
monarchy in Iran and an Imperial Rome and the Pharaohs of Egypt and continued in
later times to what we see today. 642
According to Khomeini, this necessitates revolution in all Muslim lands that have
been artificially, based on colonial intentions, divided and separated from one another (41).
Hāeri argues, however, that historically, the rule of jurisprudence has never been part of the
discourse in the Islamic fiqh (jurisprudence), and that it has never been considered, either by
Sunni or Shi’i ulama that, in addition to possessing the authority to issue religious edicts, the
ulama have the right to rule, simply because they are experts in jurisprudence (Hāeri 178).
Khomeini’s position on the extent of the authority of the Shi’ite ulama, as documented in his
own and others’ writings, demonstrates his gradual revealing of the idea that the authority of
the faqih is as boundless as the Divine, hence absolute (Kadivar 2017). 643
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The Theory of Velayat e Faqih (Rule of Jurisprudence) as Absolute
Vali Nasr in The Shi’a Revival (2006) argues that the Shi’i ulama “relied heavily on
the Platonic notion . . . of a specially educated ‘guardian’ class led by a ‘philosopher-king’”
(87). He notes Khomeini in his early career was recognized as a “noted philosopher (with a
specialty in the study of Aristotelian logic) and had dabbled in mysticism, probably while
influenced by his reading of the Andalusian Sufi mystic, Ibn Arabi. 644 He even wrote
mystical poetry, though none of it was published before his death in 1989.” Nevertheless,
what is significant for our purposes, is that among his peers, Khomeini had earned the
reputation of being an expert in analysis of one of the most difficult, yet popular texts—
Mūlla Sadrā’s Asfar Arba’a (Four Journeys) among the Shi’i scholars. In Asfar, just as Ibn
Arabi had done earlier, and echoing a Neoplatonic voice, Mūlla Sadrā explicates the journey
toward Truth in four stages: “travel ‘from Him, to Him, in Him and through Him’”
(Adamson 2016, 387). It has become clear that Khomeini saw himself as a man who has been
“led to God, learns to open himself up to spiritual wisdom and then returns to the world as
one who has become united with God, reflecting his divine attributes and qualities” (Nasr
2006, 84). Nasr quotes a conversation with Hāeri about the latter’s meeting with and
expressing concerns to Khomeini during the Iran-Iraq war and the tremendous loss of life.
Nasr recalls:
One night during the dark years of the Iran-Iraq war, as the 1980s were being
consumed in blood, with countless thousands of Iranian young men perishing at the
front, he went in distress to visit his old teacher. He found Khomeini alone, sitting on
a rug in his garden before a small pool […] He opened up his heart to Khomeini and
asked his mentor if he could not find a way to stop the awful slaughter. “It is not right

289

for Muslims to kill Muslims,” Haeri began. “Hundreds of thousands are dying in a
war that has no end and no good purpose.” Khomeini made no sound until Haeri
stopped talking. Then without turning his head and in even but reproachful tones, he
asked: “Do you also criticize God when he sends an earth quake? 645
This anecdote makes it clear that Khomeini was confident of his own “spiritual
stature,” according to his interpretations of the concepts of the “Unity of Existence” and the
“Perfect Man,”646 and possessed a “sense of destiny;” it was in this confidence that he could
employ imagination and innovation to not only give a different picture of Shi’i Islam, but to
use that image to control an entire country (Nasr 2006, 85) and beyond.647 However, the
problem of the “individual” remains as hidden as before until we come across Foucault’s
writings from his experience of visiting Iran in September and November of 1979.
In a letter to Mehdi Bazargan, the prime minister at the time, Foucault, who had been
elated at the news of the uprising of the people and removing of the Shah and his despotic
regime, expresses concern regarding the execution of a number of key individuals during the
first few months after the revolution. He notes the “responsibility” of the government,
regardless of what term prefaces it (e.g. democratic, Islamic, etc.) toward its citizens
(Foucault 2000, 440). Foucault writes, “[w]e spoke of all the regimes that oppressed people
while invoking human rights. You expressed a hope: that in the will, so generally affirmed
then by Iranians, for an Islamic government, those rights would find a real guarantee […] No
government can escape from those fundamental duties. And from that view point, the trials
that are now taking place in Iran are nothing short of alarming.” (ibid). Further he
emphasizes, “[n]othing is more important in the history of a people than the rare moments
when it rises up as a body to strike down a regime it can no longer tolerate.” Foucault is
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impressed by witnessing how Iranians were willing to give up their life to bring about
change. In an earlier article, on the people’s struggle, Foucault writes:
If societies persist and survive . . . it is because behind all the consent and the
coercion, beyond the threats, the violence, and the persuasion, there is the possibility
of this moment where life cannot be exchanged, where power becomes powerless,
and where in front of the gallows and the machine guns, men rise up. 648
It is the same concern that prompts Foucault to write the aforementioned letter to the
then prime minister Bazargan. What Foucault seems to be alarmed about is the lack of
empathy for individual life, as unfolded in the later months following the revolution. This
issue has been consistent since the very beginning, that what was being implemented as
Islam, was a kind of an ideology that was deemed more important than the life itself, which
was supposed to protect. Foucault reminds Bazargan of the assurance he gave that “[b]eing
Islamic, such a government would be bound by a supplement of ‘duties.’ And it would
respect these ties, because the people could turn this shared religion back against it”
(Foucault 2000, 440). However, the reality unfolded in a different manner. Under the rule of
jurisprudence, individual life or individual experience has no feasible space to be recognized,
and it can easily be sacrificed for the ideals put forth by the leaders.
The absolute power and the rule of jurisprudence has maintained power predicated on
the Neoplatonic philosophy and its synthesis with Islam. Where there is no regard for
individual life, there is no regard for individual rights. Yet, the idea of the individual still
eludes the contemporary thinkers, who tend to propose solutions that continue to overlook
the individual’s place, in exchange to save the unity of the country as a whole.
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Contemporary Thinkers: Mojtahed Shabestari, Abdolkarim Soroush, and Javad
Tabatabaei
The theory of Velayat-e Faqih was first proposed to the parliament by Hassan Ayat, a
member of the legislative body and the Assembly of Experts for the Constitution in the
summer of 1979 (Amanat 784); it was endorsed by Ayatollah Montazeri and Ayatollah
Beheshti (Yaghmaian 253). However, more than ever, there has been an unprecedented crisis
that has led to further fragmentation of factions, especially within the dominant parties
(Yaghmaian 206). The gulf between the Iranian president and the supreme leader and his
supporters continuously grows deeper. Among contemporary thinkers and reformers, there
are many theories that have been proposed.
Responding to the necessity of different interpretations, Mohammad Mojtahed
Shabestari (2005) argues that interpretation of the religious and other texts, such as the
prophetic revelations, require understanding of the hermeneutic “process” (Shabestari 7). He
criticizes the common belief (among the religious scholars) that one must “empty the mind of
any pre-understandings, interest, and expectation before interpreting the Book [Koran], and
the [Prophet’s] Tradition (ibid). Shabestari holds value in one’s previous experiences and
knowledge and rejects that it causes conflict among the experts. He advocates a view that
there should be a dialogue between the knowledge of fiqh (principles of religious knowledge)
and other knowledge, and laments the lack of such interaction. (Shabestari 8). The argument,
however, distinguishes between philosophy and religion and does not include the individual,
for Shabestari is addressing the “experts” in the field, when he focuses on the religious texts
(Shabestari 200).
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Similar to Shabestari, Abdolkarim Soroush seeks to establish links between
knowledge and religion but strives to expand the place of religion beyond time and space. In
More Abundant than Ideology (1996), Soroush is particularly interested in clarifying the
position of ideology with respect to religion and argues that religion (of course he means
Islam) does not have the restrictions that ideology does (Soroush 125). His comparison of
two prominent thinkers of the revolution era, Shari’ati and Mottahari, demonstrates the case
in point. Whereas Shari’ati’s hero, Abuzar Ghaffari, more than anything else, represented the
voice of social justice in early Islam, and with which Shari’ati always identified and
understood Islam, Mottahari’s role models admittedly consisted of the religious and mystic
sages649 as well as scholars (Soroush 99-100). While Mottahari had always been “sensitive to
all affairs pertaining to God,” Shari’ati was seeking to nurture an “Abuzar-like” individual,
who was “restless, rebel and faithful” (Soroush 102). Soroush concludes with the idea of
“paradox of modernism,” in which he describes the entrapment of modernism in between the
past (tradition), to which it can no longer look, and post-modernism that has brought “doubt”
and “awakening.” Soroush’s solution is to only “seek asylum” in erfan (mysticism), which
“holds within the ancient heritage of mysticism that from the beginning has doubted reason”
(363).650
Since the early decades after the revolution, and establishing of the Islamic Republic
of Iran on the constructed idea of the Velayat-e Faqih, and the need to maintain control to
preserve the status quo, discourses have shifted from preserving the passion for the
revolution to how to continue holding on to the political power. At the same time, corruption
and mishandling of the country’s affairs and injustices toward diverse groups of people have
alienated the population, and disenchanted them with religion, not to mention disheartened
them, due to the internal strife that has gripped the entire nation and obscured any hopes for
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the future. This has prompted theories on how to create a unity from the diversity (different
ethnic groups that make up the population) that has existed in Iran for centuries.
The “Iranshahri” thesis has been proposed by Seyed Javad Tabatabaei as a solution to
this problem. Tabatabaei’s attempt is to circle around the sensitive and deadlocked
discussions on religion, and look toward the Iranian history. In The History of Political
Thoughts in Iran, he aims to put forth evidence from the history of political thoughts and
strategies during other times of crisis (e.g. Abbasid Caliphate, rule of Saljuqs, etc.) that have
been able to reinstate rule and order of law in Iran. According to Tabatabaei, the political
thoughts in Iran can be traced back to the time of Sasanians, which have survived through the
writings of distinguished literary and political figures, before and through the Islamic rule
(Tabatabei 2015, 139). He argues, therefore, that treatises which were the “continuation of
the “Iranshahri political thought” and focused on how to conduct effective administration and
bureaucracy, developed independent of the “idealistic caliphate theories,” proposed by
theoreticians such as Mawardi of Baghdad651 (Tabatabei 2015, 26-27, 147). Tabatabaei cites
the examples of Abdalla Ibn Mūqaffa’ (d. ca. 760), who translated into Arabic one of the first
political Iranshahri treatises possibly for al-Mansūr the Abbasid caliph, and of Nizam alMūlk’s (1064-1092)652, Siassat Nameh, which he compares with a Sasanian document
Nameh Tansar, written by “an illuminated . . . and Neoplatonic sage” by the same name
(Tabatabaei 2015, 105). While Tabatabaei emphasizes the pre-Islamic political art of
government of ancient Iran, and prescribes it to remedy the current crises, he does not
address the current synthesized nature of political power that reflects the Shari’a and carries
concerns of preservation of Islamic fiqh as once-expressed by Khomeini, nor does he
demonstrate any concern about the issue or the place of the individual in his theory.
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The synthesis of the Iranian ancient heritage with the Islamic culture is problematic
for Aramesh Doostdar. He is critical of “our approach toward the Islamic part of our culture,
which is relentlessly ambiguous. On the one hand . . . we look toward the glories and
grandiosity of the ancient Iranian civilization, and with a defeated pride remember the
unsuccessful uprisings, which took place against the barbaric and injustices of Islam . . . on
the other hand we take pride that our spiritual culture has flourished with Islam and [has
been] nurtured in it” (105). Doostdar expresses concern for lack of thinking due to Iranians’
affinity for religion, and submits “we must battle our historical self, until perhaps gradually
the power of our thinking can flourish” (414). Doostdar notes the religious, and more
specifically the Islamic “I,” is devoid of the ability to think (415). Nonetheless, his definition
of the “I” reveals a “unity that is the center of gravity of its being and is constant.” That being
is in connection with its “other,” he argues. However, his examples identify this “other” as
one’s own religion, nationality, or all that makes that “I.”653 He states: “the ‘I’ is the cause or
base for unity of feelings, imaginations and thoughts of every human who observes things”
(416). It must be noted that what Doostdar argues here is not individuality, but rather a
universal feeling, and is distinct from what Bergson remembers in the “scent of the rose.” His
rejection of religion, and specifically of Islam regarding thinking, is moot when it comes to
“being,” because it is more of an existential question. A being has to “be” first before
thoughts can be produced, for that which mind produces is nothing but imagination (Moradi
2017).
In criticism of Tabatabaei, Mohammad Ali Moradi notes the underlying Hegelian
“master-slave” theory, which he argues has been inappropriately applied by the “leftist
Hegelians” in Iran.654 Whereas Hegelian “master-slave” theory was aimed toward arriving
from consciousness to self-consciousness in a society to which the issue of the “I” or the
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subject has never been introduced, the idea of “master-slave” can be understood only in the
context of “political ideological conflicts” (Moradi 2017).
The subject of the final chapter in this study focuses on the history of socio-political
movements in Iran in nineteenth to twentieth century. One of the aspects of political
developments during this period in Iran that sets this country apart from the other countries in
the region is the competition between the two classes: the religious and the secular. I
demonstrated how the class of the clergy, building on the Safavid political and philosophical
legacy steps out from behind the king to place itself at the position of political rule.
I selected three sets of exemplary figures to mark the pathway to show this
progression. The first group reflect the early reformers that strove, on the one hand, to bring
the rule of law to the country, where its king ruled with absolute power, and on the other, to
mitigate changes in the religious realm. The members of the second group that by the mid
twentieth century had been exposed to some of the progressive and revolution-oriented ideas,
in seeking social justice and equality, attempted to interpret from religious texts and religious
historical accounts to bring about a solution to the persistent challenges of reformation, as
well as countering colonialism and Western cultural and political influences. The third group,
selected from among prominent contemporary thinkers, have proposed solutions to the
continuous socio-economic problems that have now been added to the previous concerns. My
objective in this chapter was to make visible that none of the individuals in these groups have
been successfully either arguing for, or proposing a solution for the future of the country,
because they have all overlooked and taken for granted the issue of the subject in their
equations.
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CONCLUSION
PATRIARCHY, NEOPLATONISM, SUBJECTHOOD:
HISTORY, ART, PHILOSOPHY

Do we need a theory of power? Since a theory assumes a prior objectification, it cannot be
asserted as a basis for analytical work. But this analytical work cannot proceed without an
ongoing conceptualization. And this conceptualization implies critical thought – a constant
checking.655
— Foucault

This study investigates the principle question of why the movements toward
individual rights have been unsuccessful in the Middle East up until now. By focusing on the
example of a sixteenth-seventeenth century dynasty in Persia, this inquiry examines how the
art and philosophy shaped the collective consciousness rather than promoting individual
experience and subjectivity; subsequently, contrary to what the German Idealists such as
Hegel and others have argued, and despite the Middle East’s affinity with Hegelian
philosophy, artistic endeavors have not paved the way toward the making of a free subject for
the people of that region. The main argument rests on how formulas from antiquity were
effectively appropriated to unify a diverse population to submit to the rule of the
philosopher/sufi/religious-kings strengthening patriarchal systems. Through
intertextualization and establishing a three-pronged inquiry—i.e. patriarchy, Neoplatonism
and art—I began this research with a genealogical investigation into the long tradition of
patriarchal domination as it has informed the subject since the early centuries of civilization.
This tradition corresponds to those in Europe only to a certain point, at which time there
appears a split: one development heads for nuances of patriarchal strategies and toward the
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Enlightenment, and the other maintains its traditional patriarchal models, which has
preserved the dominance of absolutism and held collective subjectivity firmly in place.
Considering the integral role of art, it was necessary to commence from the
prehistoric roots of the act of creation, that is to say, from the earliest known human creations
in the caves that come closest to what we call art today; this approach signals an appropriate
parallel to what lies at the foundation of Plato’s philosophical creation of the Allegory of the
Cave. I suggest, following the period called “creative explosion” (Spivy 2005), once humans
learned to give material form to their hallucinatory imaginations that were experienced inside
the dark caves, they never ceased to remember how to create. Further, they continued and
enhanced the act of creation by imbuing ideas into what they created in material form,
consequently engendering myths. One such myth that has had lasting expression, exists in the
idea of patriarchy itself.
The myths were perhaps the first attempts to give order to what Foucault calls “codes
of a culture” (1994). Upon establishing a hybridized system—from the structures which
existed in the early cities, and what came from the rural and marginalized dwellers (which
aimed to protect families)—the first “other” was determined. Since this new system was
reliant on the rule of men, the first other was identified as man’s other, i.e. the woman. This
is where the foundation of misogyny rests which, systematically, has never left the
contexture of civilizations, and it has unfairly tipped the balance of power to the benefit of
patriarchy. The use of imagery was so prevalent in strengthening the position of patriarchal
systems that it invoked a revolutionary and countering idea in the region at that time; since
patriarchy in ancient times was reliant on polytheism, its counter argument became
monotheism.656 Monotheism, however, was absorbed within the idea that was patriarchy, for
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it was ultimately interpreted as suitable for such infusion and deemed crucial for its
perpetuity. This did not happen without one main nagging criticism making its way
throughout the centuries. I mean the concept referred to as the “prohibition of imagery” that
still raises questions about what it actually means, and perhaps has been one of the few
remaining gaps, through which one can find a space to critically examine that which humans
have created and continue to create across time in relation to power.
Subsequently, one of patriarchy’s self-preservation strategies, well executed and
implemented, has been through the arts which has contributed to what I have referred to as
“artificial unities.” The artistic endeavors that include that which humans create, encompass
the idea behind patriarchy itself, hence making it permissible to critique it, for the central
idea of the prohibition of imagery was initially aimed to discourage inflating human creation
with transcendental ideas that were also generated through human imagination and
consequently assuming absolutist positions of power. The artificial unities have exerted great
influence on the shaping of subjects, pulling them away from becoming a subject to
themselves to experience free consciousness, toward self-alienation and a collective
consciousness in the service of autocratic rulers.
The critical exploration of art and subjectivity, therefore, can uncover the hidden,
implicit power relations between humans and works of art predicated upon the philosophy of
power to establish a theory that can reach beyond what Foucault developed, but this is only
part of the picture, so to speak. One of the most persuasive human creations has been
Neoplatonism, itself a hybridized philosophy combining the earlier thoughts that
acknowledge some sort of space in between (Republic 202-207 and Poetics xxxviii), with the
idea of emanation of all from the “One” (IV.8). By supplanting and assuming the position of
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the “One,” however, patriarchy, at least in the Middle East, has continued its dualistic and
divisive strategy of constructing “artificial unity,” and simultaneously its “alterity” as means
to gain undisputed authority.
I approached the issue of alterity from the perspective of consciousness. This is not
unlike what Hegel argues; nonetheless, contrary to Hegel, I argue for an equal, engaging field
between the two. To demonstrate this relationship, I utilized the example of the development
of the Continental Philosophy from French (Cartesian Cogito), German (Kantian “thing-initself and Hegelian Lordship and Bondage), and even Analytic Philosophy (Hume). Another
example has been achieving Renaissance in the West by way of the works from Christian
Europe’s other, meaning the Muslims. Both examples effectively attest to the results of
learning from one’s “other.”
The relationship between a subject that becomes aware of itself and others who have
not done so, as attested to by history, has not been equal. One of the contributing factors to
this imbalance has been “abjection” (Kristeva 1982). Abjection means not being aware or
conscious of the “gap” that exists, the gap between what is real and what is made to appear as
real, and that which is temporarily concealed by patriarchy’s numerous tactics and techniques
of power (Foucault 2000) but exacerbated by alterity. However, my concern in this study has
been the Middle East.
To concretize my theory, I presented the case study of the development of a
significant dynastic rule in Persia in chapter three. The origins of the Safavids and their
casting into a new patriarchy exemplify the use of creativity in constructing power
techniques that on the one side, contributed to a made-up image of the king (as a sufi-king
initially, and as a philosopher-king eventually), and on the other, gave material representation
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to such an idea, as in the example of the Mi’raj painting. This creativity was also extended to
iterations of Islam that strengthened the political power of the ruler. The Safavids kings
exploited the ideas of the “Unity of Existence,” and the “Universal Man,” that had been
given eminence by Ibn Arabi and others earlier. Using selected key paintings, I demonstrated
how such strategy was implemented in material form to link the figure of the Prophet to that
of the king’s as a Sufi par excellence.
Further, I argued for Plotinus’s power of imagination, found in both the Safavids’ and
the German Idealists’ affinity with the transcendental in Neoplatonism. In the Safavids, it
was refined through the philosophy of Mūla Sadrā, whose influence is still present in what
has legitimized the rule of jurisprudence in Iran. Inspired by Plotinus, Mūla Sadrā develops a
philosophy that successfully interweaves Platonism, Neoplatonism, and Islam into an
authoritative principle of political governing system. But these traditional ideas are forced to
come face-to-face with modernism following the European military campaigns into the
region that left the Middle Eastern rulers apprehensive about their deficiencies in the new
technology.
The confrontation between the Middle East and Europe was the subject of chapter
four in this study, which illustrated in the three regions of Egypt, Persia, and the Ottoman
Turkey, how they each grappled with modernization and reform. Without having access to
the European experiences that brought about modernization and technology, the leaders in
these three regions strove to emulate modernity, as it appeared in modern products, such as
new technology that made photography and mass publication possible.
What this research revealed was that in the Middle East, proponents of modernism
made a leap, bypassing the issues pertaining to the individual subject and individuality, and
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moved directly toward the Hegelian idealism with which they found familiarity and felt at
home. One of the greatest challenges for the Middle East at this time was colonialism, which
was the result of Europe’s already experiencing its own subjectivity (albeit quickly turning it
into a collective ego in Eurocentrism, opposing its other, the Middle Easterners). Therefore,
it was once again the formation of camps around certain ideologies (artificial unities against
the othering of the colonialists); as admirable as their goal of fighting colonialism was, most
reformers missed any opportunity toward the individual experiences, and the results only
strengthened a collective consciousness. In the meantime, colonial policies corrupted the
subjects (Fanon), and gained legitimacy through accumulation of knowledge in the academic
arenas that solidified the positions of the colonialists (Said). Both strategies left the colonized
subject desiring to emulate the Westerners.
The idea of mimesis, however, was already hard at work as a technique of power in
the Middle East that ensured the subjects’ dependency on the central source of authority, and
removed any responsibility from the individual. Despite each using a different term, imitation
or taqlid, (analogical reasoning or qiyas) respectively, have been central to both Shi’ite and
Sunni branches of Islam. However, in Iran the conflict between these two branches was
overshadowed by the rivalry between the religious versus the secular positions of authority in
the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries.
In the final chapter, I expanded on the rivalry between two groups: religious and
secular. First, it was the Shi’ite ulama, who, carrying the abjection in their historical memory
from the time when they were a minority under Sunni caliphs, always perceived the ruling
class as unjust and undeserving to rule over them. The other group is the line of
kings/dynasties that ruled Iran in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and were the subject
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of resentment by the ulama. In the historical frame, from the Constitutional Revolution of
1905 to the 1979 Revolution, this resentment fueled further politicization of Islam, building
on “fear and pity,” culminating into an ideology that successfully and effectively crippled
reformations, and ultimately placed the ulama at the helm of the political rule, legitimized by
the constructed title of the “Rule of Jurisprudence.”
The Velayat-e Faghih (Rule of Jurisprudence) theory was fine-tuned to achieve total
power in Iran shortly after the triumph of the revolution, but as with any totalitarian regime,
to maintain its grip on power, it needed to fill the existing gaps between what had been
created and the challenges they faced in reality. An investigation of some theories currently
flowing in Iran’s philosophical arena demonstrates that the question of individual experience
is still hidden from view and is yet to receive any attention from the prominent figures among
the theoreticians. This brings a greater sense of urgency to the main thesis of this study, at a
time when the artificial ties (religious, ethnic, and political) are beginning to unravel, as
exemplified by the in-fighting between the various groups: those struggling to separate their
region with a semi-cohesive ethnic population, or those in conflict because of Sunni or
Shi’ite affiliations—not just with those outside of Iran—but within the borders as well.
Unfortunately, the Western capitalistic powers, by implementing policies that are aimed to
protect big businesses (producers of arms and technology) and trade, have exacerbated the
crisis in the region.
The history of patriarchy is intertwined with artistic enterprises which have
implemented imagination and mimesis so firmly into its mechanisms of power that it is often
indistinguishable from it; thus, it has deprived the subject any meaningful attempt toward
consciousness. Hegel provided the blue print of patriarchy in his “master-slave” dialectic, in

303

which he not only has explained the power struggle throughout the history of civilization, but
also offered a projected plan that works like a prophetic statement that ensures and foretells a
perpetuity for patriarchy in its essence. Stated differently, Hegel’s “Lordship and Bondage”
contains the genetic material of the power struggle from the early cities and early
civilizations that requires a binary conflict and the subsequent ascension of only one above
the other. This has turned Hegel’s philosophy into a philosophy of power, mainly exploited
by authoritative systems to ensure their prominence.
The objective of this study, therefore, has been first, to draw attention to the issue of
subjectivity in the Middle East. Second, it aspires to create a space in which the Middle East
and the West, each through its “other,” can recognize the importance of the process of the
formation and preservation of the individual within a collective subjectivity. Daryush
Shayegan perhaps came closest when he identified an “ambiguous space” that emerged from
the “Westernization” that the Middle East was subjected to, and when he notes the “mental
distortion” of the nations in the Middle East as a result of this ambiguity. However, the only
“I” he offers, is the “I” of the narrator, the author himself. Moreover, this research aims to
make more visible the modern movements underscoring the sparks of individual subjectivity
in the Middle East since the beginning of modernization and reformation, and to work toward
developing discourses that will acknowledge and preserve individual rights as expressed by
the contemporary voices.
It is also the intention of this study to point to an alternative that neither seeks to
reach an unverifiable, vague goal of becoming one with the universe, hence achieving an
artificial unity, nor seeks to negate artistic and creative endeavors. This study, instead,
hopefully brings light to the notion that human creation will always remain human creation
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and never grander than human beings themselves; as such, what humans create should be
subject to interpretation and criticism. However, the history of patriarchy demonstrates that
has not been the case.
Ever since humans learned how to pin down images in the caves and imbue those
images with transcendental ideas, this skill has aided a strategy toward crafting a philosophy
of power to achieve prominence and continuity. By espousing philosophy of power,
patriarchy, under different names and different guises through various alliances, has been
successful in maintaining its hold on power and domination continuously utilizing
imagination. It has done so by first creating or championing unverifiable (simply the words
of other humans) theories that lay out perfectly crafted and articulated formulas; these
formulas determine how everyone else should perceive and abide (Foucault 1994) by that
which is beyond human grasp, be it metaphysics, the ideal realm, or the Divine. These
formulas are then labeled as essence, form, abstract, and known by many other names. They
are infused with an imposed transcendental power, sometimes through visual or literary
representations, whether it be Being, existence, and other philosophical terms that do not
always clearly explain how some rise to political prominence, capitalizing on such ideals.
Those who seek prominence then duplicate these formulas through mimesis and take
possession for themselves of such relationships to the Transcendental, for mimesis affirms
unity and continuity. Even the most materialistic systems use the idealized, imagined
formulas and mimetically extrapolate from them a seemingly legitimate position of authority
for themselves.
Therefore, supporting the foundation of every authoritative system, whether religious,
secular, or even intellectual, are two significant pillars: artificial unity and imposed alterity,
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achieved and maintained through imagination and mimesis. These elements are then
incorporated into a philosophical theory solidifying and justifying it as a political theory, in
other words, ideology. It is imperative for a patriarchal rule to demonstrate it dominates all.
Just as it was important for the prehistoric people to give visual form to possibly an
individual experience to be able to establish ownership of it, it has been necessary for rulers
or political systems to have an encompassing philosophical theory, that not just signals their
subjects as such, but also establishes them as the source of power and authority over those
subjects.
As the first superpower, the Persian Achaemenids understood this well when they put
forth their idea of “king of kings.” Ever since then, constructing political philosophy has been
intertwined with art, as exemplified later in Plato. Therefore, there is creative endeavor at the
root of hybridization of ideas supporting political rule. The creative mind can argue for a soul
enveloped in the divine presence, or convince subjects there is only unity and nothing else.
But there always remains a gap—of which one should always be mindful—between what is
real (beyond our reach) and what we experience or create. The gap between the symbols and
meanings, or between noumena and phenomena, should never be concealed by imagination
and mimesis, for the gap is the only place we have to formulate questions that ensure growth
through dynamism and dialogism.
Plato was right to identify the realm of the real and the realm of illusion. However, he
could not build his republic had he not sought some sort of authority, which he did by
crafting a hypothetical “perfect” formula as the essence and form, from the ideal realm he
envisioned on the one side, and mimetically applying that to his republic on the other. This
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system does not tolerate competition; therefore, to strengthen his position of power, he had to
eliminate other creative thinkers by banishing the artists.
Aristotle recognizes Plato’s use of mimesis, and argues for the use of this valuable
tool to make it work for the benefit of the state. Here art and politics mingle, and it becomes
difficult to separate oneself (the subject) from that which provokes emotions, and creates a
sense of community (artificial unity) in the process. From here on, every philosopher has
tried to somehow follow suit. Plotinus’ story of hypostases offers a brilliant way to establish
links to the metaphysics and makes accessible that which was supposed to lay beyond
humans’ reach. Others, once again, have tried to use Plotinus’s formulas and somehow
prove, by way of creating an alterity, that they alone are connected to the transcendental and
hence are the only legitimate and worthy ruler, as in the Safavids or the current religious
leaders in Iran.
The gap exists, yet autocratic leaders or thoughts have tried to obscure it, to conceal it
through imagination and mimesis. By doing so, they take possession of that space, just as the
cave people pinned down their hallucinations inside the caves, to take ownership of that
which was extraordinary and magical. The processes of imagination and mimesis without a
proper polyphonic criticism undermines subjecthood, and if there is a subject, weakens its
being a subject to itself.
The subjects under such a system are distorted and suffer from self-alienation, as they
are constantly pulled away from that which may bring questioning, self-examination, and
ultimately establishing a healthy relationship with their alterity. The “other” is used to create
a false unity by running a wedge between the subjects, so that they may never be able to
know what the real problem is.
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It has been important to use the philosophical language to justify being. Foucault talks
about the authority of the word and epistemology. It seems necessary then to have a theory in
place to analyze and critically study a phenomenon. I assert, even though activism takes
place, it can be written off as history if there are no theories to help analyze the phenomenon.
Theories give existence to phenomena, as if they confirm it, but, as with everything else,
patriarchy has taken ownership of theories to its own advantage. It freely selects, hybridizes,
and formulates - before capitalizing on - theories.
Hybridization, reconciliation, and blending ideas have taken place since the time of
the early cities when the concept of patriarchy mingled with the structure of administering
and running the city. Since then, patriarchy has only grown more immense; as a result, a
potentially free subject is either preoccupied with the self, as in the current Western societies,
or dissolved in the collective, as anywhere else that has not yet experienced individuality and
the affirmation of the dignity of the being as subject.
The value of the individual has been defined in various contexts. Marx saw the value
of humans in their work and production. Some, like Plato, view it in their ability to reach the
highest good, as defined by the philosopher. Others deem humans’ worth in their ability to
become masters of themselves, or define their existence as “free,” and perfection in unity.
Still others contend a being is determined based on its ability to think. All of these qualities
can be turned against another and easily create the alterity required for an autocratic system. I
have argued for the worth of humans in their “being.” The value comes from the fact that
they exist, not for their membership in an ethnic or religious community, not for their gender
or sexual orientation, not for their unique geographical origin, and not for what they produce,
materialistically or intellectually. The worth of humans intrinsically comes from simply

308

“being,” first. However, this being is constantly changing and must grow and achieve
consciousness and presence (Aristotle and Heidegger). The individual existence and the
dignity from that existence is intrinsic, and other affiliations and belongings follow later.
This is not unlike what the Existentialists argued; however, the individual in question
here is not a constant, nor is it in a vacuum to create its own definitions and meanings of life
for itself. It exists in an organic network (rhizome) with other beings, constantly changing.
Therefore, no affiliation or belonging (i.e. being subject to) should hinder the growth and
consciousness of humans, which should underscore individual responsibility and shaping its
subjectivity by its “other” in a dynamic equity. How does one achieve consciousness? If we
agree with Massumi, who argued that consciousness, or “thinking-feeling,” cannot take place
without a well-established multitude of “relational” networks (2013), then it is plausible to
suggest that the more the links between beings within the rhizomic network, the more
consciousness can be attained.
Human survival is dependent on its other; humans are defined in their “other.” But,
first they must re-examine their relationship with that “other,” for philosophy of power (i.e.
patriarchy) has damaged those connections for centuries. Periods of conflict, self-centrism,
and artificial unity, have provoked violence toward the “other” and invoked abjection. Those
are missed and “unlived”657 periods that should have been spent recognizing the “other” as
the one through whom we reach consciousness. Thus, the individual consciousness is made
possible, not by artificial and manufactured techniques of patriarchy but, as Bakhtin noted, as
shaped dialogically by its alterity through “utterance.”
Hegel’s “Lordship and Bondage,” seen through Kojeve, has it partially correct in
bringing up the notion of recognition. The recognition must be predicated, however, on the
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fact that they are both beings in an a priori sense. Nonetheless, as argued by Hegel, one
becomes non-essential, because it is defined by the first self-consciousness. Defined through
words and mediated by language, the first self-consciousness supersedes the other and seeks
the position of superiority. Therefore, the relationship gets off on an uneven start (Deleuze in
Keenan 251). The same holds true for twentieth century Iran.
Ali Shari’ati, the ideologue of the Islamic Revolution, once stated, “[i]t is in
becoming that we can be . . . It is in action that truth manifests itself . . . Faith is [to be]
turned into a conscientious ideology” (Matin 9).658 Therefore, it is not the “being” first, but
rather the “becoming,” as defined by Shari’ati, that informs the potential of being. Without a
being, a subject to oneself, Hegel’s master-slave is easily turned into a political ideology. It
must be noted that the Hegelian theory of master-slave is the philosophical explication of the
story of patriarchy that has been instrumental in producing philosophy of power, rather than a
philosophy of peace. As such, the master-slave dialectic can then be applied to the
relationship between the secular monarchy and the rise of a theocracy in Iran.
The consciousness of monarchy during the Shah came face to face with the
consciousness of the ulama, and the long history of their mastery in filling the gaps of
knowledge with imagination, mimesis, and constructed truth. The struggle between the two
had its roots in the earlier Revolution of 1905; subsequently, the constitutional revolution led
to the ulama proving their mastery over the monarchy following the 1979 revolution. One
finds volumes of meaning in just the constructed titles, whether given to the aristocrats and
endowed by the king to the court associated dignitaries, or the titles the ulama have
designated for themselves.659 The struggle between the monarchs and the ulama ended in the
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rise to political power in the form of theocracy in 1979 in Iran, and the formation of an
autocratic regime that is still in power.
But the ulama (read master) could not have accomplished this task had they not have
the recognition of the population, who were not free subjects (read slaves). This recognition
came even from the intellectuals and the educated class, who had bypassed the issue of
subjectivity, and directly emulated the Hegelian left’s formulas. Hence, the relationship
between the jurisprudence and the people is also the relation between master and slave, for it
is the position of the theocratic authority that defines the subjects. But, the question remains:
How does one bring about change in the face of an all-encompassing system?
“Change” can be a double-edged sword, if Nietzsche was right in saying: “the whole
history of a ‘Thing,’ an organ, a custom, can . . . be regarded as a continuous ‘sign-chain’ of
perpetually new interpretations and adjustments, whose causes, . . . sometimes follow and
alternate with each other absolutely haphazard” (Nietzsche [1887] 2006, 48). There are
moments in human history when certain events unexpectedly produce impetus for change
that is not unlike an electron in the orbit around the nucleus in atoms that, when provoked,
jumps its orbit back and forth, releasing a spark. Such were the events of May 1968 in France
that began with student demands for co-ed dormitories but rapidly expanded to include other
groups, namely workers that nearly brought down the established government in France at
the time.660 Even though the students lost politically and the establishment was back in power
before the end of the year, more oppressively than before, the effects of that spark found
lasting impressions in the proceeding wave of anti-establishment aesthetics and philosophical
thought.
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These thoughts, which have since been manifested through the ethico-aesthetic
theory, revealed that the events of spring 1968 confirmed it was possible to take action
outside of the established formulas such as the class struggle, or the old familiar dialectics
(both born out of human mind and enjoying certain credibility and weight), and that the
linear relationship between the cause and effect can be transcended (Nietzsche [1887], 2006,
48). Nonetheless, in our own time these thoughts have yet to establish a way to overcome a
paradox between the impromptu, schizophrenic, and creative action on the one hand, and the
unpredictability (which Nietzsche calls “haphazard”) in reaching the desired outcome, on the
other. After all, one of the arguments for re-establishing a centralized authority has been to
avoid chaos and to maintain order. Even the diversity and interpretability awarded by
postmodernism could not successfully challenge absolutism. The “bearers of absolutes” have
welcomed the postmodern idea of “interpretability” and “the view that truth is a matter of
interpretation,” and they have been swift to adapt it to their own ends (Vattimo 1997, 1 and
2009, 6). But it is not so much the question of “truth,” or “multiplicity of interpretation,” as it
is being mindful of the gaps within that which becomes an “absolute.”
What authoritarian systems unavoidably rely upon is a system of illusions that lead
one toward what may be even against the individual’s basic instinct, which is selfpreservation, much less any “hopes of happiness” (Vattimo 2009, 7). The illusion can be
destabilized by individual experience and one’s presence in that experience, keeping it in
check and validated through links with human communities and networks of empathy. It is
for this reason that all absolutists deny individual experience (or try to channel it as a
collective), which can trigger what they may not be able to foresee or control. The human
experience, particularly of where the “gaps” lie, are of utmost importance, for there is where
questions can be formulated. This is why the authoritarian regimes conceal the gaps produced
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in the process of illusion-making. But every time change forces these regimes to update their
positions of authority, as happened in the Middle East during modernization, the Arab
Spring, etc., there are sparks that can point to the existing gaps that should be focused on and
dialogically examined and discussed. It is because of such gaps that the once-absolutistpowers have had to abandon restrictions on many of the fronts they held, such as gender and
race. Nevertheless, there are more questions to be asked, since the challenges of alterity still
remain and there is still more work to be done.
I have had to place outside the boundaries of this study several remaining but
important questions. Among them are: Why weren’t the Germans able to read Hegel as the
French did? How and through what process is subjectivity actually shaped by its alterity? I
am also interested in pursuing further the issue of competition and superiority in patriarchy,
which I have had to defer to a future opportunity. Moreover, I think there is much uncharted
territory when it comes to studying Islamic Art and its philosophy, most specifically the work
by the “Arabic Plotinus.” There is also great opportunity in an intertextualization between the
creative arts and philosophy of the Islamic lands in general. Scholars have only recently
begun to notice links between the issue of subjectivity, art, and power (Gruber 2018). And
finally, a close investigation of the modern to contemporary visual arts in the Middle East as
a separate topic went beyond the limitations in this study, hence it had to be deferred to a
future occasion.
All that which has informed subjectivity through patriarchy and the ever-present
Neoplatonism, has done so at the peril of the subject. One may challenge the status of
individuality in the West; the individual under a “dominant reality” is also a slave itself
(D&G 130). In the words written by Nancy:
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The capitalist economy accumulates impasses, abscesses, and uncontrollable
disorders. The society it governs does not believe in itself anymore. Words and
concepts that were still valid fifteen years ago, like the “rule of law,” “human rights,”
and “democracy,” are losing visibility and on a daily basis their practical as well as
theoretical and symbolic credibility. Scientific, technical, juridical, and moral
progress immediately displays, at every step, ambivalences that suspend the name
“progress,” and along with it, those of “humanity,” “reason,” and “justice.” That’s
when one brandishes idols, that is to say ideas reduced to a kind of belch. On one
side, “God’s will,” on the other, “human freedom.” These expressions provide a front,
of course, for large scale maneuvers aimed at seizing power and wealth. But this front
is marked with figures of identification (or rather, of subjection) and of mobilization
(or rather, of compulsive repetition). And these figures are painted on bombs.661
This demonstrates that the dominant reality makes individuals imagine they are free,
but they are actually subject to their own imagined reality, as under capitalism; thus, self is
sacrificed for the dominant reality. After two World Wars and millions of its people killed in
the process, the West’s insistence on its superior position has turned the Middle East into a
domain with an expendable population to prove that position of power by turning attention
away from its own economic inequities.
It is my hope in this study to bring the issue of the “subject” to the forefront. A
subject that knows the difference between “subject and object,” and is not persuaded or
programmed to treat others as objects, is more likely to establish a reciprocal relationship
toward mutual consciousness. Nevertheless, one cannot achieve superiority this way because
this relationship is predicated on equality.
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APPENDIX I

The evolvement of the Qizilbash itself underscores what is of great interest in this
study, which is the formation of the collective against the individual, and the reformulation
required for the new patriarchy. Kathryn Babayan comments on how,
Qizilbash religiosity created the structure around which individuals coalesced into a
single group, like the Shamlu, Rumlu, or Takkalu. A system of belief then entered
into the dynamics of a set of Turco-Mongol kinship ties in the process of
reformulation (Babayan 2002, xxxix).
Isma’il (1487-1524) was the youngest of the three sons of Shaykh Haydar, sixth
generation and successor of Shaykh Safi al-Din (d. 1334), the founder and leader of the
Safavi Sufi Order. In his ancestry, Isma’il’s mother and grandmother possessed royal Greek
lineage, and his grandfather, Uzun Hassan (d. 1478), was the leader of the Aqquyunlu tribe,
which ruled a considerable part of Iran in the second half of the fifteenth century (Newman
10). Furthermore, Isma’il was groomed for his future role among the Zahediyeh Sufi Order,
founded by Shaykh Zahed Gilani (1216/17-1301), which was centered in Lahijan, in the
north Iranian region of Gilan. His grandfather, Junayd (1447-1460), had taken up arms
against Shirvanshahs in the Caucasus, and had been killed in the process. Upon the killing of
his father Haydar that was by the hand of the Shirvanshahs with the support of the
Aqquyunlu leader (Uzun Hassan’s younger son, Ya’qub) in 1488, Isma’il was taken into
hiding, and taught in the ways of the Shi’i sect, under the protection of the local governor,
Mirza Ali Karkiya. Newman sums up:
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[t]hus was Isma’il by birth descended on both sides from princely families of
differing faiths, by upbringing associated with well-established Tajik sayyid
practitioners of a distinct body of Shi’i doctrine and practice and, at his father’s death,
the spirituo-political leader . . . of a Sufi-style movement comprised of the region’s
Turkish tribal levies . . . whose spirituality was informed by similarly Shi’i-tinged
radical messianism circulating in the region (Newman 2012, 11).
Moreover, the decision to situate the “Ithna Ashari” or “Twelver” Shi’ism at the
political foundation of the new dynasty, despite Shah Isma’il’s Sunni heritage, was not by
coincidence. Babayan notes the “scholarly attention” this issue has received, in that upon the
conquering of Iran, the emphasis changed from “Messianic claims” to the “political aspect of
the title of shah drawn from the Iranian tradition of kingship” (xxxix). Roger Savory in Iran
Under the Safavids notes three contributing factors to the justification of this decision. It was
the Safavid leader’s “claim to be the representatives on earth of the 12 th Imam or Mahdi (if
not the Imam himself) . . . and [second,] the position of murshid-i kamil, or perfect spiritual
director . . .; finally, by asserting that ‘Ali’s younger son, Husayn, married the daughter of
Yazdigird III, the last of the Sasanid kings” (27). The idea of murshid i kamel is predicated
on the idea of the “Universal Man,” and the potentiality of some to achieve a state of
perfectness. In their view, the last point established a blood link between the family of Ali
and the ancient Persian royal tradition (ibid), thereby validating the “divine right” of the
Iranian kings by way of substituting the “kingly glory” endowed by “Ahuramazda,”, the
ancient Persian “Mazdean Lord Wisdom,” (Babayan 2002, 186), with the Prophet’s lineage.
Hence, the “Twelver” Shi’ism was firmly placed at the core of “Safavid religious propaganda
and political ideology” (Savory 27). Babayan’s historiography of the Safavids identifies two
distinct phases in the development of the Safavids: the revolutionary phase (1477-1501) and
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the imperial age (1501-1722). However, she is interested in the ways in which “embracing
Shi’ism” and “Alid loyalty” (the cult of Ali, the Prophet’s son-in law and his blood line)
“created a common culture” that brought about solidarity among the Qizilbash and the
artisans (xl-xli). Furthermore, one must keep in view the issue of a “distinct political and
cultural identity.” Bert Fragner, in his article “The Safavid Empire and the Sixteenth-and
Seventeenth-Century Political and Strategic Balance of Power within the World System,”
asserts:
Being officially Twelver Shi’ite, it was not difficult for Safavid representatives to
present themselves as a distinct cultural and political unit in comparison to their
western, northern and south-eastern neighbors, all of whom were Sunni (Fragner
2015, 23).
At the time of Isma’il’s birth, following the decline of Timurids’ rule, there existed
multiple principalities that ruled Iran; each group was entangled in power struggles, vying for
domination over the others through internal conflicts, in addition to responding to external
pressures from the Ottomans to the west, who, since the capture of Trabizand in 1453, had
been trying to move eastward (Floor and Herzig 2015, 18). Noteworthy is the rise to
prominence of the military group known as Qizilbash, who were at the heart of the Safavid
“political-military” body and were the confederation of a number of Turkish tribes known by
the same name due to the adoption of a distinct red headdress since the time of Haydar.
Savory mentions an “anonymous history” to be the reference on source of the head dress,
known as “sufi taj.” According to the source, Haydar showed Uzun Hassan this head dress
and that Uzun Hassan “kissed it and put it on his head (20). He explains the term “qizilbash”
to have been applied initially to the Turcoman inhabitants of the regions east of Anatolia,
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north of Syria and the Armenian highlands, and who had converted and become followers of
the Safavids; eventually however, the term came to refer to non-Turcoman supporters of the
Safavids as well (ibid).
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APPENDIX II

Appendix II.A - Egypt
On the issue of competition, Juan Cole in Napoleon’s Egypt states: “[t]hroughout the
1790s, British naval superiority had confined the expansionist French to the Continent and
thwarted an attempt to overthrow the British enemy” (13). Others like Iradj Amini in
Napoleon and Persia (1999), reveal a more egocentric picture, drawing from Napoleon’s
own recollections in exile:
I knew . . . that I had to draw attention to myself to remain in the public eye, and that
I would therefore have to attempt extraordinary things, because people like to be
amazed. It was by virtue of this opinion that I imagined the expedition to Egypt . . .
This expedition was meant to create a great idea of France; above all, by founding a
French colony on the Nile, it was to make up for the American colonies France had
lost, and by ensuring trade with the Orient open up the paths to England’s possessions
in India (Amini 1999, 10. See also, Mémoires de Napoléon, écrits sous sa dictée a
Sainte-Hèléne par un de ses valets de chamber, Paris 1819, 00.21-22).
In Egypt, Napoleon’s swift capture of Lower Egypt and ousting of the Ottoman client
ruler Ibrahim Bey in less than a month was in part due to Ibrahim Bey’s soldiers deciding
they were no match for the French; therefore, prior to abandoning the capital, they set their
fine residences and merchant boats alight so that they would be of no use to the enemy (Cole
2007, 69).
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While the British did not view Persia as a direct colony, they were concerned with its
strategic location due to their interest held in the affairs of their East India Company
(Lambton 1993, 149). This concern extended to the influences of other powers who had
either gained (as in Russia) or had the potential to gain influence in Persia. Russian
excursions into the northern regions of Persia had “deprived her of all her provinces north of
the Aras River in the early years of the century and of territory in the north-east in the middle
of the century” (Lambton 149). The “encroachment of foreign powers,” therefore, served as a
great source of persuasion for Persia to seek the much needed advanced military technology
and training from Europe (Amini 1999, 100). Amini writes of the review of Napoleon’s
infantry by Persian ambassador, Mirza Mohammad Reza, who was “greatly amused,” by the
event and had asked “how it could happen that all the soldiers marched together.” Amini
quotes from the Duke of Rovigo that the Persian ambassador “particularly liked the military
music. He had asked if the Emperor would kindly give him some of the musicians, as though
they were slaves.”
To summarize, as the backdrop to the surge of modernism in the nineteenth century,
there were two technologically significant facets to the increasing influences of Europeans in
the Middle East. First, it was France’s new military power that emerged from the French
Revolution, as attested to by their short-lived occupation of Egypt in 1798. Additionally, in
the realm of military was Russia’s excursions from the north, briefly in Ottoman European
regions, and on a more permanent basis, the Caucasus regions . Mary C. Wilson writes: “The
ancient Christian kingdom of Georgia and part of the Iranian region of Azerbaijan were
absorbed, and a treaty with Iran in 1828 showed Russia’s superior power” (7). Where
military technology opens new territory, trade is not far behind. Innovations that changed the
nature of trade between Europe and the Middle East are the other aspect of the European
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influence. The use of steamships from the 1830s, and “the extension of telegraphs” in 1850s
and 1860s are among such technologies that facilitated the import of goods such as textiles
from factories in Europe in exchange for the raw material such as cotton from Egypt (ibid).
When Muhammad Ali took the reins in 1805 in Egypt, almost immediately he
initiated a series of reformations which began with the purpose of self-preservation by first
and foremost, establishing a bigger and more modern army and building a strong economy at
the same time. Nevertheless, the superficiality of changes he had planned on and the external
pressures from European economies did not allow for real reforms. Muhammad Ali’s new
army was to replace the foreign mercenaries on whose services he had come to rely during
the first year of his rule (Owen 114). To provide financial support for his army that by this
time was made up of 100,000 men, Muhammad Ali,
replaced the tax-farmers with a system of direct collection by government agents […]
In addition, further sums were raised by an extension of the state monopolies to cover
almost every type of agricultural produce. Crops were taken from the peasants in lieu
of taxes and sold abroad on government account, leaving the cultivator little more
than enough for bare existence (Cole 2007, 114.).
In further expanding the economy to increase the government’s revenue, Muhammad
Ali introduced new crop, namely cotton, which he knew was in high demand in Europe.
There were also plans to produce textile from that cotton in order to reduce import, as well as
send young Egyptians abroad to be trained in new technology. However, Muhammad Ali’s
plans to create a modern administration that was capable of mediating and strengthening
Egyptian economy proved unsuccessful. The pressures were building up from outside,
particularly through “the Anglo-Turkish Commercial Convention of 1838, which outlawed
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state monopolies and established a low external tariff of 8 per cent.” This led to the decrease
of the revenue that had been mainly allocated toward the military, hence weakening
Muhammad Ali’s military that dwindled to 18,000, as well as the loss of control over the
agricultural export (Owen 115). Owen also notes that the weakening of the economic role the
Egyptian government was playing at this time was hastened by the landowners and the
producers of raw material, who were “anxious to end the monopoly system so they could sell
their produce direct to European merchants rather than to the government (116).
With the state monopoly out of the way, the path was paved for European financial
expansion and investment, which manifested in the establishing of the first European banks
in Alexandria in 1850. Further, by this time, the modernization of the military and public
projects, such as the construction of Suez Canal, were being funded by the European
financial establishments. This left Egypt deeply in debt. Owen notes: “By 1875 Egypt had
borrowed a nominal sum of nearly £100 million from Europe, of which the Treasury had
obtained no more than £68 million” (116).
Appendix II.B - Ottomans
The Ottoman Turkey arguably felt the most pressure since it suffered its first major
loss of a Muslim territory to Russia in the final quarter of the eighteenth century. The treaty
between the Ottomans and the Russians at the end of this conflict “showed the unequal
power of the two empires and led to the loss of . . . Crimea […] The Ottoman government
began to create a new army on the European model” as a result . (See Mary C. Wilson,
“Introduction,” in the Modern Middle East, edited by Albert Hourani pp. 6-7).
Within half a century, Ottoman Turkey began reformation of the Empire by acquiring
Western military weapons, also with the blessings of the religious leaders. Sultan Selim III (r.
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1789-1808) had the support of several şeyhül-islāms in his campaigns to modernize the
administratively and militarily. Heyd names a number of religious authorities (9) as
supporters of Selim III, who “loyally cooperated with his successor, Sultan Mahmūd II, in
destroying the Janissaries, abolishing the Bektashi order and modernizing the army and
State” (Heyd 30). One example would be actually the submission of a project by one of the
religious authorities, Tatarcik ‘Abdu’llāh, who proposed “the adoption of Western military
science and drill, the systematic translation of European technical works into Turkish, and
the employment of foreign instructors and experts” (Heyd 30).
While both Selim III and his successor, Mahmūd II (r. 1808-1839) enjoyed the
support of some of the ūlamā, not everyone from the religious ranks agreed with the
Westernization and modernization plans. Early in the nineteenth century, Mahmūd II began
by changing his own appearance: he shortened his beard and dressed like his contemporary
Europeans counterparts “in frock coats and trousers” (Shaw 49). He initiated a compulsory
dress code by 1829 for male civilians, soldiers, and government bureaucrats, at which time
most government ranks had accepted it (ibid). What particularly did not sit well with the
opposing ūlamā, were first, the mandatory headdress from a turban to a “red fez” (1828), and
second was Mahmūd having his portrait painted in the European style. This was not the first
time the Sultan’s portrait was painted despite the şeyhül-islām’s objections; Selim III had
also had his portrait painted multiple times (Heyd 34). In 1836 the display of the monarch’s
portrait in government offices became customary, regardless of the ūlamā’s “expressed . . .
discontent” (ibid). The Ottoman autocratic Sultans, however, ruled undisputedly and were
clear in asserting their will and power, regardless of opposition.
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Among those objecting change were the softas, or the poor, underprivileged students
at the madrasa (school of religious studies), who were “the breeding ground of discontent
and trouble-making” for the Ottoman Empire. Whereas there existed corruption, nepotism,
and class difference among the ūlamā who occupied high posts in the government, the
underprivileged softas were among those elements of “class-struggle within the ūl[a]mā
corps” that had “turned against all authority” including the modernization initiated by such
authority, even the presence of the European in their midst (Heyd 35-36). Heyd discusses a
divide among the religious community regarding the reforms that aligned with economic and
social status of the members of the said community. He mentions an account of an incident in
April 1801 involving the softas and the Russian ambassador and other diplomats,
accompanied by “a few ladies,” who had been granted permission by the Ottoman
government to visit the Sūleymānīye Mosque. The softas greeted the Europeans with their
slippers and stones (36). While Heyd dismisses these kinds of actions as “fanaticism and
narrow-mindedness” that “often far surpassed those of the ūlemā leaders, I argue there is
more to such incidents that, while beyond the scope of this study, merits further
investigation, if one considers the affected subjectivity of these students, who were actually
executed following the incident.
Nevertheless, the position the “high ūl[a]mā” took on the modernization campaigns,
whether expressed in verbal or written format, was in support of the said reforms, sustaining
their position based on “religious law and early Islamic history or . . . on reason and common
sense” (Heyd 37). I suggest that mimesis played such an important part in these decisions that
legitimized the learning from the “infidel enemy.” Heyd states the ūlamā’s argument as:
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Djihād, the holy war against the infidels . . . was one of the foremost duties of
believers. To strengthen the army of Islam by every means was therefore an important
religious obligation […] [Thus,] [t]o learn from the infidel enemy would not
constitute a religiously illicit innovation (bid’at) but would be an application of the
legitimate maxim of mūkābele bi-‘l-misl or reciprocation, that is, fighting the enemy
with his own weapons (Heyd 37).
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APPENDIX III

The complexity of the socio-political and religious structures and class hierarchy in
the Middle East in general, and in Persia in particular, is distinct from Europe (Hauser 1951,
1962, 1999). (See the chapter on Germany and the Enlightenment.) Hauser explains the
situation of the middle class in Europe (France and Germany) in 17th century to be that of
indifference to political affairs, “by leaving the direction of state affairs to the holders of
power”(98). By 1830, however, the middle class itself is in power. Hauser in volume IV
states at this time “[t]he bourgeoisie is in full possession and awareness of its power. The
aristocracy has vanished from the scene of historical events and leads a purely private
existence” (2). Lambton explicates the issue as refracted through initially four identifiable
hierarchic classes in nineteenth century Persia. The first group, is made up of the ‘men of the
sword,’ who not surprisingly initiated the modernization reforms, and came mainly from the
aristocratic families. The second group, the ‘men of the pen,’ consisted of educated men,
bureaucrats, and those who were active in running the administrative offices. The bureaucrats
in charge of Tanzimat in Ottoman Turkey became so politically powerful that they even
marginalized some of the same young men they sent to Europe to become educated. They in
turn formed the Young Ottoman Turks group. (See Findlay 1982, pp 147-180). The ūlamā, or
the members of the religious class formed the third group, who drew power and prestige not
from the secular class, “but from religious learning, and the more learned among them were
regarded as the representatives of the Hidden Imam, who was, for most of the population, the
‘true king’.” Although Lambton does not make the connection, but here I want to draw
attention to the relationship between the idea of the Hidden Imam and the Neoplatonic idea
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of the “Perfect Human,” from which the ulama surely drew inspiration (Lambton 163).
Finally, the fourth group according to Lambton, was made up of the merchants, which
included “big merchants,” “money-lenders,” and members of the “bazaar and shopkeepers.”
Adamson provides further information on the four groups’ origin. The classification
of the Ottoman society, modeling after Plato’s Republic, was the work of Ottoman
philosopher, contemporary of Süleymān the Ottoman sultan, Ali Çelbī Kinalizādeh. The
balance between these groups, according to Kinalizādeh, was maintained by the rule of the
Ottoman sultan, as he “praises Süleymān as a real-life philosopher-king.” (See Adamson
2016, 413). Lambton explains these groups
were not in any way closed groups. Two things in particular served to unite them:
marriage alliance and land ownership […] As a result . . . the difference between the
classes were less sharp than might otherwise have been the case. By the end of the
century members of the Qajar family were to be found in almost all walks of life; they
were not only provincial governors and military commanders, but also ministers and
members of the bureaucracy, writers, poets and Sufis (but very rarely ulama)
(Lambton 163-166).
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APPENDIX IV

The coup was the culmination of the “oil crisis” that began in 1948, as argued by the
historians like Abrahamian, which ultimately led to the nationalization of Iranian oil in 1951
and the electing of Mohammad Mosaddeq as the premier by the parliament (Abrahamian
2001, 184-86). The parliament (majlis) in 1948 rejected a proposal from the Soviets to obtain
concession to the oil from the northern region. The parliament also rejected an earlier
Supplementary Agreement with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company dated 1933, which was
made in secret and did not consider an equal interest for Iran (Abrahamian 2001, 184).
Mosaddeq’s objective was to bring Iran “full control of the oil industry.” Nonetheless,
Britain could not give up control and sought to “safeguard its vital interest” by removing
Mosaddeq from power (Abrahamian 2001, 187). It is clear that Mosaddeq believed true
independence of Iran was not possible if foreign powers could control its natural resources
through receiving concessions as it had been done during the Qajars (ibid). It is also clear
that Britain, as repeatedly appeared in the classified documents, could never lose “control” of
the production, process and distribution of oil in Iran, or to relinquish full control to the
Iranians (Abrahamian 2001, 189). Here is an example of an old patriarchy, not willing to
relinquish “control,” and is willing to use whatever means it can to ensure its position of
authority and interests. Amanat notes this from the attitude of the British toward Iran as
expressed through the British Foreign Minister at the time, Anthony Eden, “who had studied
Persian at Christ Church and earned his degree in Oriental studies; he viewed the world
through the all-too-familiar Orientalist prism and was unwilling to accept the painful
prospects of a postcolonial Britain” (Amanat 2017, 544). While I believe Amanat is jumping
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ahead a bit here, I think his statement is a good example of the old patriarchy’s persistence in
colonial intentions. Abrahamian notes that Britain expected Mosaddeq to fail on his own, and
they tried to expedite his fall “through economic pressure, propaganda campaigns, and
subsidies to the opposition” (Abrahamian 2001, 190). However, when these attempts failed,
“they turned to the United States and harnessed the CIA” (ibid). Abrahamian explains that
while the British were awaiting the collapse of Mosaddeq’s government, they continued with
a series of charades in the form of negotiations that appeared as though they were willing to
come to an equitable agreement, and that the failure of negotiations was due to “Iranian
intransigents” (Abrahamian 2001, 191).
Abrahamian notes that indeed in the negotiations, “the impasse came . . . because of
the clashes of economic interest between imperialism and nationalism.” However, the image
projected of Mosaddeq by the Westerners was one of being “backed by the communist
party,” (Quoted from President Eisenhower in Abrahamian 2001, 182) “anti-foreign,”
“nihilistic,” and indulgent “in an orgy of mob rule” (Abrahamian 2001, 210). Abrahamian
cites the Christian Science Monitor, dated September 21-22, 1953. See also Amanat, 2017,
544.
Thus in 1952, with the support of the United States, the British moved to persuade the
Shah to replace Mosaddeq. On July 21 (known as Siyeh-Tir) Mosaddeq turned to the people
(Paidar 131) and declared that the British were trying to take back the control of the oil, and
that the Shah was using his influence through the army to manipulate the situation.
Abrahamian presents many documents written by British authorities, the Foreign Office, and
the British Embassy in Tehran that described Mosaddeq in unflattering terms, but they
secretly admitted that “he had captured the imagination of people” (Abrahamian 2001, 187),
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and that “he still had a hold on public opinion” (ibid). The British also began a smearing
campaign through the media (newspaper and BBC). The Observer characterized Mosaddeq
as “a ‘Robespierre fanatic,’ and a ‘tragic Frankenstein’ with a ‘gigantic head’ impervious to
‘common sense’ but obsessed with one xenophobic idea’ (May 10, 1951)” (Abrahamian
2001, 193). It is at this time that the crowds took to the streets “from the National Front,” to
the “communist Tudeh party;” however, the day ended in bloodshed (Abrahamian 2001,
195). See also Amanat 2017, 540. Amanat notes people on the street chanted, “[w]e
sacrificed our lives, we write with our blood: either death or Mosaddeq,” which was “voiced
by ordinary people, [who] saw in Mosaddeq not merely a political leader but a savior of the
Iranian nation” (ibid).
The United States ambassador, Loy Henderson concurred with the British Charge
d’Affaires on the idea that only a coup d’état could now bring the events to a close to the
benefit of the Western powers. Paidar argues that the Americans initially supported the
nationalization of the Iranian oil because of their own competition with the British; however,
they became “alarmed” as they saw the involvement of the pro-Soviet Tudeh Party (Paidar
131). Abrahamian notes it was the British that led the Americans to believe this, as the Tudeh
Party at this time was in no position to threaten the government (from a BBC Persian
interview, August 26, 2013). He comments that up until this point, the Americans were more
inclined to exert “economic pressures and constitutional means to remove Mosaddeq” (2001,
196). Nevertheless, the CIA and MI6 began preparing for a coup through a plan called
TRAJAX. The TRAJAX plan was a consolidation of MI6 “blue print named Operation Boot”
and of CIA operation named “Bedamn,” a project they had initiated against the spread of
Communism, and particularly the Tudeh party (Abrahamian 2001, 197). What the Americans
lacked in information about the key personalities in Iran, the British more than made up
330

through their connections and business affiliates, whether in the army, among the merchants,
or in the various tribes (Abrahamian 2001, 199-200). This soon changed and Americans like
Wilber and Cottam became instrumental in the 1953 coup, by which time “the Tudeh Party’s
support for Mosaddeq [sic] had weakened” and the prominent clergy, Kashani, who had
supported him to this point, changed sides as well (Paidar 131).
Recently unclassified documents released from the U.S. government reveal that
Ayatollah Kashani (who was part of the National Front, a party founded by Mosaddeq), had
been in contact with the U.S. embassy and the CIA prior to the coup d’état. The documents
prove however, that Ayatollah Behbahani, received large sums in monetary assistance (that
became known as Behbahani Dollars) to helped mobilize a number of unsavory characters,
including Sha’ban Jafari and Tayeb Haj Rezai in support of the monarch during the
demonstrations two days prior to the August 19, 1953. (Kambiz Fatahi from BBC-Persian
report broadcast on July 22, 2017). The clergy, as a result, remained an important player.
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NOTES

1

Foucault, [1967], p.368.

2

The criticism of the fact that the terms “West” and the “Middle East” do exist, and

utilized by nearly everyone is beyond the boundaries of this study. However, I have been
mindful of its problematic nature.
3

Is it possible there is a connection between this oversight and Baudrillard’s criticism

of Foucault?
4

One such example, found in the ancient Mesopotamia, is the Stele of Hammurabi

that shows Hammurabi receiving the divine laws from the deity, Shamash.
5

Gruber, 2004, pp.24-31.

6

BBC News. October 5, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-

34440759 , retrieved November 16, 2015.
7

Grun, Remondino, and Zhang, (September 2004), pp. 77-199.

8

It can be argued that the current destructions of works of art by the radical groups

which are recorded and shared across social media are to construct their own image.
9

The term patriarchy, while undoubtedly tied to the history of its development, is

meant here in a broader context, which is not limited to gender, or even individual. Viewed
from the perspective of power, it is inseparable from inequity; it fosters collective
subjectivity through religious interpretations and social, political, and economic apparatuses.
10

By free here I mean being subject to oneself, not to any group or political agenda.

11

This is a criticism of Hegel’s dialectic that argues for a progression out of conflict

toward the unity of self-consciousness. It is noteworthy the root of the word “art” is “ar”
(plural ars) means to join, to bring together.
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12

This is an extrapolation on Said’s theory; historically, the difference in religions

has played a key role in highlighting the differences between the West and the Middle East.
13

On July 22, 2011, Andres Breivik killed 85 young Muslims on a retreat in a

Norway Island. Also, a reference should be made here to the attack on the office of the
French satirical magazine, “Charlie Hebdo” on January 7, 2015 in Paris.
14

References come from Augustine’s City of God (Book XVIII), and Thomas

Aquinas’s On Kingship: To the King of Cyprus (Chapter 14). Both philosophers draw
parallels between what God creates/does and what the church/king should do and stand for.
Also, there is compelling argument for the affinity between Neoplatonism and Islamic
thought made by scholars in Neoplatonism and Islamic Thought, edited by Parviz
Morewedge, to which I will be returning for a more in-depth investigation.
15

Foucault uses “apparatus” to point to mechanisms that are for “transforming human

beings” ([1975] 1977). In an article, “What is dispositif?” (1988), Giles Deleuze unpacks
Foucault’s “apparatus,” and explicates it in terms of lines: “curves of visibility, . . .utterance,
[…] lines of force, […] and . . . lines of subjectivations” (in French Philosophy since 1945,
398-399).
16

This is not unlike the Aristotelian cathartic formula, for the outcome is a collective

experience of purging of that which can be counter-productive to the state.
17

By ideology here I mean ideas that are representative of a particular group and are

meant to legitimize their political domination and to artificially unite.
18

This raises the question of: How does one avoid such pitfall, when engaged in

intellectual or philosophical discourse? I consider constant examination of one's thought
through dialogical discourses to be a possible solution.
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19

I believe it was in a process of going back and forth, from the moment that the

Cartesian “I” was perceived, to when it crossed the border into Germany to be the center of
the Idealists’ philosophy, bouncing off of the Analytical philosophy in Great Britain, to
bringing Hegel from Germany over to France, through Kojeve’s lectures, it is all within the
frame of each as each other’s “other” that new ideas in European philosophy emerged in the
mid to late twentieth century.
20

Heidegger notes that something compels the humans to “set upon” the resources,

thus to enframe, but he does not elaborate on it.
21

Nochlin, 1989, pp. 33-57.

22

It is true that what Nietzsche says here, were interpreted to suit the Nazis’ ISA even

though what Nietzsche means here is regarding the individual striving for excellence. I think
it is intriguing to note the relationship between art and power on the one hand and the
individual versus the collective on the other. After all, Nietzsche considers this “forming” a
sort of art, which makes the overlapping of art and power unavoidable.
23

A prevalent example that is found under every dome and on every rug design is that

of a cosmic medallion with a focal point at the center.
24

I must add that the individuality in the West has always been fragile and in flux and

by no means a fixed destination.
25

The events following the September 11 demonstrated a reveres, in passing patriot

acts, and similar measures, that rolled back individual freedoms in the United States.
26

A similar example is during the Iran-Iraq war that proved successful (for those in

power) in uniting the country that was threatening to fracture by diverse political groups,
which were growing in discontent toward the government that was slowly solidifying its total
grip on power.
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27

This is true, perhaps until more recent events, about which I shall continue to

investigate.
28

By free society I mean a society that respects and protects individual rights and

freedoms. Also, “the struggle for critique,” is a means to counter the possibility of these
struggles turning into hegemonic move themselves.
29

Jaspers [1957] 1962. p. 63.

30

Iskandar and the Hermit, from “Khamsa Nizami,” attributed to Mir Mussavir,

1535-1540. The story bears a striking resemblance to the mystic story of a supposed meeting
between Alexander and Diogenes.
31

The term “event” here may be similar to what Alain Badiou uses in Being and

Event. Badiou’s event is applied with regards to philosophy and its conditioning of “truth
procedures” external to and distinct from it (Badiou xviii); here, I use the term “event” to
point to the seismic shifts of power, whether political, artistic, or ideological, in which one
rises to a dominant position from a rift.
32

I will include the fact that patriarchy has abandoned many fronts that once held

tightly, such as education, right to vote, etc. due to spreading of consciousness in those areas.
33

On a broader perspective, as argued by Adunis (1930 - ), the Syrian poet, both

Shi’ites and Sunnis are affected with the notion of the dissolving the “I” into the greater
unity. (Antoon, July 11, 2011, Aljazeera Opinion)
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/07/201179124452158992.html), retrieved
November 20, 2015.
34

There were moves from the merchant class, under the leadership of the clergy that

boycotted and severely criticized any governmental patronage of the arts. This took place
while the government of Iran during the 1970s, right up to just before the revolution of 1979,
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had heavily invested in purchasing modern works by American and European avant-garde
artists. (New York Times. “Masterpiece Basement,” published December 2, 2007.)
35

The support of this group proved extremely influential in the Iranian Revolution of

36

It is noteworthy that what sparked the flames of the 1979 revolution, was the

1979.

setting fire to a movie theater in Abadan, southwest of Iran, on August 19, 1978 at which 470
people perished, while watching a politically controversial film.
37

Shayegan 7.

38

Monique Bellan/ Nadia Bou Ali/ Dahlia Gubara, “Articulations of Subjectivity and

Objectivity in the Modern Middle East, North Africa, South and Southeast Asia,” in: TRAFO
– Blog for Transregional Research, 03.03.2015. https://trafo.hypotheses.org/2065. Retrieved
on May 29, 2018.
39

From the conference blog, https://trafo.hypotheses.org/2065. Retrieved on May 29,

40

Ibid.

41

Payne, 1997, p. 524.

42

Ibid.

43

The other side of the problem is “translation,” which I will discuss in the next

2018.

segment.
44

In clarifying this distinction, Benveniste introduced the two terms “subject of the

enunciation” and the “subject of the enounced” ([1966] 1971).
45

The speaking subject shaping the “other,” is addressed by Mikhail Bakhtin in

Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics (1999).
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46

Lacan has explicated it as the “aggressive turn of the subject on the other” (Ecrits

1966). I argue, it is the fear of the aggression that compels the individual, although
unwillingly at times, to submit to the collective consciousness.
47

The superiority issue is a problem that will remain outside the boundaries of this

study and merits a separate project. David Graeber has thoroughly addressed the problem of
conflict between the early communities, to which I will return in chapter two.
48

Shayegan 3.

49

Here I focus on Western philosophy, because the Islamic philosophy, at least the

branch that became dominant, is mostly entangled with religion, and preoccupied with the
metaphysics, therefore its definition of the group or individual is within that context
(Yazdchi, 2013).
50

I use “re-interpretation’ here, because Plato has already interpreted his vision in his

Allegory of the Cave.
51

R. Bain Harris notes the idea that there is a real versus an illusionistic world is not a

new idea and existed in ancient Greece as well as in Hindu writings, however it is an
imaginary idea. He states “[i]t is only a presupposition and not a scientific fact. It is a
hypothesis and a point of faith, since its verification is beyond that which can be
scientifically ascertained” (Preface, ix-x).
52

Harris, ix.

53

In addition to Plotinus’s own interpretation of his imagined system, the collection

and editing of his teachings by Porphyry adds another level of interpretation, which was not
immune to “exaggeration” (Corrigan 1), adding another layer of interpretation to the text.
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54

Harris states in the Preface of Neoplatonism and Western Aesthetics, that a system

of “evaluation” dominates Plotinus’s philosophy, in which the different components are
valued at how much “real” or “illusion” there is within them (ix).
55

This is possibly a link between Neoplatonism and what Kant argued much later.

The difference however is that Kant aims to untie the subject from being predicated on the
Divine, by focusing on the unification between the universal in our faculties and the
subsequent knowledge.
56

Will to Power, p. 85, 86.

57

The notion of beauty and ugliness is also significant during Renaissance and

dictated much of the standardizing of the art. Giorgio Vassari in his Lives, elaborates what
these standards are with regards to the High Renaissance artists such as Leonardo and
Michelangelo.
58

Adamson 2002, 1. Examples I found referenced in S.H. Nasr ([1968], 1992), pp.

32-33, and. Hourani ([1991] 2013), pp.172-73.
59

Adamson 2002, 1-2.

60

Ibid.

61

S.H. Nasr 1992, 32.

62

Qtd. in Adamson from Gerhard Endress (1973).

63

One such groups is the Mu’tazilites, which I have discussed in more details in

chapter five.
64

Adamson 2002, 1.

65

Gutas, in his first chapter refers to the agents of intellectual activities as

“international scholars . . . active in the Near East,” who were “practicing their profession”
(116).
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66

Gutas 107.

67

Gutas 119.

68

Adamson notes that the “Arabic Plotinus” is actually made up of three texts, out of

which, the Theology of Aristotle is the longest of the two. The Arabic edition of all three texts
was published in 1955 by Abdurrahman Badawi, the source of Adamson’s reference.
69

Gutas mentions although many Abbasid caliphs contributed to this task, due to

propaganda, most of the credit has gone to Harun ar Rashid, and his son Ma’mun (Gutas 12225). I found further evidence of dedication of the scholarly work conducted during the two
centuries of translation to other caliphs and princes, such as al-Mu’tasam and his son,
Ahmad, in the Great Islamic Encyclopaedia (vol.6, pp. 579, 582).
70

Ricoeur 2006, xiii.

71

Marx has addressed this in chapter 24, volume I of his Capital, which explicates

how the surplus value is transformed into capital. While I understand Marx wrote his book
with the economic concerns, I believe it can be argued that there is also an economy in
adding to meaning in the context of text and image.
72

Asad’s note is on his criticism of Godfrey Lienhardt’s paper, “Modes of Thought,”

(1954), in which Lienhardt notes: “The problem of describing to others how members of a
remote tribe think . . . begins to appear largely as one of translation, of making the coherence
primitive thought has in the languages it really lives in, as clear as possible in our own (97).
Qtd by Asad (1993, 172).
73

Shayegan 4.

74

Dabashi surveys an impressive list of Persophiles and Persian subjects in their

works, from Montesqieu’s Persian Letters, to Nietzsche’s Thus Spake Zarathustra. He cites
Xenophon’s Cyropaedia (ca. 370 BCE), and Cyrus Cylinder to point to the issues of
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tolerance and diversity, but he does very little to bring up the fact that such artistic and
cultural products have yet to be critically studied.
75

Shayegan in one of the last interviews (Andishe Pouya, no. 45), before his death, in

a confessional manner, declared: “Our generation messed up!”. Gooya News, October 9,
2017. https://news.gooya.com/2017/10/post-8143.php. retrieved August 3, 2017.
76

Arkoun 1992, 17, cited by Abu Zayd (83).

77

Arkoun 1992, 56, cited by Abu Zayd (84).

78

This is because, Arkoun argues God (or Allah) cannot be problematic, since the

understanding is “He has revealed Himself in his own words.”
79

Qtd from Abu Zayd 2006, p. 85.

80

Kamali notes specific examples that in his view indicate, and even ensure, such

freedoms. For example “the principle of hisbah . . . commanding good and forbidding evil,
nasiha, or sincere advice, shura or consultation, ijtihad or independent juristic reasoning”
(2).
81

Interpreting the Self, 2.

82

I have discussed in my final chapter, the ideas of thinkers such as Shabestari,

Soroush, and others in more details.
83

Yazdchi quotes from a text titled Seyed Ahmad Fardid, Didar Farahi va Fotouhat

Akhar e Zaman, by Mohammad Madadpour, p. 77.
84

Foucault 2000.

85

Althusser and Foucault both refer to such apparatuses in terms such as RSA or

dispositif, respectively.
86

We witness this in liberal feminism in how they focused on women winning the

same rights as men. In response, radical feminism asserted, it was not adequate to just allow
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women in society to take on the same positions as men, unless the issues of misogyny and
violence against women were addressed. Further, the cultural feminists sought an identity for
women, which they argued was rooted in the tradition of femininity, and that it “was simply
better than masculinity” (Eller 16).
87

This is not limited to the visual arts and it has been extended and developed into

creating property, such as in brand names.
88

Patriarchy also absorbs that which it cannot bring to conform, particularly in the

artistic achievements.
89

Graeber (2012) discusses in length how the debt economy gave rise and

strengthened patriarchy in his chapter 7.
90

Foucault, Essential Works, 1954-1984, volume 2. Introduction, p. xxxv.

91

Ibid, xxxiv.

92

http://LAFF-experiment.org. Here, I am reminded of Foucault’s Order of Things,

where he contextualizes the way we organize in opposites, which he sees as a way of
othering (xxiv).
93

I consider individuality in relation to the idea of a dominant power, a volatile issue.

Even in the most politically progressive societies in the West today, we often find the
individual rights and freedoms, particularly concerning women, at the core of hot-button
political debates.
94

Feminists have given a specific date of five thousand years, but Eller disagrees that

the prehistory was matriarchal (2000, 3).
95

Patriarchy and matriarchy imply binary divisions, and together they have a

patriarchal connotations. There is no evidence that female or mother-centered societies did
not follow the same structure as what they changed into as such societies (Eller 2000, 6).
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96

Bergson, [1910], 1951, x.

97

Lerner makes a distinction between “history” and “history-making” with the latter

being a “historical creation” from the time of the invention of writing in ancient
Mesopotamia (1986, 4).
98

Spivy 2005, 14.

99

Spivy 2005, 20-32.

100

Ibid.

101

V.S. Ramachandran in an article demonstrates the link between the neurological

activities of the brain and visual experience, with what becomes dominant in art (1999, pp.
15–51). I will be discussing the issue of “exaggeration” in chapter three.
102

Bataille (1955).

103

Shlain (1998).

104

Salomon Reinach (1858-1932) suggested a religious interpretation of the

Paleolithic art (London: Heinemann, [1909] 2008).
105

Breuil (1877-1961) argued that the cave paintings were connected to ritual

activities and that the caves were places of worship, hence saw the art as sympathetic magic
(Spivy 27).
106

Freeman (1987).

107

This study was the result of examination of patient who had reported having visual

hallucinations (Ffytch, 2004). Indeed there is a condition called Charles Bonnet Syndrome
that causes vivid visual hallucinations.
108

Lewis-Williams argues that the Paleolithic artists painted images that had come to

them in an “altered state of consciousness” inside the dark caves (2002, 41).
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109

It is not just cultural theorists, but those among environmentalists, Afro-centrists

and others who have created the “matriarchal myths” that have in turn become, “by default,”
“the feminist account of prehistory” (Eller 29).
110

Foucault notes how information and knowledge collected, published and

distributed, can become a source of authority. (1994).
111

The reference is the cradle of civilization in Mesopotamia, and its early centers of

urban life.
112

Both Nietzsche and Foucault have pointed this out.

113

Eller’s note makes references to Emily Vermeule’s Greece in the Bronze Age, 282;

Dominic Collon, “Mesopotamian Iconography,” in Encyclopedia of Religion, Mircea Eliade,
ed. 27, 30-31. Walter Burkert, Greek Religion, 42.
114

Eller notes: “the iconography of Mycenaean Greek religion is ‘overwhelmingly

feminine,’ but written tablets reveal that a host of additional deities—significantly male
deities—were also worshipped.” She also notes similarities in Iron Age Israel, which while
“adamantly monotheistic,” they kept “female figurines of a specific type: . . . [with] a ‘pillar’
base, breasts and molded head . . . Scholars have termed these Dea Nutrix or ‘nourishing
deity” (141).
115

King and Rabil Jr. (2003) xi.

116

This is significant since both the Middle East and Europe trace their heritage back

to the ancient Mesopotamia.
117

After exploring the traditionalist/religious views that place women’s inferiority to

men as a natural and God-created relationship, and giving Engels credit for redefining the
sexual relationships in terms of “changing social relations,” to feminist theories relying on
the “matriarchal” theories, not based on evidence, but based on myth, she arrives at the
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conclusion that “most egalitarian societies are to be found among hunting/gathering tribes,
which are categorized by economic interdependency” (29).
118

Lerner 54.

119

Graeber 182.

120

Eller quotes Cantarella from Pandora’s Daughters, 27. Also a second reference is

Sara B. Pomeroy, “A Classical Scholar’s Perspective on Matriarchy,” in Caroll, ed.,
Liberating Women’s History, 219.
121

King and Rabil Jr quote from Aristotle’s Physics. Aristotle, Physics 1.9.192a20–

24, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes, rev. Oxford trans., 2 vols.
(Princeton, 1984), 1:328.
122

It must be noted in his Republic, Book 7, Plato deemed both men and women to

possess virtues in theory and ideally (Plato’s Republic 236); however, in the real world,
Aristotle’s biological statements was more influential and had political and social
ramifications.
123

There are numerous accounts of Persian literature and poetry from the middle

Ages that echo Aristotelian view on men and women.
124

Graeber demonstrates the complexity of the honor issue for men, versus the

reducing of it to one thing for women. He points out that it was an aristocratic thing to loath
commerce, because it was a symbol for interdependence. However, in reality the markets
operated and money and goods exchanged hands. Further, he notes the veiling custom was
adopted for the Greek women, from the Assyrians, which contrary to the “stereotypes” about
Western civilizations’ roots of democracy and freedoms, was in contrast to Persia and Syria.
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125

While it has been predominantly accepted that the roots of monotheism is linked

with Abraham, there are other evidence pointing to monotheistic tendencies elsewhere, such
as Hammurabi (1792-1750 BCE) and Akhenaton (1353-1336 BCE) (Shalain 71).
126

Shlain 1998, 80.

127

Lerner notes the importance of keeping in mind the complexity of the formation of

the writing of the book of Genesis, which took place over a period of “roughly four hundred
years” (162).
128

Lerner’s extensive research identifies three written versions of the Book of

Genesis, by the hands of three different authors. She distinguishes between the narrative of J
(for Yahweh), and the version called P (a merged version between the text written by an
author called Elohist ‘E,’ and the J version). The accounts of the creation of Eve in the P
version is different than the J text (162).
129

Reference in the Bible to the letters sent to the Persian king complaining about

what Ezra was planning to do (Bible: Nehemia and Ezra’s books).
130

This notion can also be seen as giving intangible, divine characteristic to a

material thing, namely blood in this case, another version of an artistic representation to its
criticism this study has been devoted.
131

The nomadic and semi-nomadic patriarchal tribes, as described in the Book of

Genesis, were comprised of clans, a community of families, each family made up of “a man,
his wife, his sons and their wives and children, his unmarried daughters, and his servants.”
Clans unified under a common ancestry or leader, would form a tribe. Blood strengthened the
bond between the members to such a degree that imposed the responsibility of protecting
members of the same blood against others, and bringing vengeance upon their adversaries
(163).
345

132

Book of Ezra, Chapter 10, verses 7- 16, 18. Ezra speaks on how those in Jerusalem

had sullied the blood of the “chosen people” by marrying outside their Jewish heritage, and
proclaims these actions as “abomination.” This is an example of what I will refer to as intraalterity.
133

In Ezra, Chapter 4, when he mentions “the adversaries of Judah and Benjamin,”

who had written letters to the Persian king in opposition of rebuilding the temple (Ezra 4:124), he is referring to those who were the residents of the city of Jerusalem but did not follow
the strict code Ezra was advocating.
134

Lerner brings in the example of Rachel’s theft of the ‘teraphim’ from her father’s

house to her husband’s house. While her reference is meant to show the “changes from
matrilocality to patrilocality,” I think it also reveals an important connection with respect to
the subject of interest in this study (168). There are numerous extant examples of teraphim,
one even discovered in Israel recently, in February 2016
(http://www.cnn.com/2016/02/25/middleeast/israel-boy-finds-ancient-figurine/).
135

Stokstad, and Cothren 2011, 462.

136

I am arguing that fear, much like the sexual instinct as argued by Freud, is subject

to deferment. Freud (2011).
137

Virilio [2000] 2004, 29.

138

The imagination therefore, can help cover the gap between form and content.

Kristeva notes the issue of gap, and that we are born into fear and gap; we strive to fill that
gap over our life time. Further, Heidegger’s essence of being as time, can prompt the fear of
time in not knowing the future.
139

Bevan explains there was a universal belief that connected the supernatural with

material, the law that connected a waxen figure of someone hated was believed to be
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connected to the individual whose image it represented, and whose presence could be altered
through the altering, or destruction of the image (28).
140

I could have included emotions such as pleasure or pain, however in recognition of

the limitations of this study, I chose “fear” and “pity.” Kristeva notes humans are born with
fear, and that it is pre-form and objectless. It is critical as it comes out when confronted with
its “other” (6).
141

The quote within the quote is from Burke, page 36.

142

These emotions are focused on by Aristotle, not as random examples of human

emotions Plato wished to suppress, but specifically as two emotions tied closely to the
success or failure of action (Poetics, xxi).
143

Spivy 2005, 47-49.

144

Spivy 2005, 40.

145

By “historic” I mean what monotheistic religions have unfolded in time, with the

blending of pre-existing practices and beliefs.
146

147

Gombrich 1969, 114.
A manifestation of this point can be seen in the long, self-proclaimed title of the

ISIS leader, Abubakr al-Baghdadi, al-Husseini al-Hashemi, al-Qurashi, in which he is laying
claims to the first successor of the Prophet, followed by names that designate his political
lineage.
148

This is usually done with concern to solidify political power. The recognition of

the power of imagery has a long history. From prehistoric time to the classical Greece, to
Persian and the Roman Empires, there are countless numbers of artifacts, motifs and
buildings that testify to this.
149

Levinas, [1969] 1979, 36.
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150

This view has been so prevalent that authors such as Shlain, or Kirsch, have often

compared monotheism and polytheism in a binary way, concluding that monotheism has had
less religious tolerance. Kirsch quotes Freud at the beginning of his book: “[r]eligious
intolerance was inevitably born with the belief in one God” (1).
151

This is rather more of a complex issue than I can tackle within the limits of this

project; there are two parts to this argument: first why the Germans could not read Hegel as
the French did, and second, how subjectivity is informed by alterity. Further investigation on
the second part shall be deferred to future projects.
152

I thought a comparison between Bowie and Keenan’s book covers was so

revealing of this point.
153

The reference is to Keenan’s book. Each contributing author reveals a different

aspect of Hegel’s work.
154

Belting (2011).

155

Belting 2011, 3.

156

I will discuss this in the optical theory of Ibn al-Haytham, in Chapter Four.

157

Belting mentions this story quoting from the Sultan following the revealing of the

images of the angels, and seeing them for the first time in the former church: “[h]ow
beautiful they are! But we must plaster them over again, since our religion forbids them”
(55).
158

Derrida (1987).

159

Kristeva states “[p]urification is something only the Logos is capable of” (27).

160

The reference is to the paintings on the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel, in which

Michelangelo included nude male figures not part of the Biblical narratives. Further,
Veronese’s inclusion of multiple figures and characters, as well as “lack of decorum” in his
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painting, Feast in the House of Lévi (1573), brought him in front of the inquisition tribunal in
July 18, 1573.
161

Mir Emad Hassani (1554-1615) is an example to mention here. He was

assassinated on the order of the king, Shah Abbas in 1615 due to being suspected of having
Sunni inclinations. His body was left on the street for a few day, for no one had the courage
to bury him (Soudavar, 272).
162

Khata’i. Il Conzoniere di Shah Isma’il, verse 249/9. Quote from Kathryn Babayan

(2002), xxxi.
163

Newman 2012, 13.

164

Floor & Herzig. 2012, 1.

165

Babayan notes Shah Isma’il’s view of himself as the legendary king, Jamshid, is

reflected in his book of poetry (Divan) (2002, xxix-xxx).
166

It is the premise of this study that “individuality” is a step, and not the objective, in

the process toward arriving at a society/community that is predicated on fairness and
concerns for human rights.
167

As an example here, I can quote Schiller, who wrote: “[m]an must pass

through the aesthetic condition, from the merely physical, in order to reach the
rational or moral. The aesthetic condition itself has no significance—all it does is to
restore Man to himself, so that he can make of himself what he wills.” (Schiller 2004,
12).
168

Nietzsche uses these terms in On the Genealogy of Morality, to explain how this

trait becomes inherent at the cost of individuality. He states: “The strange limitation of
human development, its hesitant, long-drawn out, frequently recoiling and cyclic nature, is
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due to the fact that the herd instinct of obedience is inherited most easily and at the expense
of the art of giving commands” (Cambridge [2006]147).
169

Newman 2012, 8.

170

Babayan, 2002, xxx. See also, Newman 2012, 13.

171

The seven members, ahl-I Ikhtisas, or “persons singled out for special duty

. . . played . . . a vital role in bringing the Safavid revolution to a successful
conclusion” (Savory 1980, 21-22).
172

Babayan points to Ismai’il’s “charismatic persona” (2002, xxxi), while Savory

seems more realistic about the fact that the young Isma’il could not have accomplish what he
accomplished without the help of the advisers (22).
173

Newman discusses the efforts Uzun Hassan made on multi-levels, from political

marriages to paying homage to urban, rural and tribal constituencies in an attempt to bring
them all together under a “universalist discourse” (10).
174

. Babayan explains “[d]uring the revolutionary phase (1477-1501), the Qizilbash

composed mainly of Turkmen converts to the Safavi cause, had organized themselves
militarily into oymaqs, a Mongol term loosely translated as ‘tribe’” (2002, xxxix).
175

Savory 1980, 23.

176

Junayd and Haydar, Isma’il’s grandfather and father had converted members of

the tribe in Anatolia and Syria, but not all had converted (Babayan 2002, xxxix).
177

Babayan refers to Paul Ricoeur’s Time and Narrative, (1984) (2002, xix-xx). Also,

to David Wood’s introduction to On Paul Ricoeur: Narrative and Interpretation (1991).
178

This example was discussed in the second chapter.
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179

V.S. Ramachandran in his theories on the ‘science of art’ argues that human brain

is “hard-wired to concentrate perceptive focus upon objects with pleasing association, or
those parts of objects that matter most” (Spivy 59).
180

Although Spivy specifically focuses on the visual exaggeration, I argue there is no

reason this cannot be extended to other aspects of human activities.
181

Düttmann 2007, 5.

182

http://www.coldbacon.com/poems/fq.html, accessed October 20, 2016. Also,

Spivy quotes from Elliot to conclude “human trait of distorting images of the body seems to
be pervasive in many cultures (81).
183

While I don’t argue with Newman on the heterogeneity of Isma’il’s discourse, I do

see a distinction between “heterogeneity” and “contradictory.” Isma’il calling himself both
Faridun and Zohak in the same poem, is exemplary of this point that reveals his Neoplatonic
(as explicated in the Unity of Existence) views.
184

Canby, 1999, 10-11.

185

Bloom and Blair (2002). Both Sasanian and the Byzantine emperors had puppet

regimes and claims in the Arabian Peninsula.
186

Blair and Bloom 2002, pp. 49, 65-67.

187

A major conflict I have found is the form of government which has gone from a

form of voting (bay’at) at the time of the prophet or his son in law Ali, to the formation of
dynastic rule that has endured in the Middle East in one form or another for over fourteen
centuries.
188

Grabar rightly points out that the formation of the Islamic art was not because of

religious or intellectual directives, but rather it was the “result of the impact on the Arabs of
the prevalent art” (Grabar 1987, 93).
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189

Bloom and Blair 2002, 68.

190

Hillenbrand 1999, 38. See also Bloom and Blair 2002, 84, 124.

191
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the other hand, argues for a “free” God that is beyond any necessities (this is where he differs
from Avicenna), and all is nothing but according to what he wills. Al-Ghazali’s philosophy
closely follows Neoplatonic philosophy in the hierarchy of creation, soul and intellect (see
Adamson 140, 179). Adamson also notes that the Aristotelian reason-based arguments were
not as accessible as the Neoplatonists, since in those days, either their books had to be written
and copied to be distributed, or like Ibn Arabi they had to travel to the region to disseminate
their ideas.
435

Nasr, 1992 (1968), p. 305.

436

Adamson 2016, 11. The Abbasid caliph, al-Ma’mūn favored the position of the

Koran as created, and not eternal, as proposed by the Mu’tazilites, and in fact toward the end
of his reign in 833, he had taken measures to ensure that “the judges and scholars . . . admit
that the Koran was created by God, and not eternal like God Himself.” Adamson notes that
this was unusual because it was within the scope of the scholars’ authority to determine such
issues. He argues this probably was due to al-Ma’mūn’s plan to “assert his own authority
over that of the scholars” (ibid).
437

I have mentioned this in the previous chapter. This question often comes up about

the autocratic regimes in the Middle East, particularly among the Sunnis. The Shi’ites
situation is a bit different, as it is more weighted down by Neoplatonic interpretation of the
religion.
381

438

Nasr 1992 (1968), 307.

439

Nasr 1992 (1968), 293.

440

Ibid.

441

See Joseph Owens C. Ss.R 1992, pp. 41-50. Owens argues that Avicenna did not

just transmit Aristotelian metaphysics.
442

Moosa 2005, p. 6. Moosa gives the date 1091 of the appointment and Adamson

just mentions “following the year 1085.” What seems clear is that al- Ghazālī was in
Baghdad between 1091-95, at which point he experiences depression and anxiety (Adamson
2016, 142).
443

While I continue to look for additional historical evidence on this, I am tempted to

also consider as a contributing source of anxiety to al-Ghazālī’s condition at this time, the
threat of the Christian Crusades, as he must have also been concerned about the state of
Islamic political power in facing with the Christian Crusaders. We see similar language from
Ibn Arabi in facing with the shrinking Muslim territories in Medieval Spain.
444

Although Adamson tells us like al-Farabi, he “considers acceptance of authority

appropriate for most people” (143).
445

Adamson 2016, 140-141.

446

Adamson 2016, 141. He uses the example of the shadows that seem static as seen

by the eye, but the as moving throughout the day, as perceived by the mind.
447

This seems to be the motivation behind his book Munqidh min al Dalal, or

Deliverance from Error.
448

Adamson 2016, 141.

449

It must be noted here that al-Ghazālī does not see a contradiction between logic

and religion, as he “emphasizes that logic has no bearing on religious belief, and it would be
382

a misunderstanding of both logic and religion to think they could come into conflict”
(Adamson 2016, 144).
450

Adamson informs us: “al-Ghazālī wrote a work summarizing the views of

Avicenna, and called it Maqāsīd al-Falāsīfa, which means Aims of the Philosophers. This
was followed by a second treatise called Tahāfūt al-Falāsīfa . . . usually translated
Incoherence of the Philosophers […] al-Ghazālī’s summary and critique had an ironic legacy
in Latin Christendom, where for a long while only the Maqāsīd was known” (2016, 147).
451

Adamson 2016, 148.

452

Adamson 2016, 148.

453

Ibid.

454

Adamson 2016, 149.

455

Moosa 2005, p. 213. While Moosa is making the argument for individuality in al-

Ghazālī, he is doing so within the Neoplatonic framework of a “virtuous state of mind and
virtuous dispositions” that deems the self the same as the spirit (ibid).
456

Adamson points out that “the eastern lands of the Muslim empire had seen an

influx of Hellenic philosophy and science in the ninth and tenth centuries” (113).
457

Adamson 2016, 145-146.

458

Following the translation movement and the widespread readership of the Arabic

Plotinus, through the works of scholars like al Ghazali, all the way to Mulla Sadra, and from
there to Hajj Mulla Hadi Sabzevari, a direct link can be seen. The Neoplatonic thoughts,
continued their impressions straight through the contemporary times, to the philosophy of the
“rule of jurisprudence” that evolved out of the Iranian revolution of 1979. I will discuss this
further in the final chapter.

383

459

The authority comes from the institution of Marja’ Taqlid that was established to

focus on the extensive sources for Hadith and the Prophet’s sunna (which was deemed
sources of imitation, but in order to adapt to the contemporary problems they needed to be
interpreted), in order to issue judgment on the subsidiaries of the faith, which have to do with
practical aspects of the religion (Jafarian 3).
460

Lambton 164.

461

Hauser, vol. III. [1962], 1999, the chapter on Germany and the Enlightenment.

462

Almond 2010, p. 109.

463

Keddie explains that Jamāl ad-Dīn’s views were situated in between “pure

traditionalism” and “pure Westernism.” She provides the range of examples within “modern
Islam,” that came to have affinity with Jamāl ad-Dīn’s “style of thought . . . from the Islamic
liberalism . . . to the later more conservative Islamic revivalism . . . and the Muslim
Brethren, and include Pan-Arabism and various forms of Middle Eastern nationalism”
(Keddie 1972a, 2).
464

Keddie 1972, p. 2. (1972a)

465

Vernoit 2006, p. 30.

466

In his lecture at the Sorbonne, Renan had stated Islam was hostile toward the

sciences, which had been published in Journal des Dèbats, on March 29, 1883.
467

Keddie notes Jamāl ad-Dīn’s interest in these movements may account for the

hostility toward him from the orthodox ulama (Keddie 1972, 20).
468

Keddie 1972a, 20.

469

Keddie 1972a, 20. The more orthodox Shi’is believed that in the absence of the

twelfth Imam, Muslims must follow the guidance of the “learned but fallible judgment of one
or one of several mujtahids, [while] the Shaikhis, following the ideas of Shaikh Ahmad
384

Ahsai, believed that each epoch had its own ideal guide, whose role was more exalted than
that of the mujtahid.” The movement of the Babis that in a way was anticipated by the
Shaikhis, is also another historical movement that Keddie argues left an impression on the
young Jamal ad-Din, not as a follower, which he clearly was never a Shaikhi or Babi, but as
how he witnessed firsthand in these movements that there can be different ways of religious
interpretation (Keddie 1972a, 20-22).
470

Keddie points out that this is the first time Jamāl ad-Dīn “speaks favorably of Pan-

Islamism and of Sultan Abdülhamid II. The connection of support for the Sultan and for PanIslam with opposition to British encroachments on Muslim territory . . . . made explicit”
(Keddie 1972a, 184).
471

Keddie 1972a, 185.

472

Keddie 1972b, “Intellectuals, pp. 39-57.

473

Vahdat, 2003, p. 131. It seems Vahdat is not distinguishing between

individuality as a subject to itself and “agency” in Jamal ad-Din’s discourse, which
primarily underscores the role of the elites in modernity.
474

In the biography of Jamāl ad-Dīn Muhammad, Abduh writes, that upon Jamāl ad-

Dīn’s arrival in Egypt, he “began to take lessons from Afghani in mathematics, philosophy,
and theology, and brought other people to take such lessons.” Keddie cites Abduh as having
written: “Afghani first of all drew to him a group of young students, that later officials and
notables also frequented his gatherings, and that the differing reports of his teaching made
people eager to meet him and know what he was like.” Jamāl ad-Dīn according to Abduh
then, focused on “the rational sciences” (Keddie 1972a, 83).
475

Keddie 1972a, 163.

476

Keddie 1972a, 162.
385

477

This particular article was titled “The Benefits of Philosophy” and was published

in Mu’allim-i Shafīq (Keddie 1972a, 163).
478

These names include Shihāb ad-Dīn Suhravardī (d 1191), who was the founder of

Illuminationism. Also, Mīr Dāmād, Mūlla Sadrā’s teacher, both were directly involved in
reconciling “mysticism, rationalism, and Shi’i beliefs” (Keddie 1972a, 163n).
479

“Lectures on Teaching and Learning,” translated from Maqālat-i Jamāliyyeh in

Keddie, An Islamic Response, p. 107.
480

“The Benefits of Philosophy,” from An Islamic Response, translated by Keddie,

pp. 109-122. See Also Keddie 1972a, 163-164.
481

Heidegger uses the term “Gestell,” which ordinarily is a “fixed” term. However, in

Heidegger it is revealed as “challenging forth,” and “gathering together.”
482

These values according to Fanon include language, or “wearing European clothes .

. . using European furniture and European forms of social intercourse . . . all these contribute
to a feeling of equality with the Europeans and their achievements” (Fanon 9).
483

Said, p. 3.

484

Said 92.

485

Said cites Gobineau’s Essai sur L’inegalite des races humanines, and Cuvier’s Le

Regne animal, as well as Robert Knox’s The Races of Man (ibid).
486

This is not unlike the process I have explained in the second chapter. Once humans

learned to give a visual form to something, they could possess it and establish hierarchy.
Similarly, by creating an imaginary “Orient” through cultural products (literature, visual arts,
and an entire movement called Orientalism), the Middle East was successfully colonized by
the West. Said notes two types of Orientalists: those who speak to the exoticism and
backwardness that define the west in sharp contrast (as in Flaubert), and those who highlight
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the brilliance of the past civilizations (as in Massignon), to which Europeans saw themselves
as heirs (Said 207, 258).
487

Here I am reminded of Erich Auerbach’s Mimesis, in which a literary comparison

between the West (e.g. Homer) and the East (post Christianity) reveals a different style of
narrative, with more focus on the humanities in the latter. Auerbach argues the Western style
in which the thoughts of the characters are externalized, are different from the Biblical stories
(as in the story of Abraham’s sacrifice), through which not all point are illuminated, hence
there are gaps open to different interpretation (Auerbach [1953] 2003, xviii). See also Said
1979, pp. 258-59.
488

Vernoit 19.

489

Mehmet Baha Tanman in Islamic Art in Nineteenth Century (2006).

490

Jennifer Scarce in Islamic Art in Nineteenth Century (2006).

491

In chapter four I have explained Nasir al-Din Shah’s interest in photography as

another example of this.
492

Halliwell 314.

493

This is not unlike his “hypostasis,” which is predicated on a hierarchical mimetic

relationship, and applicable to the artist’s work. Therefore, Plotinus can maintain the
superiority of the creator over its creation, something that the Muslim philosophers could
agree with.
494

It is this aspect of Neoplatonism that plays an important part in what becomes the

“rule of jurisprudence,” as a system of political government in Iran after the revolution of
1979, engineered by Ayatollah Khomeini, to which I will return. It is worth mentioning here
that Halliwell’s argument demonstrates more than Plotinus’s direct influence; it is this
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transformative and regenerative potential that impresses the future theoreticians and
philosophers (Halliwell 323).
495

Huhn (June 2013),.Art Bulletin, 203-205.

496

Vernoit translates it as “the principle of following established religious doctrine”

497

There are also a number of Koranic verses underscoring the individual’s

(31).

responsibility. See Koran: “Every man’s fate We have fastened On his own neck” (17:13);
also, “And pursue not that Of which thou has No knowledge” (17:36); see also, “Every soul
will be in pledge for its deeds” (74:38).
498

Although the sharp point of criticism of the Shi’ites by the Sunni scholars such as

al Ghazālī and others appears to be the Ismāilīs (Adamson 2016, 54 and 143-44), taqlīd is not
restricted to this branch alone (Momen 1985). Also, Adamson notes “[t]eologians regularly
accused other theologians of slavish adherence to authority, while philosophers like al-Fārābī
happily tarred non-philosophers with the taqlid brush” (Adamson 2016, 143).
499

The objective that should have been individual’s independent judgment (as

explained in the concept of ijtihad – meaning independent judgment –Adamson 2016, 143)
gradually and over the centuries became reliant upon the expert opinion of the scholars, who
referenced the established customs and laws that existed mainly for business before the
advent of Islam. Adamson notes when disagreements in the interpretations of the major
sources took place regarding a law (as in prohibition of drinking and gambling), after the
death of the Prophet, the religious scholars sought to resolve the conflict by referring to the
“legal practices . . . [that] grew out of pre-Islamic Arab society” (165).
500

One of the Shi’ites reasoning sources stems from this Koranic verse “Ask those

who are reminders of God, if you do not know” (16:43), which eventually divided the
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population within the Islamic communities to two groups of “knowledgeable” and
“ignorant.” From this the necessity for ijtihad and taqlīd emerged among the Shi’ites
(Jafarian 1). It seems there is a great leap of imagination to go from “asking” to “blindly
following.”
501

Qiyas and Istiqra are two terms within the Sunni practice, which mean comparison

and inductive respectively, are both predicated on mimesis. They are applied to resolve
conflicts between the sources of religion. It is worth noting that there are four sources, with
particular importance regarding the laws. These sources for both Shi’ite and Sunnis in “legal
matters” are so close that “its jurisprudence does not differ more from the four schools of
Sunni jurisprudence that they differ among themselves” (Momen184). However, others have
argued that the methods maybe similar, but the difference lie in their laws (ibid). The
principles of jurisprudence (Usul al-fiqh) draw authority from four sources: the Koran,
Hadith, Sunna or accounts of the Prophet (since there is a reference in the Koran 33:21 to
take the Prophet as an example), consensus, and intellect (intellect or reason, which is called
aql is only accepted by the Shi’ites). The difference between Sunni and Shi’ite laws come
from, consensus by way of qiyas (analogical reasoning) for Sunnis, as opposed to, consensus
based on intellect (aql, the source of human reason, meaning the aql of the ulama) for the
Shi’ites (Momen 184-186). I argue there is very little difference between the two, if we view
them from the perspective of mimesis. The “analogical reasoning” has led to uncritical
imitation of the Prophet’s accounts, and the successors in Sunni Islam, and the consensus by
way of the ulama’s reasoning has ended in taqlīd or imitation in Shi’ite religious practices.
502

An example would be of Rumi himself, who criticized taqlīd in one breath, and

then submits to Shams with such devotion that it provokes Rumi’s students’ jealousy
(Adamson 2016, 349).
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503

There are two parts within the religion of Islam: acknowledgement (called

Principles) and practice (called Subsidiaries) of faith. According to Shi’a belief, when
disagreements arise from how to carry out certain religious duties, or rules, it is the “Imam,”
who fills in, in the absence of the Prophet. After the twelfth imam (from the lineage of the
Prophet) disappeared, it has become the duty of the ulama to take on the responsibility of
interpreting the instructions for the “Subsidiary” part of the faith (Jafarian 3). I must note one
of the quotes from an Imam cited by Jafarian indicates that the Shi’ite Imams (from the direct
lineage of the Prophet) made it clear that it was their responsibility to interpret the Principles
of the faith and that they would leave it up to their followers to figure out the subsidiaries of
their faith. Jafarian however does not explain that “the followers of the Imams” meant the
people, not necessarily the ulama; obviously, because such a class did not exist at the time.
Here is another instance of an imaginary jump that ensures the prominence of the ulama over
everyone else.
504

Not to be confused with Shaykh Tusi (995-1067), who was also instrumental in

establishing taqlid (Walbridge 2001). He was a pupil of Shaykh Mufid (948-1022), both
followers of the Twelver Shi’a belief. It is worth noting that the evidence to the founding of
the taqlid goes back to the time of the translation movement, after which point the need to
incorporate reasoning into religion became evident.
505

Adamson 2016, 332-333.

506

Keddie 1983, 579. Keddie offers a two part explanation predicated on a

comparative study, one with internal, and the other external examples in other revolutions.
507

This is not to say instances of individual responses did not take place. As

discussed in previous chapters, it is the lack of theory that leads to the lack of
acknowledgement and hence, the lack of consciousness about the issue of subjectivity.
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508

This philosophy had justified the position of the monarchy up until the moment

when the ulama themselves assumed the synthesized position of religious and political
authorities after the revolution of 1979. I should also mention the emergence of other groups
such as the Babis, who severed ties with the “Arabic religion” and “tyrant Shi’ite rule,” and
sought to offer new interpretations out of the Sufi tradition. However, they were not much
different in neglecting the issue of subjectivity than the other groups. Their leader, Ali
Mohammad Bāb in his pilgrimage to Mecca made statements predicated on the negation of
God and revering humans (Homa Nategh in Mullayan-2).
509

I must also note the role of British and Russian policies and influences, which

played a role. While the British appeared to be supporting the Constitutional reform, by 1909
the Russians entered the picture directly by supporting the monarchs, both pursuing their own
interests. The point is, such influences are carried out with more facility in the presence of a
society, whose members have missed (or never have experienced the acknowledgement of)
the issue of subjecthood.
510

The same argument can be extrapolated to other movements in the Middle East,

and for the same reason.
511

While there is the example of the Bābis, a group that was also inspired by

Neoplatonic thoughts, I have chosen to exclude them, for their influence on subjectivity
merits a separate study.
512

Paidar 33.

513

Abu al-Hassan al-Mawardi (972-1058) was a Sunni jurist who contributed to the

integration of politics and Sunni Islam (Momen 192).
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514

. It was Shaykh Ja’far Kashifu’l Ghita, a contemporary of Fath Ali Shah, who

issued a religious edict that declared jihad (religious war) against the Russians, which
authorized the king to enter the conflict (Momen 194).
515

Momen 195.

516

See also Keddie 1993, 604.

517

Paidar 33. See also Momen 1985, pp. 116, 186, 191.

518

Following the 1953 coup d’état, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi had “spent the

remainder of the 1950s eliminating his political opponents, particularly Tudeh Party, The
National Front, and other segments of the secular left, which he regarded as the most
important threats to his regime” (Afary 2009, 202). This left no secular opponents to counter
the religious class’s rise to political prominence in 1979.
519

The idea of freedom, was understandably aimed in response to colonialism;

therefore, by superficial I do not mean insignificant. My main point here is that there seems
to have been no place for the individual rights in the preoccupied minds on how to unify
against colonialists through the suggested strategies to eliminate foreign influence.
520

I discussed this connection in Chapter 5. The point is regardless of whether it is

from the Islamic Neoplatonism or the Western Neoplatonism, it still invokes the same
collective conscious, rather than an individual one.
521

Paidar cites Keddie’s An Islamic Response to Imperialism, 1968.

522

It must be said that arriving at free consciousness is not the end. It has not been for

the Europeans, and it must not be for the Middle Easterners. However, it is a necessary step
toward establishing a free and just society predicated on empathy and dialogical relationship.
As noted by Afary (2009), “the modern notion of freedom became unbearable for some, to
whom freedom of choice meant insecurity and loss of identity […] Some wished to ‘become
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one with the world by submission to a person, to a group, to an institution, to God,’ in order
to transcend their loneliness and individual existence and to become ‘part of some body or
something bigger than’ themselves” (200).
523

Tabatabaei 2007, 14. See Also Amanat 2017, 328.

524

See also Adamiyat 1980, p. 105.

525

Mostashar al-Dowleh had spent early professional life as a secretary at the British

Consulate in Tabriz. Adamiyat notes “Mirza Yusuf Khan was knowledgeable in Islamic Law
and aware of the European Laws” (1980, 173). Adamiyat also points out that Moshir adDowleh Sepahsalar (Naser ad Din Shah’s premier) advised Mirza Yusuf Khan to make sure
he does not enter the ulama, into the secular and governmental institutions, as he believed in
the separation of religion from state (pp. 198-200).
526

. Tabatabaei mentions “according to some reports, on the order of Naser ad-Din

Shah [they] beat him over the head [with his book] so hard that it affected his eyes, and he
passed away soon after” (2007, 14).
527

It is worth mentioning that Mostashar al-Dowleh’s book was influential in writing

the Constitutional laws. On the opposition side from the ulama’s camp, was the Hāji Molla
Ali Kani, who wrote: “the horrid word freedom . . . seems attractive on the surface and good,
but on the inside, [it] is full of deficiencies and problem. This . . . is to the contrary of the
prophetic laws and their guidance, and of all the exalted kings and of their high-ranking
officers” (Adamiyat 1980, 200).
528

This was evident in the slogans raised, which included “death to the Pahlevis,”

“throw out America,” “Hossein is our guide” (reference is to the third Shi’ite Imam),
“Khomeini is our leader,” “independence, freedom and Islam.” Abrahamian also mentions
this is the first time the crowd shouts “we want Islamic Republic” (1982, 515).
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529

This elimination appears in sync with the Hegelian dialectic, as one group

subsumes, or eliminates others in arriving at the synthesis. Here, the role of the Tudeh party
and their support of these developments is crucial.
530

Hamid Shokat in his book A Conversation with Kourosh Lashai: An Inside Look

at Iran’s Left Movement (Akhtaran Publication 2003, Tehran, Iran) asks Lashai about an
invitation he received, as a member of the left movement, from the court to help develop a
“dialectic” ideology as a means of justification for the monarch’s White Revolution in 1963
(268). Also, the Shah had already eliminated all the political and secular leftist groups that
could have been worthy opponents after the 1953 coup (Afary 2009, 202).
531

To this I also might add contact with the external influences against Mohammad

Mosaddeq, as recent declassified documents from the 1953 CIA coup in Iran demonstrate.
(BBC, Washington, July 22, 2017, reported by Kambiz Fatahi). Accessed September 10,
2017. While these documents do not prove the prominent clerics’ direct involvement in the
coup, among the documents there is evidence that per Shah’s request, two days before the
overthrowing of the prime minister, the US embassy had transferred large sums of money to
their operatives, including a prominent cleric, Mohammad Behbahani to support the Shah in
opposition to Mosaddiq.
532

On September 8, 1978 a peaceful, “staged sit-down demonstration” was met with

shooting rampage from the air and ground by the Shah’s troops. Abrahamian notes
“September 8 became known as the Black Friday and left a permanent mark on Iran. It
placed a sea of blood between the Shah and the people. It enflamed public emotions,
intensified popular hatred for the regime, and thereby further radicalized the population
(Abrahamian 1982, 516).
533

Paidar 50.
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534

Keddie notes: “Iranians, who in peaceable periods seem eager to please and loath

to disagree openly with the powerful, whether in home or with political superiors, have in the
last 90 years engaged in an unusual number of large scale popular revolts and revolutions”
(1993, 602).
535

Paidar emphasizes the role of women in the protests, which included attacking

“shops which had not closed in protest and [forcing] them to do so.” Further, the role of the
Shii mujtahid (clerics with authority to issue religious edicts), Haj Hasan Mirza Shirazi, who
officially issued a fatva forbidding the use of tobacco (Paidar 51).
536

Here I must note that, just as it had done with Egypt’s cotton, the British wanted to

get direct access to the raw material of tobacco, via by-passing the middle merchants. It
already had the monopoly of tobacco from the Ottomans through a company by the name of
Regie. The British also wanted to expand the domain to Iran; that is why they persuaded
Naser al-Din Shah to grant them the concession. However, this was costly to those domestic
investors and merchants. This common adversary brought the merchants closer to the ulama,
particularly after the ulama were urged to act (Adamiyat 1978).
537

Adamiyat mentions this concession apparently impacted 200,000 jobs negatively

538

Adamiyat cites Haji Mohammad Rahim Esfahani in making statements against the

(ibid).

concession (1978, 36).
539

A great example of this is in the harem of Naser al-Din Shah. When the king

wanted to ignore and break the prohibition decree, his wives took away the water pipes
stating that those who wed us and made our union legitimate, have forbidden tobacco (Paidar
51 and Taymouri 1982, pp. 106-8).

395

540

Abrahamian defines the crowd as “any large gathering whose behavior is not

regulated by formalized rules of conduct and whose aim is to impress its opponents either by
collective action or by the show of group solidarity. This includes protest demonstration
indoors as well as hostile outburst in the streets. But it excludes institutionalize gatherings,
such as parliamentary assemblies, where laws of procedure structure the behavior of
individuals” (Abrahamian 1993, 307).
541

Paidar’s investigation underscores the role of women in strikes, demonstrations

and even street-by-street fights during the Constitutional reforms, then the revolution, and
even after the second Majlis. According to Paidar, women even contributed in collecting
money and jewelry to raise funds and establish a “national bank” to pay off the government’s
debt to Russia that had enabled the Cossacks to fight the constitutionalists (Paidar 59).
542

Abrahamian notes that the Qajar did not have the organized mechanism of despots

such as an organized police or secret service, but they were the largest employer of many,
from different groups of people, such as servants, clerks, kitchen, etc. When the first
parliament (majlis) convened, one of the items addressed was the court budget and cutting
back on the excess spending. The House Treasury announced to the employees that it cannot
meet its obligation to pay their wages. This led to the employees petitioning the majlis first,
then taking to the streets. (1993, 297-298).
543

Abrahamian mentions examples of “reformist newspapers,” such as Sur-i-Israfil,

Habl al-Matin, and Musavat to be among the publications that were describing the
demonstrators as “hired hooligans,” “gamblers,” “blood thirsty drunkards,” and terms of such
sort.
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544

Abrahamian quotes Malik al-Shi’ara Bahar, who only passingly noted this, but he

himself identifies them as “aristocrats, merchants, craftsmen and unskilled laborers tied to the
palace economy” (1993, 297).
545

The latter was in the words of the British representative in Kirmanshah (in

Western Iran) (Abrahamian 1993, 298).
546

Sur-i Israfil openly criticized the clergy in “articles and pamphlets . . . and

described mullas as ignorant, corrupt, and parasitical” (Sur-i Israfil, February 13, 1907). (also
Abrahamian 1993, 298). Another paper, Habl al-Matin, criticized the ulama’s demands to
oversee the laws passed by people’s representatives to ensure its religious legitimacy, by
mockingly stating the ulama should also form a court to judge the representatives elected by
the people (Habl al-Matin, June 18, 1907). ( Abrahamian 1993, 298). It is worth mentioning
that this sarcasm has become reality, as in the current legislative bodies, after the 1979
Revolution, go through two cleric assemblies’ screening to determine their qualification.
547

Noteworthy in this slogan is the correlation between Neoplatonic absolutism as it

maps onto iterations of Islam at this time.
548

Abrahamian names two clerics, Haji Mirza Hasan in Tabriz, and Sheykh Fazlallah

in Tehran, whose defecting to the conservative side had a huge impact on the population, as
also pointed out by Ahmad Kasravi, who himself was critical of the clerics (Abrahamian
1993, 300).
549

Abrahamian’s use of the term is a bit problematic here, in that as Ann Lambton

has pointed out, there was very little distinction in the classes in Iran at this time, for the
merchant class and the clergy appeared to have a rather complex relationship that dissuades
one from equating them to the bourgeoisie in Europe.
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550

Abrahamian notes: “[i]n Tabriz, […] in June 1907 . . . a mob had besieged the

City Council and had lynched one of its prominent members, a wealthy grain merchant who
was suspected of cornering the market” (1993, 301).
551

Abrahamian specifies that the religious leaders had great influence on three groups

within the society that proved instrumental. The first group was consisting of people from the
religious schools, mullas, students, mosques, and “ecclesiastical foundations (vaqfs).” Those
in the second group were “lutis,” who “were religious-minded athletes in the bazaar.” The
third group was the “orthodox Shi’ite,” consisting mostly of various types of laborers, and
low-skilled workers.
552

Mir Hashim was a local preacher in smaller districts of Tabriz, “whose popularity .

. . had won him a parliamentary seat” (Abrahamian 303).
553

The majlis was initially called National Assembly (Paidar 54).

554

Abrahamian 305.

555

Reza Shah (formerly Reza Khan), in his rise to power, initially formed alliances

with conservative reformers in the fourth majlis and began to restore some of the aristocrats
into their prominent positions (Abarahamian 1982, 131). He initiated legislation for
compulsory military service, which transformed a “professional army to a truly national
army,” with himself as the commander, but the support of the landowners, whose labor
forces now had to be drafted into military service for two years, abruptly ended. Further, to
achieve leverage over the balance of power between the northern neighbor, the Russians, and
“southern neighbors,” the British (because of all the concessions they had received), brought
in a third power, the United States and New York’s Standard Oil Company, and appointed an
American, Dr. Millspaugh, as “the treasurer-general of Iran” (ibid). The compulsory military
service directive did not meet with the agreement of the ulama either. They saw two years of
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military service, as “indoctrination in a secular institution administered by anti-clerical
officers [that] would corrupt social morality and public religiosity” (ibid). The fifth
parliamentary assembly, with the “working majority of Socialist and Revival parties under
the leadership of Reza Khan as the “prime minister,” began a series of reforms (Abrahamian
1982, 132 and Paidar 80).
556

Kasravi was deeply a believer of religion. Amini in the Introduction to Kasravi’s

Shi’ism quotes from Kasravi’s Aiyin (1932) that “ever since Europe commenced inventions
and has built a few machines, it has risen up against religion, and has set out to uproot that
which contains the essence of peace for the people of the world. Now, anti-religionism is
what the [Middle] Easterners [who are] returning from Europe are bringing as souvenirs for
their fellow countrymen” (2011, 6).
557

Kasravi wrote, among others, two books, Shi’i-gari (Shi’ism) and Sufi-gari

(Sufism), in which he provides a phenomenological study of each phenomenon, then includes
his criticism of each with respect to negative impacts on subjectivity (edited by Mohammad
Amini, 2011 and 2014 respectively).
558

Abrahamian considers this as the ambiguity of Kasravi’s own generation toward

Reza Shah; he compares it to the later generation, who took a more negative attitude toward
the Pahlavis, basically focusing on the admonishments (1982, 153-54). It is my
understanding that the ulama had a hand in this attitude, for many of the reforms were aimed
at undermining their power and influence, to be sure.
559

Abrahamian 2001, 186.

560

Reference is the day of the coup, August 19, 1953.

561

From a BBC (Persian) interview, Be Ebarat e Digar: Goftogoo ba Ervand

Abrahamian, broadcast date August 26, 2013.
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562

I will discuss the theoreticians such as Ali Shari’ati and Mohammad Nakhshab

later in this chapter.
563

These events range from the tobacco protest in 1891, to the nationalization of oil

in 1951, to the “last economic and political crisis of 1960-64, highlighted by demonstrations
in 1963 that resulted in many deaths and brought about the exile of the religious leader of the
movement, Ayatollah Khomeini, in 1964” (Keddie 1993, 609).
564

Keddie names “the ulama,” “the bazaaris, “ordinary peasants, nomads, and the

urban poor” (ibid).
565

Katouzian 2009, E-version, from Introduction (no page number).

566

Abrahamian explains, whereas the regime had taken extensive measures to

suppress all secular voices, however the two groups within the traditional middle class, the
bazarris and the clergy had remained independent from the state, both financially and in
terms of the popular institutions such as mosques and other religious gathering places (1982,
533).
567

Abrahamian cites: R. Khomeini, “Proclamation,” Khabarnameh, special number

21, 9 September 1978), p.1.
568

Ibid.

569

Abrahamian 1982, 534.

570

I will discuss Shari’ati in length further in this chapter.

571

Abrahamian 1982, 534. Abrahamian refers to it as the “radical message of

Muharram,” the month in which the Prophet’s grandson was killed in Iraq in the year 680.
572

This was an appropriation from the Marxist groups.

573

Abrahamian states Khomeini incorporated into his speeches expressions in the

style of Fanon such as “the mostazafin [those were kept powerless] shall inherit the earth.”
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“[T]he country needs a cultural revolution,” and the “people will dump the exploiters onto
the garbage heap of history” (ibid).
574

Keddie notes, following an article in the Ettela’at paper that contained an attack to

Khomeini, who was in Iraq at the time, there were demonstrations and conflicts that resulted
in casualties (1993, 614). The religious observance of the 40th day of mourning concurred
with more demonstration, to which more people joined from liberal to the leftists (ibid).
575

Abrahamian quotes from a parliament deputy who spoke with a foreign social

psychologist in 1973, “religious ceremonies, especially Muharram plays were politically
useful in that they channeled social frustrations away from communism into harmless
directions.” Cited from a Ph.D. dissertation by M. Good “Social Hierarchy and Social
Change in a Provincial Iranian Town,” Harvard University, 1977, pp. 426-84.
576

The “Jafari jurisprudence” is a Shi’ite school of thought that derives its name from

the sixth Imam, Jafar Sadeq, and has followers among the Twelver, and Isma’ili Shi’ites.
577

From Martin Luther’s “Diet of Worms Letters and Papers,”

http://www.reverendluther.org/pdfs2/Diet-of-Worms-Papers.pdf. Accessed October 8, 2017.
578

Abrahamian brings detailed account of experienced British diplomats as well as

“informal network within the armed forces,” in addition to their “contacts” from among the
various tribes, newspaper editors, the bazaar, and nefarious characters such as Shaban Jafari,
a “gang leader,” even with “mid-ranking clerics” (2001, 199).
579

The term ‘Westoxication’ is from an essay published in 1962 by Jalal Al-e Ahmad

that suggest Iranians should look “to their own and Oriental ways” (Keddie 1993, 616).
580

It must be noted that Kasravi was not anti-religion or anti-Islam. He deemed

however, necessary to purify religion of what he considered corruption and superstition.
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581

Kasravi wrote in his autobiography he was actually persuaded to wear the garb of

the ulama by his guardian following the death of his father (Amini 2016, 56).
582

In his criticism of the Ismai’il Shi’s Kasravi writes “ in Islam, there has never been

a more contemptible and a more harmful invention than the invention of introspectivism, and
no other enemy has brought on such harm that the introspectivists have brought on Islam”
(2011, 7).
583

Amini in the introduction Kasravi’s Shi’ism, page 17.

584

1943b, 64.

585

He uses examples such as: “if you submit all you have to love, call me an infidel if

[you] experience any losses.” Or, another quadrant by Hatef Esfahani that states: “from the
dew of love the clay that was, became Adam; from that [creation] numerous rife and
excitement resulted in the world. The tip of the blade of love hit the vein of spirit; one drop
fell, and was named [the] heart.”
586

In Sufism, reason is the opposite of love. Kasravi quotes Sufi poems that admonish

reason: “love arrived, and reason wandered away; morning broke and candle became
destitute. The leg of those who reason is wooden; wooden leg does not bend in submission
(Rumi). Love arrived and took reason as spoil; oh my heart to thy soul this heralds” (Najm
al-Din Razi).
587

Kasravi, 1943b, 114.

588

Kasravi is very disturbed at what Rumi narrates for example of his relationship

with and devotion to his mentor Shams. Rumi writes, during the time he and his teacher spent
three month fasting in seclusion, he obliged the wishes of his mentor, when he wished to be
with a women, Rumi offered his own wife. Then Shams wished to be with a young boy, and
Rumi offered his own son. Then Shams wished for wine, and Rumi obliged by personally
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carrying the wine jug through the markets. Then Shams proclaimed and praised Rumi’s
submission, and stated he was testing the devotion of his pupil. Kasravi notes the conflict
between such acts and wishes, and wonders whether this is a true story, which would be
“absurd,” or if it is fabricated, he wonders about the followers, who would make up such
stories and attribute them to such prominent personalities (ibid).
589

Hakamizadeh asks questions such as: “isn’t it sacrilegious to seek indulgences

from the Prophet or the imams, or seeking to be healed from their burial places, prostrating
on them, building domes and high courts? Say so if it is, and if it is not, please explain
‘sherk’ [equating anything with God] first, so that we can see how this ‘sherk’ is different
from that which Islam and the Koran challenged all along?” pp. 85-87.
590

Rajaee notes that there were actually two treatises, one by Ruhollah Musavi

Khomeini and the other by Muhammad Khalesizadeh, both teachers at the Qum Seminary.
Since Khoemini’s treatise was lengthier and more comprehensive, the leadership of the
seminary approved Khomeini’s version to be published (65-66).
591

Moin 61, Marin 104.

592

In his book Bahaism (Bahaigari), he refers to his proposed religion as “pure

religion” (pakdini), which he encourages everyone to read (1943c, second chapter, page 1).
593

This would have caused alarm among the ulama as it would have been seen as

innovation (bed’at) in the religion, strictly prohibited in Islam according to common
knowledge.
594

My references here are his criticism on Shi’ism and Sufism as well as literary

tradition that in his view was filled with ideas that “mis-educated.” I must also reiterate, in
addition to the volumes mentioned above, he authored a book on criticism of the Baha’ism,
which branched out from Shi’ism earlier in the century. Kasravi admonished Baha’ism with
403

the same harshness as he did Sufism, for he believed both groups, just as with Neoplatonism,
were founded based on imagination and creative mind (Kasravi 1943c, second chapter, page
1. http://www.kasravi.info/ketabs/bahaigari/BAHAYIGARI%20b2.pdf accessed October 28,
2017.
595

Adamiyat 1980, 119.

596

Adamiyat quotes from Abbas Mirza Molk Ara’s memoirs that “none of us who

understood this could express to the Shah that the first line of such a law would be one that
restricts and takes away the concessions and autocratic rule of the Shah himself and you [the
king] would never agree to that. Therefore, we had no choice but to nod our heads in
agreement” (1978, 12).
597

Adamiyat 1978, 12.

598

Mostashar al-Dowleh 15.

599

Abrahamian translates Daftar e Tanzimat as the Book of Reform. Raeen names the

book as “secret book,” which was meant to provide advice to the Shah in how to establish
law and order (Raeen 12).
600

Abrahamian 1982, 66.

601

Raeen notes Malkum Khan’s founding of the Faramushkhaneh was his way of

continuing to promote his progressive thoughts, to familiarize people with the Western
civilization, and countering the ancien regime (Raeen 13).
602

Paidar 46. Paidar cites Sholeh Abadi’s article titled “Mirza Fath Ali

Akhoundzadeh Va Masaleh Z[a]nan” [Akhoundzadeh on the question of women], published
in Nimeye Digar, no. 17, Winter 1371 (1993).
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603

Adamiyat uses the phrase “Mulla Sadra’s philosophy” here in an anachronistic

manner, but clearly he means a philosophy that is linked by Neoplatonic thoughts, since
Mulla Sadra (1572-1640) the philosopher emerged in the seventeenth century.
604

Important to note here is the fact that the philosophy in question, since the Middle

Ages and the time of Ghazali, has been seen as partly divine knowledge, that which is
predicated on Ontotheolgy.
605

Adamiyat brings in the example of photography and Sabzevari’s problem with

photographs, which I discussed in previously.
606

de Gobineau notes publication of a translation of Descartes, which was also

ordered and supported by Naser al-Din Shah. This was made possible through the efforts of
the secretary of the French embassy and Al’azar Rahim Musa’i Hamedani, known as “Mulla
Lalezar.” The first time a translation was done was nine years earlier, and according to
Mujataba Minovi most copies of it was burned, and very little or none of that edition survives
(Adamiyat 1970, 72).
607

It is important to note, the term hekmat and philosophy has been interchangeably

used in the texts I have examined. One example would be Foroughi’s Seyr e Hekmat dar
Oroupa (The Course of Philosophy in Europe) (1931-43).
608

While, Gobineau’s reputation as a Eurocentric orientalist can be seen here, I think

he correctly makes the connection on the issue.
609

Adamiyat’s source for this passage is Gobineau’s book titled Les Religions et Les

Philosophies dans L’Asie Centrale (Religions and Philosophy in Central Asia,) translated to
Persian by Farahvashi, Tehran (year unknown). It is worth noting that later during the
Pahlavi era, from 1931 to 1941, Mohammad Ali Foroughi (1877-1942) completed one of the
most seminal and comprehensive works on the history of Western philosophy.
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610

In the introduction to his history of philosophy, the volume from the antiquity to

Descartes (1938), Foroughi notes: “a few years ago, in order to undertake a scholarly work
that would also benefit humanity, I embarked upon translating a small treatise, which was the
most famous work by Descartes, the renowned French philosopher. On completion, I realized
this work, will not serve useful for those who are not aware of European knowledge. Thus, in
order to make it useful, I added a preface to it and authored the Course of Philosophy in
Europe (Sayr e Falsafeh dar Oroupa), from the antiquity to the time of Descartes. […] Since
it pleased the minds of the knowledge seekers so much that they insisted to know the rest
from Descartes to the contemporary times, for this reason, following further editing . . . it
became the first volume to the Course of Philosophy in Europe, and included Descartes
treatise in it ” (Foroughi Seyre Kekmat, Preface).
611

I am understanding the term “dialogical” here as an integration to achieve a

balance, not as what is consistent with what Bakhtin argued for instance.
612

In 1937, Foroughi translated portions of a principle book by Avicenna “dealing

with the philosophy of natural sciences” from Arabic to Persian. He also undertook the
project of editing the collective works of Sa’di, who is a celebrated Persian poet, providing
advice for a variety of occasions and persons (Amanat 476).
613

Although, Foroughi’s criticism of Hegel’s Eurocentricism and superior attitude

toward other cultures is noteworthy, I do believe he buys into the same dialectic.
614

Abrahamian 1982, 65.

615

Ali Shari’ati underscores the role of Iqbal in the history of philosophy and

mentions his name in the same breath as Bergson and Descartes (Shari’ati 79-80, vol.5, p.
11).
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616

Mohammad Arasi in his article “On the Anniversary of the Separation of India and

the Founding of Pakistan” criticizes this action as the “high price paid to create an ommat
[Islamic nation] in the Indian sub-continent.” Published at armanfoundation.com. Retrieved
October 25, 2017.
617

The Koranic references are: 20:121, 2:29, 6:165 and 33:72. It is worth mentioning

that what Iqbal interprets in his take on an introverted individual, is in conflict with the
Koran.
618

I am reminded here of Bergson: “I smell a rose and immediately confused

recollections of childhood come back to my memory” (Bergson [1910] 1950, 161).
619

Iqbal dedicated this book to his son, Javid.

620

Encyclopaedia Iranica’s article on Muhammad Iqbal.

http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/iqbal-muhammad, retrieved on 11/12/2017.
621

Ibid.

622

Iqbal’s favorite symbol in flowers is the tulip that is the representative of the blood

of the martyr and grows in the wild, unlike the trimmed and well-tended-to rose. This is
because he is turning the attention of man within. He also replaces the nightingale, symbol of
love and longing with the falcon, as “the symbol for man, soaring high” (ibid).
623

Nekoorouh 2014. The quote is from Nakhshab’s book Neza’ Kelissa va

Materialist, in which he argues, “God-worshiping” is predicated on socialism, and if one
interprets it correctly, it can lead to freedom for the Iranians.
624

Koran, 53:39. http://www.quranexplorer.com.

625

From the newspaper Niyru-e Sevum (The Third Force), August 22- September 29

1952. Cited by Abrahamian 1982, 257.
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626

Nekoorouh argues that Nakhshab had started this way of thinking, before Maleki’s

parting ways with and criticism of the Tudeh party, by publishing books such as his Bashar e
Mauddi (Materialist Human), Neza’ Kelissa va Materialism (The the Church’s Dispute with
Materialism), Farhang e Vezhe haye Ejtemaei (The Culture of the Social Terminology), and
Iran dar Astaneh yek Enghelab e Ejtemaei (Iran in the Threshold of a Social Revolution)
(Nekoorouh 2017).
627

The art object was a ceramic vessel at the Museum of Islamic Art in Doha, with

the inscription “[f]oolish is the person who misses his chance and afterwards reproaches fate”
(63).
628

Žižek 2012, 67.

629

Shari’ati’s writings and role in formulating an Islamic ideology merits a separate

study and criticism. For this reason, I have had to limit the extensive information I found.
630

Jalal Al-e Ahmad, an influential author and a critic, also wrote about this return to

a “cultural authenticity,” in his book Gharbzadegi (Westoxication). Al-e Ahmad’s work, in
the final months of the decade of 1970s, “evolved into a journey of rediscovery for ‘true
Islam’. A powerful motif before and during the 1979 revolution, Gharbzade[h]gi later
rendered a rhetorical tool in the service of the Islamic Republic and its polemists” (Amanat
690).
631

Shari’ati 1979-80.

632

Shari’ati is very clear that the Iranians now are not interested in knowing their pre-

Islamic past, and are “unmoved by the heroes, geniuses, myths and monuments of these
ancient empires” (Bazgasht pp. 11-30).
633

Shari’ati, Islamshenasi, Lesson 13, pp. 14-15.

634

Shari’ati, Islamshenasi, Lesson 2, p. 98.
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635

Abrahamian 1982, 467.

636

“Alawi” is in reference to the first Shi’ite Imam, Ali.

637

Shari’ati’s theory aligns with Khomeini’s doctrine of Velayat e Faqih and how to

follow the path of an Imamate that is active, and not passive (Khomeini 170, 173).
638

Abrahamian 1982, 473.

639

Paidar 52, Momen 196.

640

Na’ini had proposed, in the absence of the Hidden Imam, and if the king dies, the

ulama have the authority to rule, but as pointed out by Momen, this was not a central theme
in the writings of Naraqi or Na’ini.
641

The circumstances under which the Prophet conducted his leadership among his

people of the Arabian Peninsula are completely overlooked in Khomeini’s citation, and
“historical facts” mentioned are generalized and erroneous.
642

Khomeini 39.

643

In this article, Kadivar examines various sources that cite this quote from

Khomeini that “the boundaries of the authority of the jurisprudence is as limitless as the
divine’s.”
644

V. Nasr cites Alexander Knysh, “Irfan Revisited: Khomeini and the Legacy of the

Islamic Mystical Philosophy,” Middle East Journal 46, 4 (Autumn 1992), pp.631-53.
645

Nasr 2006, 84.

646

I have explained these theories in chapter three of this study.

647

This is evident in a letter dated January 1, 1989 that Khomeini wrote to Mikhail

Gorbachev. Khomeini invites the “Soviet” leader to consider the mystic interpretations of
Islam in order to “solve their problems,” which Khomeini viewed as lack of religious faith
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(Sahifeh Nour, vol. 21, pp. 66-69) retrieved on January 19, 2018 from http://iecmd.org/monasebatha/digar/nameh_emam_gorbachev.html.
648

Foucault’s article was titled “Is it Useless to Revolt?” was printed in Foucault and

the Iranian Revolution, 2005, pp. 263-267.
649

Mottahari notes in his Jahan Bini-e Towhidi (The Monotheistic Worldview),

clearly states his Neoplatonic interpretation of Islam (84-86).
650

Soroush is one of the influential figures since the beginning of the revolution, who

was a member of the Cultural Revolution committee.
651

Mawardi was asked by the Abbasid caliph to develop a theory for the legitimacy

of his caliphate, during the time Baghdad had come under attack by the Shi’ite Buyids
(Tabatabei 2015, 148).
652

Tabatabaei notes contrary to Mawardi’s treatise, which was on “defending of the

religio-political and imamate, Iranshahri is idealistic monarchy . . . [in which] the king is
chosen, not by previous religious leaders, but by God, and possesses kingly farrah
(splendor)” (148).
653

Doostdar uses the example of an Afghani’s feeling of being an Afghani, or a

mother’ feeling of being a mother, or a faithful feeling as if being at the center of their faith
(415).
654

Tabatabaei’s views are influenced by the Hegelian left. Moradi explains that

“Marxism in other worlds of thought, including in Iran, which has not yet experienced the
awakening breeze from the ‘dogmatic slumber,’ and their philosophical constitution lies in a
pre-Kantian world, and epistemologically mind has not become the subject of the mind,
experienced another course of development and [and those thoughts] quickly turned into
ideology.” This ideology, Moradi argues, includes the principles of dialectic, and of course
410

the Hegelian “master/slave” that became a favorite of the left, because they could easily “turn
it to a political matter.”
655

Foucault 2000, 327.

656

It can be argued that the first Monotheistic religion was Zoroastriansim, dating

back to 1500-1000 BCE. (Bekhrad, April 6, 2017). However, there seems to have been a
closer and more direct interactions with Monotheism that stems from the Abrahamic
religions in the Near East.
657

Agamben 2009, 51.

658

Shari’ati, in describing how to develop a “revolutionary character” argues: “to

grow into to a revolutionary individual, as a principle and an essential and an objective, is to
perfect one’s own essence of being, which requires participating in the [shaping of the] fate
of the people that requires our humanity and perfected being” (Shari’ati vol. 2, 133).
659

The titles given by the monarch saw its height of elaborateness during the Qajars.

The titles of “al-Dowleh,” “al-Din,” “al-Saltaneh,” that was tacked onto the person’s job title,
such as “Mostashar,” were in use until the time of Foroughi. Similarly, the clergy bestowed
upon themselves titles such as “Ayatollah,” meaning sign of the divine, “Hojjatol-Islam,”
meaning the proof of Islam, which are still in use and exemplify the ulama’s system of
hierarchy.
660

From the Independent, UK. “Egalité! Liberté! Sexualité!: Paris, May 1968.

February 23, 2008. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/egalit-libert-sexualitparis-may-1968-784703.html#. Other examples that are very much on my mind are the 2009
Iranian uprising, due to the election fall out, and the 2011 Arab Spring, both now suppressed.
It remains to be seen what theories or thoughts will follow these experiences.
661

Nancy 2008, 8.
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